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ABSTRACT 
Author: Nadia Ahmad Abdul-Muhsin Al-Anani 
Title: Evaluation of the Impact of International Standards set by "the Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision" on Jordanian Law. 
Degree: A thesis submitted to the University of Durham for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Heahh, Durham Law School. 
Year of submission: 2009 
Abstract: 
Formulating international standards on banking supervision is one of the most 
important topics of international financial law. The recent international financial crisis is 
another striking example on the significance and relevance of this subject. This thesis 
attempts to evaluate the impact of international standards of banking supervision aimed 
at the creation of a "safe and sound" banking system on Jordanian legislation at two 
levels: to what extent international standards .set out by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision ("BCBS") have influenced Jordanian law; and how these standards 
can assist in improving the Jordanian law as well as direct new policy reforms. 
The first finding of the thesis is that Jordanian law is significantly compliant 
with international standards. The second main finding is that soft law, as opposed to 
hard law, is the optimal form of setting international banking supervi.sory standards. The 
thesis also finds that the BCBS standards do not provide adequate guidance on the 
structure of the banking supervisory authority. The thesis concludes with 
recommendations on how to enhance international banking supervisory standards as 
well as the structure and substantive law of banking supervision in Jordan in light of 
international standards and with occasional reference to the UK Law. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
I. Scope and Aims of the Thesis 
The main purposes of this thesis are to evaluate the influence of international 
standards, banking supervision, legislation and institutional structure designed to 
achieve the safety and soundness of the banking system of Jordan, as well as, evaluate 
how these standards can assist policies and practices of banking supervision in Jordan. 
Yet a subordinate goal of the thesis emerged during research. The rather voluntary 
compliance of the Jordanian legislator with the set international standards on banking 
supervision provides insights into the current international supervisory infrastructure 
and why some countries comply with international standards while others do not. 
Banks assume a substantial role in the economy by promoting savings, 
extending credit and providing payment services. Therefore, maintaining the fmanciai 
soundness of banks is a major policy goal for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
("Jordan'")- Furthermore, Jordan is a country which seeks a policy of openness and 
deregulation and accordingly the significance of promoting its practice and image of 
adhering to internationally recognised standards on banking supervision is essential. 
However, each country has its unique regulatory framework and banking structure. 
Therefore this thesis calls for establishing the right balance between the need for 
maintaining the robustness of the local banking systems, on one hand, and the need for 
setting out flexible international banking supervisory standards, on the other hand. 
The recent international financial crisis have put the international financial 
regulation as top priority for public policy on a domestic, regional and an international 
levels, and on an unprecedented scale since the Great Depression. Calls for tight or big 
bang type of regulation as a response to the crisis are not necessarily valid. The financial 
turmoil of 2007-08 should be a driving force for re-regulation not over-regulation. Any 
call for substituting the current soft international standards on banking supervision with 
hard law would stifle the development of banking supervision and would not necessarily 
improve compliance therewith. Likewise, the emerging recent calls in Jordan for 
adopting the UK model represented by the Financial Services Authority ("FSA") as a 
result of the pseudo effect of the financial turmoil on Jordan and other domestic 
problems is also invalid. Supervisory structures are not always determined by prudential 
consideration. Legal tradition and the size and complexity of the banking market are 
other crucial factors. 
n. Methodology and Research Questions 
The evaluation is undertaken throughout the following three successive stages. 
1. What is the optimal form of banking supervision in terms of selecting 
supervisory tools and methods, organising the institutional structure and 
handling cross-border supervisory issues? 
Answering this question is dependent on three elements. The first element 
requires an in-depth understanding of the nature and role of the banking system, as 
well as, the policy goals of banking supervi.sion. The second element is found in the 
international norms of banking supervision. These norms are mainly determined by 
the 'Basle Committee on Banking Supervision' ("BCBS"), which sets down, by itself 
or in co-operation with other international supervisory institutions, widely accepted 
standards of banking supervision. The legislation of the European Union ("EU") and 
other important jurisdiction legislation have grown in tandem with that of the BCBS. 
The international standards are comprised of minimal core principles while flexibly 
allowing each jurisdiction to adopt its detailed banking supervisory methods and 
institutional structures. This leads to the final element being that banking supervision 
should be responsive to the market structure and underiying legal tradition of each 
country. 
2. What are international standards for banking supervision? And what is the 
status quo of banking supervision in Jordan? 
The description and analysis of international standards and the Jordanian 
legislation show that Jordan is largely compliant with international standards and has 
adopted extensive banking supervision legislation and organisation, yet, banking 
problems still exist. This has drawn to public attention questions related to the 
comprehensiveness, sufficiency and efficiency of banking supervision. 
3. How can the banking legislation in Jordan be improved to reach 
the optimal model? 
This question is answered in light of international standards and with occasional 
reference to UK Law. UK Law is selected due to the significance of the City as well 
as the shortcomings in the adopted financial supervisory structure which failed to 
coordinate between supervisors and authorities responsible for bailing out troubled 
banks. 
Finally, there are three further important points to explain here. First,, the thesis 
aim is to provide recommendations on questions of law and policy. It the technical 
nature of banking regulation is inevitable. Secondly, the thesis does not cover the 
particular difficulties arising from the implementation of the BCBS standards to Islamic 
banking. Thirdly, it does not .seek to provide a thesis on the sources of international law. 
ni. Banking Supervision in Legal Research 
This thesis has drawn on economic references and aims at accuracy in 
employing economic jargon, while remaining within the boundaries of legal research. 
One author has justly described the relationship between economic analysts and lawyers 
when he states that the former identifies regulatory objects, and determines market 
imperfections as well as the cost of regulations (including rule-making, enforcement and 
compliance costs),' while the lawyers' role is to lay down such outlines in specific 
legislation. However, this is not meant to negate the fact that the two issues are 
inseparable. This is because it is essential that the supervision must be compatible with 
the regulatory goals as set out by policy makers. Two results stem from this: first, the 
law and practice of supervisory authorities should have a sound and effective legal basis 
in order to fulf i l the regulatory ends. Secondly, such laws and practices should not 
explicitly or implicitly impede the fulfilment of the policy goals. Furthermore, lawyers' 
research should focus on the assurance of fairness and justice to all of the concerned 
parties. Consequently, lawyers must consider the outcome of any suggested reform to 
Cento Veljanovski. The Economics of Law. (Hobart Economic Paper No. 157. In.stituie of Economic 
Affairs. 2006). pp. 156. 
financial legislation both legally and economically, though they do not have to 
formulate a distinctive opinion on questions such as costs and benefits.^ 
rV. Sources on Jordanian Law 
There are a number of difficulties related to the various types of source 
materials on Jordanian law. As regards legislation, it has suffered until very recently 
from weak drafting and occasionally poor listing. The subject of banking supervision 
has also been grossly neglected in legal research. None of the articles referred to in the 
thesis were published in academic journals applying stringent academic requirements. 
The articles, nevertheless, cover several of the practical problems in banking 
supervision in Jordan. They also contain useful information regarding the opinions of 
bankers and banking supervisors, while also covering the discussions of related panels 
and conferences. Searching for articles was a time-consuming effort taking into 
consideration the lack of on-line services. Furthermore, there is no major legal reference 
book on banking supervision and regulation in Jordanian law. 
In addition, the evaluation of Jordanian law in the thesis is not confined to 
published materials. Numerous informal discussions with junior staff at the Banking 
Supervision and Banking Inspection departments at the Central Bank of Jordan ("CBJ") 
were undertaken in order to help analyse the CBJ regulations and notices, as well as to 
determine practical efforts. An interview with a senior official was also conducted in 
order to better understand CBJ's regulatory policies. It is humbly hoped that this thesis 
will be a useful addition to the Jordanian legal library. 
V. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is comprised of an introduction and eleven chapters divided into 
three parts. Each of the first ten chapters begins with a short introduction. The thesis is 
also supplemented with an annex on Core Principles. 
Chapter 1 aims at providing a sound conceptual framework on which to build 
the thesis. Section I defines banking and explains the nature and the importance of the 
" Anthony Ogus, 'Economics and Law Reform: Thiny Years of L;iw Commission Endeavour' 1995 
L.Q.R. Vol. 1 I l(July), pp. 420. 
banking system. It further explains that the distinctive features of banks are their 
functions of intermediation coupled with their particular form of credit transformation. 
Section 2 defines banking supervision for the purposes of the thesis and in accordance 
with its objectives. It illustrates that avoiding systemic risks is the major economic 
rationale for banking supervision. Section 3 describes the common tools of banking 
supervision. Section 4 looks into the major developments in banking. It explains why it 
is increasingly difficult to distinguish between banks and other financial institutions, 
particularly in industrial countries where the phenomenon of large and complex banking 
institutions exists. It then explains how these developments infiuence the methods of 
banking supervision. Section 5 looks into the importance of building the capacity of the 
supervisory authority and the relevance of the supervisory structure in maintaining a 
sound banking system. Section 6 deals with the international dimension of banking 
supervision. It explains the necessity for the co-ordination of efforts in allocating 
supervisory duties between home and host authorities and the need for common 
prudential rules. 
Part I covers international standards and is comprised of six chapters. 
Chapter 2 describes the establishment of the BCBS and its early efforts in 
setting out international standards of banking supervision. Section one illustrates the 
establishment of the BCBS as an international .standard setter forum for banking. 
Section 2 looks into the BCBS early standards in promoting cross-border cooperation 
between banking supervisory authorities. Section 3 looks into the BCBS early role in 
setting out internationally recognised capital adequacy requirements, while Section 4 
looks into the remaining early standards. 
Chapter 3 is a descriptive chapter of the BCBS standards on capital adequacy 
from the mid-1990s onwards. Section 1 illustrates how the BCBS amended the Capital 
Accord in 1996 to incorporate market risk in capital adequacy measurement, as well as, 
permit banks to choose between either the standardised approach or the internal risk 
based approach. Section 2 illustrates the BCBS proposals to replace the Capital Accord. 
Section 3 reflects on the responsiveness of the BCBS to market developments by 
issuing the new capital adequacy standards known as 'Basel 11', which widens the scope 
of risks covered as well as the set of choices given to banks. It also looks into the new 
proposals to amend Basel II after the late credit crisis. 
Chapter 4 illustrates the evolution of the BCBS other substanfive supervisory 
standards during the same era (mid-1990s onwards). Secfion 1 explains the standards on 
risk management by banks and the related supervisory role. Section 2 analyses 
international standards which support the partnership between the supervisor and the 
private sector based on market discipline, the relationship between each of the 
supervisors, external audits and internal audits, as well as, sound corporate governance, 
and the internal audit and internal control functions. 
Chapter 5 looks into the standards issued from the mid-1990s onwards to 
strengthen international cooperation. Section I explains the developments in 
international standards on supervisory cooperation, and which reflects important market 
developments such as the expansion of electronic banking. Section 2 illustrates cross-
sectoral cooperation between international fora on financial conglomerates. Section 3 
looks into the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and their Methodology 
and how they support the duality of approaches in banking supervision as well as serve 
as a benchmark against which supervisors can be assessed. 
Chapter 6 examines the BCBS standards related to the institutional aspects of 
banking supervision. Section 1 shows how the BCBS set out standards only on the 
institutional capacity of banking supervisory authorities. Section 2 looks specifically 
into the limited influence of the BCBS on the techniques and structure of banking 
supervisors and the concurrent wide variety of structures across jurisdictions. Section 3 
looks on the UK structure and examines the Banking Act 1987, which provides an 
example on a semi-independent banking supervisory authority. It also focuses on the 
UK Financial Supervisory Authority ("PSA"), a unified financial authority independent 
from the central bank and one which is provided with a framework of wide statutory 
objectives. This Secfion attempts to draw lessons from the adverse effects of the UK 
model on handling banking crisis. 
Chapter 7 analyses the legal nature of the BCBS standards and its significance. 
Section 1 explains why they are considered to be "soft international law", but does not 
attempt to provide a discussion on the sources of international law. Section 2 examines 
the role of regional organisations in transposing international standards into domesfic 
legislation. Section 3 analyses the wide influence of the BCBS standards particularly on 
non-member countries and seeks to draw preliminary conclusions therefrom. 
Part II covers Jordanian law and is comprised of chapters 8, 9 and 10. 
Chapter 8 describes the evolution of the Jordanian banking supervision 
legislation in three chronologically organised sections. It shows how banking 
supervision has developed as a result of three major contributory factors: changes in the 
market structure, local supervisory experiences and more recently the influence of 
international supervisory standards. Section I covers the development of banking 
supervision from the infancy of the banking system at mid-twentieth century until 1971. 
Section 2 illustrates the major developments during the period from 1971 to 1989. It 
focuses on how a multi-tier financial system evolved during the mentioned era. Section 
3 examines the financial crisis of the late eighties and its effects, while Section 4 covers 
the late 1990s onwards. 
Chapter 9 provides description and analysis of current Jordanian banking 
substantive legislation in light of international banking standards through four sections. 
Section 1 covers the implementation of standards on licensing, branching, permissible 
activities, investment criteria and ownership. Section 2 examines the rules on risk 
management, while Section 3 examines conformity with complementary regulation on 
corporate governance, internal controls as well as the supervisor's relationship with the 
internal and external auditors. Finally, Section 4 looks into the implementation of 
international supervisory standards on capital adequacy 
Chapter 10 evaluates the current banking supervisory structure in Jordan in 
light of the BCBS standards and the lessons learned from the UK financial troubles in 
2007-08. Section 1 examines the legal framework of the CBJ which covers its 
objectives, responsibilities, powers and legal protection issues. Section 2 looks into the 
coordination between the CBJ and other domestic authorities related to its banking 
supervisory roles such as the Deposit Insurance Corporation. Section 3 looks into the 
CBJ's institutional qualities operational independence, transparency, sound governance, 
adequacy of resources, and accountability. Finally, it examines the cross border 
coordination between the CBJ and other supervisors. 
The last chapter is Chapter 11, which provides a summary of the thesis and 
sets out its recommendations. 
Finally, the law is stated as at the end of February, 2009. 
C H A P T E R I 
A C O N C E P T U A L F R A M E W O R K F O R I N T E R N A T I O N A L 
B A N K I N G S U P E R V I S I O N 
1.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a sound conceptual basis for the whole 
thesis. First, it defines banking and explains the nature of the banking system. "Banks" 
are one of the terms that can be intuitively understood, but can prove to be problematic 
for academic precision between banking and non-banking institutions (Section 1). The 
chapter then seeks to define and explain the meaning and rationale of banking 
supervision (Section 2). Having described why banks are supervised, the chapter 
proceeds to describe the types and tools of banking supervision (Section 3). It then goes 
on to explain the market developments in the field of banking and their influence on the 
types and tools of banking supervision (Section 4). The following section explains the 
importance of the institutional capacity of the banking supervisory authority and the 
relevance of the structure of such authorities (Section 5). The.se sections are necessary to 
understand and assess policies underpinning cross-border banking supervision. To put it 
another way, how domestic considerations are to be met in an international context 
(Section 6). 
1.1 Definition of Banks and the Nature of the Business of Banking 
Banks have two features, which distinguish them from other financial 
companies: intermediation and maturity transformation. 
The key task of banks is the intermediation between depositors and borrowers; 
i.e. banks transfer liquidity from depositors to borrowers be they investment companies, 
household purchasers or any other group. At the risk of over simplification, researchers 
explain that economies of scale are attained through intermediation. "Banks can pool 
risk and diversify portfolios more cheaply than individual investors, given fixed costs of 
acquiring investments. Risk it.self is reduced in turn by such diversification which 
should entail a lower cost of funds."' Information costs (the cost of searching for 
suitable transactions; verifying proposals made by potential borrowers; monitoring the 
performance of the borrowers' obligations; and costs of enforcement in ca.se of 
borrowers default) will be lowered." Banks also provide a payment agency for domestic 
and international clients such as cheques, guarantees and letters of credit. This is in 
addition to a variety of other .services such as holding safety deposits. 
The other distinctive feature of banks is maturity transformation of liquid 
liabilities to illiquid and long-term assets. Banking intermediation solves the liquidity 
problem between investors who need to borrow for a long time without interruption, and 
risk averse depositors who wish to maintain control on when to recall their deposits, yet 
prefer the higher returns of investment to that of hoarding cash. Banks, therefore, have 
an a.sset-liability mismatch problem: they have on the assets side of their balance sheets 
recallable deposits while on the liabilities side they have loans with fixed maturity dates. 
The very nature of the asset/liability structure of banks, their credit transformation 
function, in addition to their high leverage ratio (i.e. a high ratio of debt to equity 
capital), mean that banks are only "conditionally solvent", as any depositors run on a 
bank's assets can lead to its collapse.'' Banks therefore differ from insurance companies, 
which are more likely to have problems on the liabilities side of the balance sheet (due 
to the uncertainty of premiums). A major difference between banks and securities 
companies, is that the latter's assets are readily marketable. Mutual funds also compete 
with banks as repositories of liquid assets and can provide payment services. They 
nevertheless differ from banks in two important aspects: deposits therein are not 
"money certain" and they do not engage in maturity transformation." Furthermore, a 
bank's value as a "going concern" is worth much more than its value when it is 
liquidated,^ comparable to other financial institutions. 
' E . Davis, Theories of Inlermedialion: Implications for Regulation. (LSE FMG, Special Paper No. 50, 
November 1992), pp. 3. 
" Mervin Lewis, 'Theory and Practice of the Banking Firm' in C. Green, and D. Llewellyn (eds). Surveys 
in Monetary Economic: Financial Markets and Institutions. Vol. 2 (1991), pp. 120. 
' Richard Dale, The Regulation of International Banking. (1984), pp. 54. 
•' Eddie George, 'Are Banks Still Special?' 1997 B.E.Q.B. Vol. 37( l)(February), pp. I 16. 
^ J. Guttentag, and R. Herring, The l^nder-of-Last-Resort Function in an International Context. (Es.says 
in International Finance, No. 151. Princeton University. New Jersey, 1983), pp. 8. 
The separation between banking and non-banking deposit taking institutions in 
one jurisdiction depends on complex factors in the evolution of that financial system. 
Since this is an important point, it deserves to be illustrated in a detailed example of 
building societies in the UK.** Building sociefies were first established in Britain in the 
last quarter of the 18"" Century. They were comprised of people who used to pay fixed 
contributions in order to buy land and thereafter build hou.ses. Building societies, 
therefore, had two distinctive features: first, they were truly mutual which, at its 
simplest definition, means that customers are also the owners. The major distinction 
between a mutual institution and a Public Shareholding Company is the absence of 
equity shareholders in the former type. This means that building societies are more 
capable of providing pricing policies to the advantage of members, than a Public 
Shareholding Company, which has to maximise its profits in order to remunerate 
shareholders.^ Secondly, the activities of building societies were confined to home 
ownership and, therefore, they used to terminate once the houses were provided. 
Building societies initially operated in a segmented market between building societies 
and banks and the former enjoyed a virtual monopoly over the credit mortgage market. 
Banks, unlike building societies, were at the time subject to credit controls (known as 
'the corset') and other monetary controls. Activities of building societies could therefore 
be restricted. The 1962 Building Societies Act (largely based on a previous Act laid in 
1874) confined building societies activities to raising funds for home ownership. 
By lifting the controls on banks in the early eighties, banks entered the 
mortgage market to an unusual extent, and consequently building societies lost a 
considerable share of the market to banks. The response of the British government was 
issued in a Green Paper in 1984. The British government expressed its intention to 
retain the traditional role of building societies of credit mortgage, but at the same lime it 
realised that building societies should be enabled to become more competitive in the 
See: Mark Boleat, The Building Society Industry. (1982); Mark Boleat, Ronald Armstrong, Christopher 
French and Micheal Coogan; Building Societies: the Regulatory Framework. (1992); Steve Crowther, 
'Analysing the New Powers Given to Building Societies' 1995, J.F.R.&C.Vol. 3(3), pp. 275-279; and 
Maximillian Hall, 'The Regulation of Building Societies and the Issue of Conversion' 1988 J.I.B L R. 
Vol. 3(6), pp. 260-265. 
' Trea.sury and Civil Service Committee, Financial Services Regulation: Minutes of Evidence: 
Strafordshire Building Society and the Building Societies Association. HC (1994-1995) 26-111, (23 
November. 1994), pp. 72-73. 
" HM Treasury. Building Scx:ieties: a New Framework. (Cmnd 9316, July 1984). 
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.savings market by allowing them to become "one stop" centres for investment as well as 
financial services. The Building Sociefies Act (1986) accordingly allowed building 
societies to have more than a single purpose. Section 5(1) stated that the "purpose" or 
the "principal purpose" of a building society was raising loans secured on residenfial 
peoperty. Building societies were permitted in Schedule 8 of the Act to undertake new 
acfivifies such as insurance, money transmission and house building. The following 
Building Societies Act (1997) further widened the scope of permissible activities with 
the principal prohibited activities being the dealing in derivatives and taking po.sitions in 
the commodifies and currencies markets. 
The principle of mutuality was likewise eroded. Building societies eventually 
became permanent saving institutions as they accepted funds from savers who did not 
intend to own houses and paid them interest in return, this also meant that borrowers 
had to pay interest. The Building Societies Act (1986) and the subsequent Building 
Societies Act (1997) allowed and facilitated building .societies attempts to demutualise 
to banks. A number of building societies made this decision led by the Abbey National. 
Experience showed, nevertheless that building societies did not convert for competitive 
reasons as envisaged by the legislator, and have not implemented all the new powers 
they are entitled to use.'^  The spur of demutualisation was largely attributed to the 
"windfall"; i.e. were distributed profits or shares to original customers upon the transfer 
to the status of a bank.'° The ensuing legislative debate and legislation are not of 
concern here." Banks and buildings societies exist in the UK financial market. They 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Second Report. Financial Services Regulation: the Building 
Society Sector: Report together with the Proceedings ot the Committee. HC (1994-95) 26(21 December. 
1994). pp. viii. 
'"Treasury Committee, Ninth Report: Vol. 1, Demutualisation: Report and Proceedings of the 
Committee. HC (1998-99) 605-1, (27 July, 1999), para 8. 
" A report conducted later on by the Treasury Committee of the Hou.sc of Commons showed that there 
was little evidence to support that clo.se links with customers cannot be attained by none-mutuals. It 
however found that mutuals have lower overheads and are con.sequently more capable of providing better 
rates for customers. 
The UK Government, however, had concerns about the possible disappearance of building societies 
which could reduce the diversity of the British financial system. Smaller societies in particular provide 
regional focus and high quality work opportunities outside the City. Mutuals also understand their 
markets and are highly appreciated in their local markets. The Government therefore took the view that 
regulatory hurdles impo.sed on building societies seeking dcinutualisation should persist due to the 
comparative advantages of mutuality. 
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have become subject to the same supervisory authority the FSA and subject to 
regulation largely similar to banks.'" 
The other question, which imposes itself here, is whether "Islamic banks" are 
banks? Modern Islamic banks are a relatively new phenomena (the first modern Islamic 
bank was established in Egypt as recently as 1963), but with a vibrant growth rate. 
Islamic banks are simply companies, which aim at profit through investment like any 
other company. They provide their services to general customers and many of them are 
now established by western institutions such as Stanley Morgan. The name "Islamic" is 
used because these banks are founded on basis of the shari'ah (Islamic law)'^ and 
Islamic economic principles.''' The main principle of Islamic banking and finance which 
give it its distinctive feature is the prohibition of riba^ usually defined as positive fixed 
increase of income for no consideration other than the lapse of time.'^ Consequently, 
the traditional deposit taking activity, which involves the payment of an agreed fixed 
interest is considered riba and as such is prohibited. The relation.ship between a 
depositor and an Islamic bank is equity based whereby the depositors share losses and 
profits. As one scholar explains,'^ by definition Islamic banks are not "banks" as they 
do not guarantee the principal, i.e. the deposits, and therefore should be more accurately 
Source: Treasury Committee, Ninth Report, Demutualisation: Report and Proceedings of the Committee. 
Vol. 1, HC (1998-99) 605-1, (27 July. 1999); and Treasury Committee. Ninth Special Report. 
Demutualisation: the Government's Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 1998-99. HC 
(1998-99) 880 (4 November, 1999). 
Michael Blair, 'Mortgage Lending and Mortgage Intermediation' in Michael Blair and George Walker 
(eds). Financial Services Law. (2006), pp.564-566. 
The primary sources of Islamic L^w are four; the Quran, which is believed to be an authentic word of 
God, the Sunna, which refers to the sayings, actions and silences of the Prophet Muhammed, the Ijma' 
As-Sahabah the consensus of the Prophet's companions and Qiyas, which involves the science of Islamic 
jurisprudence and aims at applying the prime Shari'ah resources in every day life legal situations by 
Fuqaha or Ulama scholars who can be described as lawyers. 
For an explanation of how Islamic economy paradigm and methods may differ from conventional 
economy, see: U. Chapra, The Present State of Islamic Economics, presented in the Fifth Intensive 
Orientation Course on Islamic Economics. Banking and Finance, the Islamic Foundation in co-operation 
with the Islamic Development Bank and Loughborough University. Leicester, September, 1997. 
" . 130 :3 ul>^ J i j 276-275 :'• J J l s ^ j S l l J JJ: 
For further details on riba, see for esample: S.H. Homoud. Islamic Banking: the Adaptation of 
Banking Practice to Conform with Islamic Law. (1985), pp. 138-140. 
M. Iqbal. Islamic Banking in Theory and Practice, presented in the Fifth Intensive Orientation Course 
on Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, the Islamic Foundation, in co-operation with the Islamic 
Development Bank and Loughborough University. Leicester, September, 1997. pp.9. 
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described as financial intermediaries. Likewise, the traditional bank loan with pre-fixed 
interest is considered riba. Therefore, Islamic banks in their paradigm form will depend 
mainly on utilising profit and loss sharing arrangements. Islamic banks also employ a 
wide range of complex Islamic financing modes, which can be difficult to classify with 
certainty in English legal terms.'* Profit and loss modes most importantly cover 
Mudaraba being a form of trustee finance contract, Musharakah being a form of equity 
participation contract and direct investment. Non-profit and loss modes cover 
Murabaha or mark-up, whereby the seller determines the cost of producing or acquiring 
the underlying product, then a mark-up is negotiated between the seller and the buyer. 
1.2 Definition and Rationale of Banking Regulation and Supervision 
There is no conformity in the literature either regarding the definition of the 
term "supervision", or on the difference between "supervision" and "regulation". 
Regulation, at its simplest definition, "refers to the promulgation of an authoritative set 
of rules, accompanied by some mechanism, typically a public agency, for monitoring 
and promoting compliance with these rules''.'^ There are three generic types of banking 
regulation and supervision. First, there is regulation that is concerned with the .safety 
and soundness of the banking sy.stem. Secondly, is the conduct of business regulation 
that is concerned with the treatment of customers by such banks. Finally, there is 
economic regulation that addresses market failures in the allocation of resources. 
Some sources draw a distinction between the two terms "regulation" and 
"supervision" on the basis that regulation is completely based on the rule of law while 
supervision is bureaucratic."" Other authors refer to supervision as the functional and 
practical aspects of monitoring banks by competent authorities,"' while others add the 
complementary element of control or enforcement as necessary to make supervision 
"* For a synoptic description of Lslamic modes of finance, see: Luca Errico and Mitra Farrahbaksh, 
Islamic Banking: Issues in Prudential Regulation and Supervision. (IMF Working Paper No. 98/30. 
1998), pp. 7-8. 
R. Baldwin, C. Scott and Christopher Hood, 'Introduction' in Baldwin, C. Scott and Christopher Hood 
(eds), A Reader on Regulation. (1998), pp. 3. 
""C. Goodhart. P. Hartmann. D. Llewellyn, L. Rojas-Suarez and S. Weisbord. 1997. Financial 
Regulation: Whv. How and V^here Now?, pp. xvii. 
J. Norton, Devising International Bank Supervisory Standards. (1995), pp.xxvii. 
truly effective."" The terms "supervision" and "regulation" are used inter-changeably 
and are defined fo r the purpose o f this thesis to mean all the rules and measures adopted 
for the purpose of maintaining the "safety and soundness" o f banks. 
This thesis starts with two presumptions, that supervision is applied in a 
"market" system where individuals are left to achieve their own welfare and that 
regulation ought to be undertaken for the public interest. Some banking theorists take 
the opposite view by supporting the free banking or the laissez-fair bavAdng model. This 
argues that banks should prove their solvency to customers through competition for 
clients, and that the market should be left alone to r id itself o f incompetent and obsolete 
banks. Other theorists are sceptical about the public interest view in financial 
regulation."^ Still others believe that regulatory authorities gradually become "captured" 
by the interests of the regulated institutions. Benston believes that financial regulation in 
general benefits the regulatory authorities, politicians and other regulated institutions (as 
far as anti-competitive measures are concerned). Benston, however, refers only to 
restrictions on market entry and permissible activities but agrees that deposit-taking 
institutions should be subject to capital requirements, submit periodical prudential 
reports, and 'structured early intervention and resolution'."'* Kane, (another American 
author, who is concerned that the influence of interest groups wi l l subject the regulatory 
process to the benefit o f government officials) , is concerned that regulation might 
forcefully preserve undercapitalised and technologically outdated banks."^ Other 
authors, while accepting the principle o f financial regulation in general, warn that the 
public treats financial regulation as a "free good" which puts regulators under pressure 
to over-regulate beyond the cost-efficiency point, which is then passed on to the 
'^ B. Steil, 'Introduction: Effective Public Policy in a World of Footloose Finance" in B. Steil (ed), 
[ntemational Financial Market Regulation. (1994), pp. 1. 
"' For a review of various theories of financial regulation, see the opinions of K. Dowd, "The Case for 
Financial Laissez-Fair" ; G. Benston and G. Kaufman, 'The Appropriate Role of Financial Regulation' 
and S. Dow, 'Why the Banking System Should be Regulated'; all from 1996 The Economic Journal. Vol. 
l06(436)(May), pp. 679-707; and Charles Goodhan, The Evolution of Central Banks: A Natural 
Development?. (1985) pp. 13-22. 
G. Benston, Regulating Financial Markets: a Critique and Some Proposals. (Hobart Paper No. 135, the 
Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1998), particularly pages 19-23, 99-109 and 121. 
E . Kane, 'Government Officials as a Source of Systemic Risk in International Financial Markets" in F. 
Edwards and H. Patrick (eds), Regulating International Financial Markets: Issues and Policies. (1992), pp. 
257-265. 
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regulated institutions (or taxpayers)."^ Another undesired effect attributed to regulation 
is that it can create the wrong incentive for banks. A high capital ratio, for example, 
might hinder investment. 
The author believes that these critical views of financial regulation should be 
considered seriously and should be seen as demonstrations o f the difficulties or 
problems associated with regulation. Despite these problems, banking regulation is 
applied worldwide. The reasons could be political convenience or pubhc demand, but 
this does not negate the fact that there is an economic rationale f o r regulation.'^^ It is the 
correction o f market imperfections and failures: negative externalities arising f r o m 
banking failures (systemic risk) and asymmetry of information. 
1.2.1 Systemic Risk 
Since the financial crisis in the United States during the great depression in the 
early thirties, the major reason for banking supervision has been systemic risk i.e. the 
spread o f failure to other institutions and even sectors of the economy. The aim is 
explained as the avoidance o f externalities or knock-on effects, whereby the social cost 
of a banking failure is greater than the private cost bom by the economic unit: which in 
our case is the fail ing bank. 
Once a bank fails, there is a potentially systemic danger that this w i l l have a 
"contagion" effect on other institutions. Banks are central to the payment system and are 
major providers o f l iquidity for a large base o f clientele. Other banking institutions are 
particularly eligible to fal l because o f the large exposure o f banks to one another 
through the inter-bank market, as well as because o f the increased possibility o f runs 
against other banks once depositors loose their confidence in the banking system as a 
whole in that country. 
Despite the doubts some theorists try to shed on the need fo r an external 
regulator to avoid systemic risk,"^ financial crises occur recurrently and have serious 
- * C . Goodhart, P. Hartmann, D. Llewellyn, L. Rojas-Suarez and S. Wei.sbord, Ibid (n 20). pp. 61-72. 
For a detailed review on the economic rationale for banking supervision, see: D. Llewellyn, The 
Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation. (FSA, Occasional Paper No. I . April 1999). 
Some authors argue that many of the events described, (as financial crises are merely pseudo-financial 
crises rather than real financial crises), can be dealt with by the extension of .sound economic and 
15 
effects on the whole financial system. The International Monetary Fund ( " I M F " ) 
reported 41 incidents o f financial crisis in the period between 1980 and the spring of 
1996."^ The crises covered both developed and emerging countries and in both cases 
proved to be contagious and costly for industrial countries.""' The Asian crisis o f 1997-
98 is another financial crisis o f a major scale, and the contagion effect proved that it 
could even cross borders. The credit crunch crisis of 2007-08 started in the US sub-
prime market crossed then to other banks and money markets. Even banks became 
reluctant to lend to each other in the Interbank market. The casualties included the 
Switzerland's UBS Bank, French bank BNP Paribas, I K E and Sachsen banks in 
Germany, the U K Northern Rock Bank and the Lehman Brothers Bank in the USA. It 
also spread to the US Dollar, Sterling pound and Euro money markets 
Finally, there are three important points to stress here. First, the purpose of 
safety and soundness does not refer to any particular bank. Small banks can also 
endanger the safety of the banking system. One author explains that banks are divided 
to two groups. The "core banks", usually the large old banks, which tend to adopt low 
risks and return policy. "Other" banks which are small banks have a tendency towards 
"growth oriented policies" of high ri.sk and high r e t u r n . A n evident example is the 
fringe-banking crisis in the U K during 1973-75, which spread f r o m small banks to large 
ones.^" As to large banks, supervisory authorities quite often remind us that there is no 
institution, which can be described as "too big to f a i l . " This expression refers to the 
concern o f supervisory authorities regarding the substantial negative externalities, which 
arise when a large bank fails, and which leads to an implicit guarantee that supervisory 
authorities w i l l save large banks f rom failure. This implicit guarantee is widely 
monetary policies. See: A. Schwartz, 'Real and Pseudo-Financial Crises' in Forrest Capie, and Geoffrey 
Wood (eds), Financial Crisis and the World Banking System. (1986), pp. 11-31. Other authors argue that 
incidents of bank failures have not even brought about loss of confidence problems. See: J. Macey and G. 
Miller, "Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring and the Market for Bank Control' 1988 Columbia Law Review. 
Vol. 88(6)(October), pp. 1158. 
"''C. Lindgren, G. Garcia and, M. Saal (eds). Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy. (1996), pp.1. 
Morris Goldstein and Philip Turner, Banking Crises in Emertiing Economies: Origins and Policy 
Options. (BIS Economic Paper No. 46, October 1996), pp.7. 
" Jeffrey C. Marquardt, Financial Market Supervision: Some Conceptual Issues. (BIS. Economic Paper 
No. 19, May 1987), pp. 15-16. 
For further explanation, see M. Reid. The Secondary Banking Crisis. 1973-75: lis Causes and Course. 
(1982). 
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criticised for creating a pervasive incentive for large banks to take more excessive risk 
than the smaller banks in the market, known as the "moral hazard" problem. However, 
the practicality o f this statement remains doubtfu l as the larger a banking institution is, 
the more likely it w i l l affect other institutions through their wide connections and large 
base o f clientele. Secondly, the conditions of the market determine largely its 
vulnerability to systemic risk. The effects o f a single bank failure can be particularly felt 
where there is a concentrated banking system.^^ Thirdly, and as illustrated by the case o f 
Bear Sterns bank in the USA, the authorities intervened to rescue the bank because it 
was ' too inter-connected' to fai l though it was not a relatively big bank."*" 
1.2.2 Asymmetry of Information 
One o f the major inefficiencies in the financial market relates to the problem o f 
asymmetry o f information. This problem exists simply where one o f the contracting 
parties has more information than the other party. Borrowers for example can better 
estimate the returns and risks o f the investment underpinning the loan contract. T w o 
problems stem f rom the a.symmetry o f information: adverse selection and the moral 
hazard problem.''^ Adverse selection takes place before the conclusion o f the financial 
contract, whereby potentially bad deals are the ones most eagerly seeking credit and 
consequently they are most likely to be selected by an adverse decision o f a financial 
institution. The moral hazard problem occurs after the conclusion o f a financial contract 
whereby the institution granting credit is susceptible to the danger that the borrower has 
a motivation to undertake acfivities to the detriment of the interest o f the lender. 
Asymmetry o f information gives rise to two regulatory concerns. The first is 
how to protect consumers f r o m the misconduct of regulated firms. The second is how to 
ensure the proper functioning o f banks' management despite the existence o f an 
asymmetry of information between them and their customers. 
" R. P. Kinsella, Some Regulatory and Supervisory Lessons of the B C C i Collapse. (Research Paper in 
Banking and Finance No. 10, l E F , Bangor University, 1992), pp.3. 
.14 Rosa M. Lastra, 'Northern Rock, UK Bank Insolvency and Cross-Border Bank Insolvency' 2008 
Journal of Baniking Regulation.Vol. 9(3), pp. 172. 
}5 P. Mishkin, The Causes and Propagation of Financial Instability: Lessons for Policymakers. 
Maintaining Financial Stability in a Global Economy, paper delivered during a symposium sponsored by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming 28-30 August, 1997. pp. 56-57. 
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1.3 Tools of Banking Supervision 
Supervisory authorities usually adopt, according to Dale,^^ measures fall ing 
under two categories: protective supervision, which concerns actions taken by 
supervisory authorities when banks actually fal l into trouble, as well as preventive 
supervision, which aims at controlling risk taking by banks. As regards protective 
supervisory measures, they vary f r o m one country to another and can be used to deal 
with individual banking cases or to deal wi th a financial crisis facing a domestic 
banking system. These measures cover the role o f the Lender o f Last Resort facilities 
provided by central banks^^ in order to cover a l iquidity shortage"*^ such as discount 
windows and open market operations as well as government emergency lending. There 
are also deposit insurance schemes or deposit guarantee schemes, which aim to refund a 
certain percentage of bank depositors who suffered f rom the insolvency o f their banks. 
The difference between the two o f them is that deposit insurance is funded f rom 
premiums f r o m participating banks, while the guarantee schemes are funded ex-post.''^ 
These measures boost market confidence in the banking system and assure consumer 
protection. They, nevertheless, give rise to a moral hazard problem, as banks" 
shareholders and depositors may not exercise sufficient diligence when making a choice 
between institutions, as they depend on the fact that there are safety net schemes to bail 
them out i f their perspective banks face financial trouble. 
As regards preventive supervision, it relates to banking licensing and ongoing 
supervision. Banking licensing is a cornerstone o f banking supervision, because it is 
supposed to prevent weak banks f r o m entering the market whether established locally or 
foreign banks seeking to establish a presence as subsidiaries or branches. Supervisors 
usually ensure that the licensed bank has fit and proper management and sound financial 
basis. Likewise, supervisors should monitor major shareholders which include mergers 
and acquisitions. Supervisors also spell out the activities permissible to banks or puts 
R. Dale, The Regulation of International Banking. (1984), pp. 55-68. 
The role of the Central Bank to intervene in a credit crisis is largely attributed to Sir Walter Bagehot's 
work, Lombard Street (1802). An excerpt is reproduced in Walter Bagehot, 'A General View of Lombard 
Street (excerpts)' in C. Goodhart and G. tiling (eds). Financial Crisis. Cotagion. and the Lender of Last 
Resort: a Reader. (2002), pp. 67-72. 
D. Schoenmaker, Home Country Deposit Insurance. (LSE Special Paper No. 43, June 1992), pp. 3. 
Ibid, pp.8. 
conditions and limits thereon, e.g. they may only allow banks to undertake insurance by 
establishing subsidiary. There are a number o f reasons why regulators might want to 
restrict banking activities. One reason is the assumption that bank depositors, unlike 
customers in investment companies, are unwill ing to accept to be subject to risks. 
However, a major reason is the fear that competition increases failure probabilities.'*" 
Preventive supervision also covers prudential or quantitative requirements 
imposed on balance sheets. These controls take the fo rm o f ratios, meaning laying down 
percentages o f thresholds and ceilings restricting the size of banking activities. The 
capital adequacy (or solvency) ratio is considered the most important o f these 
supervisory tools. Liquidi ty has also attracted supervisory attention to its importance 
particularly since the credit crunch o f 2007-08. 
The nature o f bank capital had been initially understood as the "net worth" 
representing the books value o f the shareholders' interests in the banking institution. 
The major ratios applied to test banks' solvency were capital to deposits and capital to 
assets. This 'accountancy' understanding o f capital was found to be inadequate mainly 
due to the differences between the economic value and the book value, particularly 
when a bank faced failure. Capital was now understood rather as a 'cushion' against 
unexpected losses and therefore a protection f rom bank failures, which would increase 
the confidence of the market in banks. Another benefit o f regulatory capital is that a 
higher capital ratio than the f i r m would hold willingly, shifts the cost o f failure f r o m 
banks and their customers towards the owners (equity holders and subordinated equity 
holders). This should stimulate equity holders to monitor the behaviour o f their 
respective banks' management.'" 
There are three basic issues that supervisory authorities have to deal with when 
determining the capital ratio. First, they have to decide on which elements of capital 
.should be eligible to be counted as capital. Some elements such as cash are universally 
agreed upon as a component o f capital. However, the situation is less clear for example. 
* Sarah A. Wagman, 'Laws Separating Commercial Banking and Securities Activities as an Impediment 
to Free Trade in Financial Services: A Comparative Study of Competitiveness in the International Market 
for Financial Services' 1994 Michigan Journal of International Law Vol. l5(Spring). pp. 1019-1021. 
"" J. Richard.son, and M. Stephenson. Some Aspects of Regulatory Capital. (FSA. Occasional Paper No. 7, 
March 2000), pp.17. 
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with reserves. The second issue is how to measure capital. It has already been explained 
that assets to deposits and loans to deposits are useful but inadequate indicators. 
Another common method is to impose limits on large exposures. The aim o f such ratios 
is to l imit the exposure o f banks to a certain type o f risk or related risks as well as 
excessive exposures to a single borrower and related persons such as companies in the 
same group. It is believed that diversification of risk is a safety measure against losses 
that might occur in a certain type o f risk."^ A more recent method is the risk weighting 
o f on-balance and off-balance sheet assets. The third issue is the sufficiency and 
compatibiUty of accountancy standards. Inadequate accountancy standards render 
capital adequacy measurement insufficient. 
Loan assessments and provisioning are other essential benchmarks for banking 
supervisory authorities."*^ Loan assessment is based on the classification o f loans 
according to their performance (e.g. standard, special mention, substandard, doubtful , 
and loss). The evaluation generally concentrates on the original source of repayment as 
well as the quality o f collateral and guarantees. It also leads to the adjustment o f loan 
values by "provisioning" against loan loss value. Loans might be e.g. over-valued at the 
out.set or the condition o f the borrower might have deteriorated afterwards. Provisions 
are divided into two types: "general provisions" to cover against expected losses in 
portfolios o f loans; and "specific provisions" made against actual losses in individual 
loans.'*'' Banks that fai l to properly assess their credit or do not set aside adequate 
provisions undermine their capital adequacy and become more susceptible to failure. 
One o f the most important measures of preventive supervision is monitoring 
banking ri.sk management. Banks can be exposed to:"*^ credit risk, which refers to the 
risk o f non-repayment and includes the counterparty (borrower) default; l iquidity risk. 
R. Pecchioli, Pnidential Supervision in Banking. (1987), pp.71. 
"^^  See generally: Luis Cortavarria, Claudia Dziobek, Akihiro Kanaya and Inwon Song, 'Loan Review, 
Provisioning and Macroeconomic Linkages' in Charles Enoch, David Marston and Michael Taylor (eds), 
Building Strong Banks through Surveillance and Resolution. (2002), pp. 11-39. 
Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe, "To Provision or not to Provision' 2001 BIS Quarterly Review. 
(September), pp. 37. 
For more detailed discu.ssion of the various types of risks, see for example: R.M. Lastra. Central 
Banking and Banking Regulation. (1996), pp. 98-104; and Hennie van Greuning and Sonja Bratanovic, 
Analyzing Banking Risk: a Framework for Assessing Corporate Governance and Financial Risk 
Management. (2000). 
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which is related to the inability of a bank to raise cash to comply with obligations by 
maturity dates, and without having to lessen its net worth;"*^ foreign exchange rate risk, 
which stems f r o m speculations in the foreign exchange markets; interest rate risk, which 
is related to the adverse changes in the interest rates, i.e. when the interest rates the bank 
have to pay are higher than the interest rates it earns f r o m loans; and operational risk, 
which arises f r o m weak internal controls, mismanagement and failure of the internal 
controls o f a banking institufion. 
Another important supervisory tool is the early intervention to solve a banking 
problem. This includes imposing remedial actions and sanctions on troubled banks 
including banking closure when deemed necessary. 
1.4 Developments in Banking and their Influence on Banking 
Supervision 
The gap between banks and other financial intermediaries has been narrowing. 
There has been a trend since the seventies, particularly in the industrial countries, 
towards "deregulation" and "despecialisation".'*' Modern banks have increasingly 
resorted to non-traditional activities for profitability; this is due to the fierce 
competition, not only f r o m other banks, but also f rom other financial institutions. The.se 
include securities companies, mutual funds, and insurance companies. These institutions 
started to provide credit and attract savings f rom customers, which caused what is 
known as the "disintermediation" problem for banks, i.e. customers resorted to obtain 
funds f r o m other financial insfitutions instead o f banks. The seventies aLso witnessed the 
increase o f a financial "Uberalisation" o f market entry and "intemationalisation". A 
substantial proportion o f international banking was wholesale banking, in the form o f 
either large international banking loans or that which aimed at serving large institutional 
investors, who would like to invest their savings abroad in the securities markets. 
Financial markets have also become more integrated due to technological advancement. 
R. Dale, The Regulation of Inlemational Banking. (1984), pp. 60. 
•"^  For further reading on new trends in international banking, see for example: BIS, Euro-Currency 
Standing Committee, prepared by a Study Group established by the Central Banks of the Group of Ten 
("G-IO") Countries, Recent Innovations in International Banking, also known as the "Cross Report" after 
the Chairman of the Committee, (April, 1986); C.Borio and Ro Filosa, The Changing Borders of 
Banking: Trends and Implications, (BIS Economic Paper No. 43, December 1994); and 1. Swary, lizhak 
and Topf, Barry, Global Financial Deregulation: Commercial Banking at the Crossroads. (1992). 
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which facilitates and accelerates dealings in securities and the movement o f capital. 
Another motivation for deregulation is the attempted "diversification" o f risk exposures. 
These combined factors led to the affi l iat ion o f banking institutions with other 
financial institutions (known as "All f inanz" , "Bancassuranee" and "Conglomerates") as 
well as a wide expansion o f the banks' off-balance sheet activities, such as derivatives 
and securitisation fol lowed by an expansion into the insurance business. The significant 
increase in structured finance and banks' adoption of "originate-to-distribute" model 
was yet another essential change in banking particularly in the last decade. These 
developments are interrelated but w i l l be illustrated under separate headings for 
organisational purposes. 
1.4.1 Derivatives 
Derivatives'^* are financial instruments, which have witnessed a rapid growth in 
the financial market. The term derivatives denotes a wide range of complex instruments 
such as options, forwards, futures, and swaps which can be based on interest rates, 
equities, currency rates or commodities. Derivatives can be either Exchange-traded or 
Over the Counter ("OTC") derivatives. The difference between the two is that exchange 
traded derivatives are traded in regulated markets where most o f the terms are 
standardised and accepted before a dealing takes place. The clearinghouse is a 
counterpart in the dealing and, consequently, it is important for dealers to maintain its 
solvency and stability. OTC derivatives are traded without a formal market where 
contractual terms can be negotiated between parties 
Derivatives expose banks to the same types of risks related to the banking 
business: market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risks as well as 
concentration risk. Derivatives, however, raise supervisory concerns fo r a number of 
reasons. First, they have a particularly high concentration risk, as derivative trading is 
concentrated in a limited number o f large institutions. Secondly, financial .statements of 
John Board, Charics Goodhart, Michael Power, and Dirk Schoenmakcr, Derivatives Regulation, 
(Special Paper, No. 70, L S E FMG, March 1995); R. Dale, 'Derivatives: the New Regulatory Challenge' 
1995 JIBFL. Vol. lO(January). pp. 11-17; R. Dale, 'How Risky Are Derivatives" 1993 JIBL. Vol. 8(9), 
pp. 345-348; C. Goodhart, Financial Globalisation. Derivatives, Volatility and the Challenge for the 
Policies of Centra! Banks. (Special Paper No. 74, L S E FMG, October 1995); B. Quinn, Derivatives - A 
Central Banker's View. Lecture delivered on 15 September. 1994 at Clifford Chance. London; and 
William White, Clifford Smout, Christian de Boissieu and Richard Dale. The Implications of Derivatives 
for Regulation. (Special Paper No. 66. L S E FMG, January 1995). 
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banks dealing in derivatives are also quickly exchanging, perhaps every minute, which 
makes it d i f f icul t fo r supervisory authorities to monitor changes in risk exposure and 
capital adequacy. Thirdly, contagion risk is feared to increase between securities 
markets and banks that are major dealers in derivatives. Finally, there are highly 
complex contracts involved and banks may not understand how they function. 
Another development in derivatives is credit derivatives whose value is based on 
the credit worthiness o f a third party known as the reference entity."^ The most 
important type o f credit derivatives is the credit default swap ("CDS"), whereby 
counterparty risk o f default is insured. Credit derivatives have revolutionised banking. 
They aided banks to transfer credit risk to another party and reduce their capital 
adequacy requirements.^" 
1.4.2 Conglomeration 
Conglomerates raise a number o f concerns for supervisors:^' different cultural 
approaches between supervisors o f various functions; capital assessment; contagion; 
intra group exposures; and conflict o f interest. Mul t ip le supervisory authorities can 
supervise conglomerates. As banks have distinctive features that make them different 
f r o m other financial institutions, the objectives and practices of banking supervisory 
authorities might differ f r o m supervisory authorities o f other functions within the 
conglomerate. This problem manifests itself particularly in the capital assessment. 
Banks d i f fe r f r o m securities houses in that they have a high percentage o f i l l iquid assets 
in their balance sheets and are worth, as going concerns, more than when liquidated. 
Banking supervisory authorities also focus on the assets side o f the banks' balance 
sheets, (because this is where banks are most likely to be exposed to problems and given 
the difficulties in the evaluation o f loans and other assets) whereas insurance 
supervisory authorities focus on the liabilities side (due to the uncertainty o f premiums). 
Another problem in capital assessment is referred to as "double gearing" where the 
same capital is used for supervisory capital requirements in more than one company 
'^^  Schuyler K. Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives. (2003), pp. 105. 
™ Ibid, pp. 120. 
'^ IOSCO, Principles for the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates. (October, 1992); Tripartite Group 
of Bank, Securities and Insurance Regulators. The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates. (July, 1995). 
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within the conglomerate. This means that it becomes possible for each separate 
company to cover its capital requirements while the group, as a whole cannot.^" 
Supervisory authorities also fear the "contagion" effect o f a fail ing securities or 
insurance subsidiary on banking institutions in the same group. Contagion can become 
an imminent danger where there are intra-group exposures. They can take the fo rm o f 
credit extended f r o m one company in the group to another. They can also be related to 
less transparent ways such as, intra-group cross shareholdings; guarantees given by one 
company to another or providing services such as pension s c h e m e s . F i n a l l y , 
supervisory authorities are also concerned about potential conflict o f interest whereby 
bank management might manipulate the interests o f customers or affiliated institutions 
in order to benefit themselves or to benefit their banks.^" Excessive risks can also be 
taken through other consolidated companies, as banks might attempt to shield 
themselves behind the limited liability of the separate subsidiaries or affiliates.^^ 
Barings Bank is a significant example on the effects o f the failure o f a well-
founded international conglomerate as a consequence of its involvement in investment 
services. In 1995, Barings pic, the parent company o f the Barings Group and a number 
o f subsidiaries o f the group, was put under joint administration and subsequently 
purchased by the Dutch financial services group Internationale Nederlanden Group. 
Barings Bank was established two centuries ago. It started its engagement in investment 
services in 1984, but conducted banking and investment services separately. These two 
activities were merged in 1992.^^ The Group, which was comprised o f over 100 
companies, incurred massive losses by the indirect subsidiary Baring Futures 
(Singapore) Pte L td . ("BFS") in derivatives trading activities in the Far East. A n inquiry 
conducted by the then U K Board o f Banking Supervision into the circumstances o f the 
" Tripartite Group of Bank, Securities and Insurance Regulators, Ibid, pp. 17-18. 
"Jbid. pp. 20. 
^ C. Borio and R. Filosa. Ibid (n 47). pp. 16. 
J. Guttentag and R. Herring, Disaster Mvopia in Intemational Banking. (Essays in International 
Finance, No. 164, Princeton University, New Jersey, 1986). pp. 31. 
Trca.sury Committee, First Report, Barings Bank and International Regulation: Report together with the 
Proceedings of the Commiltce. Vol. 1 HC (1996-97) 65-1, par. 5. 
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collapse of Barings in 1995^^ concluded that Barings was brought down as a result of 
the unauthorised and concealed trading activities o f the manager and a senior f loor 
trader at BFS, the infamous Nick Leeson. He exceeded his authorities by maintaining 
overnight open positions, exceeding limits on intra-day trading and house trading in 
opfions. Losses were concealed in account "88888", which accumulated to £ 8 3 0 mil l ion 
by 27 February 1995. Unauthorised trading was hidden by the suppression o f account 
"88888" f r o m the headquarters in London, submitting false reports and misrepresenting 
BFS profits and a number o f false entries. 
The Inquiry also concluded that losses were not detected earlier on due to 
control failures and management confusion in the Barings Group. A significant failure 
o f control was the lack o f segregation of dudes between the f ront off ice and the back 
of f ice at BFS. Furthermore, management monitoring o f BFS trading activities and 
funding was weak. BFS was funded by Barings in London of more than £ 3 0 0 mil l ion by 
way o f "top up", i.e. margin deposits on exchanges, without knowing on whose behalf 
the monies were paid. Management did not know particulariy whether money was paid 
for house trading or client trading. "Top up" accounts also could not be reconciled with 
client accounts by Barings' Settlements Department. Control problems were intensified 
by the solo consolidation o f Baring Brothers and Co. L td . ( " B B & C o . " ) , an investment 
bank, and Baring Securities L t d . ("BSL") , an investment company, in 1994. This 
effectively meant that no limit was imposed on the amounts o f money advanced by BSL 
through B B & C o to BFS. Another significant failure relates to the Spear, Leeds and 
Kellogg ( "SLK") receivable incident. M r . Leeson created a ficfitious receivable o f £ 5 0 
mil l ion f rom SLK, which should have indicated either that M r . Leeson was engaged in 
unauthorised OTC trading or that there was a large sum paid by error to a third party. 
The matter, however, was not invesdgated by management as thoroughly and seriously 
as it should have been. Barings' management generally did not fo l low-up 
recommendafions o f internal audit reports. It also failed to react to a number o f serious 
warning signs, which even raised market concerns in 1995 and drew the attention o f the 
BIS.^^ 
Board of Banking Supervision. Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collap.se of Barings. HC (1994-
1995)763. 
For a definition of the BIS. see following Chapter 2, page 43. footnote 8. 
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The Inquiry generally concluded that the Bank o f England did not detect the 
true situation o f Barings prior to its collapse. The Bank o f England was the home 
supervisory authority o f the Barings Group as well as the lead regulator for B B & C o . 
The report noticed that the Bank o f England had confidence in Barings' management 
and, consequently, relied on its statements and did not undertake reviews o f its overseas 
subsidiaries. Furthermore, the report also concluded that the Bank o f England 
reasonably relied on information supplied by overseas regulators and explanations 
furnished by management. This is despite the fact the Bank o f England was not 
cognisant o f Barings' breach o f inaccurate reporting and connected lending limits. 
The Singaporean Minister fo r Finance also conducted inspectors to investigate 
into the affairs o f BFS. The report, which was issued in September 1995,^ *^ came 
broadly to similar conclusions. The collapse o f Barings was mainly attributed to failure 
o f controls including lack o f segregation of duties, confusion in reporting lines and 
defining responsibilities after merging the investment and banking activities o f B B & C o . 
and BSL. It was concluded that had there been adequate organisational management, 
M r . Leeson could not have produce huge remittances to fund 88888 account at BFS."^' 
It is noteworthy that a number o f differences exist between the U K and 
Singaporean inquiry reports. Most importantly, the Singaporean report concluded that 
until February 1995, it was probable that the collapse of Barings Group could have been 
avoided due to a number of factors, including that the S L K receivable could have been 
resolved had a f u l l investigation been conducted. Another difference is that the 
Singaporean report found that M r . Leeson was not alone and that other personnel at 
Barings were engaged in a cover up.^' Different conclusions were reached because the 
British inquiry had limited access to personnel and information in other jurisdiction, 
which denotes to the importance o f cross border cooperation. 
''^  Singapore Ministry of Finance (September, 1995), Barings Futures (Singapore) Pte Ltd.: Investigation 
Pursuant to Section 231 of the Companies Act (Chapter 50) - The Reiwrt of the Inspectors appointed by 
the Minister For Finance, Singapore. 
Ibid, pp.39, par. 4.34. 
Ibid, the Executive Summary pp. Bi-Bxi, particularly par. 11, 31,32 and 36. 
See also: Maximilian Hall, 'A Review of the Singapore Inspectors' Report on Baring Futures (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd' 1995 J I B F L Vol. lO(December), pp. 525-529; and Memorandum submitted by the Bank of 
England in Treasury Committee, First Report, Barings Bank and International Regulation: Minutes of 
Evidence and Appendices. Vol. 11, HC (1996-97) 65 -II (12 December, 1996), pp. 148-151. 
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The lessons to be learned f rom the failure o f Barings require deep attention. 
Considering the analysis on the failure o f Barings it is only natural to expect these 
lessons to be centred on internal controls and management as well as the Bank o f 
England's supervisory practice. As to the Bank o f England, a significant lesson to learn, 
and hence fo r other supervisory authorities, is the need to understand the supervised 
business and associated risks.^' 
1.4.3. Originate-to-Distribute Model 
Developments in the securitisation market and structured finance led banks to 
adopting the originate-to-distribute model. 
Securitisation is a technique o f transforming relatively i l l iquid assets (such as 
residential mortgages) to securities that can be unbundled and sold on the market.'*^ 
There are three major parties to a securitisation: (1) the originating bank which pools 
and transfers high quality receivables such as home mortgage loans to (2) a special 
purpose entity or vehicle ("SPE") and the investors who buy the securities issued by the 
special purpose entity. Historically, banks originated loans taking responsibility for 
credit risk. Securitisation therefore breaks the direct intermediation between depositors 
and borrowers as different institutions take responsibility for debt origination (the bank), 
placement, issuance and service. (3) The investors who buy the receivables f rom the 
SPE. 
SPEs are separate legal entities established by the originating bank usually in tax 
havens such as the Cayman, for the purpose o f selling the receivables thereto in return 
for the purchase price. The SPE then finances the price by issuing bonds. Banks gain 
three benefits f r o m securitisation. First, the receivables' credit ratings are higher than 
the underlying assets. Secondly, the SPEs are separate entities and they do not need to 
have their balance sheets consolidated with the banks, which makes SPEs more 
attractive to banks than subsidiaries. Thirdly securitisation allows banks to transfer 
riskier assets f r o m their balance sheets to the SPEs and hence improve their capital 
adequacy ratios. 
" Board of Banking Supervision, Ibid (n 57), para. 14.35. 
For further details sec: Philip Wood, Project Finance. Sccuritisations. Subordinated Debt. (2(X)7). pp. 
120-155. 
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The convenfional transfer of credit can also be substituted with the "synthetic 
securitisation", whereby the SPE agrees to cover the losses o f the originator should a 
determined default occur. The originator effectively guarantees his risk and does not 
receive his funds.*" Synthetic securitisation covers coUateralised debt obligations 
("CDOs") whereby bonds or loans are bundled in tranches o f various risk ratings and 
sold to investors seeking higher investment yields. Another type o f instruments is credit 
default swaps ("CDS"), whereby counterparty risk o f defauh is insured. 
Another important development is using structured finance as a means o f 
transferring credit risk. Structured finance is similar to securitisation in that it entails the 
pooling o f assets and selling the claims o f their cash flows which are backed by these 
assets, to investors. A major difference is that structured finance involves the tranching 
o f claims,*^ whereby claims are divided into senior claims (Super-Senior A A A and 
A A A ) , mezzanine claims ( A A , A , and B B B ) and equity (lower than investments grade 
or unrated).^* The lower or subordinated tranches absorb the first losses then the 
mezzanine tranches fol lowed by more senior tranches 67 
The period f r o m 2005-2007 witnessed important developments in the structured 
finance market.** The growth o f securitisation o f Asset Backed Securities and 
derivatives referencing highly leveraged loans; The increase o f the originate-to-
distribute model by banks have became more interested in issuing, pooling, tranching 
and distributing securities rather than the eariier "originate-to-hold" model; And finally, 
the widening o f market participants in the structured market to include banks, .securities, 
insurers, hedge funds, assets managers, as well as, Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Conduits ("ABCP Conduits") and Structured Investment Vehicles ("SFVs."), which buy 
long term to maturity tranches o f structured products and refinance themselves by 
issuing medium or short-term debt and selling notes respectively. 
^ Schuyler K Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives. (2003), pp. 222. 
''^  Ingo Fender and Janet Mitchell, 'Structured Finance: Complexity, Risk and the Use of Ratings' 2005 
BIS Ouartcrly Review. (June), pp. 67. 
Joint Forum, Credit Risk Transfer: Developments from 2005 to 2007. (July, 2008), pp. 9. 
" Ingo Fender and Janet Mitchell, Ibid (n 65), pp. 69. 
'* Joint Forum. Ibid (n 66), pp. 4-8. 
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The originate-to-distribute model helps banks manage their risks. It facilitates 
the removal of riskier as.sets f r o m banks' balance sheets and consequently increases their 
ability o f extending loans. However, it has the disadvantage o f making banks dependent 
on the demand for credit instruments in the capital market. Another disadvantage is the 
shifting o f credit risk towards less regulated markets including hedge funds and private 
equity firms. Sponsoring banks provide l iquidity lines which makes them exposed to the 
l iquidity problems o f the SPEs. Another disadvantage is reducing market transparency 
as to where risks ultimately lie. These weaknesses were evident during the global 
financial market turmoil in 2007.^^ 
These shortcomings were evidently illustrated by the credit crunch o f 2(X)7,^'^ 
which occurred against a backdrop o f strong global growth. In early 2004, interest rates 
were very low in the U.S, U . K and the Euro zone, while borrowing demand soared. The 
increase in the mortgage arrears and the decline in the housing market outlook in the 
U.S resulted in substantial mark-to-market losses on residential mortgage-backed 
securities o f U.S sub-prime loans. The surge in the delinquency rates o f mortgages lead 
to the deterioration in the value o f asset backed mortgaged securities as well as related 
CDS and CDOs backed by pools o f sub-prime mortgages. As market participants 
become uncertain about the value o f SPEs, funding become costly and less available. 
Banks have reacted in some cases by moving the assets o f SPEs back to their balance 
sheets, a second group of banks provided liquidity support, while other banks winded 
them down. This problem had a contagious effect on highly rated tranches o f mortgage 
backed securities due to investors' uncertainty about the volume o f risks and where they 
ultimately lie, due to the opacity o f structured finance, the complexity o f financial 
instruments and inadequacy o f disclosure. 
1.4.4 Influence of Developments on Banking Supervision 
The growing complexity o f many o f the banking institutions' funcfions and 
structures and their adoption o f their own models o f internal risks have influenced 
'''' Hermann Remsperger, 'Financial Stability Issues - A View from the Bundesbank" 2007 BIS Review 
(129), (2007), pp 2-3,7. 
™ For details on the 2007 financial turmoil, see for example: Bank of England, 2007 Financial 
Stability Report (October); Ingo Fender and Peter Hordahl, 'Overview: Credit Retrenchment 
Triggers Liquidity Squeeze" 2007 BIS Ouanerly Review. (September), pp. 1-16; and IIF. Interim 
Report of IIF Committee on Market Best Practices. (April, 2008). 
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banking supervision in various aspects. First, risk management by banks and the 
supervision of bank management of risk gained tantamount importance. Banks exposure 
to risks has widened and deepened. The more banks are involved in the securities 
markets in industrial countries; they naturally become more susceptible to loss. These 
developments raised also the question whether the supervisory authorities should rely 
on banks' internal models of risk assessment. A related issue is the scope of application 
of the capital ratios: should it apply to banks or extend to competitive financial 
institutions? Should the same capital adequacy rules apply to all banking institutions 
despite their various degrees of size and sophistication? Or should the supervisors allow 
only large banks to implement their internal models, and if so, how would that affect 
smaller banks? 
Secondly, the growing reliance of large banks on their internal models and the 
increased importance of risk management have highlighted the need for cooperation 
between banking supervisory authorities and the private sector as well as a shift towards 
risk-focused supervision.^' Accordingly, greater emphasis is put on management and 
.sound corporate governance. There is no universal definition of corporate governance; it 
simply refers to the interrelationship amongst management, the board of directors, 
shareholders and stakeholders. Shareholders and boards of directors should be active 
and vigilant in monitoring bank executives, while the board of directors monitors the 
banks' management, officials, and internal auditors. Therefore, supervisory authorities 
should focus on management independence, strength, integrity and their active 
involvement in the bank. A complementary measure is to examine internal controls as 
well as the external auditing of reports, which are supposed to be the first line of 
defence against any mismanagement in banks. Another element in cooperation with the 
private sector is the need to ensure stock market transparency and the reliability of its 
released data as well-informed investors can play complementary role in ensuring the 
sound management of banks. 
Thirdly, supervisors need to ensure themselves of the adequacy and 
professionalism of other financial supervisors particularly supervisors of insurance and 
investment companies. 
'^ Joseph Norton, ""Qualified Sclf-Rcgulation" in the New International Financial Architecture" 2000 
JIBR. Vol. 2(2). pp. I I . 
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Finally, market developments raise concerns about the institutional coverage 
of the supervisory authority and whether the supervision of all financial institutions 
should be internalised in a single supervisory authority. This consideration, amongst 
others, will be further examined in the following section. 
1.5 The Institutional Framework 
1.5.1 The Structure of Banking Supervisory Authorities 
The structure of the supervisory authority refers in this thesis to the particular 
form the supervisor may take as a response to the three questions: what should be the 
basis of supervisory structure? What should the relationship between the supervisory 
authority and the central bank be? Should there be a single supervisory authority of all 
financial institutions? 
Theoretically speaking, there are three possible alternative bases to the 
supervisory structure: purely "institutional", purely "functional" and "objectives-
based"." 
As to the institutional-based approach, it applies to all banking institutions 
despite the variety and diversity of their function. Authors attribute three major 
shortcoming, to the institutional approach. The first shortcoming is that it has become 
redundant considering recent market developments. Traditionally it has been 
institutions, which are supervised. Only in the last four decades that there has been a 
separation between institutions and their f u n c t i o n s . A s explained earlier in this 
chapter, the international scene of the banking sector, particularly in industrial countries, 
shows a distinctive narrowing down between banks and other financial institutions, 
which is illustrated by the following five symptoms:^'' 
First, the inter-links between banks and other financial institutions through 
derivatives markets and other new markets, making systemic risk relative to non-
This .section depends on: C. Goodhart, P. Hartmann, D. Llewellyn, L. Rojas-Suarez and S. Weisbord. 
Ibid (n 20), pp. 142-188. 
" P. Molyneux, Competilivc Equality and Regulatory Balance, (Research Paper in Banking and Finance 
No. 19, lEF, Uniyersity College of North Wales, Bangor), pp.4. 
" M. Taylor. 'Redrawing the Regulatory Map: A Proposal lor Reform" 1997 J.F.R.& C. Vol. 5(1), pp. 50. 
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banking institutions. Secondly, the application of the principle of competitive equality 
between banks and other financial institutions. Thirdly, deregulation which increased 
competition between banks and other financial institutions. Fourthly, the emergence of 
financial conglomerates demanding an all embracing group-wide supervision. Fifthly, 
the formation of new financial products, which do not fit into the usual institutional 
distinctions between various financial institutions. Finally, new technology employed in 
financial markets suggests that banks will suffer from further disintermediation. This 
point can be further understood by examining the historical development of many 
banking institutions, which, started originally as non-banks but gradually moved in to 
the banking arena. Evident examples are Chase Manhattan in the United States and 
Lloyds bank in England, which commenced as non-financial institutions. Therefore, the 
more the distinction between the various types of financial institution narrows, the less 
appropriate the institutional approach becomes. Another attributed shortcoming of the 
institutional approach is its "wasteful duplication" as one banking institution or a group 
of banks can be subject to various supervisory authorities. A bancassurance, for 
example, will be subject to the insurance supervi.sory authority for its insurance activity 
in addition to the banking supervisory authority for its banking activities. A third 
attributed shortcoming is "competitive neutrality" as different supervisory authorities 
might have different approaches towards the same function. 
The functional approach focuses on the business undertaken by institutions. It 
would therefore apply the same rules to mortgage credit whether provided by banks, 
building societies or indeed any other financial institutions. An exclusively functional 
supervisory system would mean, however, that supervisory rules would not be applied 
on a group-wide basis unless each function is separately capitalised, and this is highly 
inefficient. Furthermore, it is institufions and not functions, which ultimately become 
insolvent or f a i l . " 
The objectives-based approach means that there should exist separate 
supervisory authorities divided alongside the various objectives of supervision such as 
avoiding systemic risk and consumer protection. It subjects the same institufion to the 
supervision of two or more supervisory authorities each responsible for the attainments 
" Governor (Governor of the Bank of England), 'Some Thought.s on Financial Regulation' 1996 
B.E.Q.B. Vol. 36(2)(Mav). pp. 215. 
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of a certain regulatory objective(s). One prominent supporter of this approach is 
Michael Taylor who called for the application of the "Twin Peak" approach in the UK7^ 
He proposed that there should be a division drawn between two corrunissions'7^ the 
"Financial Stability Commission" which undertakes prudential supervision of various 
types of financial institutions, and the "Consumer Protection Commission" which 
monitors the conduct of dealings between financial institutions and retail customers. 
Other authors call for the "matrix structure" whereby an institutional approach is 
applied for safety and soundness purposes and a functional approach is applied for 
consumer protection purposes. 
As to the second question of segregating central banks and banking supervisory 
authorities, it should be borne in mind the strong hnk between the primary objective of 
central banks to achieve price and monetary stability, and the supervisory objective of 
maintaining a safe and sound banking system. Banks' liabilities are constituted of 
money, and the preserving of a stable value of money is inseparable from maintaining 
public confidence in money deposited at banks. Banks are also the channels through 
which central banks transmit their monetary policies. In addition, banking crises have 
serious adverse effects on the real economy.^^ Furthermore, central banks are looked-
upon as the providers of Lender of Last Resort facilities to bail out banking failures and 
are expected to continue to perform this role even when segregated from the supervisory 
authority.^^ In addition, supervisory authorities are concerned with the influence of the 
central bank's macro-economic policies on the stability of the banking system. The 
developments in structured finance have increased the linkages between banking and 
monetary market. The credit crisis of 2007-8 was a conspicuous evidence of the spill 
over effect of money markets on banking institutions. 
M. Taylor, Peak Practice: How to Reform the UK's Regulatory System, (Centre for the Study of 
Financial Innovation, 1996), pp. 6. 
These proposals were aimed for the UK before the establishment of the Financial Services Authority as 
will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
™ Pierre Duquesne, 'The Supervisory Role of the Central Bank' in Charles Enoch and John Green (eds) 
Banking Soundness and Monetary Stability. (1997), pp. 399. 
''^  C . Goodhart (with D. Schoenmakcr), 'Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary 
Agencies' in C . Goodhart. The Central Bank and the Financial System. (1995), pp. 359. 
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Consequently, a total segregation between the supervisory authority or 
authorities, on one hand, and the monetary authority or the central bank on the other 
hand is not possible. In practical terms, governments have to choose from three possible 
altemafives: to create a unified supervisor of all financial institutions while financial 
stability would remain the responsibility of the central bank, providing there is adequate 
co-ordination between them; to locate the supervisory authority within the central bank; 
or confer a semi-independent status on the supervisory authority within a central bank. 
The following question is whether there should be a single supervisory 
authority for all financial institutions or a separate institution for banks (accompanied by 
rules of co-ordination). Unified or single financial supervisory authorities have the 
advantages of attaining economies of scale and scope, increasing efficiency in resource 
allocation, as well as, better capability of solving conflicts between different objectives 
of regulation and competitive equality.*^ The key question is whether opting for this 
structure is more likely to attain the supervisory goal of maintaining the safety and 
soundness of banks. The answer varies relativity to the stage of development of banking 
systems. In industrialised countries where conglomerates exist strongly and banks are 
vigorously involved in risky and innovative transactions and markets, there is a stronger 
need to have a single financial supervisor in order to avoid gaps in the supervisory 
coverage. This concern is less relevant for countries where a smaller banking system 
prevails. Another major consideration for developing countries is that the unified 
supervisory authority should not be placed on central banks.^' Goodhart has explained 
this point clearly: 
"The logic of placing all supervision under one roof would then require the Central Bank to 
take responsibility for supervision over activities which lay outside its historical sphere of 
expertise and responsibility. An even more serious problem, than already exists, would arise of 
how to demarcate the boundaries between those sub-sets of depositors/institutions which would 
be covered by the "safety-net" (explicit or implicit), deposit insurance, Lender of Last Resort 
facilities, etc., and those not so covered. Would the Central Bank really want to take under its 
wing the resf)onsibility for customer protection in fund management? ... Would a Central Bank 
really want to extend its operational remit to dealing with financial markets and institution 
where issues relating to systemic stability were limited, and customer protection of much 
so Clive Briault. The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator, (FSA, Occasional 
Paper No. 2. May 1999). pp. 18-22. 
X I Some countries in practice opted for this option such as Bahrain. 
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greater importance, e.g. the pension mis-.selling scandal in the UK? So if efficiency and cost 
saving implied the unification of financial supervision, this suggested placing such a unified 
body outside the CenU-al Bank."" 
To sum up, there are two aspects to the choice of structure: one is the economic 
aspect, which is relevant to the size and complexity of the banking system; and the 
prudential aspect, which main concern is that the form of the institution does not 
compromise the efficiency and coverage of banking supervision. Particular attention 
should be given in the situations where the banking authority is or will be segregated 
from the central bank as well as to the coverage of supervision where separate 
institutions have jurisdiction on inter-related financial institutions. 
1.5.2 Institutional Requirements 
Whatever the structure a supervisory authority adopts, it should meet a minimal 
list of requirements. The first requirernent is that the supervisory authority should be 
empowered by a clear mandate of law to undertake its supervisory functions, monitor, 
encourage, and where necessary, enforce compliance. 
The second requirement is the independence from the intervention of political 
interference. This is because supervisory authorities take decisions during the course of 
their daily business, which might affect the fiscal and monetary policies of the 
government. One example is where the government considers loan provisioning and 
asset classificafion as contributors to a credit crunch in the economy. The situation is 
most delicate when supervisory authorities have to deal with a bank or banks facing 
financial closure by imposing corrective measures or taking a decision of licence 
withdrawal. 
The third requirement is that there should be well-trained, efficient and 
trustworthy personnel. The Venezuelan banking crisis of 1994 illustrates that regulatory 
requirements become meaningless if the supervisors are unable or unwilling to analyse 
**" C. Goodhart, The Organisational Structure of Banking Supervision. (FSl, Occasional Paper No. 1, 
November 2000). pp. 10-11. 
"•'j. Tuya and L. Zamalloa, 'Issues on Placing Banking Supervision in the Central Bank' in T. Balino and 
C. Cottarelli (eds). Frameworks for Monetary Stability: Policy Issues and Counlrv Experiences. (1994). 
pp. 673. 
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the prudential returns.**'* 
The fourth requirement is the adequacy of resources to cover supervisory costs. 
Rapid innovation in the banking sector means that supervisory authorities have to 
increase their expenditure on staff remuneration and training to make sure that they 
keep abreast of market developments. This is particularly relevant in advanced markets 
and where a new liberalisation policy is applied. Outsourcing has become an alternative 
solution to many supervisory authorities, despite the fact that it is an expensive solution. 
This leads us to the fourth requirement of designing the most efficient supervisory 
structure. In industrialised countries where a large number of conglomerates exist, there 
are economies of scope and scale to be attained where financial supervision falls under 
the auspices of a single supervisory authority. 
The fifth requirement is accountability. Supervisory authorities should be 
accountable for their actions before Parliament. This should be the case even if they are 
located at central banks, which tend to be powerful non-elected institutions. Related to 
accountabihty is the concept of transparency, which relates to the degree of information 
a supervisory authority makes accessible to others concerning its functions.**^ 
The sixth requirement is to determine institutional objectives and the scope of 
the supervisory authority. Clearly delineated objectives increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of regulatory authorities, enhance its transparency and accountability as 
well as more likely to create a well-focused internal management. Furthermore, clear 
objectives minimise the problems of regulatory competition and regulatory neutrality. 
Once objectives are determined, the seventh requirement is to provide for 
institutional co-ordination at least at four levels: (1) between supervisory and monetary 
authorities, i f separated; (2) supervisory authorities and the regulatory competition 
authority; (3) between bank supervisors and supervisors of other financial institutions if 
separated; (4) and between various banking supervisory authorities e.g. where both the 
central bank and a deposit insurance institution assume inspection and/or supervision 
^ Ruth De Kj-ivoy, Collapse: the Venezuelan Banking Crisis of 1994. (2000). pp. 25. 
For further discussion, see: Ro.sa M. Lastra and Heba Shams, 'Public Accountability in the Financial 
Sector' in Bill's Ferran and Charles Goodhart (eds). Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 
Twenty First Century. (2001). pp. 165-188. 
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roles. This requirement is essential particularly considering the confidentiality 
restrictions on supervisory authorities. Should the author be allowed to draw on her own 
experience, it was found that it is very difficult to legally approve on passing 
information by supervisory authorities without a clear mandate. This refers to 
straightforward Acts of Parliament, clearly spelt out in detailed regulations and/or 
orders, as well as Memoranda of Understanding. Otherwise the legal duty of 
confidenfiality will supersede the politically convenient concepts of transparency and 
co-operation. 
1.6 The International Dimension 
Banking supervision is justifiable for domestic purposes and consequently for 
international banking.^^ When a bank establishes a presence abroad in the form of a 
branch or a subsidiary, the domestic supervisory concerns become international. The 
supervisory authorities of host countries fear that a foreign bank might destabilise the 
safety of its financial system or harm the reputation of the local financial market. 
Likewise, home authorities need the co-operation of the host supervisory authorities in 
case the parent banking institution is adversely affected by the in.solvency of its 
branches and subsidiaries in other juri.sdictions. Safety considerations of international 
banks started to rise during the 1970s, when adverse economic situations motivated 
banks from developed countries to resort to internationahsation and to dangerous 
innovative financial activities.**^ Many authorities responded by racing towards the 
Benston contests the contribution of domestic regulation in preventing systemic risk and maintaing the 
safety and soundness of domestic banks. Therefore, he concludes that there is no justification for 
international regulation as a general rule. Benston, however, believes that international regulation is 
useful for dealing with foreign branches because their capital can be moved across jurisdictions. 
See: G. 'Benston, International Regulatory Co-ordination of Banking' in J. Fingleton. and D. 
Schoenmaker (eds), The Internationalisation of Capital Markets and the Regulatory Response. (1992), pp. 
197-209. 
Proponents for the 'Theory of Regulatory Competition' (who support the duality in banking regulation 
between federal and state regulators as well as interstate competition for charters in the United States) 
also advocate diversity and competition amongst international supervisory authorities as a tool to enhance 
regulatory efficiency. For a critical view of the latter theory, .see: J. Coffee, 'Competition Versus 
Consolidation: the Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation" 
1994/5 The Business Lawyer. Vol. 50(2)(Febnjary), pp. 447-484. 
" E. Kapstein, Supervising International Banks: Origins and Implications of the Basic Accord. (Essays in 
International Finance No.185, Princeton University, 1991), pp. 3. 
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adaptation of more permissible regulations in order to gain competitive advantages over 
each other. 
While the need for co-operation to ensure the safety of cross-border banking is 
evident, it is more difficult to decide on the distribution of roles. There are three 
theoretical possibilities: "home country control" where the home country takes the 
primary role of authorisation and on-going supervision, "host country control" or 
"centralised supervision" practised by a supra national body. Supervisory concerns, 
nevertheless, are not the only determinate factors in allocating responsibilities. Home 
authorities might fear supervisory measures are being employed as a disguise for anti-
competitive purposes.** The second complication arises where the host country takes 
the decision to clo.se a bank, as the consequences of the closure will be faced in other 
jurisdictions.*^ One solution is to impose the duty to exercise protective supervision on 
the authority responsible for preventive supervision, though it is very unlikely to find 
the support of the taxpayer in the home country."^" A third difficulty is the global trend 
of modem banks to diversify their activities beyond the traditional fields of accepting 
deposits and the extension of credit. Banks in many jurisdictions are permitted to offer a 
wide range of securities, insurance and other financial services as well as commercial 
activities directly. A bank can aLso be related to a non-banking group of companies 
where the bank can be the parent company, a sister company or a subsidiary.'^' A fourth 
difficulty arises where the host authority imposes measures on foreign banks for 
monetary policy purposes. A common practice is to require and compulsory reserves as 
well as liquidity ratios, which relate to the capability of a bank to raise cash to comply 
with obligations by maturity dates without having to reduce its net worth. Fifthly, there 
is the question of control: how to ensure compliance with supervisory rules on a cross-
border level. 
For further explanation, see generally. Raj. Bhala, 'Tragedy, Irony and Protectionism After BCCI: A 
Three-Act Play Starring Maharajah Bank' 1994 South Methodist University Law Review Vol. 48(Fall), 
pp. 11-62. 
For a critical view of the closure of B C C L see: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 
New Issues for International Co-operation in Transnational Banking. (UNCTC/DOC/PIC/1992/1). 
D. Schocnmakcr, Ibid (n 38), pp. 9. 
For further details .see for example: Symposium: Global Trends toward Universal Banking, as 
reproduced in 1993 Brooklyn Journal of International Law Vol. 19(1). 
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Cooperation between home and host banking supervisory authorities and other 
related domestic authorities is es.sential. Bank supervisors need to coordinate with 
supervisors of other financial institutions where the need arises. Likewise, where the 
banking supervisory authority is segregated from the central bank there is a need for 
cross-border coordination with both institutions. This becomes evident at times of 
liquidity crisis in the financial and or money markets. 
This leads to the following question: how can international standards cover 
issues of structure without undermining country specific issues, mainly, the question of 
economic efficiency without compromising cross border prudential issues. 
Another critical issue is how can supervisors coordinate their efforts without 
agreement on the basic prudential requirement that are considered essential for fair 
competition such as market entry requirements and solvency ratios. Practically there 
cannot be effective cooperation without agreeing on such requirements. This leads to 
the next question of how can the international community harmonise international 
standards flexibly in order to achieve the right balance between the soundness of 
international banks, on one hand, and catering for the needs of supervising fast 
developing banks and the differences amongst jurisdictions in the stage of market 
development, on the other hand. 
The following part I will look into the international community's approach to 
meeting these challenges of banking supervision. 
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P A R T I 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
CHAPTER 2 
T H E ESTABLISHMENT O F T H E B A S E L C O M M I T T E E ON 
BANKIING SUPERVISION 
AND ITS E A R L Y STANDARD-SETTING EFFORTS 
2.0 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, the nature of the business of banking and the meaning of banking 
supervision was discussed. The pivotal importance of maintaining a sound supervisory 
structure was identified. Finally, the challenges of meeting supervi.sory goals on an 
international level were examined. This Chapter examines extensively how these 
challenges were met on an international level through an examination of the 
organisation primarily responsible for setting international standards, the BCBS. 
This Chapter first explains the establishment of the BCBS in the mid 1970s 
(Section 1). It then examines the banking supervisory standards set out by the BCBS in 
its first two decades. It illustrates how the BCBS concentrated its efforts on two major 
issues. The first one was the setting of minimum standards of co-operation and the co-
ordination of supervisory efforts between various jurisdictions (Section 2). The second 
concern was setting internationally agreeable minimum standards on banks' minimum 
capital adequacy (Section 3). Finally, the Chapter looks into other initiatives of the 
BCBS in relation to market risk, off-balance-sheet exposures, as well as, credit risk 
including international lending risk which responds to the 1980s debt crisis resulting 
from over-lending to sovereigns (Section 4). 
2.1. The Establishment of the BCBS 
The roots of international banking supervision can be traced back to the 1970s. 
As a result of the adverse economic situations of the time, banks in developed countries 
resorted to internationalisation and to dangerous innovafive financial activities." Many 
authorities responded by a race towards more lenient regulations in order to gain 
E. Kapstein, Superx-ising International Banks: Origins and Implications of the Basle Accord, (Es.says in 
International Finance, No.l85, Princeton University. New Jersey, December 1991), pp. 3. 
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competitive advantages over each other. These facts attracted the attention of 
supervisors who realised the differences between the domestic supervisory schemes and 
the dangers that might stem from a bank's operations abroad.^ Bank supervision, 
however, remained a national concern:^ a review of the efforts of international 
economic organisations shows that they had not assumed any role in relation to banking 
supervision. The IMF and its sister organisation, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development ("World Bank") were oriented towards macro-
economic policies."* The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") was also in 
existence but it was not concerned with trade in .services in general until the Uruguay 
Round in 1986.^ The Organisation for European Co-operation and Development 
("OECD")^ had similarly not assumed any responsibility. The central banks of the 
industrialised countries, the G-IO^ had been meeting monthly at the Bank for 
" Andrew J. Cornford. The Role of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision in the Regulation of 
International Banking. (Di.scussion Paper No. 68, UNCTAD, 1993). pp. 1. 
' John Edelman Spero, The Failure of the Franklin National Bank: Challenge to the International Banking 
System, (1980). pp. 153. 
The purposes of these two organisations are cited in Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund and Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 
' Mary Footer, G A T T and the Multilateral Regulation of Banking Services' 1993 The International 
Lawyer. Vol. 27(2)(Summer), pp. 346. 
* The O E C D was established under the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development in Paris on 14 December 1960. 
' The Group of Ten is a political body composed of the ten industrialised countries, which entered into the 
General Arrangements to Borrow with the IMF in 1951. The ten countries include: Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netheriands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Switzeriand joined later on but the G-10 has maintained its original name. 
Source; G-10. 1964. Statement by Ministers of the Group of Ten: and Annex Prepared by the Deputies, 
pp. 1; and IMF, A Brief Guide to Committees. Groups, and Clubs: A Fact Sheet. (April, 2008). 
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International Settlements ("BIS"),^ but they confined their meetings to discussions on 
economic and monetary policies.' 
International banking co-operation was not triggered until the failure of three 
international banks in 1974. The response to the bank failures of 1974 came initially 
from the G-10. They first agreed in September 1974 to intensify exchange of 
information between central banks on international banks as well as strengthen, 
whenever deemed appropriate, regulations on foreign exchange positions, while 
consider it impractical to agree on procedures for providing liquidity.'° Then they 
agreed on establishing a standing committee under the auspices of the BIS which aim 
was to "assist the Governors in their continuing work of surveillance and exchange of 
information"." It was initially named the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and 
Supervisory Practices,'' and then renamed to become the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. The membership was initially confined to the original countries i.e. the G-
10 countries, including Luxembourg, Spain was invited to join on February I 2001. It 
usually holds four meetings every year, attended by representatives from the central 
banks and the banking supervisory authorities of member countries.'^ The BCBS has 
various task forces and technical working groups holding regular meetings. 
The declared aims of the BCBS are to ensure banking liquidity and solvency by 
providing a forum for discussion and co-operation among member states.'" The 
10 
** The Bank was founded in 1930 in relation to the Young Plan for the settlements of German 
repatriations. Despite its name, the BIS functions are not limited to the agency for international 
settlements as it also performs as a central bank's bank and is a forum for international monetary co-
operation. The members and principal shareholders of the BIS are central banks. 
Source: Mario Giovanoli. 'The Role of the BIS in International Monetary Cooperation and its Tasks 
Relating to the E C U ' in R C. Effros (ed). Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks. Vol. (1992), pp. 
39. 
^ John Edelman Spero, The Failure of the Franklin National Bank: Challenge to the International Banking 
System. (1980), pp. 153. 
BIS, Press Communique issued on 10.9.1974. 
" BIS. Press Communique issued on 12.2.1975. 
Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision, Report on International Developments in Banking 
Supervision. Basel, (1982), pp. 1. 
" BCBS, Hi.story of the Basel Committee and its Membership, (March, 2001). pp.1 
" BIS, The Bank for International Settlements and the Basle Meetings, (1980). pp. 56. 
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members agreed from the beginning that it would provide "an early warning system" 
against troubled banks and that such a system should be derived from national practices 
rather than creating an international organisation for this purpose.'^ There were no rules 
to govern voting practices. The decisions themselves took the deliberate form of "broad 
supervisory standards and guidelines" and "statements of best practice", while details 
were left to national supervisors rather than attempting to reach a harmonisation of 
laws."' This was to affect the legal form of the BCBS decisions as will be discussed in 
section 3 below. 
2.2. Earlier Standards of the BCBS 
2.2.1 The 1975 Concordat 
The first work of the BCBS came shortly after its establishment in 1975, when it 
issued the 'Report to the Governors on the Supervision of Banks' Foreign 
Establishments' which later became known as the "Concordat". This work was only 
made public in 1981.'^ The Concordat was a response to the three banking failures, and 
emphasised the need for international co-operation. The first bank, Bankhouse Herstatt 
was closed after wide losses in the foreign exchange market were discovered, and which 
had been disguised by fraudulent book-keeping. This bank mainly operated through its 
German head office and, therefore, it was the responsibility of West German authorities 
to handle the situation.'^ In addition, this case brought attention to the need for 
supervisory co-operation, because the bank was closed before the settlement of 
exchange transactions leaving other banks with capital losses."''* The dissatisfaction of 
foreign creditors' claims also indicated a need for regulating international banking 
20 
crises. 
" Ibid, pp. 57. 
' *BCBS, Ibid(n 13), pp. I. 
rhe Concordat was first published in the International Capital Markets: Recent Developments and 
Short-Term Prospects. (IMF, Occasional Paper No. 7, September 1981). pp. 29-31. 
Richard Dale, The Reeulation of International Banking, (1984), pp. 156. 
P. All.sop, 'Why Settlement Risk Does Matter', CIB News. (November, 1995), pp. 9. 
'" D. Aiford, "Basle Committee Minimum Standards: International Regulatory Response to the Failure of 
BCCI' 1992 Geo.Wa-sh.J.lnfl L.& Econ Vol. 26(2), pp. 246. 
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The failure of the Israel-British Bank of Tel-Aviv showed that "cross border 
contagion effect" was not limited to a bank's interwoven relations in the international 
payment system. This case showed that contagion risk could spread to other separately 
incorporated companies, which belonged to same group of companies. The Israeli 
authorities seized the assets of the parent bank and consequently the wholly owned 
London subsidiary of Israeli-British Bank of Tel Aviv closed its doors. This case also 
shed light on the differences between supervisor's attitudes towards the responsibility of 
the Lender of Last Resort. The Bank of Israel denied any responsibility to guarantee 
depositors of the London subsidiary, (even though they guaranteed all deposits held in 
the parent bank's eight branches in Israel); while the Bank of England insisted that this 
was the responsibility of Israeli authorities.^' 
Intra-group contagion and the need for international supervisory co-operation 
were raised again with the failure of the US Franklin National Bank. This time, the bank 
was large and very active in the international market .The major cause of the banks' 
failure was related to losses in the foreign exchange markets which were concealed by 
false transactions between the bank on the one hand, and the affiliates of the holding 
company, Fasco, on the other."'' Fa.sco was not declared as a banking holding company 
and, therefore, there were no investigations undertaken by the American federal 
authorities into the merits of the owner, consequently Franklin National Bank was able 
to make loans to affiliate companies within Fasco above the regulatory limits. Though 
as early as 1972 the Italian authorities had information concerning irregularities in the 
Italian banks belonging to the owner of Fasco, it failed to pass the information on to the 
American authorities."'' In the end, the bank failed despite the prolonged liquidity 
assistance from the Federal Reserve Bank. 
The Concordat provided the national authorities with two general "guidelines": 
first, that no foreign bank establishment should escape supervision and secondly that 
Richard Dale, Ibid (n 18), pp. 164. 
~ John Edelman Spero, The Failure of Ihe Franklin National Bank: Challenge to the International 
Banking System, (1980), pp. I I . 
Ibid, pp. 95-96. 
-"' Ibid, pp. 62-63. 
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such supervision is the joint responsibility of the parent"^ country and the host country 
authorities. In order to fulf i l these two guidelines, the Concordat allocated the 
supervisory duties of solvency and liquidity between home and host supervisory 
authorities."*' It also called for co-operation between supervisory authorities. 
As to the allocation of supervisory duties, the Concordat allocated supervisory 
roles according to the type of the supervised entity: branches, "which are integral parts 
of a foreign parent bank"; subsidiaries, "which are legally independent institutions 
incorporated in the country of operation and controlled by one foreign parent bank" and 
joint ventures, "which are legally independent banks incorporated in the country of 
operation and controlled by two or more parent institutions, most of which are foreign 
and not all of which are necessarily banks". 
The Concordat stressed the need for co-operation between supervisory 
authorities and provided for rules for the allocation of supervisory roles according to the 
types of banking establishments. The Concordat, like the later document,s, allocated the 
supervision of liquidity to the host authorities in the first instance, mainly because 
foreign banks apply local monetary legislation. The parent authority regulations are, 
however, relevant to the management of foreign currencies especially the currency of 
the parent authority. Other reasons for the involvement of the parent authority are that 
the liquidity of a branch must be connected to the situation of the whole bank. Branches 
may have deposits with the parent and may also call for liquid resources. Although 
subsidiaries have separate legal personalities, parent companies still feel there is a 
"moral responsibility" towards them, and may also provide them with stand-by 
facilities. Therefore, the Concordat .stated that the liquidity of the subsidiary should not 
be judged in isolation from its parent. As regards solvency, the emphasis was on the 
host authority in relation to subsidiaries and joint ventures though the report admitted 
that the parent authorities must also play a role because of the moral commitment of 
parents towards foreign establishments. Solvency of branches, on the other hand, was 
-"' The terms home and parent authorities are used interchangeably. 
There were no defmitions of host and parent authorities given, but it is obvious that the former is the 
place where the establishment is undertaking business, while the latter is where its parent was established. 
Some of the latter documents mentioned joint ventures occasionally without providing for distinctive 
supervisory standards to be applied on them. 
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the primary responsibility of the parent authorities, because they do not have separate 
legal personalities. The fact that certain host authorities require a "dotation de capital"'^^ 
was not reason enough to change this rule. 
Finally, the Concordat emphasised the need for supervisory co-operation 
between the home and host supervisory authorities. It encouraged them both to allow 
the exchange of information on banks, while it also encouraged home authorities to 
inspect their banks. As these recommendations might contradict national laws on 
confidentiality (or secrecy laws), the document stated that such laws "should" be 
modified and stressed that the purpose would be for supervisory purposes and would not 
be directly related to individual customers. 
2.2.2 The 1979 Consolidated Supervision 
In 1979 the BCBS issued a brief document entitled 'Consolidated Supervision of 
Bank's international Activities". This document first clarifies that the authority 
responsible for supervision of international banks should be fully assured of the 
soundness of individual banks only if they can examine the totality of each bank i.e. the 
parent supervisory authority should exercise its supervision on the worldwide business 
of the bank. This is in addition to the supervision of each bank on a non-consolidated 
basis. The document further illustrates that supervising branches on a consolidated basis 
should be unproblematic since branches do not have separate legal identities. The 
situation, by contrast, is more difficult in relation to foreign subsidiaries, participations 
and joint ventures, which are legally independent and are subject to different solvency 
requirements in host jurisdictions. The document therefore recommended that wholly 
and majority owned sub.sidiaries should be subject to consolidated supervision. By 
contrast, the parent supervisory authority is recommended to ensure that the capital of 
the parent bank can meet its commitments to minority interests and joint ventures. 
"Dotation dc capital" requirements of some host countries exist to oblige foreign branches that set up 
business in these countries lo make and sustain a certain minimum investment in them, as well as to 
equali.se competitive conditions between foreign branches and domestic banks. 
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2.2.3. The 1983 Accord 
Practice revealed defects in the Concordat."^ First, it did not deal directly with 
the question of the responsibility of Lender of Last Resort despite the confusion of 
supervisory authorities towards this duty in 1974. Secondly, the division of 
responsibilities in general was not clear and consequently supervisors were unsure as to 
who was responsible for the different duties laid down in the Concordat. Thirdly, an 
important shortcoming was the lack of criteria for what constitutes adequate supervisory 
standards upon which the supervisory authorities could base their judgments. A fourth 
difficulty arose from the endorsement of the BCBS recommendations in 1978 stating 
that banking supervision should be practised on a consolidated basis.""^  According to this 
document, the parent supervisory authority was responsible for the supervision of 
banks' solvency. Consolidated supervision therefore was in contradiction with the 
Concordat, which, as seen above, had designated the primary role of supervision of 
banking solvency to the host supervisory authority. 
The above facts gained emphasis with the increasing problems of international 
sovereign debt in the eighties, culminating by the failure of Banco Ambrosiano Bank in 
1982, which failed as a result of imprudent lending to Latin American companies 
through its intermediate subsidiary in Luxembourg, Banco Ambrosiano Holdings.'" The 
Italian authorities denied any re.sponsibility towards BAH and its subsidiaries in Latin 
America. The Luxembourg authorities, on the other hand, took the view that Banco 
Ambrosiano Holdings should fall under the responsibility of the supervisory authority 
of the ultimate parent, namely Italy.^^ This pointed to the lack of a rule to cover the 
situation of intermediate holding companies in the Concordat. 3.3 
-•^  Richard Dale. The Regulation of International Banking, (1984). pp. 173-178. 
w B C B S . Principles for the Supervision of Banks" Foreign Establishments, Basle Report, (May, 1983), 
pp.4 , 
• ' D . Alford, Ibid (n 20), pp. 251. 
" Andrew Comford. Ibid (n 2), pp. 4. 
B C B S , Ibid (n 30).^pp. 4. 
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The BCBS" response came in 1983 with the endorsement of the 'Principles for 
the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments' better known as the "Accord".^" The 
Accord sets "recommended guidelines of best practices" in the area of the supervision 
of international banks, which, upon their issuance, replaced the Concordat. The Accord 
is certainly an important development in the history of international banking standards. 
It emphasi.ses effective co-operation between home and host supervisory authorities 
which should be based on two major principles: first, "that no foreign banking 
establishment should escape supervision" and secondly, that the supervision be 
adequate. This means that the host supervisory authority should be satisfied that the 
concerned banking establishment is adequately supervised by the home supervisory 
authority and vice versa. Furthermore, each authority should inform the other when 
problems arise, i f the host supervisory authority does not adequately supervise the 
foreign establishment, the home supervisory authority should either extend its 
supervisory duties to such establishments or discourage the parent institution from 
conducting business in the host country. I f it is the host authority, which is not satisfied 
with the home authority's supervision, it should at a minimum discourage or ultimately 
forbid the foreign establishment from conducting business on its territory. In particular, 
the Accord points out the possible supervisory gaps that could ari.se, and how these 
should be dealt with. For example, it addresses the situation of intermediary holding 
companies (such as Ambrosiano Luxembourg) slating that the home supervisory 
authority should ensure that such companies are adequately supervised, otherwise the 
home authority .should forbid its operation. 
The Accord also emphasises the principle of consolidated supervision. It 
illustrates that the parent (i.e. home) supervisory authority should monitor the risk 
exposure and the capital adequacy of the bank or banking group on an overall basis. It 
explains, however, that this should not lessen the responsibilities of the host supervisory 
authority. Furthermore, the Accord explains the allocation of three supervisory 
responsibilities namely, solvency, liquidity and foreign exchange operations and 
positions. The allocation of these responsibilities depends upon the type of the 
establishments i.e. whether they are branches, subsidiaries, joint ventures or consortia. 
The B C B S also issued in 1983 the document. Authorisation Procedures for Banks' Foreign 
Establishments (March. 1983). which recommended guidelines for internal and external authorisation of 
banks. However, the standards set out in this paper were incorporated later on in the Supplement to the 
Concordat. See: B C B S , below (n 37). 
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The BCBS, however, does not provide for any rules of substance, for example it does 
not set the solvency ratio. 
Furthermore, the Accord confirms the allocation of supervisory responsibilities 
based on consolidated supervision. The parent supervisory authority should accordingly 
monitor the risk exposure and the capital adequacy for the banks and banking groups 
under their supervision based on the totality of their business in all jurisdictions. The 
Accord also confirms that consolidated supervision is to be applied in addition to the 
unconsolidated supervision basis (i.e. supervision of each banking institution separately 
by the relevant supervisory authorities). Furthermore, the Accord notices the gaps in 
supervising banks operating within international groups of companies, such as where 
holding companies exist at the top or in the middle. It called for co-operation between 
the relevant supervisors where there are separately incorporated banks headed by a 
banking company. In situations similar to those in the Ambrosiano case, the Accord 
stated that the parent authority (Italy) should supervise intermediate companies and their 
intermediaries or, alternatively, prohibit this intermediation. Furthermore, for the first 
time the Accord called for the co-operation between "supervisors of different functions" 
where a non-banking holding company has considerable liabilities to the international 
banking .system. The report also stated that if such co-operation cannot be achieved, 
then supervisors should aim at minimising the consequential risks of such activities. 
2.2.4 The 1990 Supplement on Exchange of Information 
The application of the previous documents faced difficulties in relation to the 
exchange of information and the need for supervisory authorities to know about 
supervisory practices in other countries. International banking supervision cannot be 
performed without effective exchange of information. There are two major elements 
here: how to determine the scope of needed information and how to have access to it. It 
is important to determine the scope of information because the passing on of 
information demands large resources, especially experienced personnel. This is 
particularly significant where a bank's foreign establishment is small in relation to the 
world-wide activities of the parent bank or the banking group. Banking confidentiality 
is another major legal problem to parent and home supervisory authorities. Parent 
authorities in particular are more reserved about divulging sensitive information that 
might affect their banks. If a bank was endorsed by a ho.st authority after obtaining 
50 
delicate information from parent authorities, the parent authority might be accused of 
breach of confidentiality. 
In order to deal with the need for transparency, supervisors agreed in the 1984 
International Conference on Banking Supervision ("ICBS") to exchange information on 
their supervisory practices on basis of a questionnaire prepared by the BCBS.^^ There 
had also been a number of complaints regarding the excessive reporting requirements of 
the United States prior to the Revised Concordat.'''' The Offshore Group of Banking 
Supervisors''* complained also about the allocation of responsibilities.^^ The BCBS 
showed interest in the difficulties surrounding the flow of information to the Offshore 
Group and a working party was established in order to make practical 
recommendations.''" A joint report was issued and circulated in 1986 and later on 
discussed in the fourth ICBS in Amsterdam,'" followed by another recommendation 
report issued in 1987''" on the basis of which a "Supplement to the Concordat" was 
made in 1990 ("Supplement").'"^ 
The Supplement included recommendations which were described as "not 
designed as minimum legal requirements" but rather ".statements of best practices" that 
B C B S . Report on International Developments in Banking Supervision. Report No. (5), (1986), pp. 52-
54. 
B C B S , Report on International Developments in Banking Supervision: 1984. (1985). pp. 2. 
"'^  B C B S , Information Flows between Banking Supervisory Authorities, (1990). 
The Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors formed in 1980 was comprised of fifteen offshore centres, 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Hong Kong, isle of Man. 
Jersey, Lebanon, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Singapore and Vanuatu. The Group's aim was to further 
international co-operation in banking supervision. 
B C B S , Ibid (n 36), pp. 26. 
* B C B S . Ibid (n 35), pp. 50. 
B C B S , Repon on International Developments in Banking Supervision. Report No. (6), (1988). pp. 18. 
Conclusions and summary of recommendations of the Joint Report on practical aspects of international 
collaboration between banking supervisory authorities were reproduced in: B C B S , Ibid, pp. 20-23. 
Although this report is often referred to as the 'Supplement to the Concordat", its official name is; 
information Flows between Banking Supervisory Authorities (Supplement to the Concordat). 
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members will attempt to implement them "according to the means available to them".'''' 
An official report summarised the Supplement into the following points:"^ 
"- the purpose for which the information is sought should be specific and supervisory in 
nature; 
- information received should be restricted solely to officials engaged in prudential 
supervision and not be passed to third parties without the host supervisor's prior consent; 
- there is assurance that all possible steps will be taken to preserve the confidentiality of 
information received by a home supervisor in the absence of the explicit consent of the 
customer; 
- there should be a two way flow of information between the host and home supervisors, 
though perfect reciprocity should not be demanded; 
- before taking consequential action, those receiving information wi l l undertake to consult 
with those supplying it". 
Finally, the Supplement recommended that sufficient provision for an external 
audit should be a condition for authori.sation. It was also preferred that the foreign 
bank's auditor be the same as that of the parent bank or at least that the parent's auditor 
should have access to their papers. It was also recommended that supervisors should 
have direct access to external auditors and be empowered to criticise and substitute 
them. Lastly, it was required that auditors should have international qualifications as 
well as sufficient experience in bank auditing in the relevant country."*^ 
2,2.5. The B C C I Failure and the 1992 Statement 
The failure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI") and its 
closure in July 1991 had a marked influence on the development of international 
banking supervisory standards. At its peak, BCCI was one of the largest private banks 
and operated in more than seventy countries. Official investigations in the UK and the 
B C B S , Ibid (n 37), pp. 2. 
B C B S and Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, below (n 70), pp. 10. 
B C B S , Report on International Developments in Banking Supervision. Report No. (7), (1990), pp. 42. 
The circumstances leading to the failure of the B C C I were examined in the following U K official 
reports: Bingham L . J . , Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. 
H C 198, (October, 1992) (known as the "Bingham Report"); and Treasury and Civ i l Service Committee, 
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USA found that the BCCI failed due to its involvement in money laundering and 
massive worldwide fraud. Furthermore, a number of problems were identified as to how 
the BCCI managed to escape from the supervisory net, despite its presence in many 
important financial centres particularly London. 
First, there is the, possibly deliberate, choice of a complex banking structure. 
The BCCI had the same structure as the Ambrosiano Bank, which the Accord dealt with 
specifically: the Bank had a holding company in Luxembourg and two main subsidiaries 
in Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands.''* Luxembourg was also a particularly 
convenient location because it did not subject holding companies to consolidated 
supervision.'" 
Secondly, the BCCI was not subject to a home supervisory authority. According 
to the Concordat, Luxembourg was the parent authority and should have supervised the 
bank on the basis of the principle of consolidation. The Luxembourg supervisory 
authority, however, admitted in 1987 that it was impossible for them to undertake such a 
role while 98% of the BCCI activities were concluded outside their jurisdiction."'''^ As 
there was no recommendation in the Concordat for this situation, an alternative solution 
was the appointment of a "college of regulators" in the same year. The formulation of a 
group of regulators was within the borderline of the principle of co-operation in the 
Concordat; however, it proved to be an unsuccessful measure because it diluted the 
assignment of responsibilities amongst supervisors." '^ They did not take action to close 
the bank until July 1991, despite the fact that regulators in the United States and the 
Founh Report, Banking Supervision and B C C I : International and National Regulation. H C (1991-1992) 
177, (4 March. 1992). 
For further discussion, see: Richard Dale, 'Regulatory Consequences of the B C C I ColIap.se: U S , U K , E C , 
Basle Committee - Current Issues in International Bank Supervision' in, Jo.seph Norton, Chia-Jui Cheng, 
and 1. Retcher (eds) International Banking Regulation and Supervision: Change and Transformation in 
the 1990s. (1994), pp.377-397,- D. Laifer, 'Putting the Super Back in the Supervision of International 
Banking, Post B C C I ' 1992 Fordham L a w Review. Vol . 60 (6)(May). pp. S467-500; and Joseph Norton. 
'Projecting Trends in International Bank Supervision; After B C C I ' in Joseph Norton and Raymond 
Auerback (eds). International Finance in the 1990's. (1993). pp. 64-84. 
Treasury and Civ i l Service Committee, Ibid, par 5. 
Philippe Vigneron, Philippe Steinfeld and Delphine Couyne. European Regulatory Lessons of the 
B C C I Collapse-The Case for Strengthening Financial Supervision" 1993 Y E L . V o l . 13, pp. 264, 
^ Treasury and C i v i l Service Comnii l lec . Ibid (n 47). par 7. 
Andrew J . Cornford. Ibid (n 2) pp. 13. 
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United Kingdom had been concerned for many years about the situation of the Bank, 
including a guilty plea regarding accusations of money laundering in Tampa, Florida in 
1988." 
Thirdly, the BCCI had two auditors until 1987 who could not have had a 
complete understanding of the Banks' wide-spread activities, a matter which helped the 
management to hide the situation of the bank.^ ^ The statement had been addressed by 
the BCBS, but the BCCI case highlighted once again the need to consider their role. 
The BCBS was engaged in a rapid evaluation of the BCCI case late in 1991. The 
major conclusion was that the "college of regulators" method ought not to be a 
substitute for the appointment of a "lead regulator" who could supervise the worldwide 
activities of banks .The principle of consolidated supervision was also preserved and 
even strengthened. The results were issued in July 1992 in a document entitled 
'Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and Their 
Cross-Border Establishments" ( "Minimum Standards").^^ It was clearly stated that "The 
Committee... reinforced the Concordat, which has a "best-efforts" character, with a 
document setting out minimum .standards". '^' The repon emphasises that the 
representatives "will be taking the necessary steps to ensure that their own supervisory 
arrangements meet the standards as soon as possible". The BCBS is also to play a 
monitoring role in the future over the implementation of the standards and further 
amendments.^^ In addition, the Statement distinguishes between two types of 'home 
country authorities': 'immediate' and 'higher level' home authorities."''* Host authorities 
are called to decide whether both types of home authorities are capable to meet the 
following minimum standards: 
" D. Alford, Ibid (n 20) pp. 258-260. 
" Treasury and Civ i l Service Committee. Ibid (n 47), para. 14. 
^ B C B S , Report on International Developments in Banking Supervision. Report No. (8), (1992), pp. 4-5. 
" The Minimum Standards were reproduced in: B C B S , Report on International Developments in Banking 
Supervision. Report No. (8), (1992), pp. 1 1-18. 
B C B S . Report on international Developments in Banking Supervision. Report_No. (8), (1992), pp.10. 
" Ibid. pp. 11. 
""^  Ibid, pp. 13. 
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The first standard is that a foreign bank or banking group should be supervised 
on a coasolidated basis by a capable home country. In order to satisfy this standard, the 
home country should obtain consolidated information from their banks and verify the 
information by conducting on-site visits or by other means. They also should hinder 
their banks from developing non-transparent structures and to prevent them from 
establishing existence in "particular jurisdictions".^^ There is, however, no explanation 
of what is meant by "particular jurisdictions". 
The second standard is that home and host supervisory authorities must both 
consent to the creation of a new foreign establishment. The strength of capital and the 
effectiveness of the risk management of the bank should be particularly taken into 
consideration.The report further illustrates that the host authority should be 
"particularly concerned with the level of support that the parent is capable of providing 
to the proposed establishment (italics added)".^' The requirement of mutual consent is 
better than the previous lax measures of the 1990 Statement. Furthermore, the 
authorities should decide on the allocation of respon.sibilities amongst themselves before 
authorisation. If they remain silent, it will be assumed that they accept the allocation of 
responsibilities in the Concordat. The purpose is to emphasise the idea that each 
international bank or banking group must have a primary home regulator whatever the 
structure of the group. 
The third standard is that the home supervisory authority is entitled to gather 
information from cross border establishments. Inward and outward authorisations 
should be contingent on a mutual understanding on the exchange of information. The 
fourth and final standard is that the host authority has the right to restrict or totally 
prohibit a foreign establishment if any of the above standards is not satisfied because the 
home authority is unable or unwilling to meet them. Host authorises, nevertheless, may 
permit a conditional authorisation on their own discretion providing that they supervise 
the bank on a consolidated basis.^" 
••'''Ibid, pp. 14. 
"' ibid, pp. 14-15. 
" Ibid, pp. 15 
" Ibid. pp. 17. 
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2.2.6. Exchange of Information with Securities Supervisory Authorities 
The deregulation trend, which started in the mid-eighties, raised concerns 
amongst supervi.sory authorities. Banks were increasingly active in securities dealings 
and consequently increasingly exposed to market risks. Banking and securities 
authorities felt that there was a need to co-ordinate the exchange of information on a 
cross-sector basis. The BCBS consequently launched meetings with securities' 
regulators from industrial countries." The outcome was the release of the joint paper in 
1990 entitled the 'Exchange of Information between Banking and Securities 
Supervisors'.^'' This document was in many ways similar to other documents on the 
exchange of information between supervisory authorities of international banking: it 
focused on the mutual need of banking and securities supervisory authorities to 
exchange prudential information, the ability to consult supervisors abroad and the need 
to be able to rely on other supervisors taking the initiative to inform their international 
colleagues of necessary information.^^ This was to include information on the financial 
standing of the institutions as well as on management and internal controls. However, 
confidential information related to customers was still excluded from the scope of the 
definition of prudential information.^^ Furthermore, it was agreed that any exchanged 
information should only be used for supervisory purposes and would not be divulged to 
authorities who were not responsible for financial supervision. This was even to include 
governmental officials who worked for the same institution.^^ In addition, the report 
stressed on the confidentiality of information received as well as recommended that the 
question of whether the relevant supervisor could or should provide the requested 
information must remain discretionary. Strict reciprocity was also discouraged as it was 
viewed that this could lead to a halt in information exchanges altogether. The report 
stressed that the recipient should not take a decisive action, such as bank closure, based 
" B C B S , Ibid (n 46), pp. 7. 
M B C B S , Exchanges of Information between Banking and Securities Supervisors, (April ,1990). 
reproduced in the Report on International Developments in Banking Supervision. Report No. (7), (1990), 
pp. 43-50. 
Ibid, Section 1, pp.43-44. 
^ Ibid. pp. 43, Footnote 13. 
" Ibid. pp. 4 4 ^ 5 . 
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upon received prudential information without prior consultation with the supplier.^ ** 
Finally, the report examined the legal restrains on the flow of prudential information 
from a securities regulator to a foreign bank's supervisor and vice versa. It 
recommended alternatives such as the appointment of a fellow supervisory authority to 
act as a medium between the cross border authorities or obtaining the concerned bank 
consent.^' 
2.2.7. Cross-Border Banking 
The BCBS report 'Supervision of Cross-border Banking' was produced in 1996 
by a working group comprised of members of the BCBS as well as the Offshore Group 
of Banking Supervisors ("Offshore Group"). The Offshore Group was established in 
order to move towards an effective implementation of the Minimum Standards with the 
view of overcoming obstacles to its implementation.™ Discussions of the report 
concentrated on the difficulties associated with offshore banking though its outcome 
was applicable to all banking supervi.sory authorities.^' The principles set by the Report 
were later "endorsed" by the one hundred and forty countries, whose representatives 
took part in the ninth ICBS in Stockholm, they "undertook to work towards their 
implementation in national centres".^" 
The report identifies two major categories of impediments to the application of 
the Minimum Standards: information access by home and host supervisory authorities 
and the meaning of effective host and home supervision in line with earlier documents 
issued by the BCBS on cross border cooperation and exchange of information. 
2.3. The Capital Accord 
The first international effort to converge capital adequacy requirements was the 
BCBS 'International Convergence of Capital Measures and Capital Standards' of 1988 
Ibid, pp. 46-47. 
Ibid, pp. 48-49. 
™ B C B S and Offshore Group, The Supervision of Cross-Border Banking, (1996) Section I, pp. 1. 
" Ibid. 
-^ Ibid, Preface. 
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known as the ("Capital Accord" and later on as "Basel f ) . The Capital Accord applied 
the method of risk-weighted assets. The aim of this method was to encourage banks to 
act prudently in an industry characterised by high leverage or low capital-to-liabilities 
ratio. It was intended that the Capital Accord would be applied on internationally acfive 
banks, though there no definition of such banks was given. The Capital Accord had two 
fundamental objectives: to support the stability and soundness of international banking 
and to provide a fair and consistent framework to eradicate competitive inequalities. It is 
important to point out that in general the BCBS Capital Accord is similar to the 'US/UK 
Agreed Proposal on Primary Capital Adequacy Assessment', which had been issued in 
1987.^^ Consultations also took place with the European Community to apply similar 
solvency ratios. 
The Capital Accord first addressed the issue of the composition of capital. The 
first type of capital was named "core capital" (or Tier 1 capital) comprised of paid up 
capital and disclosed reserves. There had been a common practice to disclose core 
capital in published financial statements; it had a substantial influence on banks' profit 
margins and their competitive ability, and it was the focus of the market's judgement on 
the firm. Core capital was comprised only of permanent shareholder's equity, which 
referred to two types of shares. The first one was issued and completely paid ordinary 
shares/common stock. The second one was non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock. 
Preferred stocks entitle their holders to extra contractual preferences in relation to their 
rights of voting, dividend and liquidation. Payment of dividend, nevertheless, is not 
decided by a decision of the board of directors (as it is the case with common stock) but 
according to their respective contractual terms and applicable legislation. Payment, for 
example, could be deferred and cumulative and therefore there remain contingent claims 
of arrears. Payment could also be limited or in perpetuity i.e. for perpetual life.^'' 
Therefore, preferred stock had to be perpetual and non-cumulative to possess the 
attributes of permanence and subordination necessary for inclusion in the capital base. 
" For further details, see the two part article by A. Murray-Jones, and D . Spencer, 'The U S / U K Proposal 
on Capital Adequacy', 1987 l . F . L . R e v Vol.(8)(Augusi) pp. 20-23 and 1987 l . F . L . R e v V o l . 
6(9)(September), pp. 27-30. 
Joseph J . Norton, Devising International Bank Supervisory Standards. (1995), pp. 8-9. 
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As to disclosed reserves these were described as those reserves "created or increased by 
appropriations of retained earnings or other surplus, e.g. share premiums".^^ 
There were other elements of capital, which the Capital Accord admitted into the 
category of "supplementary capital" (Tier 2 capital). They mostly refer to certain types 
of reserves and to certain debt instruments that are treated differently by the various 
supervisory authorities and therefore, their inclusion into the capital base were left to the 
discretion of the respective countries. Tier 2 capital should not exceed the amount of 
core capital; it should also meet certain conditions and be subject to a number of 
deductions. It encompassed five elements: first, "undisclosed reserves" or "hidden 
reserves" which referred to unpublished reserves that passed through the profit and loss 
account, i.e. they had the same quality as published retained profits but they lacked 
transparency. Secondly, "revaluation re.serves" allocated becau,se of changes in the 
market value of assets. They rise in relation to the revaluation of fixed assets (usually 
banks' own premises) or because of 'latent' revaluation of holdings of securities in the 
balance sheet valued at the historic cost of acquisition. Thirdly, "general provisions/ 
general loan loss reserves" that are held, and made readily available against presently 
unidentifiable future losses. They should not relate to a specified asset or reflect a 
devaluation of a certain asset. This is as opposed to specified reserves put aside against 
the likely reduction of the value of a certain asset. Fourthly, "hybrid debt capital 
instruments," this category covered certain capital instruments, such as cumulative 
preference shares, which have some of the characteristics of both debt and equity. The 
Capital Accord accepted the inclusion of these documents into the capital base 
providing that they were very similar to equity in their ability to absorb losses without 
having to resort to liquidation. Therefore, they should meet certain minimum 
requirements: they must be subordinated, unsecured and completely paid-up; they 
should not be redeemable at the holder's request; service obligations should be allowed 
to be deferted; and they should be made available for participation in losses without 
having to force the respective bank to cease its trading activities. Fifthly, there were the 
"subordinated debt capital instruments"; the BCBS recognised that these instruments 
have shortcomings to be included in capital due to their fixed maturity and lack of 
ability to absorb losses in a situation other than liquidation. Therefore, the Capital 
' B C B S , Capital Accord. (1988). Annex 1. para, d (i). 
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Accord provided that the "subordinated term debt" should have a minimum original 
fixed term to maturity exceeding five years, a sufficient amortisation agreement and 
should not exceed fifty percent of Tier I capital. 
The Capital Accord also specified two elements, which should be deducted from 
capital. The first one was goodwill (an intangible asset), and the second one covered the 
investments of banks in unconsolidated subsidiaries engaged in banking and financial 
activities. The Capital Accord explained that the correct procedure was to consolidate 
subsidiaries for the purposes of measuring capital adequacy. Deduction, however, was a 
recommended alternative approach to avoid "double gearing" or using the same capital 
twice. The committee left the possibility of introducing further constraints to future 
initiatives. As to banks' holdings of capital issued by other banks of a deposit-taking 
institution, it was left to the discretion of the various countries to apply policies of 
deduction. Meanwhile, it was provided that where no deduction takes place, holdings' 
in the capital of other banks have a weighting risk of 100 percent. Supervisory 
authorities were also directed to prohibit cross-ownership for the purpose of inflating 
the capital position of their respective banks. 
As to the measurement method, the Capital Accord allocated all claims (on 
balance sheet as well as off balance sheet and credit equivalent amounts of the latter) to 
five risk categories 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 pe rcen t . I t assigned, for example, a 50 
percent risk weight for loans completely secured by residential mortgage. As to off-
balance-sheet items, their nominal principal amounts were multiplied by a conversion 
factor. The amount resulting would then be risk-weighted according to the category of 
the respective counterparties. Standby letters of credit and other off-balance-sheet 
claims considered as substitutes of loans were assigned a 100 percent conversion risk 
factor, while a nil weight was assigned to commitments which could be cancelled 
unconditionally. The Capital Accord covered all off-balance-sheet items and classified 
them into five categories according to their level of risk. The divisions were broad and 
discretionary. For example, claims on the central governments, central banks as well as 
claims on banks or guaranteed by banks from the OECD countries attracted a zero 
weight. 
Annex (2) of the 1988 Capital Accord provides for risk weights by category of on-balance-sheet assets. 
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Risk weights were accordingly assigned to the level of perceived risk that each 
type of obligor. The higher the estimation of risk of loss associated with an investment, 
the higher the risk weighting. A 100 per cent risk loss implied that the whole of an 
investment can be lost and a zero per cent risk-weight (basically holdings in 
Government Treasury Bills and bonds) implied that the asset concerned is risk-free. 
Claims on the non-bank private sector carried a flat 8 percent rate. The capital 
measurement was accordingly as follows: 
Capital (1) 
Capital Ratio according to the Capital Accord -
Risk Weighted Assets 
The risk weighted assets were then to be multiplied by the solvency ratio of 8 
percent (or its inverse 12.5 percent). 
The Capital Accord was subject to continuous amendments.The following 
Chapter 3 will look into this issue .specifically. 
2.4. Other Early Standards 
The BCBS issued a number of other reports, which spelled out supervisory 
standards of substance, besides the standards on capital adequacy, asset quality and 
loan-loss reserves, as the need arose. Below is an explanation of documents still of 
relevance and which fall under three categories market risk, credit risk, and the 
management of banks' off-balance-sheet exposures. 
2.4.1 Market Risk 
The late seventies witnessed an increase of banking risk in foreign exchange 
positions due to the instability of the exchange rates at the time. During 1980, the BCBS 
issued a report setting three major guidelines for supervisory authorities in this regard.^* 
The B C B S issued the following amendments: Amendment to the Basle Capital Accord in Respect of 
the Inclusion of General Provisions/ General Loan-Loss Reserves in Capital, (November, 1991); 
Treatment of Potential Exposure for Off-Balance-Sheet Items, (April , 1995); (July, 1994); The Treatment 
of the Credit Risk Associated with Certain Off-balance-sheet Items. (July, 1994); Interpretation of the 
Capital Accord for the Multilateral Netting of Forward Value Foreign Exchange Transactions (Apri l , 
1996) and Instruments Eligible for Inclusion in Tier I Capital (Press Relea.sc. October. 1998). 
™ B C B S , Supervision of Banks' Foreign Exchange Position. (August. 1980), I, Section I. 
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The first recommendation was that supervisory authorities check that banks have 
adequate internal controls to monitor their foreign exchange exposures. The same report 
set out standards for the role of such an internal control. First, that there should be a 
clearly defined role as well as a clear division of responsibility between each of (i) 
foreign exchange dealers, (ii) accountants and (iii) internal supervisors. The second 
recommendation was that supervisory authorities should set limits on foreign exchange 
exposures of banks. The report particularly found it desirable to distinguish between 
banks' dealing positions and banks' own positions in foreign exchange. It also 
suggested a system of "dual Umits," placing one on banks' overall exposure and the 
other on its exposure to each single currency. The third recommendation related to the 
supervisory role of monitoring banks' foreign exchange exposures. The report has also 
explained that supervisory authorities need to be satisfied that banks adopt and apply 
rational policies to limit open exchange positions and, desirably, to relate the limits of 
exposure to the size of the bank's balance sheet. 
2.4.2. Credit Risk 
In the field of credit risk management, the BCBS issued two important reports 
on concentration limits as well as exposures arising in international lending. 
As to concentration limits, the BCBS issued in 1991 a document on measuring 
and controlling large exposures .This document seeks to attain a degree of 
convergence in national treatment of large exposures. It addresses five issues within this 
context. First, it looks into the issue of the definition of credit exposure, which involves 
the answering the question of extent of coverage of credit exposures. It determines that 
large exposures should cover all forms of actual, potential and contingent liabilities. It 
therefore covers credit substitutes such as acceptances and securitised assets. 
Furthermore, it recommends that large exposures should be measured on a consolidated 
basis at group-wide level. Secondly, the document defines the counterparty to 
encompass single counterparties as well as related counterparties, which cover all 
economically and legally related parties that constitute a single legal risk (though 
ostensibly they might have separate identities). A related party can be determined by 
considering common ownership, management or control as well as cross-guarantees. 
" BCBS. Measuring and Controlling Large Credit Exposures. (January. 1991). 
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Thirdly, the document sets the appropriate level of credit exposure as 25 percent of the 
total capital base (as defined by the BCBS standards), and suggests reporting of a lower 
threshold, for example 10 percent. It also calls for careful attention to connected 
lending, i.e. counterparties with connections to the creditor bank. Fourthly, the 
document emphasises the need to monitor "clustered" (i.e. over-concentrated) loan 
books. Finally, it also stresses on paying careful attention to extensive exposure in 
certain geographic or economic sectors or from extensive exposure in loans. The 
document, however, did not set out precise definitions of geographic and economic 
sectors but highlighted the importance of credit risk diversification in this regard to 
avoid the risks of over-exposure. 
A particular type of counterparty risk, which raised a serious concern of the 
international supervisory community in early 1980s, was country risk. Many developing 
countries borrowed heavily in the 1970s and early 1980s from developed commercial 
banks, which lead lo an international debt crisis including Mexico's default in 1982.'^° In 
1982, the BCBS issued a document on the management of risks associated with 
international lending i.e. country risk.^' Country risk is defined with reference to "[T]he 
possibility that sovereign borrowers of a particular country may be unable or unwilling, 
and other borrowers unable, to fu l f i l their foreign obligations for reasons beyond the 
usual risks which arise in relation to all lending".**"^  It illustrates that there are many 
varying causes for country risk such as natural disasters and external shocks, which 
makes country risk significantly difficult to predict. It is also a difficuh risk to measure 
as its effects may vary from time to time.^'' 
The report recommends guidelines that all banks, despite their size, should apply 
to their country risk management.*'* The document stresses on the importance of banks' 
awareness of potential exposure to country risk and their need to establish a system for 
country risk assessment that is integrated with their overall risk management processes. 
^ J. Nonon, Financial Sector Law Reform in Emerging Economies. (2000), pp. 264-267. 
BCBS, The Management of Banks' International Lending (Country Risk Analysis and Country 
Exposure Measurement and ControU. (March. 1982). 
Ibid. Section I., pp. I. 
Ibid. Section I, pp. 1-7. 
Ibid. Section II. pp. 3-8. 
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The document also emphasises the importance of the measurement of country exposures 
according to each bank's size and degree of complexity. The measurement should be 
based on three elements: first, that country exposure should be determined according to 
where the final risk is, and that there should be allowance for risk reallocation. An 
example is where there is available liquid collateral from a resident in a jurisdiction 
other than that of the borrower's. In this case, a bank can usefully make a dual exposure 
measurement. Secondly, country exposure should be measured on a consolidated basis 
to allow the bank's management an overall look at the bank's country risk. Thirdly, the 
document recommends a breakdown of country exposures by borrower country. It 
should also cover all on and off balance sheet claims. The document also calls for 
claims to be recorded despite the currency of repayment. Furthermore, the document 
draws attention to the limitations on offsetting deposits from a certain country against 
deposits from the same country, as well as, risks raised by off-balance sheet items. 
After as.sessing and measuring country exposures, the document recommends 
that banks should set a limit on individual country exposures. Although the document 
does not suggest a specific limit, it recommends that banks should diversify their risks, 
set safeguards measures such as segregating functions as well as establish monitoring 
procedures. 
The document also addresses four recommendations to banking supervisory 
authorities. The first one is that supervisors should see whether banks operate a risk 
assessment system for country risk, devote sufficient resources for this system and 
ensure that it is efficiently managed. The following recommendation is that supervisors 
should examine the bank's country exposure management. Banks should have a system, 
which captures their country exposures with adequate details and allows sufficient 
diversification of each bank's exposure. Furthermore, supervisors should ensure that 
banks continuously maintain adequate controls on such exposures. Finally, macro-
economic statistics are considered a very u.seful tool for assessing country risk, and 
therefore, the report recommends that supervisory authorities should make sure that 
banks engaged in international lending should have access to these reports. 
There were two subsequent country risk crisis. The first one was the crisis which 
hit the banking sectors in Latin American countries including Mexico, as a result of the 
high debts combined with the increa.se if interest rates as well as other political and 
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monetary factors.**^ The second one was that the Asian Crisis 1997-8 which hit a 
number of emerging East Asian countries. It started in 1996 with banking problems in 
Thailand, which had a contagious effect in the region as foreign investors overreacted to 
the Thai problem and local economies were vulnerable to sudden changes to capital 
outflows.*^ 
In both the 1994 Mexican Crisis and the Asian Crisis 1997 which, GIO banks 
incurred significant losses from short-term claims on cross-border counterparties which 
where denominated in a currency other than the local one. In the Mexico crisis, 
exposures were dominated by sovereigns and country risk was related to transfer risk, 
while in the Asian crisis there were public and private counterparties adversely affected 
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by their regional economic conditions. The study issued by the BCBS however found 
that there was no reason to impose limits on Interbank exposures, introducing limits on 
geographical exposures or any other amendment on its above guidelines on large 
exposures. Likewise, the BCBS found that its guidelines on country risk remain vahd. 
2.4.3. The Management of Off-Balance Sheet Exposures 
In March 1986, the BCBS issued the document The Management of Banks' 
Off-Balance-Sheet Exposures'. This paper examined the then new banking trend of 
increased exposures in the off-balance sheet, examined the various risks banks are 
exposed to consequently, and factors banks need to take into account to keep these 
exposures under control. Finally, and most importantly, the report set three guidelines 
for supervisory authorities in this regard to make sure that banks are keeping their off-
balance-sheet exposures under control.^* First, supervisory authorities should keep 
themselves informed of market developments through open dialogue with banks. 
Secondly, supervisory authorities should review their supervisory returns' requirement 
Claudio Loser, 'Recent Financial Crisis- Comments from the International Monetary Fund: Recent 
Financial crisis in Latin America' in IMF (cd). Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law. 
Vol. I (1999), pp. 99-108. 
'* Bijan Aghevli, 'Recent Financial Crisis- Comments from the International Monetary Fund: Asian 
Crisis, Causes and Remedies" in IMF (ed). Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law. Vol. I 
(1999), pp. 109-114. 
" BCBS. Supervisory Lessons to be Drawn from the Asian Crisis. Working Paper No. (2) (June, 1999), 
by a working group led by Rudi Bonte and participation from Joseph Bisignano and others. 
BCBS, The Management of Banks' Off-Baiancc-Shcet Exposures. Section V (March. 1986) pp. 14 and 
15. 
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so that all types of financial instruments are captured. Thirdly, supervisory policies 
should also be put under constant review so that developments in off-balance-sheet 
business would be taken into account. 
The following chapter looks into the substantial development in the BCBS 
standards on capital adequacy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY RULES: 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE DUALITY APPROACH 
3.0. Introduction 
The previous Chapter covered the establishment of the BCBS and its early 
endeavours on establishing international banking supervisory standards. It showed that 
the BCBS set out international standards on the cooperation between supervisory 
authorities based on the rules of home country control, consolidated supervision and 
active exchange of information. The BCBS also set out international minimum capital 
adequacy standards against credit risk in the Capital Accord. 
In the 1980s and onwards, banks, particularly in industrialised countries, 
increased their wholesale and capital markets' activities and became more engaged in 
complex transactions such as OTC derivatives and securitisation. These developments 
increased large banks' exposure to market, credit and other risks, and prompted banks to 
develop their own internal risk based measurement models. Internal models are 
expensive and require advanced technology and well-trained staff which makes them a 
more likely choice of large banks. The BCBS flexibly responded to market development 
by amending the Capital Accord in 1996 to incorporate market risk in capital adequacy 
measurement, and to allow the application of a dual approach whereby banks are 
entitled to choose between the application of the traditional standardised approach, and 
the more advanced internal risk based approach (Section 1). The BCBS later on issued 
three sets of proposals to change the Capital Accord in order to avoid many of the 
shortcomings revealed as a result of market developments and the experience of the 
Asian Crisis 1997-98 (Section 2). The proposals resulted lead to the issuance of new 
capital adequacy standards known as Basel I I . Basel II focuses simultaneously on the 
measurement and management of capital adequacy and is based on the three reinforcing 
pillars of capital adequacy, the supervisory process and market discipline. It 
encompasses operational risk and allows banks a set of options for each of market, 
credit and operational ri.sks (Section 3). 
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3.1 Amendments to the Capital Accord 
The BCBS introduced in January 1996 three documents for the purpose of 
incorporating market risk into capital adequacy measurement.' The BCBS document 
'Overview of the Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks ("1996 
Capital Accord Amendment") prescribed capital adequacy rules, to be applied world-
wide on a consolidated basis, for market risks arising from open positions in traded 
equities, commodities and options, traded debt securities as well as in foreign exchange 
markets. The capital adequacy relation was accordingly amended to accommodate for 
Tier 3 of regulatory capital to meet market risk to become as follows:" 
Capital Ratio According to the Capital Accord Amendment = 
Capital 
(2) 
Risk Weighted Assets + I l2.5xMarkel Risk Capital Charge] 
Banks were allowed lo choose between two methods. The first one was relevant 
to larger banks which could apply for the first time their own internal models, in our 
case Value at Risk ("VaR") models. Internal models can generally be defined as 
"statistical, computer-based models that calculate the potential change in the value of an 
instrument or a portfolio from historical changes in market price factors".VaR can be 
defined at the risk of oversimplification as a representation of the probability of the 
maximum amount to be lost over a certain holding period. The second one was the 
standardised approach which applied to less sophisticated banks. 
BCBS. Overview of the Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks. (January, 1996); 
BCBS, Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks. (January. 1996); BCBS, 
Supervisory Framework for the Use of "Backtesting" in Conjunction with the Internal Models Approach 
to Market Risk Capital Requirements. (January. 1996). 
" This equation is modelled on: Maximilian Hall, 'Basel U: Panacea or a Missed Opponuniiy?' 2006 
Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 7 (1/2). pp. 108. 
BCBS. Report on International Developments in Banking Supervision Repon No. 9. (September. 1994). 
pp. 5. 
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The standardised method adopted the "building-block" approach, whereby each 
item of the market risk is calculated separately and then summed arithmetically. This 
methodology also disfinguished between risk stemming from "movements in broad risk 
factors" on one hand, and "specific risk associated with individual securities positions" 
on the other hand. Risk categories were; interest rate position risk (for debt 
instruments), equity position risk (for equity instruments) as well as foreign exchange 
risk and commodities risk (throughout the bank). A separate section on the treatment of 
options also provided for possible methods for measuring their risks. This differed from 
the VaR approach whereby a bank was permitted to produce a single figure as the 
maximum possible loss on a financial portfoho resulting from market risks. The 
outcome of VaR measurement is less than the sum of different parts, because in VaR the 
correlation between risks and currencies is acceptable."* 
For banks to be entitled to apply internal models, they should satisfy quantitative 
and qualitative requirements. As to quantitative standards, the Capital Accord 
amendment required"^ the following: VaR must be calculated on a daily basis; a 99th 
percentile and one tailed "confidence interval" should be used in VaR calculation; there 
should be a minimum "holding period" of ten days, i.e. instantaneous prices shock 
equivalent to ten days; the choice of 'historical observation period' (sample period) for 
calculating value-at-risk will be restricted to a minimum length of one year; "data sets" 
should be updated at least once every three months; there was no mandatory "type of 
model", providing that the model captured specified risks; it was left to the discretion of 
competent supervisory authorities to decide whether or not to authorise "correlations" 
within broad risk categories; internal models must capture the particular risks associated 
with options; and the daily capital measure should be the higher of either the VaR of the 
previous day, or the average of the preceding sixty working days, multiplied by at least 
three. The reason for the minimum three-time "multiplication factor" was to "account 
for potential weaknesses" in models.^ 
' Matthew Elderfield, 'Basle Publishes Final Market Risk Capital Standards' 1996 J I B F L Vol. 
11 (March), pp. 126. 
^ BCBS, Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks. Ibid (nl) pp. 44-45. 
BCBS, Overview of the Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks. Ibid (n I), para. 
1 
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Another obligatory requirement was "Backtesting," which is simply a technique 
for the evaluation of the risk measurement model of banks by comparing actual trading 
results with those generated by the model, was also made obligatory. A separate 
document was issued simultaneously by the BCBS setting out the requirements of 
backtesting and the subsequent procedures.^ Most importantly, banks were obliged to 
add to the multiplication factor, a "plus" factor ranging from zero (where all the results 
of backtesting were satisfactory and all quantitative and qualitative requirements were 
met) up to one depending upon the results of the backtesting. 
The BCBS was not entirely satisfied with the modelled treatment of "specific 
risks," as essential elements of specific risk (such as default or event risk) were 
generally not captured.^ Therefore, these were only allowed if subject to a "floor" of 50 
percent of the specific charge applied by the standardised approach for specific risks. 
The BCBS, however, modified the market risk amendment in 1997.' The 50 percent 
floor was removed, but only as far as idiosyncratic variations (day-to-day variations not 
justified by the general market) was concerned. The rationale given for this amendment 
was the development and innovation in modelling techniques, and adequate similarities 
in the internal modelling methodologies applied to idiosyncratic variations. The BCBS 
also took the stand that until a bank demonstrated that its internal model captured event 
and defauk risk, it would be subject to a multiplication factor of four (instead of three). 
The amendment also specified qualitative requirements for the purpose of 
permitting banks to apply internal models or become eUgible for the minimum 
multiplication factor. The relevant bank should accordingly have a specialised unit on 
risk control independent from business trading units.'" There should also be adequate 
internal controls and risk management standards. Furthermore, the amendment provided 
that a programme for "stress testing"" should be applied routinely and rigorously. The 
' This requirement was elaborated in the BCBS, Supervisory Framework for the Use of "Backtesting'" in 
Conjunction with the Internal Models Approach to Market Risk Capital Requirements. Ibid (nl). 
" BCBS, Communique (12 December, 1995), para. 11. 
BCBS, Explanatory Note: Modification of the Basle Capital Accord of July 1988. as Amended in 
January 1996. (September, 1997). 
BCBS, Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks. Ibid (n 1) pp. 39-41. 
" Ibid (nl) pp.46-47. 
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purpose of stress testing is the identification of events and influences, which have a 
great impact on banks. Its scenarios cover extraordinary portfolios' losses and gains and 
low probability events in general. This entails subjecting the bank's trading book to 
hypothetical market shocks such as 200 basis points shift interest rate or the 
consequences of a coup.'^ Furthermore, there should be routine checks for the 
compliance of internal controls and an independent review of the risk measurement 
system. 
Finally, as to the definition of capital, the 1996 Capital Accord Amendment 
authorised banks, upon the discretionary agreement of their supervisory authorities, to 
issue short-term subordinated debt to meet market risks under what became Tier 3 
capital.'^ Tier 3 capital was subject to four conditions: an original maturity period of at 
least two years and limited to 250 percent of the Tier 1 capital; it was approved for 
market risks only; there was a "lock-in" clause that interest and principal may not be 
paid should this lead to less than the minimum capital ratio; and Tier 2 capital may be 
substituted for Tier 3 within the same 250 percent limit provided that the 1988 Capital 
Accord was adhered to. As to the calculation of a bank's overall capital ratio, the 
amendment created a numerical link between market and credit risk by multiplying 
market risk by 12.5, (which was the reciprocal of the 8 percent capital ratio in the 
Capital Accord). The resulting sum would then be added to the figure of risk-weighted 
assets for credit risk purposes. '"^  
3.2 Initiatives to Replace the Capital Accord 
The implementation of the Capital Accord revealed its shortcomings. 
Globalization and financial innovation which have taken place since the adoption of 
Capital Accord multiplied and diversified the risks of the banking system. Yet the 
Capital Accord provided a fixed measure of capital without recognising the changes in 
risk profiles or creditors, e.g. it did not differentiate in the assessment of credit risk 
between variable maturities. The non-differentiation between various types of risk gave 
'- M. Elderfield, Ibid (n 4) pp. 126. 
" BCBS, Overview of the Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Ri.sks. Ibid (n I) para. 
26. 
'•' Ibid, para. 27. 
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banks an incentive to lend riskier business in their pursuit of higher yield. Meanwhile, 
the flat rate on the private sector was an incentive to move high quality assets off the 
balance sheet through securitisation and other methods (capital arbitrage) leaving banks 
with lower quality loans. The Capital Accord also provided incentives for banks to 
invest in OECD bonds at the expense of lending to business.'^ The Asian Crisis also 
highlighted the dangers of correlation between market and credit r i sks .Ca l l s were 
accordingly raised to modernise the existing capital framework and make it more 
comprehensive and risk-sensitive. Furthermore, the Capital Accord did not cover 
operational risk although it became an increasingly important risk in banking. It did not 
provide for risk mitigation techniques such as guarantees and collateral as well. 
The BCBS reahsed that the Capital Accord suffered from a number of 
weaknesses.'^ In the spring of 1999, the 'BCBS Models Task Force' embarked on 
studying banks' internal rating systems in relation to credit risk. It i.ssued in the .same 
year a report on practices and applications of credit risk modelling, which rai.sed the 
issue of whether such models could be a basis for measuring regulatory capital.'** The 
BCBS found that internal credit models align the regulatory capital more closely to the 
risks faced by banks. The BCBS, nevertheless, found that there were hurdles to the 
application of credit rating compared with the applicafion of market risk. First, market 
instruments are marked to markets and a few days' holding-period is typically u.sed in 
market risk models. Conversely, credit instruments are not usually marked to market 
and therefore they rely heavily on historical data to project potential risks. However, 
there is a problem of scarcity of data on the historical performance variables such as 
loans, which might eventually impair the model's ability to capture default probability. 
This problem is heightened by the infrequency of default, which leads to a need for 
longer time horizons covering a number of cycles. Therefore, model-builders rely more 
on proxy data and simplified assumptions. Secondly, the longer time horizons (a year at 
least) creates a problem of model validation, i.e. the assessment of the precision of these 
" Jan H. Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational and Comparative Commercial. Financial and Trade Law. 
(2007), pp. 1262. 
BCBS, Supervisory Lessons to be Drawn from the Asian Crisis, Working Paper No. (2) June 1999, by 
a working group led by Rudi Bonie and participation from Joseph Bisignano and others, pp. 14. 
" BCBS, A New Capital Adequacy Framework. Consultative Paper, (June, 1999), paras. 6-8. 
BCBS. Credit Risk Modelling: Current Practices and Applications. (April. 1999), 
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models in delineating credit risk. It is noteworthy to refer here to the banking industry 
views on the BCBS assessment.The industry agreed that data problems make model 
estimates more difficult to attain accuracy. Some respondents opposed the implicit hint 
that there can be an equivalent to backtesting of market risk models to be applied on 
credit risk models. 
The BCBS launched successive proposals to amend the Capital Accord, which 
were reviewed in light of qualitative impact studies."" The first proposal was launched 
in 1999."' The second proposal was envisaged that it would be finalised by 2002, and 
implemented by 2005." However, a third round of consultation took place in 2003 and 
the ultimate date for implementation is scheduled to take place by end 2006."'' 
3.3. Basel I I 
On 26 June 2004, the BCBS released its new capital adequacy framework for 
banks, 'International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards', 
better known as ("Basel 11")."'' Whereas the Capital Accord focu.sed on the amount of 
capital, Basel II focuses on the measurement and management of capital. The Capital 
Accord covered only credit and market risks by providing a flat 8 percent rate of risk 
BCBS, Summary of Responses Received on the Repon Credit Risk Modelling: Current Practices and 
Applications. (May, 2000). 
This package covers the following B C B S documents: The New Basel Capital Accord, January 2001, 
and seven further explanatory documents: The Standardised Approach to Credit Risk, January 2001; The 
Internal Ratings-Based Approach. January 2001; Asset Securitisation. January 2001; Operational Risk. 
January 2001; Pillar 2 (Supervisory Review Process). January 2001; Principles for the Management and 
Supervision of Interest Rate Risk. January 2001; Pillar 3: Market Discipline. January 2000 and Overview 
of the New Basel Capital Accord. January 2001. 
BCBS, A New Capital Adequacy Framework. Consultative Paper, (June, 1999). 
BCBS, Press Release. Update on the New Basle Capital Accord. (25 June, 2001). 
"•^  The source of information on the third consultative paper depends heavily on: BCBS, Overview of the 
New Basel Capital Accord. (April, 2003). 
References to Basel II in this Thesis are made to the Comprehensive Version issued by the BCBS in 
June 2006. This document is a compilation of the June 2004 Basel U Framework, the elements of the 
former 1988 Capital Accord that were not revised during the Basel IJ process, the 1996 Amendment to 
the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks, and the November 2005 paper on Basel II: International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revi.scd Framework. 
It is noteworthy that the BCBS is undertaking consultations to improve Ba.sel II. See: B C B S . Proposed 
Enhancements to the Basel II Framework. (January. 2009). 
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weighted assets according to broad categories of borrowers. Basel I I , by contrast, covers 
credit, market and operational risks. Basel I I also seeks to better align capital adequacy 
requirements to actual risks. In order to do so, it defines risks according to credit rating 
bureaus or alternatively it gives greater freedom to individual banks to assess their own 
capital after taking account of risks. Under Basel I banks could choose between two 
market risk methodologies, while under Basel I I banks are given options, with the 
supervisor's approval, for methodologies employed for the calculation of capital 
adequacy against the three types of risks. This provides institutions with the opportunity 
to adopt the approaches most appropriate to their situation and to the sophistication of 
their risk management leading to a degree of self regulation. {Table 1 illustrates the 
continuum of approaches permitted to banks under the three types of risks). 
Furthermore, Basel I I permits wider recognition of risk mitigation methods such as 
collateral, guarantees, credit derivatives and securitisation. The aim of capital reduction 
for these risk mitigants was to provide an incentive for banks to improve their risk 
management,"^ while stressing on the imposition of operational standards. 
Unlike the Capital Accord which covered only regulatory capital, Ba.sel II is 
comprised of three pillars; namely, minimum capital requirements, supervisory review 
and market discipline. The second pillar is concerned with the supervisory review 
process by national regulators for ensuring comprehensive assessment of the risks and 
capital adequacy of their banking institutions. The third pillar provides international 
norms for disclosure by banks of key information regarding their risk exposures and 
capital positions and aims at improving market discipline. 
Basel I I is therefore a more complex document comprised of 333 pages. Its 
complexity demands resources from countries seeking to understand and appropriately 
transpose it into their regulation. To make this task easier, the Basel I I document 
contains the annex on the "Simplified Standardised Approach" which is a collection of 
the simplest approaches for calculating capital adequacy (and not an alternative 
approach for the calculation of capital adequacy).'^ The BCBS initially decided that the 
BCBS. Overview of the New Basel Capital Accord, Ibid (n 20). executive summary para. 13. 
BCBS, Basel U. pp 322-333 particularly footnote number 256 on page 322. 
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standardised and foundation approaches would be implemented from year-end 2006 
then extended the date another year.'^ 
3.3.1 Scope of Application 
Basel II applies on a fully consolidated basis to international banks "to preserve 
the integrity of capital in banks with subsidiaries by eliminating double gearing"."^ Its 
scope of application is extended on a consolidated basis to cover any parent holding 
company of a banking group (i.e. any group which mainly undertakes banking 
activities), and on sub-consolidated basis to international banks at every Tier within the 
banking group."^ Basel II should also be applied, as a general rule and to the extent 
possible, to banking and other financial acdvities undertaken within a group containing 
an internationally active bank. The definition of financial activities within this context 
covers portfolio management, financial leasing, issuing credit cards, investment 
advi.sory, and other activities ancillary to banking excluding insurance. The majority 
owned or controlled financial companies and banks within a group will be consolidated 
for capital adequacy requirements as a general rule.^° 
Three items should be deducted from capital: majority-owned securities and 
other financial subsidiaries which are not con.solidated for capital purposes;'" significant 
minority investments in banking, securities and other financial entities (as a general 
rule.);''" and any cross-shareholdings used for the purpose of artificially improving the 
capital position of the bank.^ ^ 
" BCBS, Consensus Achieved on Basel 11 Proposals. Press Release (11 May, 2004). 
B C B S . Basel IL main text para. 20. 
Ibid, main text para. 21-22. 
Ibid, main text para. 23 - 25 and footnotes. 
Ibid, main text para. 27. 
' Ibid, main text para. 28. 
' Ibid, main text para. 29. 
75 
3.3.2 The Three Pillars of Basel U 
Basel I I is comprised of three pillars: capital adequacy, the supervisory review 
process and market discipline. 
3.3.2.1 Pillar 1: Capital Adequacy 
Capital adequacy charges cover the three types of credit, operational and market 
risks. The overall minimum capital adequacy measurement covers: ( I ) the credit risk 
requirements including the credit counterparty risk on OTC derivatives both in the 
banking and trading books, but with the exclusion positions in commodities and debt 
and equity securities in the trading book; (2) capital charges for operational risk; and (3) 
capital charges for market risk.^^ 
Ba.sel I I measures the capital adequacy ratio according to the following 
relation:^^ 
Capital Ratio under Basel 11= Capital (3) 
Credit Risk+ Market Risk+ Operational Risk 
Basel I I retains major elements of the Capital Accord including the requirement 
for banks to hold total capital equivalent to at least 8 percent of their risk-weighted 
assets. The definition of eligible regulatory capital is determined by large according to 
the Capital Accord, and as clarified by the BCBS 1998 press relea.se on 'Instruments 
Eligible for Inclusion in Tier 1 Capital'. 
Capital is comprised of the following tiers: 
- Tier 1 (core capital). 
" Ibid, main text para. 701(v). 
Mahcr Ha.san, 'The Significance of Basel 1 and Basel 2 for the Future of the Banking Industry with 
Special Emphasis on Credit information' 2002 A ^ ^ I J L ^ I _ pp. 87. 
B C B S . Basel II main text para. 41 and Annex la. 
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Tier 2 (supplementary capital)''^ with the latter component not exceeding 100 
percent of the former. 
- Tier 3 capital: Banks are also entitled, at the discretion of their national 
authority, to use short-term subordinated debt covering market risk. They 
have in this case to meet certain conditions including that Tier 3 capital will 
be confined to 250 percent of a bank's Tier 1 capital. In addition. Tier 2 
capital may not exceed total Tier 1 capital while long-term subordinated debt 
must at a maximum be 50 percent of Tier 1 capital. 
Finally, Basel I I provides for three types of deductions from the capital base for 
the purpose of calculating the risk-weighted capital ratio; namely goodwill, increase in 
equity capital ensuing from a securitisation exposure, and investments in subsidiaries 
which are engaged in banking and financial activities and are not consolidated.'''^ The 
holdings of other banks' capital instruments can be deducted provided that they will bear 
a risk weight of 100 percent.''" 
1. Credit Risk 
Basel II introduces fundamental changes to credit risk assessment. It allows 
banks to choose between different approaches. The first approach is the Standardised 
Approach where banks assess their own risk with the support of external credit 
assessment institutions recognised as eligible by national supervisors in accordance with 
the criteria defined in Basel IT.'" The eligibility criteria cover the objectivity of the 
assessment methods; the independence of the credit institution and the assessment 
process; availability and transparency of assessments and assessments methodology to 
domestic and international markets; disclosure of the a.ssessment methodology, and the 
sufficiency of the bank's resources to carry out high standard assessments, as well as the 
Tier 2 capital is comprised of undisclosed reserves; evaluation reserves; general provisions or general 
loan-loss reserves; hybrid debt capital instruments; and subordinated term debt 
B C B S . Basel U. main text para. 49(xiii). 
Ibid, main text para. 49(xv). 
Ibid, main text para. 49(xvi) and (xvii). 
•" Ibid, main text para. 50 and 52. 
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credibility of the credit institutions.'*'^ The other approach is the Internal Risk-Based 
Approach ("IRB") where banks' assessments are employed in the calculation of capital 
with the explicit approval of their supervisory authority.''^ 
Table 1: Menu of Approaches Adopted By Basel II 
Credit risk 
V Standardised Approach (a modified version of the existing approach) 
V Foundation Internal Based Approach 
V Advanced Internal Rating Based Approach 
Market risk 
V Standardised Approach 
V Internal Models Approach 
Operational risk 
V Main Indicator Approach 
V Standardised Approach 
V Internal Measurement Approach 
A. The Standardised Approach 
The standardised approach is an amplification of the Capital Accord in that it 
categorises risks according to the borrower type: sovereigns and their central banks, 
non-central government public sector entities ("PSEs"), multilateral development banks, 
banks, securities firms, corporates, retail portfolios, claims secured by residential 
Ibid, main text para. 90. 
Ibid, main text para. 51. 
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property, claims secured by commercial real estate, past due loans, higher-risk 
categories, other assets such as securitised exposures, and off-balance sheet items. A 
significant development in Basel n is that risk weights are determined by external 
ratings. Standard & Poor's ratings are applied by Basel I I (though an equivalent rating 
might also be used by banks).'''* In the case of corporate exposures, banks may 
exceptionally refrain from using credit ratings, but they need to assign a 100 percent 
risk weighting to unrated loans. Afterwards, banks determine the eligibility and effect of 
credit risk mitigation techniques (such as collateral and guarantees). The exposure 
amount (after risk mitigation and net of specific provision)"*^ should be multiplied by 
specified risk weights. Claims related to securitisation exposures are dealt with under a 
separate section. 46 
Claims on sovereigns and their central banks: The credit risk will be 
weighted as follows ,47 
Credit 
Assessment 
AAA to 
AA-
A-i-
to A-
BBB-h to 
BBB-
BB-i-
toB-
Below 
B-
Unrated 
Risk Weight 0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Supervisors may by way of exception allow their sovereign a lower risk rating 
for credit exposures denominated in the domestic currency.''* Furthermore, supervisors 
may identify the country risk scores according to the credit ratings of eligible Export 
Credit Agencies (instead of applying rigid pre-determined categories),''^ which 
correspond to the following categories: 
^ Ibid, main text para. 50 and accompanying footnote 14. 
•'^  Ibid, main text para. 52. 
^ Transactions exposing banks to counterparty credit risi< (i.e. the risk of counterparty default before the 
final settlement of the underlying transaction cash flow). These transactions are O T C and .securities 
financing transactions such as repurchase agreements, reverse repurcha.se agreements, and margin lending 
and borrowing. 
See: Main text para. 52 and accompanying footnotes 15 and 16. 
Ibid, main text para. 53. 
Ibid, main text para. 54. 
Ibid, main text para. 55. 
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Risk Scores 0-1 2 3 4-6 7 
Risk 
Weight 
0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 
In addition, claims on the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank and the European Community and the International Monetary Fund may 
receive a 0% credit risk weight^° 
PSEs: The BCBS applies a flexible approach as it allows the regulatory 
authority to apply either of the options applicable to banks as illustrated below, or the 
risk weighting applicable to the Central Governments.^' The simplified standardised 
approach proposes the following optional classification for PSE: 
"-Regional governments and local auihorities could qualify for the same treatment as claims on their 
sovereign or central government if these governments and local authorities have specific revenue-
raising powers and have specific institutional arrangements the effect of which is to reduce their 
risks of default. 
- Administrative bodies responsible to central governments, regional governments or to local 
authorities and other non-commercial undertakings owned by the governments or local authorities 
may not warrant the same treatment as claims on their sovereign if the entities do not have revenue 
raising powers or other arrangements as described above, if strict lending rules apply to these 
entities and a declaration of bankruptcy is not possible because of their special public status, it may 
be appropriate to treat these claims in the same manner as claims on banks. 
- Commercial undertakings owned by central governments, regional governments or by local 
authorities might be treated as normal commercial enterprises. However, if these entities function as 
a corporate in competitive markets even though the state, a regional authority or a local authority is 
the major shareholder of these entities, supervisors should decide to consider them as corporates and 
therefore attach to them the applicable risk weights' 52 
Multilateral development banks: Their ratings are, in general, based on 
external credit assessments according to the second option for claims on banks. Highly 
Ibid, main text para. 56. 
" Ibid, main text para. .56-58. 
Jbid. Annex 1 I: The Simplified Slandardi.sed Approach, pp. 323 footnote 260. 
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rated banks are assigned a zero risk weight, such as the European Investment Bank, for 
example."''-' 
Corporates: The following risk weights are applied to the credit risk assessment 
of claims on corporates: 
Credit A A A to A+ BBB+ Below BB- Unrated 
Assessment AA- to A- To BB-
Risk Weight 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Banks and securities companies: Basel II provides the supervisory authorities 
with two alternative options. One option is that all banks are given one category less 
than the one assigned to claims on their sovereign. The other option is to adopt the 
credit rating assessment of the bank itself, while assigning a 50 percent credit weighting 
to unrated banks. Short-term claims (original maturity of three months or less) of banks 
weighted below 150 percent are given preferential treatment of one higher category, 
subject to a floor of 20 percent.Securities companies are treated like banks if they are 
subject to regulatory arrangements comparable to Basel I I , otherwise they are treated 
similarly to corporates in general.'''' 
Claims included in the regulatory retail portfolios: They are assessed on a 
portfolio basis. They must meet four criteria in order to be eligible under this criterion 
and carry a risk weight of 75 percent.^' Claims should be extended to individuals or to a 
small business (the orientation criterion); be of a certain type such as student loans, auto 
loans and credit cards but excluding securities and residential mortgages (client 
criterion); be well diversified (granularity criterion) and be of low value whereby the 
aggregate individual exposure does not exceed €J m. 
" Ibid, main text para. 59 and footnote 24. 
Ibid, main text para. 66. 
" Ibid, main text para. 60-64. 
'''' Ibid, main text para. 65. 
" Ibid, main text para. 69-70. 
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Claims secured by real estate: They have a risk weight of 100 percent of 
secured loans, while claims fully secured by residential property are more favourably 
risk weighted at 35 percent.^ "^  
Past due loans: Basel I I differentiates between the risk weightings of residential 
mortgage loans and other types.Unsecured past due residential mortgage loans for 90 
days or more have a risk weighting of 100 percent net of specific provisions. The latter 
risk weighting becomes 50 percent i f specific provisions amount to 20 percent or more 
of the outstanding loan. By contrast, unsecured past due non-residential mortgage loans 
for 90 days or more have a higher risk weighting of 150 percent of its risk weight if less 
than 20 percent of the outstanding loans are covered by specific provisions. The risk 
weight is reduced to 100 percent if the specific provisions cover 20-50 percent of the 
outstanding loan and 50 percent i f the specific provisions cover 50 percent or more of 
the outstanding loan. 
Higher risk categories: Basel 11 numerates four types of higher risk 
categories.''** First, claims on sovereigns, PSEs, banks and securities firms rated below 
B-. Secondly, claims on corporates rated below BB-. Thirdly, unsecured past due non 
residential mortgage loans for 90 days or more. Fourthly, securitisation tranches which 
are rated between BB-i- and BB-. Al l of the mentioned categories are rated at 150 
percent except the mentioned securitisation tranches, which are risk weighted at 350 
percent. Finally, supervisory authorities have the discretion to apply higher risks to 
other assets. 
Other assets: Cash carries only a zero percent risk weight. Gold, at national 
supervisors' discretion, may carry the same weighting. Cash in the process of collection 
is weighted at 20 percent. The standard risk weight for all other assets (without 
securitization exposure) is 100 percent.^' 
Ibid, main text para. 72 and 74. 
Ibid^ main text para. 75-78. 
Ibid^ main text para. 79-80. 
Ibid, main text para. 81 and ftx)tnoie 32. 
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Off-balance-sheet items: These items are categorised then transformed into 
their credit exposure equivalents by multiplying them by the credit factors illustrated in 
{Table 2 ) . " 
Table 2: Treatment of Off-balance Sheet Items under Basel II 
Item Credit Conversion 
factor (%) 
Commitments with a maximum original maturity of one 
year. (20%) 
Commitments with an original maturity exceeding one year. 
(50%) 
Commitments which are unconditionally cancellable by the 
bank without prior notification, or which effectively provide 
for automatic cancellation because the borrower's credit 
worthiness has deteriorated. 
(0%) 
Direct credit substitutes such as acceptances and general 
guarantees of indebtedness (including standby letters of 
credit which provide financial guarantees for securities and 
loans). 
(100%) 
Asset sales with recourse and sale and repurchase 
agreements, whereby the bank bears the credit risk. (100%) 
The lending of banks' securities or banks' posting of 
securities as collateral. (100%) 
Forward deposits, forward asset purchases, as well as, well 
as partly-paid shares and securities. (100%) 
Specific transaction-related contingent items (such as 
performance bonds, warranties and bid bonds). (50%) 
Revolving underwriting facihties (RUFs) and Note issuance 
facilities (NIFs). (50%) 
Self-liquidating short-term trade letters of credit arising from 
the movement of goods such as documentary credits 
collateralised by the underlying shipment. 
(20%) 
B. The I R B Approach 
The purpose of the IRB approach is to resolve banks' credit loss distribution, 
which combines probabilities and losses. It is based on the measurement of banks' 
expected and unexpected losses, '^' It identifies first the expected losses, which determine 
Ibid, main text paras. 82-85. 
Ibid, main text para. 212. 
83 
the amount of provisions to be set aside by banks. Meanwhile, the inclusion of general 
provisions (or general loan-loss reserves) in Tier 2 capital under the Capital Accord 
does not exist under the IRB approach specifically (not the standardised approach).^ 
Banks using the IRB approach compare the two elements of 'total eligible provisions' 
and 'total expected losses'. In cases where expected Josses surpass provisions, the 
difference may be deducted from capital equally distributed between Tier 1 and Tier 2. 
If the provisions are more than the expected losses, banks may recognise the difference 
under Tier 2 capital subject to an upper limit of 0.6 percent of risk-weighted assets*'^ . 
The method finally adopted by the BCBS is illustrated in the following relation:^^ 
Capital Ratio (IRB)= Capital + (provisions - Expected Losses) 
>=8% (4) 
Unexpected Losses x J2.5 
The IRB approach determines exposures by capitalising on the advancement of 
large banks' internal risk management systems.^ ^ It is based on three inter-related risk 
components. The first component is the probability of default ("PD"). i.e. the possibility 
that a debt will not be paid back. Default is defined as the occurrence of at least one of 
two events. The first event is a subjective one as it refers to the bank's opinion on the 
obligor's ability to fully pay its credit obligations without the bank having to resort to 
actions such as realising security. The other event is that the obligor is in default or pa.st 
due for more than 90 days.*** The second component is loss given default ("LCD"), 
which is an estimate of how much a bank will loose in case of borrower's default, 
expressed as a percentage of its exposure. The third component is exposure at default 
("EAD"), which represents the money owed at the time of default. An additional 
possible element is Maturity.^^ Effective maturity is generally determined under the 
" Ibid, main text paras. 42-43. 
" Ibid, main text para. 43. 
66 Ryozo Himino, 'Basel 11 - Towards a New Common Language' 2004 BIS Quarterly Review. 
(September), pp. 45. 
'^^  Nout Wellink, 'Basel 1.1 and Financial Institution Resiliency: Remarks bv Dr Nout Wellink' delivered at 
the Risk Capital 2007 Conference, Paris, 27 June. 2007. pp. 1. 
^ BCBS, Basel II. main text para. 452. 
''"ibid, main text 318-319. 
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foundation approach and assumed under the IRB approach to be 2.5 years. Expected 
losses are expressed according to the under relation:^" 
EL^PDX LCD X EAD (5) 
The IRB approach is divided into two categories. First, the Foundation 
Approach, where the PD is provided by banks while the supervisory authority provides 
the other elements of LGD, EAD and probably Maturity. PD can be estimated by using 
external credit rating agencies such as Moody's Investors Service, or Standard and 
Poor's for estimating PDs from historical default experience. Secondly, the Advanced 
Approach, whereby banks supply not only PD but also LGD, EAD and Maturities, 
which is an expensive and onerous task, but has the potential benefit of reducing capital 
requirements. Therefore, the Advanced Approach is the expected choice and advantage 
of large complex banks over smaller ones. 
Exposures of the banking-book (i.e. loaning book) under both IRB approaches 
are categorised into broad classes of assets, namely corporate, sovereign, bank, retail, 
and equity.^' Basel II determines the credit risk for the unexpected losses of each of the 
mentioned categories. 
There are two major differences between the standardised approach and the IRB 
approach in the treatment of corporates. First, concessionary treatment is given to small 
and medium-sized entities ("SMEs") under the IRB approach.^" SMEs are defined as 
"corporate exposures where the reported rates for the consolidated group of which the 
fu^m is a part is less than €50 million.^^ Secondly, the IRB approach creates a sub-
category for "specialised lending", to mainly address exposures to Special Purpose 
Entities ("SPEs"). SPEs are created as financing vehicles, which buy bank's exposures 
in return for cash or debt originated thereby. Therefore, SPEs differ from commercial 
™ Hugh Thomas and Zhiqiang Wang, 'Interpreting the Internal Ratings-Based Capital Requirements in 
Basel ir 2005 Journal of Banking Regulation Vol. 6(3), pp. 285. 
" BCBS, Basel II. main text para. 215. 
Ibid. Annex 5, and main text paras. 278-279. 
" Ibid, main text para. 273. 
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corporate, which have the wider capacity to generate income.^'' Specialised lending 
itself is subdivided into five categories.^' 
1. Project finance, which is usually used for mines, power plants and other 
expensive transactions, whereby the lender depends mainly on the project 
revenues for repayment and security. 
2. Object finance is used for financing acquisition of assets such as aircrafts where 
the generated cash flows are usually assigned or pledged to the lender. 
3. Commodities finance, which is structured short term lending for the purpose of 
funding inventories, receivables, or reserves of crude oil and other exchange-
traded commodities. 
4. Income-producing real estate, which differs from collateralised real estate in that 
the pro.spect of repayment depends on the income generated by Funded real 
estate. 
5. High-volatility commercial real estate, which exhibits higher asset price 
volatility compared with the other types of specialised lending. 
Banks may apply their foundation or IRB estimates to all categories of 
specialised lending with the exception of high volatility commercial real estate. Banks 
which cannot apply their own estimation of PD must map their risk grades into five 
criteria (strong, good, satisfactory, weak and d e f a u l t ) . A risk weighting is assigned to 
each category with a higher weight assigned to the category of high volatility 
commercial real estate. 
Ibid, main text para. 219 read together with para. 552. 
" Ibid, main text paras. 220-228. 
Ibid, Annex 6, pp. 280-297. 
Ibid, main text paras. 249-251. 
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Capital charge for equity^*^ exposures held in the banking book for long term (as 
opposed to short term holdings in the trading book) is treated differently under the IRB 
approach^^. IRB banks may follow one of two different approaches. The first one is the 
PD/LGD approach, which is similar to the general IRB foundation approach, but banks 
are subject to 90 percent L C D and a risk weight of 100 percent. The second approach 
provides banks with the opportunity to u.se their internal models to measure the market 
value of their equity over a quarterly holding period. A simplified version of the latter 
approach is also permitted, where the risk weight of 300 percent is applied to equities 
traded in recognised securities markets and a higher 400 percent rating is applied to 
other equity. 
Retail exposures under the IRB approach are also treated on a pooled basis, but 
need to be divided into three risk weight functions of residential mortgage exposures, 
qualifying revolving retail exposures and other exposures.^° 
C . Operational Requirements for the IRB Approach 
Basel I I sets out minimum operational requirements for banks applying the IRB 
approach upon authorisation and on-going basis. The underlying goal of these principles 
is to ensure that bank's internal ratings are applied to properly assess risks and not to 
minimise regulatory capital. This entails providing meaningful assessments of 
borrowers, meaningful differentiation of risks as well as consistency and reasonable 
accuracy of risk estimates.^' 
First, banks must demonstrate their compliance with the minimum requirements 
of Basel I I and subsequent relevant requirements issued by the BCBS,*^ including the 
design of each "rating system" it uses for its internal ratings.'*^ 
™ Equity includes direct and indirect ownership interest in the assets and income of an enterprise. It 
should be irredeemable before liquidation, does not impose an obligation on the issuer and conveys a 
residual claim on the holder. 
Source; Ibid^ main text para. 235. 
Ibid, main text paras. 340-361. 
Ibidj main text para. 326. 
" Ibid, paras. 388-389. 
Ibid, para. 392. 
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The design of the rating system encompasses six elements. First, the rating 
dimensions. For example, the corporate, sovereign, and bank exposure should have two 
dimensions; one for borrower default and one for transaction-specific factors such 
seniority and product type.**" As for retail exposures, they are grouped into pools of 
exposures. The rating system here should also encompass borrower and transaction 
risks, and demonstrate that the group is homogenous to ensure that it is an accurate 
estimation of losses at a pool level.Secondly, the rating structures, whereby banks 
should have borrower grades for corporate, sovereign, and bank exposures, which are 
based on the specific criteria of their risks. Exposures then should be meaningfully 
distributed across grades on both its facility-rating scales and its borrower ratings. 
Similarly, there should be distribution of borrowers and exposures for pooled retail 
exposures.*^ 
Thirdly, there is the issue of the rating criteria. Banks should have specific 
criteria for assigning exposures to grades within the rating system. The criteria must be 
intuitive, plausible and lead to meaningful differentiation of risk.*^ Fourthly, banks are 
expected to use more than one year as their time horizon for the assessment of their 
ratings (despite that the time used in PD estimation is one year).'^ '^  Fifthly, statistical 
models and other mechanical methods, such as credit scoring, are permissible for 
assigning rates to exposures and may be utilised for the estimation of loss, provided that 
there is also human judgment and supervision.*'* Finally, banks need to document their 
Basel II defines the term "rating system" as one that "comprises all of the methods, processes, controls, 
and data collection and IT systems that support the assessment of credit risk, the assignment of internal 
risk ratings, and the quantification of default and loss estimates". 
Source: Ibid, para. 394. 
^ Ibid, main text para. 396. 
Ibid, main text para. 401. 
Ibid, main text paras. 403-409. 
Ibid, main text para. 410. 
'*''lbid, main text para. 414. 
' Ibid, main text para. 417. 
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rating systems' design and operational details. These documents should prove that 
banks comply with the BCBS minimum requirements for the IRB approach.^ *^ 
The following IRB criterion concerns the risk rating system operations. The 
rating system should cover exposures and possess integrity. Ratings assigned to 
corporates, for example, should cover borrowers, guarantors and associate exposures 
with a facility rating, as well as regularly refreshed and reviewed by an independent 
party. Banks should also have guidelines for the procedures where the human judgment 
may override the outputs of a rating process. Furthermore, banks should maintain data 
on facility characteristics and key borrowers to support their credit risk management. 
Finally, IRB banks should implement stress testing processes for their capital adequacy 
assessments. Stress testing encompasses the identification of general future economic 
conditions, which might adversely affect the banks' credit exposures as well as specific 
conditions.^' 
Another operational criterion is the use of internal ratings. Basel I I stresses that 
rating systems should not be used by banks merely as a tool to qualify for the IRB 
approach, but rather become an indispensable ingredient in the risk management, credit 
approval, corporate governance and internal capital allocations functions of qualified 
banks.''" 
There are also detailed operational requirements for risk quantification. The 
general rule is that internal estimates of PD, LGD, and EAD should incorporate all 
relevant information, data and methods. They also need to be based on empirical 
evidence and historical experience and subject to regular review at least annually. In 
order to avoid unpredictable erroneous over-estimates, banks must introduce to its 
estimates a margin of conservatism.^^ Banks should also implement a system to validate 
''^  Ibid, main text para. 418. 
Ibid, main text paras. 422-437. 
Ibid, main text para. 444. 
Ibid, main text paras. 446-451. 
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the consistency and accuracy of its internal rating and risk estimation systems. They 
should also compare their realised default rates with their estimation of PD.^ "* 
D. Credit Risk Mitigation ("CRM") 
Basel n has increased the range of credit risk mitigation techniques eligible for 
deduction from credit risk. It covers collateral, netting as well as guarantees extended by 
third parties and their equivalents such as credit derivatives. Before embarking on 
di.scussing each CRM, Basel II makes important general remarks. First, a transaction 
using a CRM technique cannot have a risk weighting higher than a similar transaction in 
which no CRM is used. Secondly, the effects of CRM should not be double counted for 
capital adequacy purposes. Thirdly, Basel II draws the attention of the supervisory 
authority to the potential of CRM techniques to raise operational and other risks 
although they reduce credit risk.'^ ^ 
I. Collateral 
Basel II allows the application of two methods to measure the risk weight of 
collateral under the standardised approach, the simple approach and the comprehensive 
approach in the banking book, while the comprehensive approach is only permitted in 
the trading book. Maturity mismatch between the exposure and collateral is permissible 
only under the comprehensive approach, while partial collateralisation is allowed in 
both approaches.'^ ^ 
A l l collateral must meet a minimum list of requirements. First, legal certainty 
i.e. collateralised documents must be binding on their parties and enforceable.^^ 
Secondly, the bank must be able to Uquidate the collateral upon default, insolvency or 
bankruptcy. Thirdly, banks must follow all procedures needed to maintain the 
98 
collateral. Fourthly, the value of the collateral and the credit quality of the 
counterparty must not have a material positive correlation (e.g. collateral must not be 
''^  Ibid, main text para. 500-501. 
Ibid, main text paras. 113-118. 
'* Ibid, main text para. 121. 
Ibid, main text para. 123, read in conjunction with paras.. 117-118. 
'™ Ibid, main text para. 123. 
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securities issued by the debtor).'^ *^ Finally, banks should have well established 
procedures for timely liquidation of collateral. 100 
The instruments eligible for treatment as collateral are cash, including 
certificates of deposits; gold; debt securities rated at least BB- if issued by sovereigns, at 
least BBB- when issued by other enfities or A-3/P-3 for .short term instruments; senior 
debt securities issued by banks and listed on a recognised exchange whether related or 
not, provided that they are not rated below or believed to justify a rating below A-3/P-3; 
equity included in a main index; and units in mutual funds or collective investments in 
transferable securities where prices are publicly quoted on a daily basis, and their 
investments are themselves eligible as collateral.'^' Equities which are not included in 
the main index but are listed on recognised exchanges as well as funds and collective 
investments in such equities are eligible as collateral only under the comprehensive 
approach. 
Under the simple approach, a claim is divided into a collateralised part (by one 
or more types of collateral) and the unsecured part. For the collateralised part, the value 
of the collateral is multiplied by the risk weight of the issuer e.g. the risk weight of the 
company issuing the security used as collateral.'"'' In most cases a 20 percent floor is 
imperative because risk may still persist despite collateral and due to possible 
difficulties with enforcing collateral.'"'* Under this approach the collateral must be 
pledged during the life of the exposure, revalued biannually and be marked to market.'"^ 
As to the comprehensive approach, the value of the exposure to counterparty and 
the value of the posted collateral are both adjusted so as to reflect possible fluctuations 
in their values. Here the risk weighted assets represent the difference between the 
Ibid, main text para. 124. 
Ibid, main text para. 125. 
Ibid, main text para. 145. 
Ibid, main text para. 146. 
Ibid, main text para, 121. 
Philip Wood, Regulation of International Finance. (2007). pp. 639. 
BCBS, Basel U. main text para. 182. 
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volatility-adjusted exposure amount and the adjusted collateral amount multiplied by the 
risk weight of the counterparty.The haircuts under the comprehensive approach can 
be calculated either by imposing standard supervisory haircuts laid down by Basel I I or 
implementing the banks' own estimates of haircuts. A bank may apply either method 
whether it is following the standardised or foundation IRB approach to credit risk.'°^ 
Banks applying the foundation IRB approach may reduce their credit risk with 
the same financial collateral eligible under the standardised approach in addition to 
other precise forms such as specified commercial real estate. Similar operational 
requirements are also applied to both of the foundation IRB and the standardised 
approaches. The risk weight of IRB collateral is however similar to that of the 
comprehensive approach to collateral, and banks applying the IRB approach may not 
use the simple approach."** 
I I . Netting 
Basel I I recognises netting"*'* as a means of mitigating banks' credit risk. 
Accordingly, the net exposure of loans and deposits is the basis for measuring capital 
charges. These charges must be measured similariy to collateral, whereby liabilities 
(deposits) are treated as collateral and assets (deposits) are treated as exposures. Basel 
I I , however, sets out that on-balance sheet netting should have a .sound legal basis to 
ensure the enforceability of netting in relevant jurisdictions irrespective of whether the 
counterparty is insolvent or bankrupt. Therefore, banks should be aware of the 
differences in jurisdictions in this regard. The bank must be able to determine clearly 
assets and liabilities with the same counterparty and which are subject to the netting 
agreement. Finally, the bank must monitor the related risks and the net exposures 
robu,stly.'"* 
Ibid, main text paras. 130,132. 
Ibid, main text para. 134. 
Ibid, main text paras. 289-290. 
The term netting is used widely here to encompass both netting and offsetting despite technical legal 
difference. For more details on netting generally, see Philip Wood, Set-off and Netlini;. Derivatives. 
Clearing Systems. (2007). pp. 3-23. 
"" BCBS. Basel U. main text para. 188. 
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in. Guarantees 
There are two methods of measuring the effect of guarantees: the standardised 
approach and the internal rating based approach. Under the standardised method,'" a 
guarantee must satisfy a minimal list of requirements and the guarantor must be of a 
particular type in order to qualify as a risk mitigant: it must have legal certainty so as to 
be binding on all parties and be enforced in all relevant jurisdictions;"^ it should 
represent a direct claim on the guarantor and the extent of the cover must be clearly 
defined and incontrovertible; it must be unconditional as well as irrevocable (i.e. the 
guarantor cannot unilaterally cancel the guarantee or increase the cost of the cover); in 
case of counterparty default, the bank must be able to pursue the guarantor for 
outstanding amounts without having first to take legal action against the obligor; it 
needs to be explicitly documented, therefore, oral commitments and comfort letters do 
not count as eligible guarantees;'" it must cover principle and other payments of the 
obligor such as margins and interest. I f the guarantee is confined to the principle, 
uncovered payments should be considered unsecured; and eligible guarantors are 
sovereigns, PSEs, securities firms and banks which risk weights are lower than the 
counterparty as well as other entities rated at least A- including sister companies, which 
have lower ri.sk weights than the counterparty."'' 
The risk weights of exposures in this approach are counted similarly to 
collateral, i.e. by splitting the exposure to, first, guaranteed portion where the risk 
weight of the guarantor replaces the risk weight of the counterparty; and, secondly, the 
unsecured part which retains the risk weight of the counterparty."^ 
As to the internal based approach, it is subdivided into two types: the foundation 
approach, which mirrors the standardised approach for credit risk in that all inputs are 
supplied by the bank except LGD, and the advanced approach, which includes banks' 
own estimation of LGD. 
"' Ibid, main text paras. 189-190. 
Ibid, main text para. 190 read with main text paras. 117-118. 
Philip Wood, Regulation of Internationa] Finance. (2007) pp. 633. 
BCBS, Basel II. main text para. 195. 
Ibid, main text para.s. 196-198, 
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The foundation approach requires the same conditions o f eligible guarantees and 
qualified guarantors under the standardised approach for guarantees, though it permits 
other guarantors rated A - or above according to internally-generated ratings o f banks. 
The risk weight o f the guaranteed exposure is determined according to the risk weight 
of the type o f guarantor and the PD appropriate to the guarantor's borrower (or a 
grading between the obligor and the guarantor's borrower when deemed necessary by 
the relevant bank). Meanwhile, the unsecured portion retains the risk weight o f the 
obligor."^ Under the advanced internal based approach the bank may calculate 
guaranteed capital exposures by adjusting the estimates o f either the PD or L G D as long 
as this is done consistently."^ 
IV. Credit Derivatives 
Credit derivatives emerged after the Capital Accord and have grown to reach 
$20 tr i l l ion in 2006 due to their quality o f transferring risk without underlying credit."'^ 
Credit derivatives are similar to guarantees because they involve a third party 
(protection provider) agreeing to make a payment (underlying obligation) to the creditor 
bank in case o f default on the part o f the obligor (default event) to pay its obligation 
(reference obligation). 
Protection providers must meet the requirements o f an eligible guarantor.'^*' 
Credit derivations must also represent a direct claim on the protection provider so that 
the underlying cover is incontrovertible and clearly specified. Credit protection must be 
irrevocable and unconditional as well . There are, however, the various additional 
regulatory requirements for the el igibi l i ty of credit derivatives for risk mitigation 
purposes.'"' First, the credit event must at least cover three elements. The first one is 
non-payment o f amounts due at the time o f failure. The grace period o f the credit 
Ibid, main text para. 302. 
Ibid, main text paras. 303-304. 
"* Ibid, main text para. 306. 
"'' Irina Molostova, 'Credit Derivatives as Credit Risk Mitigation under Basel 11" 2007 J I B F L , Vol . 
22(September), pp. 465. 
B C B S , Basel II. main text para. 195. 
'-' Ibid, main text paras. 191-194. 
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derivative must be close to that of the underlying obligation. Secondly, the credit event 
must cover the inabili ty o f the obligor to pay its debts, insolvency, bankruptcy or any 
other similar event. Thirdly, restructuring o f the underlying obligation is considered a 
credit event i f i t entails relinquishing or postponement of all or part o f the underlying 
obligation. I f the restructuring meets mentioned requirements, but is not covered by the 
credit derivative, (1) the maximum l imi t o f the eligible hedge may not exceed 60 
percent of the underlying obligation; (2) the underlying obligation and the reference 
obligation must match. A mismatch o f assets may be permitted i f (a) the reference 
obligation is junior or pari passu with the underlying obligation, and (b) they have 
cross-default or cross-acceleration clauses and the same obligor;'^"^ (3) the credit 
derivative must not terminate before the expiration o f the grace period for default o f the 
underlying obligation; (4) the protection buyer must have the right to determine whether 
a credit event has occurred; (5) robust valuation processes for cash settlements are 
imperative; and, finally, credit derivatives that do not provide protection equivalent to 
guarantees are not eligible fo r recognition. 
E . Securitisation 
There are various types o f securitisation. Under traditional securitisation, the 
securitised exposure o f the originating bank is transformed. Payments to the investors 
are derived f r o m the performance o f the specified underlying exposures not the 
originating bank. In synthetic securitisation, the payment is by contrast secured by the 
originating bank by using credit risk mitigation techniques such as collateral.'^^ Clean-
up calls are also options that allow securitisation exposures lo be called before the f u l l 
repayment o f underlying exposures.''^'' 
The cornerstone in securitisation is to find out the reference capital level o f the 
securitised position, i.e. how much capital a bank should hold i f its exposure is not 
securitised (referred to as " K | R B " ) . I f the exposure is equal to or less than K | R B under a 
"first loss position," it should be deducted. In other words, the general rule under Basel 
' ~ For an explanation of why these requirements are important, please see: Irina Molostova, Ibid (n 119), 
pp. 468. 
Ba.sel II main text paras. .539-540. 
Ibid, main text para. 545. 
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11 is that originating banks should "hold regulatory capital against all o f their 
securitisation exposures,"'"^ though banks may exceptionally deduct securitised 
exposures f r o m their risk-weighted assets i f certain operational requirements are met.'^^ 
These requirements include requirements for the recognition o f risk transfer f r o m the 
originating bank.'^^ The originating bank should transfer "significant" risk to third 
parties, do not retain control over transferred exposures nor hold obligations towards the 
investors. Credit risk mitigation techniques, when used should meet the prudential 
requirement o f Basel 11. Call up calls should not be mandatory, as well . In addition, 
when a bank provides implici t support, i.e. "provides support to a securitisation in 
excess o f its predetermined contractual obligation"' '* it should maintain capital against 
exposures that has not been securitised. 
2. Operational Risk 
Basel 11 defines operational risk as "the risk o f loss resulting f rom inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or f r o m external events. This definition 
includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk".'"^ Basel 11 also 
proposes three models for calculating operational risk; namely, the Basic Indicator, 
Standardised Approach and Advanced Measurement Approach ( " A M A " ) . ' ^ ^ Moving up 
through these three consecutive approaches should provide banks with an incentive to 
improve their operational risk management.'^' 
Income is used as the proxy for the scale o f a bank's operation and hence the 
degree o f its operational risk. Under the Basic Indicator approach, operational risk is 
calculated according to a basic formula, whereby the gross income o f the bank for the 
preceding three years is multiplied by 15 percent. Under the Standardised Approach the 
Ibid, main text para. 560. 
Ibid, main text para. 554. 
'-^ Ibid, main text paras. 554-559. 
Ibid, main text para. 551. 
™ Ibid, main text para. 644. 
Ibid, main text para. 645. 
Richard Belhell-Jones, 'Basle Committee Tries to Come to Terms with Operational Risk' 2001 I F L R . 
Vol . 20(March), pp. 12. 
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operational risk o f the bank's business lines is measured separately by fo l lowing the 
same formula then summed up. By contrast banks are allowed to use their internal 
operational risk models under the A M A . Risk mitigants are also recognised under the 
A M A . 
3. Market risk 
A. Outline 
Basel I I introduces less significant changes to the treatment o f market risk for 
capital adequacy purposes. Like its predecessor (1996 Capital Accord Amendment), 
market risk is defined as "the risk o f losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising 
f r o m movements in market prices."'''" The risks subject to this requirement are also 
interest rate risk and equity position risk in the trading book as well as commodities risk 
and foreign exchange risk throughout the bank.'^^ The definition o f the trading book is 
widened to cover all positions in financial instruments held either for trading purposes 
or for hedging other instruments in the trading book.'' ' ' ' 
Financial instruments and positions are defined as fol lows: 
"A financial instrumeni is any contract that gives rise to both a financial asset of one entity and a 
financial liability or equity instrument of another entity. Financial instruments include both 
primary financial instruments (or cash instruments) and derivative financial instruments. A 
financial asset is any asset that is cash, the right to receive cash or another financial asset; or the 
contractual right to exchange financial assets on potentially favourable terms, or an equity 
instrument. A financial liability is the contractual obligation to deliver cash or another financial 
asset or to exchange financial liabilities under conditions that are potentially unfavourable. 
Positions held with trading intent are those held intentionally for short-term resale and/or with 
the intent of benefiting from actual or expected short-term price movements or to lock in 
arbitrage profits, and may include for example proprietary positions, positions arising from client 
servicing (e.g. matched principal broking) and market making."'"^' 
1.12 B C B S , Ba.sel II. main text para. 683(i). 
Ibid, main text para. 683(i). 
Ibid, main text para. 685. 
Ibid, main text paras. 686 and 687. 
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Banks are provided with guidance on prudent valuation o f positions in the 
trading book, because it usually contains less liquid positions.'^^ They should first have 
adequate systems and controls to ensure the prudence and reliability o f the valuation 
estimates. This includes the adoption o f documented policies on evaluation and the 
existence of an independent reporting line f r o m the front off ice. Basel I I also 
emphasises that positions should be marked-to-market, and i f not possible, they may be 
marked-to-model. Marking-to-market should be at least undertaken on a daily basis at 
available close-out prices f r o m independent sources such as exchange prices. Marking-
to-model is permitted only i f certain condifions are met. Models and their embedded 
assessments should be evaluated and periodically reviewed. Inputs should also be 
externally obtained. Furthermore, valuation adjustments or haircuts (i.e. percentages o f 
capital set aside to cover against a possible risk) must be established. In addition, 
haircuts must cover at least close-out costs, unearned credit spreads, operational risks, 
future administrative costs, early termination, investing and funding costs as well as 
model risk where appropriate. 
Instruments in the trading book are subject to capital charges against market risk 
as a general rule. OTC derivatives, repo style and unsettled trades are exceptionally 
charged against counterparty credit risk. The methodology applied for calculating credit 
risk in the banking book (be it the standardised or the IRB approach) shall also be 
employed to the trading book, when applicable. 
Basel I I also entitles banks to hold Tier 3 capital to cover against market risk 
only provided that three conditions are met. First, credit and market capital requirements 
must be met forehead. Secondly, Tier 3 capital should not exceed 250 percent o f Tier 1 
Capital. Thirdly, Tier 2 capital may substitute Tier 3 capital provided that it does not 
exceed the 250 percent ratio. 
Banks may choose between the standardised methodology using determined 
measurement, or the internal model based methodology, wi th the approval of their 
supervisory authorities. 
Ibid, main text paras. 690-701. 
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B. The Standardised Method of Measuring Market Risk 
The standardised method covers the four types of market risk as well as provides 
separate rules f o r options' risks. Accordingly, capital charges are calculated separately 
for interest rate risk, equity position risk, commodities risk, foreign exchange risk and 
options. Then, the sums are added ari thmetically. '" The standardised methodology also 
employs the "building block" approach, whereby 'specific risks' related to the issuer as 
well as 'general market risks' emanating f r o m equity and debt positions are calculated 
separately.'^^ 
I. Interest Rate Risk 
Measurement o f interest rate risk under Basel I I covers fixed-rate and floating 
rate debit securities and instruments o f similar effect such as non-convertible preference 
shares.''^'' It determines capital requirements by calculating charges for 'specific risk' 
and 'general market risk' separately then summing the results. It also provides 
independent rules on dealing wi th derivative instruments with the exception o f options. 
Specific risk here refers to unfavourable movements in the price o f securities related to 
the issuer itself. Risk weights are assigned for government and other issuers, e.g. 
governments rated A A A to A A - are assigned a risk weight o f zero percent.''"' The 
general market risk, by contrast, is designed to capture the risk of loss pertaining to 
general market movements. 
Basel I I permits a choice between the 'maturity method' , and the 'duration 
method' to capture interest rate risk in the trading book. Required capital under both 
methods is the summation o f four elements: the net position in the trading book; 
'vertical disallowance', being the small proportion o f the matched positions in each time 
band; 'horizontal disallowance', being the larger proportion o f the matched positions 
across time bands; and finally the net charge for positions in options.'"' 
Ibid, main text para. 701 (i)-
'^ ^ Ibid, main text para. 701 (iii). 
Ibid, main text para. 709(i). 
Ibid, main text paras. 709(iii)-7IO. 
Ibid, main text para. 718(i). 
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As to banks employing the maturity method, short or long positions are slotted 
into a maturity ladder divided into thirteen time bands at least. Floating rate instruments 
are classified according to the remaining term to next repricing date, while f ixed rate 
instruments are classified according to residual term to maturity.''*" The fu-st stage in 
this method is to weight positions wi th in each time band according to a specific table,''*"^ 
comprised o f three time zones (zero-one year, one year to three years and four years and 
above). In order to avoid basis risk (defined as "the risk that the relationship between 
the prices of similar commodities alters through time") as wel l as gap risk (defined as 
the risk that "price may change fo r reasons other than a change in interest rates").'*'* 
Basel I I levies a 10 percent capital charge for the smaller (short or long) position, 
known as 'vertical disallowance'.' ' '^ Then banks w i l l be permitted to conduct two 
rounds o f 'horizontal offsett ing' between net positions within the same zone (30 percent 
for the first time zone and 40 percent for zones 2 and 3) and then between the different 
zones. The last offsetting is subject to a scale of horizontal disallowances wi th in the 
same tiine zone and between adjacent zones (40 percent). Finally, the residual net 
position o f each zone may be offset against opposite residual positions o f other zones, 
subject again to a disallowance factor.'*^' 
As to the duration method, banks with the approval of their respective 
supervisory authorities should measure their general market risk by calculating the price 
sensitivity for each position on its own. Then they w i l l slot the results into a duration 
based ladder comprised o f 15 time bands. Positions in time bands w i l l afterwards be 
subject to a 5 percent vertical disallowance, in order to capture basis risk. Finally, net 
positions of each time zone w i l l be carried forward to be offset horizontally subject to 
scaling disallowances.'''^ 
Ibid, main text para. 718(iii). 
Ibid, main text para. 718(iv). 
Ibid, main text para. 7 I 8 ( X L V ) . 
Ibid, main text para. 7 I8(v). 
Ibid, main text para. 7 l8 (v i ) . 
Ibid, main text para. 7 l8 (v i i ) . 
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Capital charges also cover interest rate derivatives. The measurement should 
cover all interest rate derivatives and off-balance sheet instruments in the trading book 
wi th the exception o f options. They should be converted into positions and become 
subject to general and specific market risk charges.'"^ 
I I . Equity Position Risk 
Banks should hold capital charges against equity positions in the trading book. 
Instruments include common shares instruments which behave like equity and 
commitments to buy or sell equity. Similarly to debt securities, the capital charges are 
the summation o f 'specific risk' and 'general market risk' calculated for each market 
separately. Specific risk is the sum of all short and long positions in an individual 
equity, while the general market risk refers to overall net position i.e. the difference 
between the sum o f long and short positions.'"^ 
The capital charge for the general market and specific risks w i l l be 8 percent 
however; the ratio for specific risk may be reduced to 4 percent in case o f well-
diversified and l iquid p o r t f o l i o s . E q u i t y derivatives and off-balance-sheet positions 
infiuenced by equity prices, wi th the exception o f options, should be converted into 
notional positions then be subject to capital charges.'^' 
in. Foreign Exchange Risk 
Banks should hold capital to capture risks o f taking or holding positions in 
foreign exchange including gold.'^" The calculation is undertaken by fo l lowing two 
processes, first, measuring the exposure in a single currency position and, secondly, 
measuring foreign exchange risk in a portfol io o f foreign currency positions and gold.'^'' 
The second process allows the application o f two alternative methods, wi th the 
Ibid, main text para. 7 l8( ix) (x) . 
Ibid, main text para. 7 l8(xx) . 
Ibid, main text para. 718(xxi). 
Ibid, main text para. 7 l8 (xx ix) . 
Ibid, main text para. 7 l8 (xxx) . 
"•^  Ibid, main text para. 718(xxxi). 
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supervi.sor's approval. The first method is the internal model approach, which should 
reflect the risk according to the composition o f the portfol io. The other method is the 
'short method,' which treats all the currencies on an equal basis. The capital charge is 
the higher of net positions (net long or net short) plus the net position in gold multiplied 
by 8 percent.'-'''' 
Banks that do not hold foreign exchange positions for their own and do 
insignificant business in foreign exchange are excluded f r o m this requirement. 
rV. Commodity Risk 
Basel I I establishes min imum capital requirements against taking or holding 
positions in commodities. It defines commodity as "a physical product which is or can 
be traded on a secondary market, e.g. agricultural products, minerals (including o i l ) and 
precious metals." '" Precious metals do not include gold, which is captured by capital 
foreign exchange.'^*' 
Commodities markets are less l iquid than the debt and equity markets, more 
volatile and less transparent. It is also less likely to hedge positions in commodities. 
Therefore, they expose banks to wider risks including basis risk and interest rate risk.'^^ 
Basel I I provides banks with three alternatives for the calculation o f commodities risk. It 
allows the application o f banks internal models, the standardised method comprised o f 
the maturity ladder approach or the simplif ied approach, whereby the net long and short 
positions for each commodity are calculated.'^^ 
A l l positions affected by commodity prices are included and subject to a 15 
percent capital charge for net positions in each commodity. Each commodity is also 
subject to a 3 percent capital charge o f the bank's gross position valued at the current 
spot price. 
'•'^  Ibid, main text para. 7 l8(x i i ) . 
Ibid, main text para. 718(xLii)(xLii i ) . 
Ibid, main text para. 7 l 8 ( x L i i i ) . 
Ibid, main text para. 7 l 8 ( x L v ) , 
'^ ^ Ibid, main text para. 718 (xLv i i ) . 
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V. Options Risks 
Banks are offered various approaches for the calculation o f capital charges 
against holding positions in options. Banking institution involved in wri t ing options 
should apply the more sophisticated methods.'^' The capital charge is 8 percent for 
general market risk plus 8 percent for specific risk.'^'' 
C . The Internal Models Method of Measuring Market Risk 
Banks must obtain the prior approval o f their supervisors on applying the 
internal models approach for measuring capital requirements against market risk. The 
approval shall be granted only i f the respective bank has, at a minimum, an appropriate 
risk management system, adequate staff, track record o f accurate internal models, and 
conducts stress testing.'^' Stress testing is ante post testing o f internal models to 
"ident ify events of influences that could greatly impact banks''.'^" 
Banks employing the internal model approach should also meet a list o f 
quantitative and qualitative requirements. '" An essential requirement is that the 
measurement system should capture all the on and off-balance-sheet market risks, 
whether related to interest rate, equity position, foreign exchange or commodities' risks. 
While banks may devise their internal models, they are bound to observe a minimal list 
o f quantitative requirements. First, VaR must be calculated on a daily basis, wi th 99"' 
percentile, one tailed 'confidence interval, ' min imum 'holding period' o f ten days, and 
at least one year o f 'historical observance.' Banks should also update 'data sets' used 
for their models at least every three months and when material changes in market prices 
occur. Each bank must meet a min imum capital requirement being the higher o f ( i ) the 
preceding day's VaR and ( i i ) an average o f the daily VaR o f the previous sixty business 
days, multiplied by a multiplication factor o f at least 3. 
Ibid, main text para. 701 (iv). 
Ibid, main text para. 701 (iv). 
"'' Ibid, main text para. 718(Lxxi) . 
Ibid, main text para. 7 !8(Lxxvi i ) . 
Ibid, main text para. 7 l8(Lxxiv)-(xcix) . 
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Qualitative requirements refer to the role o f the boards o f directors and senior 
executives in active risk monitoring. They include the existence o f an effective risk 
control unit, adequate internal audit review and compliance o f internal models wi th set 
out policies, controls and precedence. They also cover conducting backtesting i.e. ex 
post comparison between model-generated results and actual market movements, as 
well as conducting stress testing, which should include factors that can cause 
extraordinary losses (such as low probability incidents). Internal models should also be 
subject to initial and periodic validation reviews by wel l qualif ied and independent 
parties. 
In situations where a bank applies VaR measures to specific risks, it must 
capture all components o f price risk, including event risks that are not reflected in its 
VaR such as risks beyond the ten days internal and severity events and low probability 
risk. It should also cover credit risk in the trading book known as 'incremental default 
risk.' The latter type o f risk was introduced into Ba.sel I I in 2(X)5, '^ in order to cover 
banks against default risks emanating f r o m their increased exposures to credit risk 
particularly i l l iquid products. It was designed to capture 99 percent 10 day VaR over 
one year. 
Finally, banks are allowed to combine internal models wi th the standardised 
approach for different broad types o f risk. They may not use the two methodologies for 
the same category o f risk. Also, once a bank is permitted to apply its internal models, it 
may not revert back to the standardised approach.'*^ 
D. New Proposals 
The credit risk crisis o f 2007-2008 highlighted that most losses occurred in the 
trading book and mainly as a result o f over-exposure to SPEs. It showed that the VaR 
treatment of banks' assets in the trading book cannot capture extraordinary events 
(migration risk combined with loss o f l iquidi ty) and losses that occurred less frequently 
than 10 days in a year. Therefore, the BCBS is currently reviewing the treatment of 
B C B S . The Application of Ba.sel II to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double Default Effects. 
(July, 2005). 
B C B S . Basel U. main text para. 718(Lxxxvi) . 
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incremental default risk to cover both types o f risks.'^^ In addifion, Basel I I is proposing 
amendments to its market risk framework in general.'^^ The proposed amendment is 
designed to capture both risks in the banking book for unsecuritised products. 
Securitised products w i l l also be treated equally in the banking and trading books to 
ensure the avoidance o f arbitrage. Furthermore, the preferential treatment provided for 
well diversified portfolios is proposed to be eliminated. In addition, the BCBS is 
proposing various measures to enhance the stress testing o f banks and improve the 
external validation o f stress testing. 
3.3.2.2. Pillar 2: The Supervisory Review Process 
The declared purpose o f the supervisory review process is to stimulate banks to 
improve their risk management techniques not merely to monitor banks' capital 
adequacy.'^'^ Basel I I therefore stresses that increasing capital is neither an alternative to 
adequate risk management nor the sole solution fo r dealing with increased risks. Other 
solutions are improving internal control systems and strengthening provisions.'^^ Within 
this context, Basel I I sets out four supervisory principles, as well as elaborates on issues 
to be addressed under the review process. 
The first supervisory principle focuses on the bank's duty to adopt rigorous 
Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process ("1CAAP") . '^° First, board members and 
senior management should understand and monitor the risk management process. 
Secondly, banks need to undertake sound capital assessment, which relates capital to the 
level o f the bank's risks, as well as determines measures for the identification, 
measurement and reporting o f material risks. Thirdly, the assessment should be a 
comprehensive one, including credit risk, operational risk, market risk, interest rate risk 
B C B S , Guidelines for Computing Capital for Incremental Default R i sk in the Trading Book 
Consultative Document. (January, 2009). 
167 
16S 
B C B S , Revisions to the Basel LI Market Risk Framework, Consultative document (January, 2009). 
Ibid, main text para. 720. 
Ibid, main text para. 723. 
'™ It is noteworthy that Basel U employs the term "internal capital adequacy assessment process" only in 
paragraph 55 without acronym ' I C A A P ' and uses the term "internal capital adequacy process" in other 
paragraphs, although the term is more common in academic literature and later B C B S publication such as 
B C B S . 'Progress on Basel II Implementation: New Work.streams and Outreach' 2007 Basel Committee 
Newsletter. ( I I ) (May). 
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in the banking book, l iquidity risk and other risks. It explains that "other risks" are not 
easily measurable, and expects the industry to further develop techniques for managing 
all aspects o f these risks.'^' Fourthly, the establishment o f a system fo r monitoring and 
reporting risk and demonstrating how change in the risk profi le may affect the need fo r 
capital. Finally, banks should review their internal control systems to ensure the 
accuracy, integrity and reasonableness o f the risk management process. 
The second principle o f the supervisory review process concerns the role o f the 
supervisory authorities to review and evaluate the I C A A P in order to identify 
deficiencies and intervene promptly to reduce banking risks.'^^ The focus o f the review 
should be on the quality o f risk management. The review should also examine in detail 
banks' internal analysis, because o f the huge adverse impact that errors in methodology 
and assumption can have on capital requirements. Banks' supervisors, nevertheless, 
should not attempt to assume the duties o f banks' management, who are ultimately 
responsible fo r sound risk management. 
The third principle is that supervisors should expect regulated banks to maintain 
capital ratio and be empowered to require banks to do .so. Basel I I document offers the 
fo l lowing explanation:'^^ 
"Pillar 1 capital requirements wil l include a buffer for uncertainties surrounding the Pillar 1 
regime that affect the banking population as a whole. Bank-specific uncertainties will be 
treated under Pillar 2. It is anticipated that such buffers under Pillar I wil l be .set to provide 
reasonable assurance that a bank with good internal systems and controls, a well-diversified 
risk profile and a business profile well covered by the Pillar 1 regime, and which operates with 
capital equal to Pillar I requirements, wil l meet the minimum goals for .soundness embodied in 
Pillar I . However, supervisors wil l need lo consider whether the particular features of the 
markets for which they are responsible are adequately covered. Supervisors will typically 
require (or encourage) banks to operate with a buffer, over and above the Pillar 1 standard." 
The fourth principle concerns the duty o f supervisors to intervene in a t imely 
fashion to prevent the bank's capital f r o m fall ing below the minimum capital adequacy 
requirements. Supervisors need to impose remedial measures such as increasing capital. 
Ibid, main text para. 742. 
Ibid, main text paras. 746-756. 
Ibid, main text para, 757. 
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More permanent solutions such as improving systems and controls are also 
recommended.'^" 
The specific issues that Basel 11 recommends that supervisors should be mindful 
o f can be grouped under three categories:''^ risks that are not captured by Pillar I 
capital adequacy (such as interest rate risk in the banking book and credit concentration 
risk); elements of risk which are not captured by Pillar I (such as the influence o f the 
business cycle); and specific areas within Pillar I I that might not be sufficiently and 
adequately covered against risk, such as stress testing, defini t ion o f default and residual 
risks o f risk mitigation techniques. Furthermore, Basel I I stresses the importance o f 
supervisory transparency and accountability, as wel l as the importance o f enhanced 
cross border exchange o f information and coordination.'^^ 
Finally, Pillar I I particularly stresses on the importance o f the supervisory 
review of securitization although already captured by Pillar I . Pillar I I first emphasises 
that, considering the various forms o f securitisation transaction.s, banks should 
determine the regulatory capital on the basis o f the economic substance o f the 
transaction, rather than its legal f o r m . ' ' ' Consequently, a higher capital assessment 
might be required o f banks i f the general rules on capital are not found adequate and 
sufficient against securitisation exposure or reducing capital relief in ca.se of originated 
assets.'"^ 
3.3.2.3. Pillar 3: Market Discipline 
Pillar l U provides for complex and well detailed disclosure requirements for 
banks. It calls banks to disclose information on their risk management systems to allow 
market participants to evaluate their risk profile and capital adequacy, as well as provide 
the market wi th consistent, understandable and comparable information."^ 
'''^  Ibid, main text paras. 759-760. 
Ibid, main text paras. 724 and 761-778. 
"*Ibid , main text paras. 779-783. 
Ibid, main text para. 784. 
Ibid, main text para. 785. 
Ibid, main text paras. 809-900. 
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The recent international financial crisis has rai.sed attention fo r the need to 
strengthen certain aspects o f the BCBS standards on capital adequacy, particularly stress 
testing.'^" Under all circumstances, an effective implementation o f Basel I I highlights 
the importance o f risk management and the partnership with banks' management and 
auditors. These issues w i l l be examined in the fo l lowing chapter. 
The most recent initiative in this regard is the B C B S Consultative Document, Principles for Sound 
Stress Testing Practices and Supervision. (January. 2009). This document is issued for comment by 13 
March. 2009. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMNT, 
AND P U B L I C - P R I V A T E PARTNERSHIP 
4.0. Introduction 
The previous chapter illustrated how Basel I I focuses on the measurement and 
management o f capital and provides for prudential rules on market discipline, while the 
earlier standards were concerned only with the calculation o f capital adequacy. This 
chapter examines the BCBS extensive efforts to lay standards on the identification, 
assessment, monitoring and controlling o f banking risks as well as related supervisory 
rules. In doing so, the BCBS analysed and flexibly responded to international crises and 
market developments by issuing new supervisory standards or replacing existing ones, 
when deemed necessary. Most significantly, the Asian crisis o f 1997-8 highlighted the 
importance o f the management of country, l iquidity and foreign exchange risks as well 
as sound accounting and sound loan assessment. Weak risk management control is a 
major cause o f banking failures. Therefore, the BCBS emphasised in a document issued 
in 1997 on the critical role o f risk management by banks. It afso issued many documents 
which set out standards on various types of risk management and the supervisory role in 
monitoring banks' implementation o f these standards. Furthermore, the financial 
difficulties o f Long-Term Capital Management ( " L T C M " ) , underscored the particular 
risks o f exposure to highly leveraged institutions ("HLIs") as opposed to ordinary credit 
risk. Most recently, the Credit Crunch o f 2008-8 also highlighted the significance o f 
liquidity risk management amongst others (Section 1). 
The growing emphasis on risk management denotes to the need for enhanced 
public private partnership. Public private partnership in the case of banking supervision 
comprises three basic elements: sound corporate governance, internal audit function and 
internal control; secondly, effective external auditing as well as the existence o f a 
tripartite relationship between the external auditors, the internal auditors and bank 
supervisors; and finally market discipline (Section 2) . 
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4.1 Risk Management 
4.1.1 Credit Risk 
4.1.1.1 Principles for the Management of Credit Risk, 1999 
The B C B S document, 'Principles for the Management of Credit Risk' 1999 
established four major principles for the assessment of banks' credit risk management: 
(i) establishing an appropriate credit risk environment; (ii) operating under a sound 
credit-granting process; (iii) maintaining an appropriate credit administration, 
measurement and monitoring process; and (iv) ensuring adequate controls over credit 
risk." 
The document recommended that supervisory authorities should "conduct an 
independent evaluation of a bank's strategies, policies, procedures and practices related 
to the granting of credit and the ongoing management of the portfolio".'^ Where internal 
risk-rating and/ or credit rating models are applied, the supervisors or external auditors 
should evaluate the quality of such models and assess internal reviews of credit 
administration and credit granting functions of the bank. When weaknesses in credit 
management control are spotted during evaluation, such as excessive concentration and 
problem asset classification, supervisory authorities should adopt appropriate measures 
to enhance the credit management control process. Finally, "supervisors should consider 
setting prudential limits to restrict banks exposures to single borrowers or groups of 
connected counterparties".^ 
There were three important points to be emphasised concerning credit risk 
control. First, these principles should be applied despite banks' stage of sophistication. 
Secondly, the inter-relationship between credit risk and other risks should be taken into 
consideration. For example, settlement arrangements influence credit risk. Thirdly, the 
four principles, mentioned above, should be read in conjunction with other B C B S 
' BCBS. Principles for the Management of Credit Risk. (September, 2000), pp. 1. para. 5. 
- Ibid. 
' Ibid, pp. 4, Section E, Principle 17. 
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complementary principles on concentration limits, exposures arising in international 
lending disclosure, as well as asset quality and loan-loss reserves. 
4.1.1.2 Sound Credit Risk Assessment and Valuation of Loans 2006 
The B C B S issued its comprehensive document 'Sound Credit Risk Assessment 
and Valuation for Loans' in 2006. The document provides for two sets of rules, first, 
"supervisory expectations concerning sound credit risk assessment and valuation for 
loans", and secondly, "supervisory evaluation of credit risk assessment for loans, 
controls, and capital adequacy". The document does not cover the particularities of 
loans carried on a fair value basis. 
The first set of rules is composed of seven principles. The first principle explains 
the role of banks' directors and senior management responsibilities in maintaining and 
monitoring credit risk assessment procedures and effective internal control systems. The 
internal control system should particularly cover the integrity and reliability of their 
loan review information. Internal controls should also ensure compliance with 
applicable legislation and accountancy frameworks. Funhermore, banks should have a 
loan review process independent from the lending function that includes a credit risk 
grading system, a process that ensures that collected information is properly used for the 
estimation of loss. In addition, banks should set up an adequate communication system 
amongst relevant functions in the bank. 
The second principle is that banks should classify their loans according to credit 
risk. The classification of large loans should be based on a credit grading system, while 
smaller loans can be either classified according to either a grading system or their 
payment delinquency status. The grading system should also typically cover 
information on the borrower, realisability of collateral and specific information on the 
credit facility. The grading system should be subject to regular review as well. The third 
principle stresses that banks that apply the I R B approach (which entails the use of 
judgment in credit risk assessments) should ensure the validation of their assessment. 
Validation includes stress testing, back testing, and tolerance limits between actual 
losses and expected losses. The fourth principle is that banks should monitor the quality 
of their loan portfolios, and accordingly determine their loan loss or provisioning 
methodology. The fifth principle illu.strates that banks should review the collectibility of 
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individual and collective loans at least annually taking into consideration all-important 
relevant factors such as probability of liquidation and concessions granted by banks. 
The sixth principle calls banks not to rely on standard formulae alone in their loan 
classification but they should also use their credit experience judgment. The judgment, 
however, should be subject to written policies within determined limits set out by the 
bank. It is also recommends that banks consider current factors such as changes in local 
and international markets rather than being hmited to historical loss experience. This 
principle, however, does not cover the important issue of training staff. The seventh 
principle recommends that the aforementioned basic requirements of credit risk 
assessment should be applied for the purposes of accounting and capital adequacy as 
well. This commonality should ensure the reliability and consistency of resulting figures 
as well as sound provisioning practices. 
The document provides three principles on the supervisory evaluation of credit 
risk assessments. The eighth principle is that supervi.sors should evaluate banks' internal 
loan review processes periodically and recommend necessary amendments thereto. The 
following principle is that supervisors should ensure that loan loss provisions' methods 
result in prudent and rea,sonable measurement of credit losses estimated in the loan 
portfolio. The last principle illustrates that supervi.sors should take into consideration 
banks' credit risk assessment practices in their capital adequacy assessments. 
4.1.1.3 Exposure to Highly Leveraged Institutions 
A particular type of credit risk, which has caught the attention of the B C B S , is 
exposure to HLIs . HLIs, including hedge funds, have three features: they are large 
financial institutions; they fall completely, or to a large extent, out of the realm of 
supervision and disclosure requirements, and have a significant leverage (defined as the 
risk to capital ratio). The failure of L T C M , a highly privileged hedge fund or mutual 
fund in the US market is a significant example of the adverse effects of banks' 
exposures to HLIs . In its search for high yields, L T C M resorted to leverage its capital in 
risky derivatives market and securities repurchase contracts." Domestic banks incurred 
large exposures towards L T C M either as a result of extending loans or through 
Alan Greenspan, "Mr. Greenspan Testifies on Private-Sector Rctlnancing of the Large Hedge Fund, 
Long-Term Capital Management'. 1988 BIS Review (77). pp. \. 
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derivatives contracts, and it is believed that had the authorities allowed L T C M to fail 
banks would have incurred significant difficulties.' 
The B C B S responded in 1999 by issuing its first document on banks' 
interactions with HLIs.^ The document evaluated banks' credit risk management 
towards credit extended to HLIs and related supervisory matters, and identified 
significant weaknesses. Most notably, banks did not have clear policies on management 
of exposures to HLIs , in Une with their overall credit management strategies. Another 
deficiency was that banks' evaluation of the creditworthiness of HLIs was considerably 
limited. 
The B C B S issued a simultaneous document 'Sound Practices for Banks' 
Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions', which provides guidance on sound 
banking practices in this regard.^ The aim of this document is to address the mentioned 
weaknesses and to improve banks" management of credit risk exposures to HLIs . These 
techniques are similar to general credit risk management standards but are adopted for 
the particular nature of credit risk identified with HLIs . The document, therefore, 
emphasises, inter alia, that banks should develop clear policies regarding their relation 
with HLIs that remain within the context of their credit risk strategy and that remain 
compatible to their exposures to HLIs. Banks should al.so have sound credit risk 
standards designed to address specifically the problems of HLIs . As a result, the 
document emphasises the importance of due diligence, credit analysis and collecting 
sufficient information of HLIs for the credit approval process and on-going basis. Banks 
should also have structured exposures' limits to HLIs and constantly monitor their 
implementation. 
' Ibid, pp. 5. 
^ BCBS. Bank's Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institution.s. (January. 1999). 
^ BCBS, Sound Practices lor Banks' Inteructiuns with Highly Leveraged Institutions. (January, 1999.) 
B C B S Compendium Vol. I. 
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4.1.2 Liquidity risk 
Before explaining the B C B S standards on liquidity risk management, it is first 
important to understand the context of liquidity risk.* Chapter I illustrated that one of 
the major activities of banks is to create liquidity and that the liquidity mismatch 
problem is one of the most serious banking problems. Chapter 1 also explained that a 
bank, which is critically facing a shortage of liquidity, is usually given access to the 
central bank's funds as a Lender of Last Resort. Therefore, it is important for 
supervisory authorities to monitor banks' liquidity. The traditional method was to 
impose statutory requirements of liquidity ratios on banks. The growth in banking size, 
complexity and sophistication of activities led to a new supervisory trend, which 
focuses on the assets and liabilities maturity structure. This is done by constructing what 
is termed as 'maturity ladders' for as,sets and liabilities during a certain period, whereby 
expected flows are calculated.*^ A bank is seen to have sufficient liquidity if it has 
adequate funds to cover potential obligations either by increasing their liabilities or 
liquidating their assets. Accordingly, in order to examine a bank"s liquidity 
management, supervisory authorities need to look first at its funding structure to check 
whether the bank has a sufficiently large and diverse deposits ba.se to minimise its 
exposure to liquidity risk. Another essential element in funding structure is market 
accessibility; i.e. the bank's ability to borrow from the market rapidly and with suitable 
costs, to meet liquidity demand. 
4.1.2.1 Sound Practices for Managing Liquidity in Banking Organisations, 2000 
The B C B S document 'Sound Practices for Managing Liquidity in Banking 
Organisations' issued in February, 2000 took the same general view on liquidity risk 
management. It stated that each bank should set out a management structure'*^ for 
liquidity risk, which suits its size, and they should then regularly review and monitor it. 
This included setting limits on banks' liquidity positions. Alternatively, the supervisory 
" See generally: Hennie van Greuning and Sonja Bratanovic, Analyzing Banking Risk: a Framework for 
As.sessing Corporate Governance and Financial Risk Management. (2000), pp.157-176. 
"ibid. pp. 158. 
"' BCBS, Sound Practices for Managing Liquidity in Banking Organisations. (February. 2000). paras. I-
22, pp. 1-6. 
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authority may set down these limits. Furthermore, banks should have adequate 
information systems, the purpose of which are to mea.sure, monitor and control liquidity 
risk, as well as to provide reports to senior management and concerned personnel on a 
timely basis. In line with the new risk-based approach to banking supervision, the 
document emphasised the need for adequate internal control systems," and the role of 
disclosure in order to improve l iquidity .Meanwhile , the role of supervisors was 
viewed mainly as undertaking independent evaluations of banks' policies and practices 
of liquidity risk.'^ 
4.1.2.2 The New Standard on Liquidity risk 
The market turmoil which commenced in mid 2007 has raised the attention 
towards the importance of banking liquidity management. The B S B S Working Group 
on Liquidity consequently reviewed banking supervisory practices in relation to 
liquidity management and published a summary of its findings in February 2008.''^ 
The document illustrates that banks have become more dependent on the capital 
market for funding; though the capital market is much more volatile than the traditional 
retail deposits. During the credit crunch period, risk-averse investors required higher 
compensation for risk and banks could only roll over to short term money market or 
even refrain from extending credit facilities. Another challenge is the growth of the 
securitisation market and the "originate-to-distribute" model of banking. The lengthy 
securitisation process of pooling and distributing assets can lead to excessive 
warehousing of assets in stressed markets. The wide-spread form of sercuritasation of 
"asset-backed commercial paper" in particular gives rise to contingent liquidity risk, e.g. 
where banks need to support conduits. 
The growth of complex financial instruments (which might not be actively 
traded, include embedded optionality, or have a short data history) has complicated 
liquidity risk assessments and management. In addition, the substantial increase in 
" Ibid, pp. 18-19, paras. 81-85. 
"ibid, pp.19, paras. 86-87. 
"ibid, PP.20-2L paras. 88-94. 
BCBS, Liquidity Risk: Management and Supervisory Challenges. (February, 2008). 
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collateral renders banks more susceptible to funding liquidity risk, because parties might 
request additional collateral in adverse market conditions. Furthermore, banks have to 
meet intra-day liquidity requirements due to developments in the settlement and 
payment systems, such as real-time gross settlement, which introduces intra-day finality 
and the unwinding effect of transactions. Finally, the increase in cross-border flows 
across currencies means that market liquidity problems might have contagious effect on 
other markets. European banks, for example, were affected by the US sub-prime 
mortgage markets. 
The document identifies liquidity lessons learnt from the 2007/8 market turmoil. 
First, the scope of stress testing was limited during the crisis to firm-specific and 
idiosyncratic shocks, which is not wide enough to capture global financial disruptions. 
Secondly, banks proved to be over-reliant on As.set-Backed Commercial Papers 
("ABCP") and did not anticipate problems with the inter-bank market. The conclusion 
is that banks' liquidity risk contingency plans should be enhanced. Thirdly, liquidity 
management failed to capture risks resulting from off-balance-sheet activities and 
contingent commitments coming up to bank's balance sheets. Fourthly, events 
illustrated that many of banks' treasury functions were not aware of the liquidity risks, 
which means that there should be coordination between treasury and business lines. 
Fifthly, the crisis highlights that liquidity problems may affect even well capitalised 
banks, and hence brings to attention the paramount importance of sound liquidity risk 
management. Sixthly, the turmoil focused supervisors' attention on the importance of 
gathering information once the market is stres.sed in addition to routine information. 
Seventh, the crisis showed that there is a stigma of banks' using central banking lending 
facilities, causing other banks to cut their exposure to the borrowing bank and 
eventually worsening funding pressure. Finally, the crisis emphasised the importance of 
cross-border supervisory co-ordination on liquidity risk. 
In light of the findings of the latter study, the B C B S issued in mid 2008 a new 
consultative document, which updates and augments its earlier 2000 standards on 
liquidity." The recommendation crystallised into the new B C B S document 'Principles 
BCBS, Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision. Draft for Consultation, 
(June, 2008). 
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for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision' issued last September. The 
document set out six principles. 
First, it stressed on the importance of sound management and supervision of 
liquidity risk describing it as the fundamental principle. The primary objective of 
liquidity risk management is to address and withstand liquidity stress. Meanwhile, 
supervisors should supervise liquidity risk to reduce the severity and recurrence 
liquidity problems.'^ 
Secondly, the document stresses on the governance of liquidity risk management. 
This entails the establishment of a liquidity risk tolerance i.e. the level of liquidity risk 
the bank is willing to take, commensurate with the bank's strategy, complexity and risk 
profile.'^ Furthermore, the bank's senior management should develop and monitor 
liquidity strategy, policies and practices and monitor its implementation according to its 
risk tolerance. The strategy should contain extensive details on the liquidity policy, such 
as the diversification and stability of funding sources, composition of a.s.sets and 
liabilities, managing intra-day liquidity, management of liquidity in various currencies, 
across borders, business lines and legal entities. The strategy should also cover both 
normal and stressed market conditions on market-wide, firm specific, as well as a 
combination of both market and firm scopes."* Senior management should also monitor 
the implementation of the liquidity strategy. In addition, banks should also incorporate 
liquidity risk in their product pricing, product approval and performance 
measurements." 
Thirdly, the document sets out detailed guidance on the measurement of 
liquidity risk to cover all important business activities and all types of liquidity risk. The 
scope of the measurement should cover liquidity risk positions for four bank items."° 
The first item is future cash flows of assets and liabilities both long-term and short-term. 
BCBS, Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision. (September, 2008), paras. 8-
9. 
" Ibid, para. 10. 
'"ibid, para.ll. 
Ibid, para. 19. 
' Ibid, paras. 22-46. 
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The second item is contingent hquidity demand. Banks should take into consideration 
any recourse provisions in asset sales and funding risks related to non contractual 
obligations particularly securisations and conduits. They should also be aware of 
undrawn loan guarantees because they can drain liquidity from banks as well as 
potential credit risk of derivatives. The third item is that all currencies in which the bank 
is active .should be included. The fourth element is that the effect of correspondent, 
custodian and settlement risks on the management of liquidity risk should be assessed 
and managed. 
In addition, the document sets out recommendations on liquidity measurement 
tools. It illustrates that banks should apply various metric tools to obtain forward-
looking assessments, impose liquidity risk exposure limits and design early warning 
systems."' Finally, liquidity management should cover the bank's institutions in each 
jurisdiction, separately on an aggregate group basis as well as cover all types of 
liquidity risk on intra-day, day-to-day, and longer time horizons."" 
Fourthly, the measurement of liquidity risk is supplemented with seven 
principles."'^ ( I ) Liquidity risk should be managed on a group wide basis across business 
lines, currencies and legal entities. (2) Banks should set out a funding strategy that 
ascertains the diversification of the tenor and sources of funding. The document stresses 
here on the significance of maintaining market access. (3) Banks should manage their 
intra-day liquidity risk so that they can meet their settlement and payment obligations 
and should be reflected in contingency funding plans and stress testing. (4) Banks 
should manage their collateral .so that it would be able to meet various collateral needs. 
(5) Another recommendation is that banks should conduct stress tests on market-wide 
and firm specific bases both separately and in combination. The purpose of the test is to 
ensure that the bank is complying with tolerance limits and accordingly amend their 
liquidity risk strategies. (6) The document underscores the importance of adopting a 
funding contingency plan appropriate for the bank's risk profile, complexity and 
operations. (7) Finally, the document proposes that banks should maintain a 'liquidity 
cu.shion' comprised of unencumbered liquidity assets of high quality. The size of the 
-' Ibid, paras. 47-55. 
" Ibid, paras. 47-56. 
~^  Ibid. Principles 6-12. which are illustrated in paras. 58-127. 
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cushion should be determined according to the complexity and risk profile of the bank. 
Within this context, banks should ensure that there are no legal or operational 
requirements preventing using these assets when needed. 
Fifthly, the document reaffirms the importance of regular public disclosure of 
banking liquidity.^'' Finally, the document expands its guidance to supervisors' role in 
monitoring liquidity risk. While the B C B S 2000 liquidity standards were comprised of a 
single guidance, this document contains four principles on this regard."^ It affirms the 
general principle that supervisors should require banks to maintain adequate liquidity 
and have sound liquidity risk management in line with the B C B S standards. Another 
principle calls supervisors to supplement their assessments with information available to 
the public, internal reports and prudential reports. The following principle is that 
supervisors should be empowered by legislation to enforce remedial measures against 
banks revealing deficiencies in their liquidity management or liquidity position. The 
final principle addresses the significance of timely and adequate information sharing 
between relevant domestic authorities including central banks, securities regulators, and 
banking supervisory authorities, as well as, on a cross border level. 
4.1.3 Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions 
The B C B S emphasises the new risk-based approach in relation to foreign 
exchange ("FX") settlement risk^^ in a document issued in 2000."^ F X settlement risk is 
defined as "the risk of loss when a bank in exchange transaction pays the currency it 
sold, but does not receive the currency it bought".^* Settlement risk exists in all traded 
products, but the significant increase in banks' exposure to currency settlement risk has 
prompted the B C B S to set out supervisory standards."^ 
-"Ibid, para. 128. 
-'ibid, paras. 132-147. 
Settlement risk is but one aspect of risks associated with currency. For farther details see: Hennie van 
Greuning and Sonja Bratanovic, Ibid (n 8)), pp. 211 -230. 
BCBS, Supervisory Guidance for Managing Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions. 
(September, 2000). 
Ibid. pp. I. para. 1. 
Ibid. 
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Settlement risk has many risk dimensions to it.''^  First, it has a credit risk ambit, 
as the bank might loose the whole principal value in case of its counterparty's default. 
Therefore, it should be treated as an equivalent credit risk exposure in terms of its size 
and exposure."" Secondly, it has a liquidity risk dimension, as large unsettled payments 
can cause the receiving bank a liquidity squeeze if it has to meet other due obligations 
out of the unsettled amount. Thirdly, it has a legal risk, as settlements often take place 
across jurisdictions. Finally, there is the possibility of facing systemic risk, taking into 
consideration the large size of settled amounts. 
In line with other B C B S documents on risk management, this document stresses 
on banks' senior management's role of monitoring settlement risk."*' Banks should have 
a clear policy on settlement risk as an indivisible part of its counterparty risk and 
proportionate with the size and scope of the bank's activities. The supervisory 
authorities' main duty is to ensure that banks have adequate procedures to measure, 
monitor and review risk exposures and policies related to .settlement risk 
appropriately.''^ 
4.1.4 Management of Interest Rate Risk 
In 2004, the B C B S issued its document 'Principles for the Management and 
Supervision of Interest Rate Risk' to replace the earlier 1997 document as well as 
support Pillar II under Basel 11^ ". The document defines interest rate risk as "the 
exposure of a bank's financial condition to adverse movements in interest rates''"*^  and 
provides a brief explanation of the four sources of interest rate risk; "repricing risk", 
which is the most common type of risk and it arises from differences in term to maturity 
Ibid, pp.2, paras. 5-8. 
Two points are worth mentioning here. First, settlement risk was not assigned a minimum capital 
adequacy requirement, as is the case with other risks such as credit and market risk. However, the Capital 
Accord, as amended, recognised this within the context of "netting," a mitigation technique often resorted 
to in settlements. For further details, see: the BCBS repon. Interpretation of the Capital Accord for the 
Multilateral Nettinij of Forward Value Foreign Exchange Transactions. (April, 1996.) 
BCBS, Ibid (n 27), pp.3, paras. 9-11. 
" Ibid, pp. 12, para. 47. 
^ BCBS, Principles for the Management and Supervision of Interest Rate Risk (July, 2004). pp. I . 
Ibid. pp. 8-20. 
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for fixed interest rate or the repricing of float interest rate; "yield curve risk", which 
takes place when unexpected shifts in the banks' yield curve reduces the income of the 
bank or its economic value; "basis risk", which results from unexpected differences in 
the rates earned and paid on financial instruments which are otherwise expected to have 
similar repricing features; and "optionality risk", which stems from holding explicit or 
embedded options (i.e. the right of the holder to buy or sell an instrument). Options can 
expose banks to serious interest rate risk if asymmetrical payoffs occur. 
The general principles on the management of interest rate risk apply to both the 
banking and trading books as well as principles applicable only to the banking book. As 
with the other risk categories, the B C B S general principles stress on the implementation 
of sound internet rate risk management practices commensurate with the bank's size and 
level of diversification. 
The B C B S sets out the following four basic elements for sound interest rate 
management.''^ The first element is that the bank's board of directors and .senior 
management should appropriately monitor the implementation policies for interest rate 
management. Banks should also define personnel and or committees responsible for 
interest risk management as well as .segregate the function of position taking from key 
control functions to avoid conflict of interest situations. The second element concerns 
the essential responsibility of banks to define interest rates and policies and procedures 
to be applied on a consolidated basis. The procedures and policies should clearly define 
lines of responsibilities, authorised instruments, hedging policies, position 
opportunities, as well as, acceptable level of interest risk. Banks should also identify 
interest rate risk inherent in new instruments and activities and ensure aforehead that 
they are subject to adequate controls. The third element is that banks must have 
adequate internal controls to ensure the integrity of the interest rate risk management. 
The fourth element is the appropriateness of risk measurement, monitoring and 
control functions. This element itself is based on four components: 
The first component is interest rate measurement, which should identify the level 
of interest rate risk of the bank and any possible excessive exposure. The measurements 
should afso as.sess all types of interest rate risk (repricing, yield curve, basis and 
Ibid. pp. 8-20. 
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optionality) associated with the bank's assets, liabilities and off-balance-sheet 
obligations as well as the affects of interest rate on the earnings and economic value of 
the bank. 
Furthermore, the document recognises various techniques of interest rate 
measurements provided that they are in tandem with the complexity of the interest risk 
profile of the bank. It makes specific reference to the simple technique of "gap 
analysis", where various types of interest rate risk exposures are divided along time 
bands according to the next repricing (for fixed-rates) or term to maturity (for floating 
rates). The interest risk exposure is deducted from the gap in a time-band. The other 
technique is the "duration" techniques, which applies additional interest rate sensitivity 
weights for each time bank. And finally, for more sophisticated banks, there is the 
"simulation" technique which assesses the effect of interest rates by detailed simulation 
of the future trend of interest rates and their influence on the bank's cash flow. All 
techniques should be based on valid assumption and accurate methodologies. 
Underlying data on current positions should also be supplied accurately and in a timely 
fashion. The document also stresses that bank risk managers thoroughly understand the 
techniques. 
The second component of sound interest risk measurement is the establishment 
and enforcement of a system of interest rate limits, which assists the bank's risk 
managers to control and monitor risk exposures. The third component is stress testing. 
Banks should test their possible vulnerability to stressed market condition and take the 
results into consideration when formulating their interest rate policies. Finally, the 
fourth component is the possession if timely and accurate reporting system of interest 
rate exposure. 
The document makes three other recommendations generally applicable to banks 
interest rate risk management^^. First, supervisors should regularly obtain information 
from banks regarding their interest rate risk management. They should at a minimum, 
receive information adequate to spotting significant mismatches in repricing. 
Information should take account of exposures in various currencies and different 
maturities across the banking and trading books. Secondly, the banks' holding of capital 
" Ibid, pp. 21-23. 
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should be commensurate with their level of exposure to interest rate risk. Finally, banks 
should disclose adequate information on their interest rate risk profile and risk 
management. 
The document provides two guiding principles applied only to the interest risk in 
the banking book (i.e. the trading book is excluded ). The first principle is that 
supervisors must ensure that banks capture their interest rate risk exposure in the 
banking book adequately. Banks should specifically supply their supervisors with 
information on their internal measurements including the results of a standardised 
interest rate shock measurement (or equivalent test). The other principle calls 
supervisors who find out that banks do not hold adequate capital in the banking book to 
require the concerned bank to hold additional capital, reduce its risk, or apply a 
combination of both remedial activities. 
4.1.5. Operational Risk 
4.1.5.1 General Principles 
The B C B S issued in 1998 a paper on operational risk, which .set out the results 
of an earlier survey conducted by the B C B S on the participating banks' techniques of 
operational risk management."^^ The paper illustrated that the breakdown of internal 
controls and corporate governance expose banks to operational risk.''" Financial losses 
would be incurred because of banks' management and staffs neglect of their duties, 
committing faults, errors, delays or any other acts that jeopardi.se the bank's interests. 
Other causes are the failure of I T systems and disastrous events. The survey also 
recognised that banks' senior management's awareness of the importance of internal 
management had certainly increased, but operational management and monitoring 
system were in their infancy stage and many necessary conceptual frameworks and data 
Ibid, pp. 24-26. 
BCBS, Operational Risk Management. (September. 1998). 
•"'Ibid. pp.I. 
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were aLso lacking."' It further stated that it would be working on developing standards 
for the measurement, management and control of operational risk 42 
Banks operational risk has increased sharply in the decades as a result of 
advancement in banking technologies, globalisation and deregulation. Information 
technology, for example, has transformed the risk of manual error to I T system failures. 
Risk mitigation techniques such as collateral and netting also increased banks' exposure 
to legal risks, while reduced their market and credit risks."* .^ Banks therefore sustained 
substantial losses including losses resulting from external and internal fraud, systemic 
failures and business disruption,'"' causing at times serious banking failures. Banks and 
supervisory authorities consequently started to treat operational risk management as a 
distinctive risk comparable to credit and market risks.""^ 
The B C B S responded to last-mentioned market developments by issuing in 2003 
a new document on 'Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of 
Operational Risk'. It defines operational risk as the risk of loss emanating from the 
inadequacy or failure of internal processes, people and systems as well as external 
events. The definition includes legal risk but excludes strategic and reputational risk.'"' It 
also spells out principles on .sound operational risk management practices applicable to 
all banks, despite their sizes and complexity. First, it states that banks should develop 
their own operational risk framework."^ The board of directors should approve and be 
familiar with such framework, regularly monitor its application and ensure that it is 
subject to adequate internal audit. Senior management should also be responsible for the 
implementation of the framework as well as developing needed policies and procedures 
for operational risk management. Secondly, banks should develop viable operational 
" Ibid, pp.1. 
Ibid, pp. 7. 
B C B S . Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of Operational Risk. (February, 2003), 
pp.3, para. 3. 
^ Ibid, pp.2, para.5. 
Ibid, pp.3, para. 7-8. 
•"' Ibid, pp.2, para. 4. 
Ibid, pp. 6-8, paras. 1 1-22. 
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risk management programmes covering the stages of risk identification, assessment, 
monitoring and control or mitigation."* Identification and assessment of operational risk 
should cover all substantial products, activities, systems and proces.ses undertaken or to 
be introduced. Operational risk should also be regularly monitored and reported thereon 
to senior management. Banks also need to regularly review their risk control strategies 
and adjust their risk profile accordingly, as well as, adopt risk contingency and 
continuity plans. Thirdly, banks should disclose adequate information about their 
operational risks."*' 
As to the role of banking supervisory authorities, the document sets out two 
important principles:^° 
"Banking supervisors should require that all banks, regardless of size, have an effective 
framework in place to identify, assess, monitor and control/mitigate material operational risks 
as part of an overall approach to risk management". 
"Supervisors should conduct, directly or indirectly, regular independent evaluation of a bank s 
policies, procedures and practices related to operational risks. Supervisors should ensure that 
there are appropriate mechanisms in place which allow them to remain apprised of 
developments at banks". 
4.1.5.2 High Level Principles on Business Continuity 
One of the most significant issues in operational risk management is to ensure 
effective business continuity management during major disruptions such as earthquakes, 
outbreak of Avian Flue, and terrorist attacks. The B C B S and other members of the Joint 
Forum issued their specialised guidance 'High-level Principles for Business Continuity' 
in 2006. This document provides the following definition for business continuity 
management:^' 
"A whole-of-business approach that includes policies, standards, and procedures for ensuring 
that specified operations can be maintained or recovered in a timely fashion in the event of a 
Ibid, pp. 8-14, paras. 23^4. 
* Ibid, pp.14, paras. 50-51. 
^Ihid. pp. 13. 
" Joint Forum, High-level Principles for Business Continuity. (August, 2006). pp.1. 
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disraplion. Its purpose is to minimise the operational, financial, legal, reputalional and other 
material consequences arising from a disruption". 
The document illustrates that effective business continuity management is 
comprised of three elements. It starts with a business impact analysis, which identifies 
and measures the effects of loss of business both quantitatively and qualitatively. The 
other element is the recovery strategy which spells out the recovery objectives and 
prioritises actions in light of the business impact analysis. The last element is the 
provision of a business continuity plan which provides details on the recovery 
strategy.^' 
The document provides seven principles comprising a framework for business 
continuity management for both financial supervisors and financial institutions.^^ 
The first principle calls upon institutions to have business continuity management 
integrated within their risk management plans and procedures. This entails the board 
and senior management roles in developing and implementing sound business 
continuity management, and an adequate reporting framework. It also covers defining 
roles, responsibilities and succession plans, particularly determining the locus of 
responsibility during a crisis. The second principle emphasises on the importance of 
addressing major operational disruptions on business continuity including the allocation 
of a remote alternate site with adequate infrastructure, the availability of current data 
and essential systems and equipment as well as the provision of sufficient staff. 
The third principle advises setting out recovery objectives which represent the scale 
of the institution's operations and risk profile. Critical service problems e.g. should be 
recovered within the day of disruption. Supervisory authorities are also advised to 
participate in the recovery objectives of supervised institutions. The fourth principle 
emphasises on the inclusion of effective communication procedures with internal and 
external parties during the event of operafional disrupfions, including the decision to 
invoke the business continuity plan. The communication procedures should, at a 
minimum, identify personnel charged with communication, utiUse exisfing 
communication protocols, regular updafing for contact details, responses to 
~ Ibid, pp. 7 read together with the glossary on pp. I -4. 
"ibid. pp. 11-18. 
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communication disruption and, as far as financial institutions are concerned, contain 
contact information with government authorities. 
Principle five warrants the attention of both supervisors and institutions to the 
importance of cross-border communication during disruptive events and the necessity of 
including related procedures in business continuity plans. The sixth principle draws 
attention to the significance of testing business continuity plans, and accordingly 
updating these plans. Finally, the document calls upon financial authorities to 
incorporate the evaluation of business continuity plans in their assessment of supervised 
institutions. 
4.1.6 Compliance Risk 
Compliance risk has emerged as a new type of banking risk, '^* as a result of 
compliance related deficiencies which occurred in important international banking 
institutions, most significantly ABN AMRO Bank.^^ The BCBS responded by issuing a 
novice document for this purpo.se in 2005 entitled 'Compliance and the Compliance 
Function in Banks'. This document defines compliance risk as "the risk of legal or 
regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss to reputation a bank may suffer as a 
result of its failure to comply with laws, regulations, rules, related self-regulatory 
organisation standards, and codes of conduct applicable to its banking activities''.^^ The 
definition of compliance risk is therefore a broad one as it entails breach of legislation 
and codes of conduct related to anti-money laundering and countering the financing of 
terrorism on one hand, and other legislation such as tax evasion, on the other hand.^ ^ 
The BCBS and other standard-setting fora, most notably, the Financial Action 
Task Force ("FATF")^^, an inter-governmental forum which aims at setting out policies 
for promoting anti-money laundering and the financing of terrorism, had already 
BCBS, Basel Committee Issues Guidance on the Compliance Function in Banks. Press Release 29 
April, 2005. 
"Arnold Schilder, 'Banks and the Compliance Challenge', BIS Review No. 20, 2006 pp. 4-6, 
BCBS, Compliance and the Compliance Function in Banks. (April, 2005), pp. 7. 
" Ibid, pp. 7. 
'^^  For Funher details, please see: www.fatf-gafi.org. 
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recognised and addressed the potential danger of money laundering and the finance of 
terrorism. It is beyond the scope this thesis to discuss in detail related international 
standards. It is sufficient to mention that early documents focused on the duty of banks 
to know their customer for financial crimes purposes, while the 2005 BCBS document 
on compliance seeks to create an umbrella compliance function which generally 
embedded within the bank's culture. In addition, it charges bank's boards of directors 
with the duty to approve their respective banks compliance policies including the 
establishment of a formal policy document as well as monitoring the management of 
compliance risk.^^ The major responsibilities for managing the compliance function fall 
on the senior management; it is their duty to ensure that the compliance plan is 
observed, and disciplinary or remedial action is imposed and reported to the board of 
directors whenever there is a breach. They are also responsible for the establishment of 
an effective and permanent compliance function.*^ 
The BCBC does not impose on banks to have a .separate unit or department for 
compliance, as long as they have independent and well resourced compliance functions 
capable of undertaking their responsibilities. The latter document however, also 
recommends that the compliance function be subject to the internal audit function**'. It 
further sets out four safeguards for the independence of the compliance function. First, 
it should have a formal written document establishing its status within the bank. 
Secondly, there should be a head for the overall compliance function of the bank. 
Thirdly, compliance staff should not be charged with other responsibilities that do or 
may conflict with their compliance duties. Finally, compliance staff should have access 
to documents and be empowered to induct investigations as well as have a direct 
reporting line to the board of directors." 
It is noteworthy that Basel 11^ ^ does not cover compliance risk. It rather states 
that banks should cover all material risks in their capital assessments.^ ^ Basel I I lists 
BCBS. Ibid (n 56), (April, 2005), pp. 9-10. 
Ibid, pp. 10. 
" Ibid, pp.15. 
Ibid. pp. 10-13. 
''^  References to Basel II in this Thesis arc made to the Comprehensive Version issued by the BCBS in 
June 2006. This document is a compilation of the June 2004 Basel IJ Framework, the elements of the 
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compliance risks within a broad category of "other risks" (i.e. other than credit market, 
operational, interest rate risk in the banking book) expecting banks to manage them 
despite admitting that they are not easily measured.''^ 
4.2. Public Private Partnership 
The new risk focused approach requires the co-operation between a number of 
public and private key players: the supervisory authorities, bank management, 
shareholders, external and internal auditors and the general public. Therefore, the BCBS 
has increasingly focused on setting standards on corporate governance, external and 
internal auditors as well as transparency of banks' financial systems. 
4.2.1. Internal Control 
Significant banking failures, which took place during the 1990s were attributed 
to weak internal controls .The first shortcoming in internal controls was weak board 
management oversight of the internal control function, particularly, in relation to two 
elements: lack of emphasis on the importance of strong internal control systems and 
failure to define organisational structures and lines of managerial responsibilities. The 
second shortcoming was inadequate risk identification and assessment. An example was 
banks' involvement in new sophisticated financial instruments without updafing their 
risk assessment systems. A third shortcoming was the lack of segregation of dufies. 
Another shortcoming was inaccuracy and inadequacy of financial information and 
problems in communicating important information such as reports on improprieties 
committed by employees. Finally, banks did not effectively monitor their internal 
controls or did not adequately address weaknesses referred by evaluation reports. 
In light of the lessons learned from above banking failures, the BCBS issued its 
1998 document 'Framework for Internal Control Systems in Banking'. It defines 
former 1988 Capital Accord that were not revised during the Basel II process, the 1996 Amendment to 
the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks, and the November 2005 paper on Basel U: International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework. 
^ BCBS, Basel IJ. para. 732, pp. 206. 
Ibid, para. 742 read in injections with pars. 733-741. pp 206-208. 
66 BCBS, Framework fur Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations. (September. 1998). see 
generally: Appendix U pp. 27-31. 
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internal control as a "process" necessary for a bank to meet its objectives and achieve 
financial viability, rather than the historic approach which saw internal control a merely 
a mechanism for decreasing banks' exposure to errors, misappropriations and fraudulent 
ac t ions .The document sets out twelve principles on sound internal control which 
evolve around five elements: 
The first element is management oversight and control culture. The document 
takes the view that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for maintaining 
adequate and effective internal control systems. They should accordingly approve and 
monitor the business strategy, organisational structure and risk levels of the bank.^ ^ The 
senior management should implement and monitor the application of said and policies, 
as well as, oversee the banks' risk levels and organisational structure. Senior 
management should also delineate responsibilities including the delegation of 
responsibilities, and set out reporting lines.'^ '^  Both board of directors and .senior 
management should establish and promote a strong internal control system that can be 
well understood by all personnel.^" In addition, compensation .schemes should not 
provide wrong incentives to personnel so that long term performance targets are not 
jeopardised for short term profits.^' 
The second element is risk recognition and assessment. The document states that 
the risk control system should cover all material risks faced by the bank and should be 
constantly reviewed to capture new and any existing uncontrolled risks.^" 
The third element is controlling activities and segregation of duties. The 
document illustrates that control activities should be an integral part of every-day 
business of the bank.^ ^ Examples of control cover are top-level reviews undertaken by 
" Ibid, pp. 
/fc/c/. Principle 1, pp.2. 
Ibid, Principle 2, pp. 3. 
™ Ibid, Principle 3, pp. 3. 
"ibid, pp. 13. 
Ibid, Principle 4, pp. 3. 
" Ibid. Principle 5. pp. 3. 
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boards of directors and senior management (e.g. comparing financial results as opposed 
to the budget); reports of activities on a department or division level; physical controls 
such as limiting access to vaults; setting up and observing risk exposure limits; approval 
and authentication requirements concerning specific transactions; and verification of 
transactions and undertaking periodical reconciliations, (e.g. comparing cash flows and 
account records). Secondly, the stresses on the segregation of duties and avoiding 
assigning conflicting responsibilities to the same person. For example responsibilities 
for the trading book and the banking book should be segregated. 
The fourth element is information and communication. The document 
emphasises the need for the establishment of a reliable information management system. 
The information system should cover internal data external market information needed 
to support decision-making. In addition, information should be provided on a standard 
format and meet the requirements of reliability, timeliness and accessibility.^^ Reliable 
information systems .should cover all of the bank's activities.Furthermore, there 
should be an adequate flow of information in all directions throughout the banking 
institution.^^ 
The fifth element is monitoring activities and correcting deficiencies. The 
document stres.ses on the importance of monitoring the effecfiveness of the internal 
control systems on a continuous basis .The document also emphasises the importance 
of internal audits in building a robust control system. Auditors should be well trained, 
competent, enjoy operational independence and report directly to senior management or, 
where applicable, the audit committee.Final ly, the document recommends that 
deficiencies in the internal auditing should be timely reported to the appropriate 
managerial level, and that there should be quick response to correct such deficiencies. 
Ibid. Principle 6, pp. 4. 
" Ibid, Principle 7, pp, 4. 
Ibid, Principle 8, pp. 4. 
" Ibid, Principle 9, pp. 4. 
Ibid, Principle 10. pp. 4. 
™lbid. Principle 11, pp.4. 
Ihid, Principle 12, pp. 5. 
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In addition to the above, the document stresses that banking supervisory 
authorities should require banks to implement adequate internal control systems, 
relatively to the size of the bank and the nature of it's on and off balance sheet activities. 
It calls supervisors to monitor whether banks have adequate internal control system and 
adopt necessary measures to address weaknesses in the internal control system. The 
document further encourages supervisors to adopt a risk-focused approach that is 
flexible and institution-specific. Banks should for example address special attention to 
situations usually associated with increased risks such as introducing changes in 
personnel and information systems.*' 
4.2.2. Internal Audit 
The BCBS issued its specialised document 'Internal Audit in Banks and the 
Supervisor's Relationship with Auditors' in 2001. 
The role of internal auditors was further elaborated on in the specialised 1998 
BCBS paper on Internal Audit in Banks.**" This document illustrates that the objective 
of the internal audit is providing assistance to the board of directors and senior 
management in carrying out their responsibilities effectively and efficiently.*'' 
Internal auditing should also adhere to various principles.*'' It should first of all 
be a permanent function and, therefore, should be supplied with adequate resources and 
staff commensurate with the size and complexity of its activities. The internal audit 
must also be independent from the daily control process as well as the bank's audited 
activities. The internal audits therefore should be given an appropriate standing within 
their organisation. Specifically they should be able to undertake their duties on their 
own initiatives, be placed directly under and have direct communications with the chief 
executive, board of directors or, where applicable, the auditing committee. The internal 
audit should undertake its assignments free from any undue interference and bias, which 
entails avoiding conflict of interest as well as any involvement in a banking operation 
Ibid, pp. 22-24. 
" BCBS, Internal Audit in Banks and the Supervisor's Relationship with Auditors. (August, 2001). 
Ibid. pp3. 
Ibid. pp. 4 - 8 . 
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which would adversely affect its independence of judgement. Furthermore, each bank 
should draw up and circulate throughout the organisation an audit charter that increases 
enhances the standing of the internal audit. 
Individual internal audits as well as the internal audit department as a whole 
should be competent by acquiring knowledge, experience and continuous training. The 
scope of internal auditing should cover all of the bank's activities and entities including 
subsidiaries, branches and outsourced functions. They should be given access to all data 
and records including those related to management. In addition, it should regularly 
review the internal capital assessment procedure of the bank. Furthermore, the 
document recommends the establishment of a permanent audit committee particularly 
for large, complex banks as a solution to the practical problems of maintaining internal 
controls. " The document also accepts the outsourcing of internal auditing, a practical 
method for smaller banks, provided that the board of directors and senior management 
continue to be the ultimately responsible parties for maintaining effective internal 
controls.^ * '^ 
In addition to the above, the document stresses on the tripartite relationship 
between supervisors and external auditors, between supervisors and external auditors as 
well as between external audits and internal audits. 
The relationship between supervisors and internal audits.- Supervisors 
should assess the work of the bank's internal audits. I f the supervisors are satisfied with 
the level of internal auditing, then they can rely on their reports as the main mechanism 
to identify internal control problems and potential r i sk s .Bank supervisors are also 
recommended to undertake regular consultations with the internal audits in order to 
discuss risk areas and how such risks should be dealt with.** In addition, supervisors are 
recommended to meet with heads of internal audits i f and when they are relieved from 
their duties. Furthermore, it is considered good practice for the supervisory authorities 
to discuss matters of general policies with the internal audits. 
Ibid, pp.15. 
'"Ibid, pp. 17. 
Ibid, pp. 11. 
*"*Ibid, pp. 11-12. 
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The relationship between internal and external auditors." The document 
envisages a role for supervisors in encouraging co-operation between external and 
internal aud i to r s . I t explains the mutual benefit of the co-operation for both of them. 
External auditors have a positive impact on the quality of internal auditing. The external 
auditors on their part may find internal audits helpful in determining the scope, timing 
and nature of their auditing. They both need to co-ordinate efforts as well as exchange 
information on significant issues which affect their work, reports and common 
understanding.^" 
The relationship between supervisors and external auditors.- The document 
illustrates that the relafionship between supervisors and external auditors should be 
regulated under law or contractual. It also stresses that supervisors can only assign to 
the external auditors tasks which are within the latter's competence or complementary 
to their regular assignments.* '^ The co-operation between supervisors and external 
auditors is important because they can provide each other with insights originating from 
their perspective works. External auditors, as an important example, can provide 
supervisors with significant information such as the failure of the audited bank to meet 
one or more of the banking licensing requirements or where there is a substantial 
adverse movement in the bank's risk exposures.'''^ The paper therefore has 
recommended relieving external auditors from legal responsibiUties for disclosing 
confidential information to supervisors in good faith,'^^ as well as, legalise disclosure of 
information by supervisory authorities to external auditors when this is found necessary 
for performing supervision.^'' 
Co-operation among the supervisory authority, the external auditors and the 
internal auditors: Finally, the document recommends co-operation among the three 
'''ibid, pp. 12. 
'Ibid. 
" Ibid, pp. 13. 
Ibid, pp. 14. 
' Ibid, pp. 15. 
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parties in order to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in performing their tasks. It also 
recommended holding regular periodic meeUngs among them. 
4.2.3. Supervisory Authorities Relationship with External and Internal 
Auditors 
The BCBS issued in 2002 its document 'Internal Audit in Banks and the 
Supervisor's Relafionship with Auditors'. This document looks into the responsibilities 
of the directors and management, explains the respective roles of, and the inter-
relationship between the auditors and banking supervisory authorities as well as the 
contribution of auditors to the supervisory process. 
First, the document emphasises the primary responsibility of the board of 
directors and management.'^ It reiterates that the primary responsibility for the conduct 
of the business of a bank is vested in the board of directors and the management 
appointed thereby. The bank's management should undertake the responsibilities of 
preparing financial statements according to an appropriate reporting framework, 
allowing external auditors accessibility to information needed to perform their tasks and 
adopting necessary measures to ensure the continuity and adequacy of the internal audit 
function. Furthermore, the internal audit function should be independent, well resourced 
and regulariy report to the bank's board of directors and management. The management, 
therefore, should ensure that there are procedures established for the consideration and, 
whenever appropriate, the implementation of the recommendations of the internal audit. 
Secondly, the document clarifies the main features of the role of the external 
auditors.'^ Most importantly, the document explains that the objective of the external 
auditors' opinion is to ascertain the credibility of the bank's financial statements and not 
to provide assurances on either the future viability of the bank or the effectiveness or 
efficiency of its management. Furthermore, the external auditor follows procedures set 
out to ensure that the bank's financial statements are prepared according to an identified 
financial reporting framework. The audit, however, does not provide a guarantee that all 
material misstatements, such as failure to disclose essential information, will be 
BCBS. The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors. (January. 2002), 
pp. 24 . 
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detected. Where a material misstatement is detected, the external auditor asks 
management to correct the misstatement by adjusting the financial statements. 
Otherwise, the external auditor issues an adverse or a quahfied opinion on the financial 
statements, which could have serious repercussions on the credibility and even stabihty 
of the concerned bank. In addition, the document explains that the practice in certain 
countries is that the auditor .sends reports the banks management on internal control 
function. In some countries the auditor is required to promptly report to the supervisor 
of any material breach of law. The document however did not make recommendation on 
this regard, the. 
Thirdly, the document explains the role of the banking supervisors as to 
maintain the stability of the banking system.^ ^ The supervisory tasks depend heavily on 
the collection and analysis of information and, therefore, supervisors need to received 
data and information through onsite inspection or external auditors. That is why 
supervisors are interested that external auditors are independent, licen,sed, in good 
standing, have professional experience, competent, objective and impartial and subject 
to applicable codes of ethics and quality assurance programs. 
The document then proceeds to review the relationship between the banking 
supervisor and the bank's external auditors.'* It explains that external auditors and 
supervisors play complementary roles.''^ First, the primary concern of the supervi.sor is 
to maintain the safety and soundness of the whole banking system and, therefore, he or 
she monitors the current and future viabihty of the bank on basis of its financial 
statements, amongst other tools. By contrast, the auditor is interested in reporting on the 
financial statements to the bank's board of directors and shareholders and consequently 
judges the bank's management on the going concern assumption. Likewise, bank 
supervisors are interested in the role of the internal control function in maintaining the 
safety of the bank's activities while the external auditor is focused on the reliability of 
internal control to plan and perform the audit. Bank supervisors and external auditors 
also share the same interest that banks maintain adequate and reliable financial records, 
but for various reasons: the supervisors are interested in the sound appraisal of the 
Ibid, pp. 8-11. 
Ibid, pp. 12-15. 
'"•'ibid.pp. 12. 
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financial condition of the bank and its profitability, while auditors need to avoid 
material misstatements in order to express their opinion on financial statements. 
In cases of supervisory authorities, which assign part of their supervisory duties 
to external auditors, the document requires the establishment of a suitable legal 
framework in the form of contract or legislation as well as sets criteria that should be 
applied to separate engagements.First, the bank's management retains the primary 
responsibility of supplying the supervisor with complete information. Secondly, the 
normal relationship between the bank and the external auditor should be retained. For 
example, information should be furnished to the supervisor by the bank itself. Thirdly, 
the external auditor needs to resolve any problem of conflict of interest before 
undertaking an assignment. Fourthly, supervisory tasks assigned to the auditor must be 
clear and specified. Fifthly, the supervisor should only assign tasks that can be 
technically and practically undertaken by an auditor. Sixthly, there should be a rationale 
for assigning a task to the auditor, for example, to reduce co.st or avoid duplication of 
work. Finally, the confidentiality duty of the auditor should not be breached. 
The significance of the role of the external auditor for sound banking 
supervision has been highlighted by the recent BCBS document 'External Audit Quality 
and Banking Supervision' issued last December. This illustrates four key areas of 
interest: supervisory authorities and banks have increa.sed their reliance on the external 
auditors' expert judgment; state of the art auditing improves market confidence, 
specially in times of market stress; supervisors are increasingly relying on high-standard 
bank auditing to complement their processes; and the globalisation and complex 
structure of major external audit firms draws attention to possible weak governance and 
lack of transparency, which could adversely affect the bank."" 
The BCBS has according set out a list of actions to address the above areas in 
cooperation with international bodies representing external auditors.'"^ 
Ibid, pp. 15-17. 
"" BCBS, External Audit Quality and Banking Supervision. (December. 2008), pp. 4-8. 
Ibid. pp. 8-9. 
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4.2.4. Accountancy and Transparency 
The recognised international accountancy standard setter is the International 
Accounting Standard Board ("lASB") (previously known as the International 
Accounting Standard Committee ("lASC")). lASC was established in 1973 and has 
been issuing International Accounting Standards ("IAS"). The issue of banking 
accountancy, however, is relevant to supervisory work for two reasons. Accounting 
standards are an essential basis of reliable measurement of banks' equity and income, 
assets, liabilities and transparency.Accountancy standards also enjoy an increasing 
importance in the new supervisory approach where transparency of accounts is 
considered an essential ingredient to assure market discipline. The BCBS has, therefore, 
established a Task Force on Accounting issues in 1996. 
The BCBS undertook a review of accounting standards both international and 
domestic, upon the request of the Group of Seven ("G-7") Central Bank Governors and 
Finance Ministers in October 1998. The BCBS also issued separate guidelines on the 
four interrelated issues of loan-loss provisioning, loan valuation, fair value accounting 
and banking transparency. These documents include its document on 'Sound Practices 
for Loan Accounting and Di.sclosure' issued in July 1999 and the above-discussed 
document 'Sound Credit Risk Assessment and Valuation of Loans' in 2006. 
4.2.4.1. Enhancing Bank Transparency 
The BCBS issued the document 'Enhancing Bank Transparency' in 1998. It 
defines transparency as "public disclosure of reUable and timely information that 
enables users of that information to make an accurate assessment of a bank's financial 
condifion and performance, business activities, risk profile and risk management 
practices". 
The document adopts the view that bank supervisors can play an active role in 
improving bank transparency in three ways. First, in order to achieve the "maximum 
benefit of public disclosure", supervisors should pursue policies that encourage the 
'"•^  B C B S , Repon to G 7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on International Accounting 
Standards. (April, 2000), pp. 6. 
B C B S . Enhancing Bank Transparency: Public Disclosure and Supervisory Inrormation that Promote 
Safety and Soundness in the Bankina Systems. (September, 1998). pp. 4. 
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disclosure of comparable, relevant, reliable and timely information.'""^ Supervisory 
authorities can particularly encourage the application of supervisory definitions as well 
as reporting classifications for disclosure purposes.Supervisors should also cooperate 
with the banking industry in order to reduce the costs of disclosure.Secondly, 
supervisory authorities should utilise their stock of supervisory information in order to 
enrich market information, providing that this done legally e.g. by publishing aggregate 
information on b a n k s . F i n a l l y , supervisors should use their powers to ensure 
compliance with disclosure standards. Comphance can be complemented with the 
application of effective internal control, sound risk management systems and 
independent external auditing."*' 
The document also provides a number of recommendations on transparency.'"^ 
Most importantly, it recommends that banks should disclose their financial statements 
to the public under the six broad categories: financial performance (particularly 
profitability), financial position (including capital, solvency and liquidity), risk 
management strategies and practices, risk exposures (market, liquidity, operational and 
legal risks), accounfing policies as well as basic business, management and corporate 
governance information. The level of details within each category should be relevant to 
the bank's size and nature of business. 
4.2.4.2 Fair Value Accounting 
Traditionally banks held their assets and liabilities to maturity and applied 
historical cost accoundng, which is based on the original purchase price. Deterioration 
in the value of loans under this approach is recognised only when assets are impaired 
and provisions are held against them. When banks in industrialised countries became 
more involved in securifies markets, they started to apply the fair value approach to 
'''^ Ibid, pp. 10. 
Ibid, pp. 11. 
Ibid, pp. 
'"^  Ibid, pp. 12. 
Ibid, pp. 13. 
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their trading book. Instruments held for trading purposes would be valued according to 
market prices.''' 
This mixed approach in accounting methodology in the banking book and the 
trading book was followed by lASC in its International Accounting Standard 39 
'Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement' ("IAS 39") first issued in 1998 
then amended in 2005. The initial IAS 39 applied fair value accounting to derivatives 
and securities held for trading purposes, while applied amortised value to deposits, loans 
and securities held to maturity. In 2005, LAS 39 was amended to permit institutions to 
decide irrevocably on the designation of any financial instrument as at fair value, where 
certain conditions are met. This was an important development for banks implementing 
or planning to implement internal risk-based models, which brought the evaluation of 
their loan book closer to an economic value than the historical cost value. 
The BCBS responded to accounting developments by issuing its 2006 document 
'Supervisory Guidance on the Use of the Fair Value Option for Financial Instruments 
by Banks'. This document illustrates the banking supervisory expectations relevant to 
the adoption of fair value generally, (though it reflects specifically on IAS 39) as well 
as, supervisory evaluation of banks' application of the fair value option. 
Concerning supervisory expectations,"^ banks should meet the criteria set out 
under IAS 39, which allows banks to use the fair value option for the purpose of 
substantially reducing or eliminating accounting mismatch, or where a group of assets 
and/or liabilities is evaluated and managed on a fair value basis. Supervisors should also 
ensure that banks set out and implement sound risk management systems before they 
apply fair value and continuously afterwards. Risk management systems need to focus 
particularly on the volatility of fair values as well. In addition, supervisors expect that 
banks will apply fair value options only to instruments that they are capable of 
estimating their fair values. I f the value can be obtained from market prices, banks 
should ensure that the mentioned market is liquid and that prices do represent actual 
"' Patricia Jackson and David Lodge, 'Fair Value Accounting: Capital Standards, Expected Loss 
Provisioning and Financial Stability', 2000 Financial Stability Review. (8)(June). pp. 106. 
Ibid, pp. 120. 
"•' BCBS. Super\'isory Guidance on the Use of the Fair Value Option for Financial Investments bv Banks. 
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trades. Banks should apply more robust methods where the market is illiquid, e.g. by 
reference to similar financial instruments traded in more liquid markets. Where the 
value cannot be obtained from the market, banks should apply robust valuation 
methods. Whatever valuation method is applied, it should be documented and back-
tested. Finally, supervisors may require banks to provide additional information to 
enable them to assess the impact of fair value measurement on the level of banks' 
capital, earnings, and risk. 
The document sets out three guiding principles on supervisory evaluation of 
controls, risk management and capital adequacy for banks applying the fair value 
option.'"* Supervisors should at least ensure that banks comply with the above 
guidelines on supervisory expectations as well as IAS 39. Supervisors should also 
examine the effect of risk management and controls pertaining to the use of fair value in 
their capital adequacy assessments. Potenfial supervisory responses to the lack of sound 
fair value evaluation include increase of capital and the exclusion of related unrealised 
Tier 1 Capital. Finally, banks should adjust their capital when designating a financial 
liability as at fair value, which could cause gains and losses from changes in credit risk. 
The market turmoil of 2007-8 revealed difficulties in estimating fair values 
emanating from the wide use of complex structured financial instruments. As market 
liquidity was reduced rapidly and prices were no longer available, banks had to depend 
more on unobservable inputs."^ The BCBS evaluated the challenges emanafing from 
the valuation of fair value lately in June 2008 and proposed developing related 
international supervisory standards in relation to five areas: (1) governance and 
controls; (2) quality of measurement tools and diversification of valuation measures; (3) 
production of valuafions during stressed periods; (4) banks assessment of uncertainty in 
valuation; and (5) internal and external transparency."^ A new Consultative document 
was issued accordingly and it is open for comment until February 2009.' 
'"Ibid, pp. 11-13. 
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BCBS, Supervisorv Fuidance for Assessing Banks' Fair Value Practices. (Novdmber, 2008). 
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4.2.5. Corporate Governance 
The issue of corporate governance gained momentum towards the end of the 
1990s. The OECD was the first inter-governmental organization to develop 
international standards for corporate governance. The OECD document 'Principles of 
Corporate Governance' were issued in 1999 to serve as a benchmark against which 
governments evaluate and improve their related legislation. It defined corporate 
governance as "a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders", as well as "the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined"."^ Furthermore, the document set out five 
categories of non-binding principles of corporate governance, which focused on a 
particular cause of corporate failures; namely, the lack of separation between ownership 
and control. These categories were the rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of 
shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and 
transparency, and the responsibilities of the board. 
In 2004, the OECD issued the revised 'OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance' in response to prominent corporate failures such as Parmalat in Italy and 
Enron in the USA. Public concerns were afso raised concerning the enforceability of the 
principles, particularly the independence and accountability of board members and the 
opacity of corporate structures in many jurisdictions. Furthermore, the initial OECD 
principles did not cover executive compensation and institutional investors.""^ 
The revised OECD principles retain the five categories of the earlier document 
and build upon them. Below is a brief review of the principles with particular focus on 
the amendments introduced by the revised document: 
' O E C D . Principles of Corporate Governance. (1999), pp. 8. 
Bill Withereli, 'Corporate Governance; Stronger Principle.s for Better Market Integrity" 2004 O E C D 
Observer. (243)(May). 
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First, the revised principles introduce a sixth set of principles entitled "the 
governance frameworks, which aims to promote market transparency and efficiency as 
well as define the lines of responsibilities among various supervisory authorities. 
Secondly, the category of protection of shareholders' rights covers a wide array 
of rights. First, basic rights including securing ownership registration, conveyance of 
shares, obtaining information on the corporation, participation and voting in general 
shareholders meetings, taking of profits and electing members of the board. Secondly, 
participation in fundamental corporate decisions such as amendments to the articles of 
association and extraordinary transactions. Thirdly, effective participation in general 
shareholding meeting safeguarded by furnishing shareholders with fimely and adequate 
information on their meetings, securing their right to ask questions and vote in person or 
in absentia. Fourthly, disclosure of corporate structures which might lead to 
disproportionality between control and equity ownership such as pyramid structures and 
cross shareholdings, shares with multiple or limited voting rights, and shareholders' 
agreements granting preferential rights.'"' 
The revised principles further strengthen shareholder's rights. They empower 
shareholders to remove members of the board of directors for the first time.'"" They also 
grant shareholders are also granted the novice right to decide on the remuneration policy 
for key-executives and board members.'"'' In addition, institutional investors are 
required for the first time to disclose their corporate governance policies; their plans on 
using their voting rights as well as how they manage material conflict of interest. 
Furthermore, restrictions on shareholders to consult each other on the exercise of their 
rights are recommended to be eased, where there is no breach of applicable Competition 
Law. '^ "^  
- " O E C D , Ibid (n 1 18), pp. I I . 
'-' Ibid, pp. 29-31. 
Ibid, pp. 33. 
Ibid, pp. 34. 
Ibid. pp. 37-39. 
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Thirdly, the principles stress on the equitable treatment of shareholders, 
including minority and foreign shareholders, whereby self-dealing is prohibited and 
redress of violation of rights is granted. 
Fourthly, the principles call for the protection of the rights of stakeholder such as 
creditors and employees to be protected while recommending performance-enhancing 
mechanisms. The revised principles tackle the protection of stakeholders whether 
established by mutual agreement or by law. They also recommend providing procedures 
and protection for employees and their representative bodies' who pass information on 
the corporate's unethical or illegal behaviour.'^^ 
Fifthly, the initial principles called for timely and accurate disclosure of all 
material information including "[t]he financial operating results of the company; 
Company objectives; Major share ownership and voting rights; Members of the board 
and key executives, and their remuneration; Material foreseeable risk factors; Material 
issues regarding employees and other stakeholders; Governance structures and 
policies".'"*' It also called for information to be prepared by independent auditors and be 
subject to auditing and disclosure requirements according to best international 
accounting standards, and that information is disseminated giving users fair and cost-
efficient access. The new principles add new elements to the definition of material 
information for disclosure purposes, being party transactions of major shareholders, or 
close family members.'"^ They also focus on the independence of the auditors and call 
for their accountability before shareholders and their duty to exercise professional 
care. " Another new principle states that rating agencies, brokers and other entities 
responsible for providing information analysis and advice should avoid conflict of 
interest situations.'^' 
Finally, the initial principles covered the responsibilities of the board members and their 
accountability before the company and its shareholders. The principles also stressed on 
Ibid, pp. 47. 
'-'Ibid, pp. 21. 
O E C D , Principle-s of Corporate Governance. (2004) pp.52. 
ibid, pp. 55-56. 
'-" Ibid. pp. 56. 
144 
the board's independence from management, and recommended the appointment of 
non-executive board members. It also called management to devote adequate time to the 
company. The revised principles clarify the duty of board members as a "fiduciary 
duty" which combines a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.'^" They also add a new 
function to the board members; namely, the alignment of board and key executive 
remuneration with the interests of the company and its shareholders.''" The principles 
also stress on the independence of the board. They do not recommend the adoption of 
the tow-tier structure but suggest that the role of the chief executive should be 
segregated from the role of the chairman. Furthermore, they emphasise the 
independence of board members from controlling shareholders. 
The BCBS has stressed on the importance of corporate governance in various 
documents including the 1999 document 'Enhancing Corporate Governance for 
Banking Organisations,' which reinforced the OECD first set of principles, and 
addressed and updated its principles in this regard.'"^ "^  
In its attempt to define corporate governance, the BCBS document quoted the 
following definition from the OECD standards: 
•'[A] set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders, and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of 
the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and shareholders and 
should facilitate effective monitoring, thereby encouraging firms to use resources more 
efficiently".'" 
Furthermore, the document explained that as far as banks are concerned, 
corporate governance entails how banks' boards of governors and senior management 
manage their respective banks, and influenced how these banks do the following: set 
objectives for the banking corporation; run the daily business operations; adjust the 
Ibid, pp. 59. 
Ibid, pp. 61. 
B C B S Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations. (September. 1999), pp. 
Ibid. 3. 
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bank's objectives and behaviour with the need to maintain the safety and soundness of 
the banking business and compliance with applicable legislation; the protection of the 
depositors' interests; and serve the interests of various stakeholders who include bank's 
employees, supplies and customers should be adequately addressed. The government 
and supervisory authorities are considered amongst the stakeholders as well, due to the 
particular nature of the banking business.'^'' 
The BCBS 1999 document provided for the following standards of sound 
corporate governance practices:'^^ 
First, banks should set strategic objectives and corporate values to control the 
ongoing operations of the bank. These values should be applied to top management and 
circulated throughout the banking institution. The board of directors should be certain 
that senior management is adopting policies which counter practices likely to reduce the 
quality of corporate governance including conflict of interest, imprudent self-dealing 
(for example lending to banks' employees on terms inconsistent with market 
conditions), and treatment of related parties on a preferential basis. 
Secondly, the key responsibilities and line of authorities of both the boards of 
directors and senior management should be defined clearly in order to avoid slow and 
diluted responses to problems. Senior management is ultimately responsible for the 
running of the banking business though they should also set a hierarchy of 
accountability for staff. 
Thirdly, the board of directors should provide checks and balances to senior 
management. Board members should also be well qualified, understanding their role as 
well as be independent. Measures that can be adopted to ensure that board members do 
not fall under undue influence from both bank management and outside concerns 
include having a sufficient number of board members, including qualified independent 
members from outside the management or a separate supervisory board of auditors. 
Furthermore, the board should regularly evaluate its performance and adopt any 
necessary corrective measures. 
Ibid. 
Ibid, pp. 5-9. 
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Fourthly, senior management should monitor line managers of specific business 
activities. In smaller banks, the rule of "four eyes principle," decisions being made by at 
least two people, should be apphed. The senior management group should also include 
the chief auditor, the chief financial manager and divisions' heads. They should enjoy 
adequate skills and knowledge as well as control over key individuals. 
One of the remaining three principles illustrated the important role of internal 
and external auditors should be recognised and properly utilised in order to enhance 
banking corporate governance. Another principle called for banks' compensation 
schemes to be aligned with their overall values, objectives, strategies and control 
environment. This recommendation was particularly relevant to traders and loan 
officers. The experience of the failure of Barings bank, as a strong example, illustrated 
that business incentive schemes should not be based only on volume or short tem 
profits. Finally, the document focused on the need to enhance corporate governance 
with transparency.''"^ 
After the OECD had released its new revised principles on corporate 
governance, the BCBS launched consultations on amending its own guidance for banks. 
It issued its document 'Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations' in 
2006. Like the earlier document, the BCBS withholds the definition of 'corporate 
governance' adopted by the OECD. It also explains guiding principles on sound 
corporate governance that widely accepted and well-established principles that guide 
supervisory authorities as well as all types of banks' managements.'^^ 
The document provides eight principles on sound corporate governance.'"'^ The 
first principle illustrates that board members should be well-qualified and understand 
their role in maintaining sound corporate management in order to exercise their 
judgment independently (particularly from senior management) and objectively to the 
best interest of the bank. To be able to do so, the board members should be of adequate 
The report referred here to the earlier B C B S document on enhancing bank transparency. Ibid (n 104). 
BCBS, Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations. (February, 2006), pp. 2. 
Ibid, pp. 6-18. 
147 
number and comprise non-executive members. Furthermore, the document recommends 
the formation of an audit committee, the majority of its members are non-executive 
members. The functions of the committee include oversight of external and internal 
auditors, recommending the appointment and dismissal of external auditors and 
determining their remuneration. Other recommended specialised committees are the risk 
management, the compensation (or remuneration) committee and the nominations/ 
corporate governance/ human resources committees. 
The second principle calls upon the board of directors to approve and monitor 
the implementation of the bank's strategic policies and corporate values. These policies 
should prohibit conflict of interest situations, preferential treatment to related parties 
and illegal extension of credit to bank managers, officers or controlling shareholders. 
The third principle illustrates that effective boards of directors define and enforce lines 
of authority and accountability in their banks separately and on a group-wide level. 
Banks' managements and control functions must be particularly vigilant where matrix 
management .structures are employed. The fourth principle emphasises the board's role 
to ensure that senior management on its part oversee the daily management of the bank 
according to the board policy. This role significantly includes establishing an effective 
internal control function. Meanwhile, the fifth principle states that banks' boards and 
senior management should recognise and enhance the effectiveness, independence and 
competence of the internal audit and internal control functions, external auditors as well 
as utilise their findings. The sixth principle states that the board should ascertain that the 
compensation policies are linked to the bank's corporate strategy and controls. Salaray 
scales should also be set to avoid undue risk taking. The seventh principle focuses on 
the pivotal importance of transparency. It calls banks for timely and accurate disclosure 
of information related to the bank's corporate governance and commensurate with its 
size and complexity. In addition to financial information, banks are encouraged to 
disclose information on their organisational structure, ownership structure, board and 
senior management structures, code of business conduct and conflict of interest policy. 
Finally, the document calls upon the board and senior management to thoroughly 
understand and manage their operational structure, particularly where the bank operates 
through opaque structures (such as SPEs) or in jurisdictions that obstruct appropriate 
transparency. 
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In addition to the above, the document sets out several principles to assist 
supervisors in their assessment of banks' corporate governance.'^' First, banks should 
provide guidelines on sound corporate governance with emphasis on transparency and 
accountability. Supervisors should also implement processes for evaluating the effective 
ness of banks' implementation of corporate governance principles. Supervisory 
assessment should cover banks internal controls; external and internal auditing; and the 
bank's group structure. Supervisors should also bring to the bank's board and 
management's attention information on any poor corporate governance practices within 
the bank. Finally, supervisors should take into consideration the existence of any deposit 
protection scheme not merely the interests of shareholders. 
This chapter is the last chapter on the substantive rules of international banking 
supervisory standards issued by the BCBS. The following chapter will discuss the rules 
on international cooperation on banking supervision which have had to expand from the 
siinple initial standards to tackle the more sophisticated aspects such as the emergence 
of conglomerates and electronic banking. 
Ibid, pp. 19-20. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
5.0 Introduction 
Chapter 2 illustrated how the BCBS early international banking supervisory 
standards were divided into two complementary types: prudential standards as well as 
standards on defining and enhancing cooperation between banking supervisory 
authorities. This pattern continued through the second era of the BCBS which started 
approximately in the mid 1990s, although the standards became more sophisticated. 
Chapters 3 and 4 explained the BCBS standards related to the prudential supervision of 
banks during the second era, while this chapter describes the standards issued 
simultaneously by the BCBS on enhancing international supervisory cooperation. 
The BCBS standards on strengthening intemafional cooperation are 
commensurate with both market developments and the BCBS own prudential standards. 
They can be grouped under three categories. First, standards set out to improve cross-
border exchange of information in relation to, amongst others, information sharing 
under Ba.sel 11, electronic banking as well as shell banks and booking offices (Section 
I ) . The chapter also shows how the BCBS has been engaged with other international 
financial fora in setfing out cross-sectoral international standards on financial 
conglomerates (Section 2). Thirdly, the chapter examines the importance of the Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and their methodology in reaching out for 
non-BCBS member countries. While the BCBS has supported the risk focused 
supervisory approach indirectly by providing rules on risk management and public-
private cooperation, the Core Principles illustrate that applying this method is 
discretionary (Section 3). The Chapter is also supplemented with Annex 1 which 
contains the BCBS Core Principles. 
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5.1 Emphasis on Supervisory Cooperation 
5.1.1. Statement of Cooperation 2001 
A number of countries expressed the need for a document which sets a 
framework for a "Memorandum of Understanding," to act as a reference for bilateral 
supervisory relations. The BCBS responded by releasing the document 'Essenfial 
Elements of a Statement of Co-operation between Banking Supervisors' in 2001. This 
was a short document establishing a Memorandum of Understanding that can be used as 
"a reference for establishing bilateral relationships between banking supervisory 
authorities in different countries".' It clarifies that information should be shared for the 
purpose of facilitating effective consolidated supervision, which should cover contact 
during banking authorisation procedures, supervision of on-going institutions as well as 
banks facing difficulties. Furthermore, the document gave in detail the information that 
should be contained in the Memorandum of Understanding regarding authorisation and 
licensing, on-going supervision, on-site inspections, protection of information and on-
going co-ordination between supervisory authorities." 
5.1.2 Shell Banks and Booking Offices 2003 
The BCBS addressed again in 2003 the issue of banking structures which pose 
serious obstacles to cross-border banking supervision, namely, "shell branches", 
"booking branches", "booking subsidiaries" and "parallel-owned banking structures". 
Shell branches are defined as "banks that have no physical presence ... in the 
country where they are incorporated and licensed, and are not affiliated to any 
financial services group that is subject to effective consolidated supervision".' 
Physical presence is also defined to mean "meaningful mind and management" located 
in the .same jurisdiction, a concept which covers the existence of administration rather 
than maintaining books and records or even low level-staff or a local agent," a practice 
1 BCBS, Es.sential Elements of a Statement of Co-operation between Banking Supervisors. (May, 2001), 
pp.1. 
- Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
• BCBS, Shell Banks and Bookina Offices, (January. 2003), Section 1, pp. I. 
Ibid, Section I, pp. I, footnote (2). 
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most practiced in off-shore centres. Accordingly, the country where the shell branch is 
located becomes the only one responsible for supervising the shell bank, yet it cannot 
exercise its supervisory role due to the existence of the bank's mind and management in 
another jurisdiction. The BCBS consequently recommends that supervisors should no 
longer license shell banks or permit the continuation of their presence.^ 
Booking branches are also branches of foreign banks which have no meaningful 
mind and management in the jurisdictions where they are licensed, and usually their 
local operations are not generated therein.^ Unlike shell banks, booking branches are a 
part of an institution with a home supervisory authority.^ In cases where the booking 
branch is directly controlled or managed by the home country, the home supervisory 
authority should exercise its duty of consolidated banking supervision, as well as have 
access to information needed within this context.* In situadons where the mind and 
management of said banks are located in a jurisdiction other than the home and host 
countries, the BCBS states that home and host supervisory authorities "must" satisfy 
themselves that they are subject to effective banking supervision. To this end, these 
authorities and the third supervisor may conclude a Memorandum of Understanding 
providing for the allocation of supervisory responsibilities and rules on the flow of 
information.' The BCBS also states that booking branches, which mind and 
management are based in an unregulated entity in a third jurisdiction should be 
prohibited."^ Concerning banks, which take the form of "booking subsidiaries," the 
BCBS recommends that they should be subject to the supervision of the home and host 
authorities." It also recommends that supervisory authorities should not license a 
' Ibid, Section 1, pp. I. 
' Ibid, Section 2, pp. 2. 
^ Ibid, Section 2, pp. 2. 
Jbid, Section 2, pp. 2. 
Ibid, Section 2, pp. 3. 
Ibid, Section 2, pp. 3. 
"ibid, Section 3. pp. 4. 
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booking subsidiary or allow it to continue its operations i f its mind and management are 
located in a third country.'" 
Parallel banks are defined as "banks licensed in different jurisdictions that, while 
not being part of the same financial group for regulatory consolidafion purposes, have 
the same beneficial owner(s), and consequently, often share common management and 
interlinked businesses. The owner(s) may be an individual or a family, a group of 
private shareholders, or a holding company or other entity that is not subject to banking 
supervision".'-' Parallel banks can be identified by a number of characteristics such as 
having an individual or coordinated group of individuals who controls a foreign banking 
institution as well as a class of voting shares in a domestic bank; an officer or a director 
of a domesfic bank controls a foreign bank or serves as a director or officer therein; 
sharing a similar name or adopting similar unique strategies or policies by a domestic 
bank and a foreign bank; or having extensive correspondent banking between a 
domestic and foreign bank.''^ 
Parallel-owned banks might escape consolidated banking supervision as they 
have at least two home supervisory authorises, and none of which finds it feasible or 
practicable to undertake consolidated supervision of the whole g r o u p . T h e BCBS 
recommends that parallel-owned banks should not be permitted. Where the supervisory 
authority lacks the legal or practical power to do so, it should at least reduce supervisory 
gaps during hcensing procedures and during on-going supervision.'^ To this end, 
supervisors should request information from applicants for licensing concerning their 
respective group structures and the applicants' relafionship therewith. Upon granting 
authorisation, the supervisory authority may take a number of preventative measures 
including enforcing a change of the group structure, imposing restrictions on the bank's 
abihty to conclude transactions, or sharing management process with parallel banks as 
well as requesting declarations from the bank's beneficial owners to furnish information 
Ibid, Section 3, pp. 4. 
" BCBS, Parallel-owned Banking Structures. (January, 2003), Section 1, pp. 1. 
" Ibid. Section 2, pp. 1. 
Ibid, Section 3, pp. 3. 
Ibid, Sections 4 and 5, pp.3-6. 
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related to parallel banks. Regarding on going supervision, the BCBS proposes the close 
coordination between supervisory authorities and, when practicable, the appointment of 
a lead supervisory authority. The supervisor may also place a restructure plan of the 
bank group or ring-fence the operations of the domestic bank. Ultimately, and where the 
international standards cannot be satisfactorily implemented, the supervisory authority 
should close the bank. 
5.1.3 Supervision of Cross-border Electronic Banking 
Developments in electronic banking have also posed new challenges related to 
the allocation of roles between home and host supervisory authorities. Information 
becomes available in any jurisdiction once they are posted on the Internet by a bank. It 
is therefore difficult to determine who the host supervisory authority is and how to 
define the scope of the home supervisory authority's role to exercise global consolidated 
supervision. The BCBS has consequently examined the definition of "cross-border e-
banking", stating that it is "the provision of transactional on-line banking products or 
services by a bank in one country to residents of another country".'^ Therefore, the 
availability of information on the internet per se is not considered as cross-border 
banking.'* The BCBS provides an annex containing list of "possible indicators of cross-
border e-banking-ascertaining an entity's intentions to extend services",'^ such as the 
extent and types of electronic activities extended to the residents of the host country. 
BCBS also admits that there is a need for exercising discretion on a case by case basis. 
Another difficulty related to how the host authority can determine that electronic 
banking is provided without effective home country supervision.^" Despite these 
practical difficulties, the BCBS emphasises the application of the home country control. 
17 BCBS, Management and Supervision of Cross-Border Electronic Banking Activities, (July, 2003), 
para. 12, pp.5 
"*lbid, para. 36, pp.10 
''^  Ibid, Annex l,pp.l2-13. 
-"Ibid, Annex 2, pp.14-15. 
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5.1.4. Information Sharing between Home and Host Supervisors under Basel II 
The complexity of Basel I I and the widening of the scope of the application of 
internally-based models mean that respective supervisory authorifies need to be fully 
aware of their role and coordinate their efforts. The BCBS has therefore issued 
guidelines on the exchange of information specifically under Basel I I . 
5.1.4.1. High-level Principles for the Cross-Border Implementation of the New 
Accord, 2003 
This document illustrates that the home and host supervisors should approve of 
the capital adequacy method adopted by banks. It also calls supervisors to adopt the 
following six principles of coordination and cooperation under Basel 11: '^ 
"Principle 1: The New Accord will not change the legal responsibilities of national supervisors 
for the regulation of their domestic in.stitutions or the arrangements for consolidated 
supervision already put in place by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision". 
"Principle 2: The home country supervisor is responsible for the oversight of the 
implementation of the New Accord for a banking group on a consolidated basis". 
"Principle 3: Host country supervisors, particularly where banks operate in subsidiary form, 
have requirements that need to be understood and recognised". 
"Principle 4: There will need to be enhanced and pragmatic cooperation among supervisors 
with legitimate interests. The home country supervisor should lead this coordination effort". 
"Principle 5: Wherever possible, supervisors should avoid performing redundant and 
uncoordinated approval and validation work in order to reduce the implementation burden on 
the banks, and con.serve supervisory resources". 
"Principle 6: In implementing the New Accord, supervisors should communicate the respective 
roles of home country and host country supervisors as clearly as possible to banking groups 
with significant cross-border operations in multiple jurisdictions. The home country supervisor 
would lead this coordination effort in cooperation with the host country supervisors". 
These principles are extracted directly from BCBS, High-level Principles for the Cross- Border 
Implementation of the New Accord. (August, 2003). 
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5.1.4.2. Home-Host Information Sharing for Effective Basel II Implementation, 
2006 
This document recommends extensive information sharing when a bank selects 
the advanced Basel II options."" It differentiates between judgmental information such 
as inspection reports and assessments information which can only be obtained from 
respective supervisors, on one hand, and factual information can be obtained from the 
supervisors and possibly banks."' 
This document most significantly illustrates that the home authority is best 
situated for providing information on the whole group and calls host supervisory 
authority to supply the information needed by the home supervisor. It also explains that 
the home and host supervisors are entitled to exchange information related to the 
methods of supervision. It stresses that both supervisory authorities have the right to 
obtain from the respective supervised insfitutions information concerning a particular 
entity within the banking group. 
5.1.4.3 Home-Host Supervisory Cooperation and Allocation Mechanisms in the 
Context of the Advanced Measurement Approach 
This document covers a set of principles which apply the home-host information 
sharing principles to banks that apply the Advanced Measurement Approach ("AMA") 
to operational risk. It confirms the long-established principles of information sharing 
and the high level principles of information sharing under Basel I I . It also determines 
that the home supervisor undertakes a pivotal role for coordinating the following on a 
group-wide level:"" 
1. "The supervisory assessment of the bank's rollout plan(s) and implementation, resulting in a 
decision on the approval of the bank's group-wide AMA; and 
2. Practical cooperation across multiple host supervisors responsible for the group's legal entities". 
2J 
BCBS. Home-hosi Information Sharing for Effective Basel U Implementation, (June, 2006), par 11. 
' Ibid, par 11. 
BCBS. Principles for llome-l losl Supervisory Cooperation and Allocation Mechanisms in the Context 
of Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA). (November, 2007), pp.2. 
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The document further explains that the frequency, scope and mechanics of 
information sharing should be adapted according to the circumstances of the supervisors 
as well as the risk profile of the bank on both group and subsidiary levels; the type of 
risk management; the degree of centralisafion within the group; and the significance of 
the subsidiary and its operational risk profile. Enhanced cooperafion is required 
whereby the bank employs a stand alone A M A relying on information supplied by the 
parent bank. In the case of hybrid A M A , the host authority should have adequate 
information on the allocation mechanism and any other relevant risk data"^. Home and 
host supervisors .should also have access to the inputs, outputs and assumpfions related 
to the allocation mechanism."^ 
5.2. Cross-Sectoral Cooperation on Conglomerates 
We have seen in Chapter I how despecialisation of financial institutions, 
innovation in financial instruments, internationalisation and deregulation have lead to 
the growth of the phenomenon of financial conglomerates in industrial economies and 
many emerging economies. Since international conglomerates cut across the 
jurisdictions of different sectoral supervisors in different countries, it has become 
essential for the major sectoral supervisory authorities to cooperate with each other. The 
BCBS took the first initiative to tackle supervisory concerns arising from financial 
conglomerate's economies and many emerging economies as in the 1990 document 
'Exchange of Information between Banking and Securities Supervisors'."^ 
Further cooperation was needed and a Tripartite Group of international banks, 
securities, and insurance regulators, was formed in 1993; namely, the BCBS the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") and the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors ("LAIS") to deal with prudential concerns 
regarding conglomerates from a cross-industry perspective. Conglomerates were 
referred to as "any group companies under common control whose exclusive or 
predominant activities consist of providing significant services in at least two different 
" Ibid. pp. 4. 
Ibid. pp. 8. 
For further information, see above pages 56 and 57 of Chapter 2. 
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financial sectors (banking, securities, insurance)".The Tripartite Group issued a 
document which was published in 1995 as a discussion document"^ on the problems of 
conglomerates and how can supervisors deal with them. 
In 1996, the Joint Forum was established under the auspices of the same parent 
organisation to immediately replace the former Tripartite Group. The original mandate 
of the Joint Forum focused on facilitating the exchange of information between the 
three types of financial supervisory authorities and the enhancement of effective 
guidance on the supervision of conglomerates.In 1999, the parent organisations 
announced that the mandate of the Joint Forum was expanded to cover cross-sectoral 
issues that supervisors need to deal with.^' The first principal mandate is to revise issues 
of general interest to the three financial sectors as well as develop principles and 
guidance and/or identify best supervisory practices, as appropriate. The Joint Forum 
also has the specific mandate to work on risk assessments and capital, disclosure of 
financial risks, as well as, cross-sectoral repercussions of severe exogenous shocks^". 
The other principle mandate is the supervision of conglomerates. 
The Joint Forum has conducted surveys and issued supervisory guidelines on 
issues important to conglomerates such as capital adequacy as spelt out in the following 
sections. 
5.2.1. Capital Adequacy Principles 
The Capital Adequacy document has two major purposes^^. The first one is to 
promote techniques for the capital adequacy measurement of conglomerates. This is a 
difficult task to achieve, because conglomerates are heterogeneous groups of financial 
The Tripartite Group, (n 29), p. 1. 
The Tripartite Group, The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates: a Report by the Tripartite Group of 
Bank, Securities and Insurance Regulators. (July, 1995). 
'"Joint Forum. Original Mandate of the Joint Forum: Mandate for the Financial Conglomerates Group 
reproduced in BCBS, Compendium of Documents Produced by the Joint Forum, (July, 2001) Annex 1, 
pp.8. 
" Ibid. pp. 6. 
'' Joint Forum. Mandate of the Joint Forum. 
" Joint Forum. Capital Adequacy Principles. (February. 1999). as reproduced in the BCBS, Compendium 
of Documents Produced by the Joint Forum , (July, 2001), pp. 1 1-28. 
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companies often subject to various capital requirements. Therefore, the document does 
not seek to set out a unified technique for capital assessment of conglomerates, but 
rather determine approaches that can lead to generally equivalent results. The second 
objective is the identification of situations that can yield inaccurate estimation of 
conglomerate's capital.^" 
The objectives of the document should be attained by following five guiding 
principles.The first three principles focus on double or multiple gearing whereby the 
same capital is used against risks in two or more companies within the conglomerate. 
The first principle is that the capital adequacy measurement must detect situations of the 
double or multiple gearing, whereby the same capital is used against risks in two or 
more companies within the conglomerate. Solo assessment of each company's capital 
will lead to an overestimation of the group-wide capital. Consequently, intra-group 
holdings should be excluded from group capital. The second related principle is that 
banks should include mechanisms to assess the effects of double, multiple or excessive 
gearing via unregulated intermediate holding companies. The third principle is that 
capital assessment should detect excessive gearing resulting from the parent company 
issue of debt and down.streaming it to a dependent, as equity for example. The fourth 
principle considers the possibility of mixing regulated and unregulated entities within a 
single group. It states that conglomerates should address the risks accepted by 
unregulated entities undertaking similar financial activities, such as leasing, in their 
capital measurements. As to non-financial entities, the general rule is that they should 
be excluded from the conglomerate's capital base. 
The last principle illustrates how conglomerates should address participations in 
regulated entities. Conglomerates are hereby called to distinguish between the three 
situations. First, if the participation does not lead to control or significant influence on 
the target company (usually a participation of less than 20%), it should be subject to the 
solo supervision rules on capital adequacy. Secondly, group participation of significant 
influence (generally participants of 20% or more, but less than 50% of target company) 
should be included in the capital assessment of the group to the extent it is in excess of 
' Ibid, paras. 1 and 14. 
' Ibid, paras. 17 and 47. 
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the target company's own capital requirements. Thirdly, participants who have effective 
control or meet the applicable company law definition of a subsidiary (usually ranging 
from above 50% up to and including 100% of the target company) should be fully 
consolidated, and minority shareholdings should be illustrated separately. 
Finally, the document sets out alternative techniques capable of producing 
consistent and comparable capital adequacy measures on a conglomerate-wide basis. 
It allows three alternative measures for calculating the capital adequacy of 
conglomerates. The first, and most preferable technique, is the "building block" 
approach whereby the consolidated capital of the conglomerate is compared with the 
aggregate of the solo capital of each financial block (or sector). The second method is 
the "risk-based aggregation", which resembles the pervious approach with amendments 
needed to suit unconsolidated groups. The solo capital of each entity after deducting 
intra-group investments is compared with the solo capital of each entity comprising the 
financial conglomerate. Thirdly, the "risk-ba.sed deductions", where the parent capital is 
replaced by investments in other dependants then adjusted by solo capital surplus of the 
conglomerate's entities. 
5.2.2. Fit and Proper Principles 
The Joint Forum's document Ti t and Proper Principles'^^ seeks to ensure sound 
supervisory assessments of the soundness and prudence of the conglomerates' 
managers, directors and key shareholders (who enjoy material influence on the group or 
hold shareholdings above a specific threshold) as well as facilitate exchange of 
information between different supervisory authorities.^^ 
Solo supervisors of banks, insurance, and security firms are interested in the 
fitness (i.e. the competence) of the directors, managers, and key shareholders of their 
regulated firms as well as their propriety (i.e. their suitability and integrity). When these 
regulated entities form part of a wider financial conglomerate, managers and directors 
of unregulated entities might have material influence on the regulated entities. This 
'''ibid, pp. 19-27. 
" Joint Forum, Fit and Proper Principles. (February, 1999), as reproduced in the BCBS, Compendium of 
Documents Produced by the Joint Forum. (July, 2001) pp. 41-46. 
Ibid. para. 42. 
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explains why supervisors are interested in the fitness and propriety on a conglomerate 
wide-basis. Supervisors are also concerned about the geographical and sectoral limits to 
their jurisdictions in the exercise of their latter role, as well as, the constrains on the 
flow of information between supervisors of various sectors particularly on a cross 
border level. 
The Joint Forum accordingly sets out various principles on fitness and propriety. 
First, directors and managers of all entities within a conglomerate can influence the 
operations of other regulated entities and must be subject to the rules of fitness and 
propriety. Similarly, the key shareholders who hold substantial shares that can 
materially influence a regulated firm within the conglomerate must be subject to 
supervisory criteria of fitness and propriety. In addition, qualification tests should be 
applied at the authorisation stage and on-going basis, and regulated entities are expected 
to apply them continuously. In addition, where a director or a manager of an entity 
within the conglomerate is or has been assuming an equivalent position in another 
regulated entity in the same conglomerate, consultations should take place between the 
respective supervisory authorities. Finally, supervisors should inform each other when a 
manager, director, or a key shareholder is deemed unfit, improper, or does not meet 
other qualification requirements. 
5.2.3. Supervisory Information Sharing 
The Joint Forum issued in 1999 'Principles for Supervisory Information 
Sharing',"'^ which builds upon earlier standards set out by lAIS, IOSCO, and the BCBS. 
This document sets out five guiding principles on enhancing information exchanged 
amongst and between various supervisory authorities of the conglomerate."" 
The first principle stresses that information should be available to each 
supervisory authority, taking consideration of the wide range of structures adopted by 
conglomerates particularly as the growth of complex financial instruments means that 
business activities and legal structures are no longer aligned. It illustrates that all 
supervisors need essential information on the structure, management, strategy, risks and 
Joint Forum, Principles for Supervising Information Sharing. (February, 1999). as reproduced in the 
BCBS, Compendium of DcKuments Produced by the Joint Forum, (July, 2001), pp. 91-98. 
Ibid, pars 9-27. 
financial condition of the conglomerates. The extent of supervisory needs for 
information, however, varies according to their regulatory systems and objectives as 
well as the conglomerate's own structure and risk controls. In addition the primary 
supervisors should wide range of information made available to it. The primary 
supervisor is the supervisor of the parent or the dominant entity in a conglomerate. 
Should the primary supervisor be difficult to identify, supervisors need to define it on a 
case-by-case basis."' 
The second principle is that supervisors should be proactive in communicating 
material developments and concerns to their counterparts. Supervisors receiving said 
information should also respond adequately and in a timely fashion. The third principle 
stresses that all supervisors should inform the primary supervisor about material 
developments and emerging issues of adverse nature including supervisory actions. 
Fourthly, the primary supervi,sor, on his turn, is responsible for extending information to 
other supervisory authorities concerning institutions falling within their regulatory 
responsibilities such as information on control functions, organisational structures, and 
plans of supervisory activities. Finally, the f i f th principle calls for the supervisors to 
establish an atmosphere of trust and cooperation amongst them, recommending 
measures such as face-to-face communication and attending international supervisory 
meetings. 
Exchange of information is the sine qua non of effective international 
supervision. The Joint Forum, therefore, issued another document in 1999 that sets out 
special rules on information sharing on the 'Framework for Supervisory Information'."^ 
This paper focuses on large internationally active groups but can benefit the supervision 
of smaller conglomerates. 
The document classifies conglomerates into quadrants based on two elements. 
The first element is the organisational structure and whether it is based along business 
lines or corporate legal structures. The second one is the corporate control function and 
whether it is organised on a local or global basis. Quadrant A, for example, represents 
conglomerates based on the structure of former Barings Bank, where business activities 
Ibid, para. 9. 
'^ Joint Forum, Framework for Supervisory Information. (February. 1999), as reproduced in the BCBS, 
Compendium of Documents Produced by the Joint Forum, (July, 2001), pp. 49-87. 
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are designed along services and activities. This means that the business line structure is 
unrelated or has a limited relationship to the corporate legal structure. It also means that 
the matrix management approach is adopted, whereby the front and back offices assume 
their responsibilities according to the business lines which cover various legal enfities 
and geographical regions, while the corporate control function is largely based at the 
group's headquarters. Under these complex structures, supervisors should be vigilant 
and exchange information more extensively. At the other end of the spectrum there is 
Quadrant D, whereby the conglomerate's control function is organised on a local basis, 
but its structure is organised along business lines which cut across separate legal 
entities. The supervisors should under this structure monitor autonomous local 
managements and be aware of weak global managements and separate audit 
arrangements."^ 
The framework further sets out guidelines for the exchange of information in 
various circumstances, which cover the establishment of a new conglomerate, granting 
permission for the provision of a new activity or establishing a presence in a new 
jurisdiction, developing the financial conglomerate structure, ongoing supervision and 
the identification of supervisory concerns."" 
5.2.4 The Coordinator Paper 
The 'Coordinator Paper' (1999), deals with the needs of conglomerates' 
supervisory authorities to appoint a coordinator to facilitate the supervision of 
conglomerates on a cross sector and cross border level. The objectives of this document 
are to provide guidelines on the identification of a coordinator or more and to set out 
coordination elements.""^ To attain these objectives, the Coordinator Paper sets out 
guiding principles, which help supervisors to assess i f they need a coordinator, how to 
select it and determine its roles. First, the solo supervisor should determine information 
needed both in ordinary and emergency situations. Secondly, the selection of the 
coordinator (or less favourably) coordinators should be left to the discretion of the 
Ibid, paras. 6-36. 
Ibid, paras. 37-62. 
Joint Forum, Coordinator Paper. (February, 1999). as reproduced in the BCBS. Compendium of 
Documents Produced by the Joint Forum. (July. 2001). para. 1. 
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supervisors. Likewise, supervisors should enjoy the discretion to determine the 
coordinator's duties. The identification of the coordinator can be easier where, e.g., the 
group is headed by a bank responsible for consolidated supervision."^ An early 
identification of a coordinator and his duties in an emergency is also recommended to 
avoid confusion when an unexpected adverse event takes place. Furthermore, the paper 
recommends that the supervisors' regulatory responsibilities should neither be 
constrained by appointing a coordinator nor transferred to the coordinator. Finally, i f the 
appointment of a coordinator has no value added to the supervision of a conglomerate, 
there is no need to appoint one. 
5.2.5 Intra Group Transactions and Exposure Principles 
One of the most important supervisory concerns regarding conglomerates is the 
treatment of intra-group transactions and exposures, which can take various forms, such 
as, cross shareholdings, guarantees, and providing management and service 
arrangements. The Joint Forum covers this subject in the document on 'Intra-group 
Transactions and Exposures".''^ 
The main purpose of the document is to ensure the prudential management and 
control of intra-group transactions and exposures without having to prevent them. This 
is because these transactions have the advantages of cost efficienc; improved risk 
management as well as effective control of funding and capital. Inira-group transactions 
might, however, raise supervisory concerns for various reasons: the inappropriate 
transfer of capital from the regulated entity; the possible inclusion of unfair terms that 
would not be accepted by entities dealing at arm's length; possible adverse affect on 
liquidity, solvency or profitability of a regulated entity, or being employed as a means 
of regulatory arbitrage e.g. to evade capital adequacy requirements. 
The Joint Forum sets out five guiding principles aimed at striking the right 
balance between the advantages and disadvantages of intra-group transactions. First, 
conglomerates should have sound and adequate risk management processes which cover 
intra-group exposures that might jeopardizes the integrity of the entities comprising the 
* For Further guidance on this issue plea.se refer to Annex 2 of the Coordinator Paper. Ibid, pp. 107 
'^ Joint Forum, intra -Group Transactions and Exposures. (December, 1999), as reproduced in the BCBS, 
Compendium of Documents Produced by the Joint Forum, (July, 2001) pp. 129-138. 
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conglomerate. Secondly, supervisors should monitor intra-group exposures regularly 
whether on consolidated or solo basis. Thirdly, supervisors should encourage public 
disclosure of intra-group exposures to allow market participants an insight into the 
conglomerate's inter relationships. Finally, different supervisors should coordinate their 
efforts and exchange information related to intra group exposures. 
5.2.6 Risk Concentrations and Credit Risk Transfer 
The Joint Forum issued another document entitled 'Risk Concentrations' in 
1993,""^  because risk concentration in one group has a spillover effect on the other 
sectors within the group. This document defined a risk concentration as "an exposure 
with the potential to produce losses large enough to threaten a financial institution's 
health or ability to maintain its core operations"."^ The document covered risk 
concentrations across the conglomerates whether they relate to assets, liabilities or off 
balance sheet commitments. 
There has been sharp increase in the concentration risk of conglomerates since 
the issuance of the latter document, due to the growth of the credit transfer market in 
which conglomerates are an active participant.''" Traditionally, banks have been 
employing credit risk transfer ("CRT") tools such as syndications, guarantees, and 
securitisation for a very long time, mainly becau.se of their ability to distribute risk 
amongst a wide base of market participants. Banks have also benefited from transferring 
risky assets from their balance sheets to SPEs. CRT markets, however, have 
exponentially grown as a result of substantial increase in credit derivatives markets, the 
broadening of securitisation and the increased involvement of non-bank participants 
particularly hedge funds and asset managers. Failure to manage CRT and address its 
risks eventually contributed to the credit crunch of 2007.^' 
Joint Forum. Risk Concentrations Principles. (Decemeber. 1999) as reproduced in the BCBS, 
Compendium of Documents Produced by the Joint Forum , (July, 2001), pp. 141-150. 
Ibid, para. 4. 
Joint Forum. Cross-Sectoral Review of Group-wide Identification and Management of Risk 
Concentrations. (April. 2008). pp. 11. 
Joint Forum. Credit Risk Transfer Developments from 2005-2007. Consultative Document, (April 
2008). pp. 4- 8. 
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The Joint Forum reviewed the effect of CRT on financial stability in its 2005 
document 'Credit Risk Transfer', which concluded with various recommendations 
addressed to institutions and market participants dealing in CRT instruments as well as 
the supervisory authorities. 
Institutions should use CRT instruments consistently with their overall risk 
management policies and framework. They also need to understand and properly assess 
risks underiying CRT instruments and comprehensively measure their risk exposures. 
The documents stresses that institutions should assess CRT instruments by using 
internal models and hire well trained staff who understand the underlying assumptions 
of models and their limitations including correlation assumption. They should also 
assess the extent models capture risk where trading or hedging takes place. Furthermore, 
the documents emphasises that institutions should understand the market liquidity risk 
associated with CRT transactions. Furthermore, calls institutions to manage vigorously 
counterparty credit risk related to unfunded CRT transactions (swaps and other 
instruments where payments are not made upfront). In addition, the document highlights 
the importance of operational, legal and compliance risks. It recommends that 
institutions comply with the applicable laws on the use of material non-public 
information. Confirmations and other documents related to the settlement of CRT 
transactions should be executed quickly and handled by experienced personnel. 
The document stresses that parties to CRT transactions should assess the legal 
risk and the appropriateness of their CRT transactions before entering into them. Within 
this context, the contracting parties should understand the risks involved and do not over 
rely on external credit ratings. Investors should also have access to information 
necessary to evaluate their risks initially and on-going basis. The document stresses that 
market participants should particularly understand external credit rating of CRT 
instruments so that they can evaluate their potential risks. Furthermore, market 
participants are advised to exert their efforts to improve disclosure of CRT transactions 
as well. 
As to the supervisory authorities, the document illustrates that they should 
improve their understanding of CTR market development. Supervisors should also 
regulariy review the supervisory procedures related to CRT transactions as well as 
enhance the mutual exchange of information pertinent to CRT transactions. Finally, 
166 
supervisory authorities should support efforts to improve the identification of aggregate 
information on credit risk. 
The above recommendations were reviewed by the Joint Forum in the awake of 
credit crunch, 2007. A new Consultative Document on CRT was accordingly issued in 
2008,^^ which retains the earlier guidelines of 2005, and builds upon them. It also 
focuses on five supervisory concerns: 
First, institutions might fail to assess and manage risks pertaining to CRT 
transactions due to their increased complexity. Many institutions particularly appeare to 
have failed to appreciate the correlations between liquidity risk on one hand and market, 
credit, and other risks on the other hand. 
Secondly, despite the 2005 recommendation on excessive dependence on 
external credit ratings, the Joint Forum found out that this trend continues. Institutions 
also do not seem to understand clearly how ratings are assigned. Therefore, institutions 
are recommended to deepen their understanding of CRT transactions and credit rating 
methodologies particularly in circumstances leading to downgrading of ratings. Thirdly, 
the complexity and innovation of new CRT transactions cast doubts on the valuation 
and adequacy of internal risk models to capture all risks. There are also concerns about 
the valuation of fair values in shallow markets. Fourthly, there are questions concerning 
the originate-to-distribute model for exposing institutions to liquidity funding ri.sk and 
limiting banks' ability to move credit as.sets to their off-balance sheets, which can cause 
concentrations of credit risk. Fifthly, banks are exposed to reputational risk as a result of 
financial difficulties affecting SPEs and other entities associated with banks' CRT 
activities. Banks might interfere to protect these entities although they are not obliged to 
do so. Another important regulatory concern is that banks are prompted to transfer risks 
to less regulated markets for regulatory arbitrage purposes. It can be even difficult for 
supervisors to identify the ultimate risk holder. 
"Joint Forum. Credit Risk Transfer Developments form 2005-2007. Consultative Document. (April 
2008). 
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5.3. The Core Principles 
5.3.1. The First Generation of Documents 
The BCBS with the cooperation of non G-10 countries" developed in 1997 its 
important document on the 'Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision' ("Core 
Principles 1997"). The document was issued in response to the G-7 meeting in Lyon^'' in 
June 1996, which had called for the strengthening of the financial system.Its purpose 
was to provide a basic reference for supervisory and other public authorities on a 
domestic and international l e v e l . I t contained 25 core principles which were a 
compilation of "minimum requirements" mostly extracted from earlier supervisory 
standards, and which in many situations would need supplementary measures suitable 
for the financial systems of adopting countries.These principles were broadly 
categorised into seven groups: "preconditions for effective banking supervision"; 
"licensing and structure"; "prudential regulations and requirements"; "methods of 
ongoing banking supervision"; "information requirements"; "formal powers of 
supervisors" and "cross-border banking". An important development in the document 
was that the BCBS dealt with the structure of banking supervisory authority directly in a 
standalone principle. 
The Core Principles 1997 transferred the BCBS from a limited elite forum to an 
international leader in .setting out comprehensive regulator of banking supervision.^ ** 
According to the BCBS, the Core Principles 1997 became "the most important global 
" There were representatives from the following countries: Chile, China, the Czech Republic. Hong 
Kong, Mexico, Russia and Thailand. Eight other countries were closely associated with the B C B S 
namely, Brazil, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Poland and Singapore. 
Source: BCBS, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. (Sept 1997) para. 3. 
^ The Group of Seven ("G-7") major industrial countries held its first annual economic summit meeting 
of heads of state or governments in 1975. Members are, Canada. France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK 
and the USA. 
Source: IMF, A Brief Guide to Committees. Groups, and Clubs: A Fact Sheet. (April, 2008). 
" B C B S , Ibid (n53), para. 1. 
Ibid, para. 8. 
" Ibid, para. 7. 
George Walker. International Banking Regulation Law. Policy and Practice. 2001, pp. 135. 
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standard for prudential regulation and supervision" and were endorsed by the 
overwhelming majority of countries."^^ During the Asian financial crisis of the late 
1990's voices were raised for enhanced global banking supervision and particularly for 
implementing the Core Principles 1997. As implementation begins with self-
assessment, the Basle Committee resorted to distributing a survey for banking 
supervisory authorities worldwide on compliance with the core principles. Over 120 
countries responded, but the level of the responses varied.^° This prompted the BCBS to 
resort to issuing the Core Principles Methodology' in 1999 to serve as a harmonised 
assessment tool. The draft was prepared by the Core Principles Liaison Group, a sub-
group of the BCBS, which consisted of supervisory authorities from the G-10 and non-
G-10 and after consulting with the IMF and World Bank. 
While the IMF and the Worid Bank envisaged a role of assessing countries 
implementation of the core principles, the BCBS would not follow suit, explaining the 
following:''' 
"The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has decided not to make assessments of its own 
due to a lack of necessary resources; however, the Committee is prepared to assist in other ways. 
inier alia by providing advice and training. Committee members may also individually 
participate in as.scssment missions conducted by other parties such as the IMF. the World Bank, 
regional development banks, regional supervisory organisations and private con.sultants. "Peer 
reviews" are also po.ssible. whereby supervisory experts from one country a.s.sess another country 
and vice versa". 
5.3.2. The Second Generation of Documents 
The BCBS issued in 2006 a new set of core principles ("Core Principles 2006") 
which emphasised the role of the core principles as "a framework of minimum standards 
for sound supervisory practices", which would strengthen the financial system both in 
developed and developing domestic banking systems and globally.^" They were also 
issued in cooperation with a wide base of regional banking supervisory committees 
''J BCBS, Core Principles Methodology, (October, 1999), para. 6. 
^ Ibid, para. 19-20. 
Ibid, para. 2. 
" BCBS, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. (October, 2006), para. 5. 
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representing non G-10 countries including the Arab Committee on Banking Supervision 
("ACBS") and the ; the Islamic Financial Services Board ("IFSB") and after consulting 
with the IMF, The World Bank and other international supervisory standards setters 
such as IOSCO and l A I S . " The Core Principles 2006 are also comprised of 25 
principles, which only adjust the Core Principles 1997 to ensure their relevance and 
consistency with comparative international .standards on insurance, securities and anti-
money laundering.^" 
The new 'Core Principles Methodology' was issued in 2006 to update the earlier 
methodology as part of the BCBS effort to aid assessors of a country's compliance with 
the Core Principles 2006.^^ Although the BCBS does not undertake the responsibility of 
monitoring the application of these principles by domestic supervisory authorities, it 
reaches out to them via the International Liaison Group which focuses on the 
implementation of the Core Principles 2006 as well as seeks to deepen the BCBS 
relationship with supervisors from within and outside the G-IO countries.'''^ The Core 
Principles Methodology reinforces the dual approach of banking supervision by setting 
out two types of criteria for assessing the implementation of the core principles. The 
first type is the "essential criteria", which "are the only elements on which to gauge full 
compliance with a Core Principle" and the "additional criteria", which are "suggested 
best practices which countries having advanced banks should aim for".*^^ The additional 
criteria are only voluntarily employed by countries. 
" Ibid, par. 4. 
" Ibid. par. 6. 
For further details, see: BCBS, Comparison between the 1999 and 2006 versions of the Core Principles 
Methodology. (April 2006). 
'''' There are eight countries represented in the BCBS: France, Germany, Italy. Japan, the Netherlands, 
Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition, there are 16 countries that are not members 
in the BCBS: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, India, Korea, 
Mexico, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, and the West African Monetary Union), 
the European Commission, the IMF, the World Bank, the Financial Stability Institute, the Association of 
Supervisors of Banks of the Americas and the F S B . 
Source: BCBS. About the Basel Committee. 
" BCBS. Core Principles Methodology. (October. 2006), pp. 2. 
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5.3.3. Elements of the Core Principles Methodology 2006 
The Core principles 2006 and their Core Methodology 2006 can be grouped 
under four dimensions. The first dimension supports the institutional capacity of 
banking supervisory authorities by providing for rules on the objectives, independence, 
legal powers (including corrective measures and remedial actions), transparency, and 
cooperation. The second dimension is cross-border supervisory cooperation. The third 
dimension is the implementation of minimum rules of sub.stance to banks at the 
authorisation stage and continuously afterwards. The last dimension is supervisory 
techniques and methods. 
5.3.3.1 International Cooperation 
Core Principles (25) confirms importance of home-host supervisory cooperation, 
which should be based on the exchange of information between respective supervisory 
authorities as well as exercising comprehensive home country con.solidated supervision 
The criteria of as.sessing cross-border cooperation are ba,sed on the documents 
issued by the BCBS on this regard. A noticeable exception which appears in both 
generations of core principles is the role of the home supervisory authority in enforcing 
remedial or corrective measures on a consolidated basis. The 1996 document 'the 
Supervision to Cross Border Banking'** referred to the role of the home authority 
exchanging information on "a track record of taking effective remedial action when 
problems arise".The Core Principles Methodology 2006, by contrast, states that it the 
host supervisor which should provide information on any remedial Action. 
5.3.3.2 Minimum Prudential Powers 
The Core Principles 2006 and its Methodology are overwhelmingly extracted 
from the BCBS general documents and principles on prudential requirements. Below is 
a summary of these prudential requirements. The full text of the Core Principles is 
annexed to this thesis due to its importance and in order to avoid excessive repetition. 
B C B S and Offshore Group, The Supervision of Cross-Border Banking. (1996). See above pp. 57 for an 
outline of this document. 
Ibid, Annex A paragraphs 6 and 7. 
' " B C B S , Ibid (n 67), pp.41. 
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First, Core Principles 2 calls for the definition of the term "banks" in legislation 
and the prohibition of the employment of this term and its derivations (e.g. banking) 
without prior permission in situations where the public might be misled. Likewise, the 
legislation should determine activities by banks. 
Secondly, Core Principles 3 calls for the supervisory authority to set out 
licensing criteria which should at least cover governance structure, ownership 
assessment (including fitness of management and board members), strategic plan, risk 
management, operating plan, financial projection as well as the prior approval of the 
home supervisory authority in relation to cross border banking. 
Thirdly, Mergers and acquisition of financial institutions have prudential 
dimensions.Principle 4, therefore, states that the supervisory authority should have the 
power of reviewing and rejecting any significant transfer of "controlling interest" or 
"significant ownership" held either directly or indirectly. This power entails various 
es.sential criteria. First, the law provides for a definition of the terms "controlling 
interest" and "significant ownership". Secondly, the supervisor should have the powers 
of prior notification, approval and obtaining information from banks on such holdings. 
Thirdly, the supervisor should have the legal power to reject the transfer of signification 
ownership or controlling interest in banks. Fourthly, the supervisor should also be 
empowered to reverse any undesirable transfer of power without its prior notification or 
approval. In addition. Core Principle 5 illustrates that the supervisor should have the 
power to review major acquisitions. An essential criterion is that the legislation should 
define major acquisitions which require the prior notification of the supervisors. 
Another essential criterion is that legislation should determine the standards against 
which an acquisition is reviewed, including the prohibition of acquisitions exposing 
banks to endure excessive risks or which hamper effective supervision. 
Fourthly, Core Principles 4 and 5 accordingly determine indirectly the 
relationship between the banking supervisory authorities and any other local authority 
responsible for competition. The conclusion is that the supervisory authority, not the 
competition authority, should have the final descioin in terms of banks' mergers and 
'^ Michael Andrews. 'Addressing the Prudential and Antitrust Aspects of Financial Sector Mergers and 
Acquisitions" in Charies Enoch, David Mart.son and Michael Taylor (eds). Building Strong Banks through 
Surveillance and Resolution. 2002 pp. 201. 
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acquisitions. In other words, there is a primacy of prudential concerns over competition 
issues although the principle should have called for the legislation to explicitly embody 
this supremacy principle. The Core Principles should have also called domestic 
supervisory and competition authorities to set out a framework (most probably a 
memoranda of understanding) organising the sequence of events in a merger. 
Fifthly, Supervisors should also ensure that banlcs have a comprehensive risk 
management plan and processes according to the bank or banking group risk and 
complexity. Supervisors should identify, measure, monitor, and control credit risk 
(including counterparty risk), country risk, transfer risk, market risk, liquidity risk, 
operational risk, and interest rate risk in the banking book. Supervisors should be 
satisfied that banks manage their problem assets and maintain adequate reserves and 
provision. Supervisors should also impose limits on banks' large exposure to individual 
and connected counterparties. In addition, they should identify related parties, ensure 
that that they are treated equally to other counterparties as well as monitor and control 
bank's exposure thereto (Core principles 7-16). 
The remaining Core Principles stress that supervisors should ensure that banks 
have adequate internal controls and internal audit function in place (Core principle 17); 
be satisfied that banks have adequate policies that prevent the criminal use of its assets 
such as money laundering (Core Principle 18); be empowered to collect and review 
statistical data and prudential reports both on a solo and consolidated basis (Core 
Principle 21) be ensured that banks maintain and publish sufficient records according to 
widely acceptable accountancy standards (Core Principle 22), as well as exercise their 
supervision on a consolidated basis (Core Principle 24). 
This chapter finalises all the chapters on international banking supervisory rules 
regarding sub.stantive standards and international cooperation. The following chapter 
will consider the international standards on structural issues with reference to the UK 
law. 
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CHAPTER 6 
T H E BCBS STANDARDS ON T H E S T R U C T U R E OF T H E 
BANKING SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES WITH 
R E F E R E N C E TO UK LAW 
6.0. Introduction 
This Chapter looks into the BCBS standards on institutional issues. It shows that 
the BCBS focuses only on the strengthening the institutional capacity of the banking 
supervisory authority (Section 1). The BCBS standards, by contrast, neither recommend 
a particular form of supervisory technique nor the adoption of a specific type of 
supervisory structure (Section 2). There BCBS standards, however, overlook that there 
are certain prudential aspects to the structure of the banking supervisory authority. Most 
significantly, the relationship between the banking supervisory authority, on one hand, 
and the Central Bank and any authority responsible for bailing out troubled banks, on 
the other hand, should be regulated. The recent UK experience financial turmoil 
beginning in 2007 illustrates this point. The earlier amendments introduced by the 
Banking Act 1987, by contrast, provide an example of how to strengthen the 
institudonal structure of the banking supervisory authority without having to segregate 
the institution from the central bank (Section 3). 
6.1 International Standards on the Institutional Capacity 
The first principle of the Core Principles (2006) is the central BCBS standard on 
institutional capacity, though it is entitled "[o]bjectives, independence, powers, 
transparency and cooperation". 
6.1.1. Clear Responsibilities and Objectives 
The Core Principles Methodology 2006 identifies four essential criteria for the 
assessment of this element. First, the responsibilities and objectives of each authority 
involved in banking supervision should be determined and disclosed to the public. 
There is no definition of what is meant by involvement in banking supervision but the 
text is broad enough to cover any degree of monitoring role. It should, therefore, cover 
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deposit insurance or deposit guarantee agencies responsible for banking inspection as 
well as any central bank which assumes a residual role in banking supervision after 
segregating their banking supervisory departments. It is less obvious whether this 
criteria encompasses securities exchange authorities, where banks are established as 
public shareholding companies. It is equally not evident whether controllers of 
companies are included in this criterion. Secondly, the regulatory framework of the 
banking supervisory authority should provide for minimum prudential standard to be 
adopted by banks. Thirdly, the banking supervisory legislation should be updated when 
necessary. Fourthly, supervisors should confirm that information on the performance 
and resilience of banks are available. 
6.1.2. Independence, Accountability and Transparency 
The Core principle Methodology 2006 identifies four essential criteria to attain 
the independence, accountability and transparency of the supervisory institution. 
First, the law should clearly stipulate the operational independence, governance 
structure and accountability for each institution assuming banking supervisory 
responsibilities. There should specifically be no interference from the Government 
officials or banks which might undermine the operational or financial independence of 
the supervisor. Furthermore, the senior executives of the supervisor should not be 
removed from their positions except for reasons determined under law and that the 
removal should be disclosed to the public. By contrast, specifying the tenure of senior 
staff is considered an additional criterion. 
The second essential criterion is that the supervisory objectives should be 
publicly disclosed and that the supervisor should be accountable for the attainment of 
these objectives in a transparent fashion. The third essential criterion refers to the 
professionalism and integrity of the supervisor's staff Furthermore, the supervisory 
authority should be financed without compromising its independence. In order to do so, 
the budget should cover the costs of appointing skilled and adequate staff paying 
competitive salary rates, outsourcing expenses (when necessary), continuous training 
programmes, costs of computers and other equipments as well as travelling expenses for 
on-site supervision. 
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6.1.3. Legal Framework 
The supervisory institution should have a legal framework, which supports its 
authorisation and on-going supervisory tasks. The Core Principle Methodology 2006 
identifies three essential criteria within this context. First, that the law identifies the 
authority or authorities charged with the responsibility of licensing banks. Secondly, 
supervisory authorities should be empowered under law to set out prudential rules. 
Thirdly, the law should empower supervisors to obtain needed information from banks 
when deemed necessary. 
6.1.4. Legal powers 
The law should empower the supervisory authority to address non-compliance 
issues and the right to apply their qualitative judgement in their attempt to maintain the 
safety and soundness of the banking system. Supervisors should also be granted 
complete access to the banks' board of directors, managers, staff, and records. Legal 
powers should cover corrective or remedial measures as well as the imposition of 
sanction. An informal communication may solve a minor violation of the rules. 
However, where there is a serious violation, corrective measures should range from 
restrictions on permissible activities, withholding approval of new activities, and 
restricting or suspending the distribution of profits. Supervisory authorities should also 
be able to oppose the appointment of external auditors and senior management. In an 
extreme situation, they should be empowered to withdraw licences and to launch 
liquidation procedures. Therefore, the Core principle (23) was specifically set out to 
emphasise that supervisors should have at their disposal a range of supervisory tools to 
address problem banks. 
The BCBS document 'Supervisory Guidance on Dealing with Weak Banks', 
issued in March 2002 also looks into remedial actions. This document calls for the 
application of prompt and consistent corrective actions in relation to 'weak banks',' as 
opposed to observable weaknesses which are temporary or isolated and can be rectified 
' A weak bank is defined as "one whose liquidity or solvency is or will be impaired unless there is a 
major improvement in its fmancial resources, risk proHle. strategic business direction, risk management 
capabilities and/or quality of management". 
Source: BCBS. Supervisory Guidance on Dealine with Weak Banks. (March. 2002), para. 10. pp. 6. 
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by suitable remedial action." It states that supervisory authorities should be guided by 
five related principles being the realisation of supervisory objectives of deposit 
protection and financial stability, timeliness, commitment of the bank's management, 
proportionality as well as comprehensiveness, which refers to covering both the causes 
and symptoms of banking weaknesses.'' The supervisor should also draw up an action 
plan of corrective measures based on the assessment of the nature and seriousness of the 
bank's underlying weaknesses as well as the extent of its management cooperation with 
the supervisor." The document further recommends that countries issue laws and 
regulations facihtating the application of prompt corrective actions to avoid 
procrastination in handling problem banks which could be attributed to good faith or to 
pressure from the government or the banking industry.^ 
The Core Principles Methodology 2006 does not make a reference to the last 
document. It rather sets out six essential criteria of the exercise of remedial and 
sanctioning powers. It calls supervisors to intervene early where they have concerns, by 
addressing management in writing and requesting remedial actions as well as the 
submission of progress reports on the implementation of these actions. It also 
emphasises on the supervisor's participation in the resolution of the problem bank 
including the decision of closure. Furthermore, it also stresses on the importance of 
having a wide range of remedial tools at the disposal of the supervisory authorities as 
well as sanctioning powers that should apply to banking institutions and individuals 
(managers for example). In addition, it calls supervisors to take measure where the 
capital adequacy of the bank falls below the minimum capital ratio. 
6.1.5. Legal Protection 
The Core Principles Methodology 2006 considers it an essential criterion to 
guard both the supervisory authority and its staff from "lawsuits for actions taken and/or 
" Ibid, para. 11, pp. 6. 
' Ibid, para. 68, pp. 19. 
' Ibid. para. 69-87. pp. 19-23. 
' Ibid, para. 78 and 79. pp. 21. 
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omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith".*" The authority and its staff 
should also be protected from the costs of such law suits. 
6.1.6. Cooperation with other Authorities 
This element is subdivided into four essential criteria. First, there should be 
effective formal or informal (Memoranda of Understanding etc) cooperation 
arrangements between cross border supervisory authorities for banks and banking 
groups. This issue has been a central to the work of the BCBS as illustrated in Chapter 
5. The second element relates to the cooperation with domestic authorities but briefly. 
The BCBS calls for the establishment or formal or informal forms of cooperation 
between "all domestic authorities with responsibilities for the soundness of the financial 
system".^ Furthermore, supervisors should ensure that extended information should only 
be used for supervisory purposes. Finally, supervi.sors should be entitled to maintain the 
confidentiality of information received as well. 
6.2 International Standards on the Technique and Type of the 
Supervisory Authority 
6.2.1. The Techniques of the Supervisory Authority 
Supervisory techniques are covered in Core Principle 20 which calls supervisors 
to appropriately mix between on site supervision and off-site supervision. The 
supervisors should afso have policies and processes for assessing the quality and 
effectiveness of their supervision as well as the integration of on-site and off-site 
supervision. Supervisors should ensure that on-site and off-site supervision are 
conducted coherently and according to set objectives and responsibilities as well. On 
site supervision can be conducted either by outsourcing or the supervisor's own 
personnel provided that it is used as a means to verify the adequacy of corporate 
governance, reliability of information submitted to the supervisor by banks, obtaining 
needed additional information as well as monitoring issues that raise supervisory 
attention. Off-site supervision should on its part be used as a means to analyse the 
financial condition of banks on ba.sis of prudential returns, follow-up on supervisory 
BCBS. Core Principles Methodology. (October, 2006), pp. 9. 
' Ibid. pp. 9. 
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concerns as well as plan on-site work. Furthermore, the supervisor should evaluate the 
quality of the bank's management from both on-site and off-site supervision. It should 
also determine whether it can rely on the internal auditors to identify areas of 
weaknesses in the bank. In addition, the supervisor should maintain regular contact with 
bank managements and communicates its findings to it. 
Banking supervision in industrialised countries is becoming increasingly risk-
focused. According to a study of the World Bank in 2000,* most supervisory authorities 
in the OECD countries have moved away from monitoring the compliance of banking 
institutions with prescriptive supervisory rules. The basic role of supervisory authorities 
has become evaluation, and perhaps supporting the internal models applied by banking 
institutions for risk management purposes. Their main mission is to create an 
environment where risk management can be optimised. This approach is also forward 
looking as it determines supervisory programmes and allocate resources on basis of risk 
expectation. Where the risk-focused approach of banking supervision is applied, there 
exists a partnership between the supervisory authorities and the private players. The 
other approach is rule-based and depends on on-site and off-siie supervision. 
The BCBS, as seen in the Chapter 4, provides adequate standards on risk 
management and partnership with the private .sector. The BCBS, however, does not 
formally support a particular form of supervisory approaches. According to Core 
Principle 19, it is sufficient that supervisors understand the operations of individual 
banks and banking groups as well as the whole banking system in order to maintain its 
safety and soundness. The BCBS rather considers the risk based approach as optional 
due to the absence of consensus on this point. The Core Principles Methodology 2006 
provides the following additional criterion: 
"The supervisor employs a well defined methodology designed to establish a forward-looking 
view on the risk profile of banks, positioning the supervisor better to address proactively any 
serious threat to the stability of the banking sy.stcm from any cuirent or emerging risks".'' 
Another additional criterion states the following: 
Hennie van Greuning and Sonja Bralanovic, Analvzing Bankine Risk: a Framework for Assessing 
Corporate Governance and Financial Risk Management. World Bank (2000), pp. 31-57. 
BCBS, Ibid (n 6). pp. 32. 
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"In determining supervisory programmes and allocating re.sources, supervisors take into account 
the risks posed by individual banks and banking groups and the different approaches available to 
mitigate those risks".'" 
The BCBS standards, however, have failed to warn supervisory authorities, 
particularly those from developing countries, of the dangers that surround the risk-
focused approach. While this approach is useful for reducing the regulatory bill, 
particularly in advanced banking markets," wrong estimation of risk might allow 
weaker banks to escape the supervisory net. One of the countries which apply the latter 
approach is the U K ' ^ which failed to diagnose the problems of the Northern Rock Bank 
ex ante. 
6.2.2. The Type of the Supervisory Authority 
The BCBS standards do not specify any particular structural form for the 
banking supervisory authority as the optimal structure. They also do not attempt to 
answer any of the following major structural questions: what should be the basis of the 
structure of the supervisory authorities? Should the same authority supervise all 
financial institutions? Should the functional scope of the supervisory authority 
encompass regulatory goals other than the maintenance of the safety and soundness of 
the banking system, such as regulating the conduct of business (consumer protection) 
and competition? Should the supervisory authority be segregated from the central bank? 
A study published early in 2008 and which covers 193 jurisdictions'^ shows that 
there is a wide variety of institutional forms of banking supervisory authorities. The 
simplest form is the one adopted by Jordan. As will be discussed in Chapter 10 in 
further details, the CBJ undertakes the supervision of banks, while insurance and 
investment companies are supervised separately. This is the case in the majority of 
countries which supervise banks separately from other financial institutions, as their 
BCBS, Ibid (n 6), pp. 7. 
" Gray, Joanna. 2008. 'The Difference a Year Makes in Financial Regulation' JIBFL Vol. 23(5)(May), 
pp. 245. 
The FSA applied the ARROW framework, an acronym for Advanced. Risk-Responsive Operating 
FrameWork and which covers the three components of individual firms, cross-cutting themes and internal 
risk management. For further details, see: FSA. The FSA's Risk A.s.sessmcnt Approach. 2006 (August). 
" . How Countries Supervise their Banks. Insurers, and Securities Markets. (2008). 
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respective central banks are responsible for this task. In Panama and Chile, however, 
banking supervision is undertaken by a specialised separate banking supervisory 
authority. In France and Germany, both the Central Bank and the banking supervisory 
authority play a joint role in banking supervision; Germany has a single financial 
supervisory authority, while France has a separate banking supervision institution. 
Another survey conducted in 2007''* on 128 jurisdictions illustrates that major 
changes has taken place in banking supervisory structures during the last two decades: 
the decline in the number of supervisory authorities located in central banks, and a 
parallel increase in separate banking supervisors, although central banks remain the 
major location for banking supervision.'^ Countries, which are adopting the unified (or 
single) financial supervisory model themselves, take various forms. In some small 
countries, (Bahrain, Bermuda, Cayman Island, Ireland, Macau, Netherlands Antilles and 
Singapore), the central bank supervises banks, insurance and investment companies. 
Most countries, however, locate the unified supervisory authority outside the central 
bank. The single supervisory authority might encompass banks and insurance 
companies which is the situation in Canada; banking and securities industries such as 
the situation in Switzerland and Liechtenstein; or cover all three types of financial 
industries in one institution segregated from the Central Bank as it is the case in Norway 
and Denmark. 
The Jordanian model is also a simple traditional model whereby the main 
function of the banking supervisor is maintaining the safety of the banking system. 
Some jurisdictions, by contrast, apply the "twin peaks", model whereby the financial 
system is subject to the supervision of two supervisory authorities, one responsible for 
prudential regulation and the other one for consumer protection or market conduct. 
Prominent examples of the latter form are Australia and the Netherlands. The United 
Kingdom adopts a unique model which combines the unified model with the twin peaks 
model. Jordan and the UK stand therefore at opposite ends of the supervisory structures' 
spectrum. A common factor between two jurisdictions is that the developments of their 
banking supervisory structures have been influenced by market structure and domestic 
FSI, Institutional Arrangements for Financial Sector Supervision: Results of the 2006 FSl Survey. 
(Occasional Paper No.7, (September 2007). 
" Ibid, pp. 14. 
experience, while international standards apply an insignificant role. The recent 
financial turmoil of 2007-8 has however, highlighted the importance of setting out 
standards on certain aspects of the supervisory structure adapted by the UK. 
6.3. The United Kingdom Model 
Banking supervision in the UK started from the Central Bank and was 
distinguished for its informal approach. As the UK banking market grew in size and 
sophistication, the approach became more formalistic and the banking supervision was 
becoming more semi-independent. A complete change took place in 1995 when the 
FSA was established. 
6.3.1. Evolution of Banking Supervision 
6.3.1.1. Early Stages 
The UK has a long tradition of central banking and banking supervision. The 
Bank of England was established in the .seventeenth century as a private institution 
pursuant to the Bank of England Charter of 1694.'^ Although the Bank of England was 
established as a private institution, a central banking role emerged gradually. The 
monetary role has led the Bank to assume a supervisory role. 
Banking supervision was initially characterised by its informal nature. The 
Macmillan Committee noticed in 1931 that banks were not subject to formal legal 
requirements and advocated the continuation of this traditional approach.'^ The first 
time any statutory authority was given to the Bank was through the Bank of England 
Act 1946, which nationalised the Bank and entitled it for the first time the right to issue 
"directions" in a hesitant language. Section 4(3) states that the Bank, " if they think it 
necessary in the public interest" may make recommendations and request information 
from bankers and may also, if authorised by the Treasury, issue directions to them. 
Despite the new Act, the culture of the Bank remained persuasive and flexible.'^ 
The Charter of the Corporation of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, (July 27. 1694). 
Committee on Finance and Industry, Reports of the Committee on Finance and Industry. (Cmnd 3897, 
1931), (known a.s "'Macmillan Committee"), pp.15-18. 
'"G.Blundcn.'The Supervision of the UK Banking System" 1975 B.E.Q.B. Vol. 15(2), pp. 189-190. 
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The informal approach was considered suitable for the British banking 
structure at the time, which had two particular characteristics:''' first, the dominant 
position enjoyed by the Bank in the City of London, which again emanated from its 
functions as a central bank. In an official report issued in 1959, it was stated that the 
Bank "does not formally supervise the policies or operafions of the clearing banks".'" 
The Radcliff Committee report stated regarding above Section 4(3) of the Bank of 
England Act that "[e]ven before this Act was passed the Bank could bring pressure to 
bear upon a bank by refusing to maintain an account for it, though it has not done so in 
recent years."'' Furthermore, the Bank assumed at an early stage a Lender of Last 
Resort role towards institutions involved with its money market operations.'' There 
were a number of examples of the Bank's willingness to interfere in the market."'' The 
Bank, for example, assisted banks during the crisis. 
Before 1974, there was no special banking supervision department in the UK. 
It was conducted through the Discount Office, which specialised in the Bank's money 
market functions. Banks accepted the supervisory role of the Bank, as they wanted to 
benefit from the Lender of Last Resort facilities as well as discount their acceptances."" 
Secondly, there were a small number of dominant homogenous clearing banks, which 
enjoyed an oligopoly and did not have to enter into fierce competition (e.g.. they formed 
an interest rate cartel). They were afso cohesive institutions, which observed business 
standards. Another contributory factor that made the informal approach possible was the 
particularity of British banking authorisations, which led to dividing banks into 
hierarchal types known as the "ladder of recognitions". A small number of depository-
D. Llewellyn, The Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institutions. (Gilbart Lectures on Banking, 
Institute of Bankers, London, 1986), pp. 31-32. 
Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, Report of the Committee on the Working of the 
Monetary Svstem. (Cmnd 827, 1959), (known as "Radcliffe Committee'"), pp. 118. 
Ibid 
" This refers to banks, discount houses and acceptance houses. For more information see for example: J. 
Fforde, The Bank of England and Public Policv: 1941-1958. (1992). pp. 749-760. 
Sec for example: R. Sayers, The Bank of England: 1891-1944. Vol. 2 (1976). pp. 528-560. 
Wilson, J.. 'Supervision of the United Kingdom Banking System" 1977 Banka Nazionule del Lavaro 
Ouanerlv Review Vol. 30(120)(March), pp. 38. 
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taking institutions, classified as authorised or recognised banks, were allowed to provide 
all banking activities and fell within the supervisory remit of the Bank. 
6.3.1.2. The Seventies 
The period from 1973 to 1979 was characterised by the increased trend towards 
formalism because of the three following factors. The first factor is the formation of the 
BCBS in 1974 after the disruption which had taken place in the Euro market leading to 
the convergence of international supervisory standards. The second one is the 
Europeanisation process of the British banking supervisory legislation. The 
transposition of EU Treaties and secondary legislation into UK law was carried out by 
the enactment of the European Communities Act 1972. 
The third factor refers to the British market development and its interaction 
with domestic regulatory experience. Changes in the British banking market structure 
led to changes in monetary policies and consequently supervisory policies."^ The central 
oligopolist position of clearing banks was challenged by competition from other 
institutions, particularly finance hou.ses. A major contributory factor was the 
deregulation of direct credit controls."^ The catalyst was the issuance of the Competition 
and Credit Control,"^ which abolished the interest rate cartel of clearing banks, lending 
ceilings and Hire Purchase Terms Control. Consequently, there was a trend of 
disintermediation by other deposit-taking institutions who under-cut the clearing banks. 
A wholesale secondary or parallel market (outside the traditional discount market) was 
developing whereby secondary or fringe banks were active. Meanwhile, clearing banks 
have become active in the "Eurodollar" market based in London.'^ 
The growth of fringe banking in large numbers beyond the scope of the 
banking supervisory remit, which were involved widely in property securities, 
eventually faced failures as the property prices went down, deposits were withdrawn 
For more details, see; J. Fforde. 'Competition, Innovation and Regulation in British Banking' 1983 
B.E.Q.B. Vol. 23 (3), pp. 363-367. 
M. Hall, Banking Regulation and Supervision: a Comparative Study of the UK. USA and Japan. 
(1993), pp. 29-30. 
Bankof England,'Competition and Credit Control' 1971 B.E.O.B. Vol. I l(2)(June). pp. 189-193. 
J. Fforde, Ibid (n 22) pp. 367. 
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and a crisis looked imminent,''' know as the "fringe banking or secondary banking 
crisis". The Bank interfered by launching the "lifeboat", a support scheme at shared 
risk, as well as subsequent operations in order to assure domestic and international 
confidence in British banks.^'' This crisis called for attention to deal with four matters: 
first, a large number of deposit taking institutions escaped banking supervision by the 
Bank and any other authority; secondly, the Bank failed to exercise banking supervision 
effectively, thirdly, there was a need for formal deposit protection arrangements, finally, 
the public was confused about which institutions could be described as banks 
considering the ladder of recognitions."" 
Although the lifeboat was generally considered successful, it led to calls for 
tightened banking supervision culminating with the promulgation of the Banking Act 
1979. A number of supervisory arrangements were undertaken, nevertheless, before 
1979. The Discount Office, responsible for banking supervision at the lime was 
expanded and reorganised; returns were required from .statistical banks and prudential 
examination started to be undertaken by the Bank. London and Scottish clearing banks 
were, however, exempted from submitting prudential returns.'^ " In 1975, a new Banking 
Supervision Department was established headed by a higher rank of official, namely 
Head of Department and the number of officials working for the Department was 
increased."'-^  
6.3.1.3. The Banking Act 1979 
The above mentioned international and regional supervisory developments, as 
well as the fringe-banking crisis, led to the promulgation of the Banking Act 1979. This 
was the first comprehensive law regulating banking supervision in the UK. The linchpin 
of the Act was Section 1(1), which prohibited the acceptance of deposits in the course of 
" See generally: M. Reid, The Secondary Banking Crisis. 1973-75: Its Causes and Course. (1982). 
For further details on the lifeboat .scheme, see: 'The Secondary Banking Crisis and the Bank of 
England's Support Operations' 1978 B.E.O.B. Vol. I8(2)(june), pp. 230-239. 
" Ian Morison. Paul Tillett and Jane Welch, Banking Act 1979. (1979). para. 56. 
G. Blunden, Ibid (n 18), pp. 190-192. 
" J. Wilson. Ibid (n 24). pp. 40. 
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carrying on a deposit-taking business, unless the concerned institution fell within the 
exempted categories (or the transaction was exempted). 
The exempted institutions were mainly those institutions, which were granted 
the status of "authorised" or "recognised" banks by the Bank of England.This led to 
what became known as the "two-tier system" whereby two categories of authorisations 
emerged of "licensed" and "recognised" deposit-taking institutions which caused 
confusion amongst the public.^^ Applications for authorisation as a recognised bank had 
to show that the applicant satisfied two requirements over and above those required 
from licensed deposit-takers. The first one was to enjoy "a high reputation and standing 
in the financial community". The second was to supply either a "highly specialised 
banking service" or a "wide range of banking services".Only recognised banks were 
permitted to describe themselves as banks and as institutions engaged in the banking 
business."*^ The two-tier system ensured a close relationship between the Bank of 
England, while the latter retained its control over licensed banks. 
In addition to controlling deposit-taking, the Banking Act 1979 .strengthened 
the supervisory authority of the Bank of England in a number of respects. First, it was 
entitled with a wide .scope of discretionary power to issue directives in the interest of 
depositors.''" Failure of banks to comply with these directives would result in the 
imposition of summary convictions ranging from imposing a fine to imprisonment."' 
The Bank was also given the right to sohcit information, to conduct investigations, and 
to seek the winding-up of deposit-taking institutions."*" The Act, nevertheless, did not 
For funher details sec: Ian Morison, Paul Tillett and Jane Welch, Ibid (n 31), paras. 71-116. 
" Banking Act 1979, Section 2(1). 
^ Treasury, The Licensing and Supervision of Deposit-Taking Institutions. (Cmnd 6584, 1976), pp. 4. 
" Banking Act 1979, Sch 2. 
Ibid, Section 36. 
G. Penn, A. Shea and A. Arora. The Law Relating to Domestic Banking: Banking Law. Vol. 1, (1987), 
pp. 13. 
* Banking Act 1979. Section 8. 
Ibid, Section 8(5). 
'-Ibid. Sections 16. 17 and 18. 
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provide for the duty of institutions to supply the Bank with prudential returns. It only 
entitled the Bank to compel licensed deposit-taking institutions to provide information 
and to supply reports by an accountant approved by the Bank. 
6.3.1.4. The Banking Act 1987 
The collapse of Johnson Matthey Bankers Limited ("JMB") in 1984 raised 
questions about the effectiveness of the Bank's traditional discretionary approach of 
banking supervision."'' JMB was a recognised bank as well as one of five members of 
the London Gold Market Association, responsible for fixing the price of gold, which led 
the Bank of England to step in and bailout JMB. The losses of JMB were attributed to 
bad loans and high concentration in the loan portfolio, which were reported to the Bank 
too late. This had brought into question the adequacy of the supervisory system, which 
relied on voluntary submission of information by recognised banks."'' The British 
Government responded by establishing a committee to review the banking supervisory 
system."^ A White Paper was issued in the same year, which proposed a number of 
reforms to the Banking Act.""" 
The proposals found their way into the new Banking Act 1987."^ The purpo.ses 
of the Act were stated in its lengthy title as "to make new provision for regulating the 
acceptance of deposits in the course of a business, for protecting depositors and for 
regulating the use of banking names and descriptions". The Act sought to attain its 
objectives by regulating deposit-taking authorisation (licensing requirements, refusal, 
restriction and revocation of authorisation),"^ providing for a deposit guarantee 
" Chris Blackhurst, 'What Lurks behind UK Bank Supervision?' 1985 I .F.LRev. Vol. 4 (February), pp. 
4. 
" Maximilian Hall, UK Banking Supervision and the John.son Matthev Affair. (Research Paper No. 8, 
Loughborough University Banking Centre, May, 1985), pp. 1. 
The Treasury, Report of the Committee Set-up to Consider the System of Banking Supervision. (Cmnd 
9550,1985). 
Treasury. Banking Supervision. (Cmnd 9695, 1985). 
For description and analysis of the Banking L.aw 1987 see: Anu Arora, 'The Banking Act 1987 (1)' 
1988 The Company Lawyer Vol. 9(1), pp. 8-13; Anu Arora,' The Banking Act 1987 (2)'1988 The 
Company Lawyer Vol. 9(2). pp. 39-46; Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of 
England. (1996). pp. 78- 276; and: G. Penn, Banking Supervision: Regulation of the UK Banking Sector 
under the Banking Act 1987,(1989). 
Banking Act 1987. R 1. Sections 3^9. 
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scheme, '^' and laying down restrictions on the usage of banking names and 
descriptions,"^" while introducing an appeal system for the aggrieved party. A vestige of 
the two-tier system is that only authorised institutions incorporated in the UK and with a 
paid-up capital mounting to at least five million pounds can use the name "bank" or 
"banker".^' 
Most importantly, the Banking Act 1987 enhanced the trends towards the 
formalistic approach of banking supervision.^' It imposed a specific duty on the Bank to 
supervise institutions for the first time (though the duty could be inferred from the 
earlier Act). It mainly provided for the duties "to supervise the institutions authorised by 
it in the exercise of those powers"^^ and "to keep under review the operation of this Act 
and developments in the field of banking which appear to it to be relevant to the 
exercise of its powers and the discharge of its du t ies" .The Act also put the Bank 
under a duty to report annually to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on its functions 
pursuant to the Act during the year ended. The report should also be published and 
submitted to the Parliament,thus enhancing the accountability and transparency of the 
Bank. Furthermore, the Act conferred upon both the Bank and its staff immunity from 
liability for damages for the actions and omissions committed during the discharge of 
their supervisory functions.^* 
The Banking Act 1987, though obsolete now, can provide guidance for 
countries who seek to enhance their banking supervisory structure without completely 
segregating it from the banking supervisory authority. The British Government had 
••^Ibid, Pt II, Sections 50-66. 
™ Ibid, Pt III, Sections 67-73. 
" See Pt III of the Banking Act 1987 for rules on banking names and descriptions and for explanation: E. 
Ellinger and E. Lomnika, Modem Banking Law. (1994), pp. 45^8. 
For the view of the Bank of England on the influence of the Banking Acts on banking supervision, see 
for example: Brian Quinn, 'The Influence of the Banking Acts (1979 and 1987) on the Bank of England's 
Traditional Style of Banking Supervision' in Norton, Jo.seph (ed), Bank Regulation and Supervision in the 
199Qs, pp. 1-6. 
"ibid, Section 1(1). 
•'''ibid. Section 1(2). 
Ibid, Section 1(3). 
""Ibid. Section 1(4). 
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deliberated seriously on the issue of segregating the banking supervi.sory function from 
the Bank prior to the Banking 1987.^^ Instead, the Board of Banking Supervision was 
established in 1986 to act as a supervisory committee to the Bank. The Banking Act 
1987 conferred upon the Board statutory enforcement. It provided that the Board was 
comprised of nine members: three ex officio members: the Governor, (the Chairman of 
the Board of Directors), the Deputy Governor, and the Executive Director of the Bank, 
responsible for supervision, as well as six independent members.^* The duty of the six 
independent members was to advise the ex officio members on supervisory functions. 
The Banking Act did not oblige the Bank to follow the advice of the independent 
members. Should the Bank reject the latter's advice, the independent members should 
inform the Chancellor of the Exchequer in writing.^*^ The Bank should also supply the 
Board with regular reports on its discharge of its supervisory functions as well as any 
other reasonably required information.^' 
The Banking Act 1987 provided for a number of measures to assure the 
independence of the Board. First, section 2(7) conferred on the members of the Board 
immunity from liability in the discharge of their functions. Secondly, Schedule 1 to the 
Act defined rules for independent members' terms of reference for removal from office. 
The Bank was entitled to remove such a member, after consultation with the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, if it was satisfied that he had become bankrupt or had been put under 
similar proceedings with creditors, become incapacitated, has not attended the Board's 
meetings for a period exceeding three months without the prior consent of the Board or 
has become unfit or unable to perform his functions. The Act also determined the 
quorum for meetings as three independent members and only one ex officio member. 
The Act, nevertheless, left it to the discretion of the Bank of England to determine 
provisions for the independent members' allowances, remuneration and other benefits.^" 
Treasury, Ibid (n 47), paras. 5.3-5.4. 
Banking Act 1987. Section 2(2). 
Ibid, Section 2(3). 
^ Ibid, Section 2(5). 
Ibid, Section 2(4). 
*'lbid, Sch 1, Section 5. 
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The new banking supervisory framework was questioned because o f two major 
banking failures in the U K , namely the BCCI and Barings Bank. Concerning BCCI 
bank, a special U K inquiry which was conducted to examine the supervision of the 
B C C I (known as the "Bingham Report"),^^ praised the Bank's traditional approach 
based on trust and cooperation with banks.^ "* The issue o f creating an independent 
supervisory body for banking supervision separate f r o m the Bank o f England was also 
considered in the Bingham report. The inquiry stated that the "[a]rrangements o f this 
kind are not immutable, and it is not impossible to conceive the future development of a 
national or an international supervisory body".^^ The head o f the Bank's Banking 
Supervision Department also supported the integration o f banking supervision within 
the Bank.^^ 
As regards the Barings Bank, an inquiry was conducted by the Board o f 
Banking Supervision into the circumstances o f the collapse of Barings in 1995.^^ It 
neither called for major changes in the supervisory system nor recommended changes in 
the Banking Act 1987. It rather called for the re-evaluation of the number and skill o f 
surveillance officers, the conduct of quality assurance reviews of banking supervision, 
and the increase o f resources as a consequence o f banks conducting complex and 
material trading activities. 
It is important to notice that the latter Inquiry, and subsequent discussions at the 
House o f Commons, did not mount to a recommendation to change the basis of the 
structure o f banking supervision, suggesting the alternative route o f nominating a lead 
Bingham L . J . , Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, (known 
as the "Bingham Report'"). (October, 1992). 
^ Ibid, para. 3.7-3.8. 
*^Ibid, para. 3.5. 
^ Brian Quinn, 'The Bank of England'.s Role in Prudential Supervision' in Brian Quinn, Robert 
Morgenthau, and Sir Thomas Bingham. Banking Supervision after BCCI . ( L S E Special Paper No. 54, 
Augu.st 1993), pp. 9. 
" Board of Banking Supervision. Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings. HC (1994-5) 
673. 
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regulator.''** The House o f Commons, nevertheless, was concerned about the problem of 
"regulatory c a p t u r e " . I t stressed on the fol lowing: 
•'Bank to demonsu-ate that it is able to separate its supervisory activities from its other functions 
and avoid any possible weakening of its regulatory effectiveness due to its proximity to the day 
to day banking market. Otherwise it maybe that in order to bring about the necessary cultural 
change banking supervision will have to be taken away from the Bank of England".™ 
The Bank o f England consequently took steps to strengthen its Supervision and 
Surveillance function,^' which would remain part thereof. The Barings Bank failure had 
a significant impact on the technique o f banking supervision U K . The traditional 
approach was questioned and the Bank o f England preferred a system which prioritised 
supervisory efforts according to potential risks.^' 
6.3.2. The Financial Services Authority 
Soon after the newly elected Labour Party assumed office in the U K in 1997, 
the Chancellor o f the Exchequer (i.e. Minister o f Finance) announced the inost 
important institutional and operational changes at the Bank of England for decades. 
First, the Bank was given operational responsibilities for setting interest rates. '^^  A new 
Bank o f England Act was enacted in 1998, providing in Section 13 that operational 
decisions are made by the Monetary Policy Committee comprised of the Governor, 
^ Treasury Committee, First Report, Barings Bank and International Regulation; Repon together with the 
Proceedings of the Committee, Vol. I HC (1996-97) 65-1 (12 December 1996). para. 62-68. 
" Ibid, para. 99. 
™ Ibid, para. 100. 
" The Bank applied a number of measure consequent to the 17 recommendations of the Inquiry directly 
or after conducting a study by Arthur Anderson firm. For further details, .see: Memorandum submitted by 
the Bank of England, in Treasury Committee, First Report, Barings Bank and International Regulation: 
Minutes of Evidence and Appendices. Vol. IL HC (1996-97) 65-11 (12 December, 1996), pp. 144-148; 
Bank of England, Arthur Anderson: Findings and Recommendations of the Review of Supervision and 
Surveillance. (July, 1996); Bank of England, The Bank's Review of Supervision, (July 24, 1996); Bank of 
England, Banks' Internal Controls and the Section 39 Process, a Consultative Paper. (February, 1997); 
and Bank of England, The Objectives, Standards and Processes of Banking Supervision. (February, 
1997). 
Dalvinder Singh, Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets, (2007), pp. 48-49. 
•^^  Chancellor, Letter from the Chancellor to the Governor on 6 May 1997. As reproduced in 1997 
B.E.Q.B. Vol. 37(3), pp. 244. 
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Deputy Governor and other six members.^'' Secondly, and only a fortnight later, the 
Chancellor announced the formation of a new regulatory authority responsible at a 
mininnum o f the supervision o f the banking institutions and investment services. 
Banking supervisory responsibilities were to be transferred to a new and strengthened 
Securities and Investment Board ("SIB"), which had already been the regulatory 
authority o f the investment sector. The Bank would accordingly be responsible for the 
overall stabiUty o f the financial system, while the new integrated authority would be 
responsible for the prudential supervision and, later on, the conduct o f business rules by 
firms." The SIB was off ic ia l ly renamed the Financial Services Authori ty in October 
1997. 
The reform was introduced in progressive stages before it became fu l ly 
operational.^^ The first stage o f reform was completed by the transfer o f the banking 
supervision function f r o m the Bank of England to the FSA in June 1998,^' but the 
Board of Banking Supervision was dissolved later on.^* The Financial Services and 
Markets Act was enacted in 2000 ( " F S M A " ) , which transferred the responsibilities o f 
six other regulatory authorities, namely, the Building Societies Commission, the 
Friendly Societies Commission, the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation, 
the Personal Investment Authority, the Register of Friendly Societies and the Securities 
and Futures Authority. Most o f the responsibilities were assumed in 2001, while 
responsibility for general insurance sales and mortgage advice were assumed in 2005. 
^"For further explanation of the Act and the role of the MPC, see: Governor, (the Governor of the Bank of 
England),' The New Lady of Threadneedle Street' 1998 B.E.Q.B. Vol. 38.(2)(May), pp. 173-177; Peter 
Rodgers, 'The Bank of England Act' 1998 B.E.Q.B. Vol. 38.(2)(May), pp. 93-96; Peter Rodgers, 
'Changes at the Bank of England' 1997 B.E.Q.B. Vol. 37(3)(August), pp. 241-243; and Maximilian Hall, 
'All Change at the Bank of England' 1997 J IB PL. Vol. 12(July-August), pp. 295-302. 
Chancellor, The Chancellor's Statement on the Bank of England on 20 May 1997. As reproduced in 
1997 B.E.Q.B. Vol. 37(3), pp. 246. 
For further details of early plans for the progressive stages, see; FSA, Financial Services Authority: an 
Outline. (1997). 
" The Banking Act 1987 was initially amended by Bank of England Act 1998 Sch. 5(I)(1) para. 2(a) in 
order to transfer the function of banking supervision to the FSA. (See also Bank of England Act 1998 
(Commencement) Order 1998/1120). The Banking Act 1987 was later on repealed by the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Consequential Amendments and Repeals) Order 2001/3649. Pt 1 art. 
3(1 )(d). 
Section 416(3)(d) of the FSMA which came into existence by virtue of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (Dissolution of the Board of Banking Supervision) (Transitional Provisions) Order 
2001/3582, which came into force on 26th November 2O0I. 
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6.3.2.1. The Wide Powers of the FSA 
The F S M A creates a very powerfu l authority in terms o f its institutional 
coverage, functions, principles, and statutory powers. 
The FSA enjoys a wide institutional scope which encompasses banks, insurance 
companies, building societies and friendly societies, credit unions, investment and 
pensions advisers, professional firms offer ing particular types o f investment services, 
stockbrokers, fund managers, as well as, supervisory cooperation with the Lloyd's 
insurance underwriting market. Regulated activities initially covered activities inherent 
f rom earlier legislation including accepting deposits,^^ but are defined and altered by 
statutory instruments.*'^ The authority o f the FSA was extended, e.g. to cover issuers of 
electronic money.*' 
The FSA also regulates prudential and market conduct aspects o f the financial 
sector. The F S M A stales that the FSA has four objectives.**^ First, market confidence, 
which is 'maintaining confidence in the financial system' operating in the U K . 
Secondly, public awareness, meaning 'promoting public understanding o f the financial 
system.' This objective encompasses the understanding o f risks and benefits of various 
types of investment as well as the provision o f adequate information and advice. 
Thirdly, the protection o f consumers, which means 'securing the appropriate degree o f 
protection fo r consumers'. Finally, the reduction o f financial crimes, which cover (a) 
fraud or dishonesty, (b) misconduct, or misuse o f market-related information, and (c) 
handling crime proceeds. 
The FSA should have regard to the seven 'principles o f good practice' provided 
for in Section 2(3) o f the F S M A . They cover cost efficiency, the responsibilities o f 
managers o f authorised persons, the proportionality o f restrictions and burden imposed 
and their expected outcome, facilitating innovation, and preserving the international 
™ FSMA, Section 22 read together with Sch. 2 numerate the specific activities including deposit taking. 
Section 22(5) of the FSMA empowers the Treasury to determine the classes of regulated activities and 
accordingly Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001/544 and its 
amendments were i.ssucd. 
**' Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2002/682. 
FSMA, Section 2(2) as further illustrated by Sections 3-6. 
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competitiveness o f the British financial .system. Furthermore, the FSA should take 
account o f "the need to minimise the adverse effects on competition that may arise f rom 
anything done in the discharge o f those functions" as well as "the desirability o f 
facilitating competition between those who are subject to any f o r m o f regulation by the 
Authority."^^ 
The FSA enjoys a wide range of powers encompassing the authorisation, 
legislation and enforcement. 
As to authorisation, the F S M A provides for a general prohibition^" on 
undertaking regulated activities including deposit-taking^^ by anyone other than an 
authorised person or an exempt person (such as a 'recognised clearing house' or 
'recognised investment exchange').**^ There are three types o f authorised persons:^^ first, 
apphcants granted Part I V Permission by the FSA and who should satisfy minimum 
threshold conditions related to their legal status, location, approval o f close links, 
adequacy o f resources, and .satisfying the fit and proper criteria.** Secondly, European 
Economic Area ("EEA") credit institutions'^'^ authorised by their respective home state 
authorities may apply for authorisation under Schedule 3 o f the F S M A which basically 
implements the EU passport concept. Thirdly, Treaty credit institutions which do not 
meet the requirements o f an EEA f i r m are authorised under Schedule 4 o f the same law. 
The FSA may also vary its Part IV upon the request o f the applicant or on its own 
A banking review was undertaken at the time by a team of Treasury Consultants headed by Don 
Cruickshank to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on competition and regulation recommended that 
competition should become a primary objective of the FSA, but was overlooked by the UK Government. 
Source: Don Cruickshank, Competition and Regulation in Financial Services in the UK: Striking the 
Right Balance, an interim report, (1999) reproduced at Annex F, Don Cruickshank, Competition in the 
UK Banking: a Report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. (March, 2000) pp. 317-366. 
'' 'FSMA, Section 19(1). 
" Deposits are defined in Sch 2, para. 22 and Article 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(Regulated Activitie.s) Order 2001/544 and amendments. Article 5 of the same order defines deposit-
taking activity. 
^ FSMA, Sections 39 and 285. 
''^  FSMA, Section 31. 
FSMA, Sections 40 and 4 land Sch 6. 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2(K)6/48/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit in.stitutions (reca.st). OJ L 177, (30 June 2006), 1-200. Article4.!. 
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initiative and may also cancel the authorisation.'^" Furthermore, the F S M A requires 
certain persons who carry specific functions in an authorised institution to be registered 
as 'approved persons'.^' In addition, financial promofion for soliciting deposits can only 
be undertaken by an authorised person and according to the requirements set out by the 
FSA.^-
The F S M A confers on the FSA with enforcement powers including obtaining 
informafion and documents, conducting invesfigation and may enter premises in order 
to search for documents and seize them.^' The FSA also has at its disposal a wide range 
o f disciplinary measures such as public cen.sorship, imposing financial penalties'^" and 
restitution.'^^ The aggrieved person has a right o f reference to the Financial Services and 
Markets T r i b u n a l . F u r t h e r m o r e , the FSA may apply to the court for injunctions and 
resfitution (or 'disgorgement') orders which apply to authorised and non-authorised 
p e r s o n s . I n addifion, the FSA may take part in any insolvency proceeding or petition 
for the winding up o f an authorized person.'^ ** 
The FSA enjoys wide rule-making powers both generally'^'^ and on specific 
issues such as financial promotion rules.'"" The obligation o f legislation is mainly 
expres,sed in the F S M A Handbook o f Rules and Guidance, which combines high 
principle standards and prudential standards, many o f which are carried forward f rom 
the previous banking Laws. '" ' In addition, the FSA is responsible for establishing the 
FSMA, Section 44 and 45. 
FSMA, Section 59. 
FSMA, Sections 21 and 145. 
FSMA, Section 165-169 and 176. 
FSMA, Sections 205 and 206. 
''^  FSMA, Section 384. 
FSMA, R K . 
FSMA, Section 380, 382. 
' See generally, FSMA, Ft X X I V . 
•^'FSMA, Section 138. 
Available online: www.fas.gov.uk 
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Financial Deposit Compensation Scheme,'"' which replaced the earlier Deposit 
Compensation Scheme, as well as establish the Financial Ombudsman Service, 
which provides an alternative dispute resolution scheme. 
It is noteworthy that the F S M A as well as its members, officers and staff are 
also immune fo rm liability in damages for acts and omissions undertaken or purported 
to be undertaken in the discharge o f its business.'"^ It is noteworthy that the House o f 
Lords ruled concerning the equivalent Section 1(4) o f the Banking Act 1987 that the 
immunity does not extend to acts or omissions committed either in bad faith or under 
the tort i f misfeasance in public off ice. 
6.3.2.2. Relations with the Bank of England 
The Bank o f England Act 1998 put a statutory responsibility on the Bank to 
maintain the monetary stability,"^^ which entailed maintaining financial stability. 
Although the Bank o f England Act 1988 did not provide directly for the objective o f 
financial stability, it was considered by the Bank as a "core purpose" beside monetary 
stability, due to their influence and counter-influence relationship.'"^ The Financial 
Stability Board was accordingly established in 2004 and is comprised of senior Bank o f 
England staff under the chairmanship o f the Deputy Governor for Financial Stability. Its 
objectives are to review and prioriti.se potential risks to the financial system, and to 
determining fo l low-up action; review o f the implementation o f the risk mitigation plan; 
and proposing policy lines. 
In order to set a formal relationship between the Bank o f England, the FSA and 
Her Majesty's Treasury, a Memorandum o f Understanding between the three parties 
'"^  FSMA, Pt XV. 
FSMA, Pt XVI. 
"^FSMA, Sch l,para. 19. 
'"^ The Three Rivers Disirict Council v Bank of England No. 3 [20O3J 2 A C I . 
Bank of England Act 1998, Section I I . 
Bank of England, 2008 Financial Stabilitv Report.(24)(October). cover page. 
Bank of England. Bank of England Annual Report, (2004), pp. 19. 
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was agreed in 1997."^^ Accordingly, a high level Standing Committee representing the 
three authorities was established. It conducted regular meetings in order to reach a 
common position regarding important matters. The relationship was further 
strengthened by the membership o f the Deputy Governor in the FSA Board and the 
Chairman o f the FSA as one o f the Bank o f England's Court. This arrangement was 
believed to have improved the sight o f the Bank into the non-banking financial sector as 
well as the flow of information in the system."" 
The Treasury, the Bank o f England and the FSA signed another Memorandum 
of Understanding in 2 0 0 6 . " ' The Memorandum seeks to coordinate their efforts and 
delineate their responsibilities in the field o f financial stability. It explains that the 
Treasury is responsible for "the overall institutional structure o f financial regulation and 
the legislation which governs i t " . " ' It also illustrates the main responsibihty o f the Bank 
as contributing to maintaining the financial stability of the financial system, which 
stems f r o m its monetary role. The main relevant role o f the FSA under the F S M A is the 
authori,sation and prudential supervision o f banks such as setting out .solvency ratios. 
The Memorandum explains that the division of responsibilities is ba.sed on four 
principles: the accountability o f the institution which entails the clear definit ion of 
responsibilities; transparency that allows the Parliament, the markets and the public of 
the specific responsibilities of each institution; the facilitation o f the exchange of 
information amongst these institutions; and the avoidance o f the duplication o f efforts 
amongst the institutions.' ''^  
The Memorandum of Understanding o f 2006 also establishes a Standing 
Committee on Financial Stability, which is chaired by the Treasury and comprises 
representatives o f the three authorities. Under normal conditions, the authorities are 
represented at deputy level and conduct monthly meefing to discuss financial stability 
'"^  Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial 
Services Authority as reproduced in: 1998 B .E O.B. Vol. 38(2) (May), pp. 97-99. 
"° Clive Briault. Revisiting the Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator. FSA, 
Occasional Paper. No. (16), (February, 2002), pp. 15. 
"' The first tripartite Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 1997. 
Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial 
Services Authority. (March 22, 2006), para4. 
Ibid, para.I. 
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and significant individual ca-ses.""* In crises situations, the Bank undertakes "official 
financial operations...to l imit the risk o f problems in or affecting particular insfitutions 
spreading to other parts o f the financial system","^ while the FSA undertakes operations 
other than the ones the Bank is charged with including charging o f capital."^ I f support 
operations are needed, the Standing Committee convenes at principal l e v e l . I n 
exceptional circumstances, where there is "genuine threat to the stability o f the financial 
system to avoid a serious disturbance in the U K economy", the Chancellor becomes 
ultimately responsible for the authorisation o f support operations."* 
6.3.3 The Banking Act 2009 
The segregation o f the Bank o f England and the FSA was subject to criticism in 
the wake o f the Northern Rock failure, where the first run on a British Bank for a very 
long time took place. A number o f U K reports were conducted on the causes of the 
failure and the lessons to be learnt therefrom."^ The House o f Commons Financial 
Reform Report issued in September 2008 stresses on the role o f the Central Bank in a 
segregated financial regulation system and the inter-relationships between depositor 
protection and preventative supervision. It explains the fo l lowing: 
"The separation of regulatory responsibilities from the continuing responsibility for liquidity 
support to secure financial stability has created uncertainty within the Bank of England. As we 
have noted above, the Governor has interpreted this as meaning the Bank was not to engage with 
I ' '0 
individual institutions. This interpretation placed the Bank in a no-man's-land". 
Ibid^para. 10 and 11. 
lbid^para.2. 
lbid^para.3. 
Ibid^para. 13. 
Ibid^para. 14-16. 
"•^  Treasury Committee, Fifth Report, The Run on the Rock. HC (2007-08) 56-1 (January 26, 2008); 
Treasury Committee, Eleventh Special Report, The Run on the Rock: Government Response to the 
Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2007-08. HC(2007-08) 918, (July 10, 2008); Bank of England, HM 
Treasury and FSA, Financial Stability and Depositor Protection: Strengthening the Framework, (Cm. 
7308, January, 2008); FSA Internal Audit Division, The Supervision of Northern Rock: a Lessons 
l-.earned Review: Report. (March, 2008); Bank of England, HM Treasury and FSA, Financial Stability 
and Depositor Protection: Further Consultation. (Cm 7436 July. 2008); Treasury Committee, Seventeenth 
Report, Banking Reform. HC(2007-08) 1008. (September 16, 2008). 
Treasury Committee, Banking Reform. Ibid. para. 10. 
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The major shortcoming o f the U K supervisory structure was the late intervention 
by the Bank to handle the crisis. This is attributed to two shortcomings in the 
institutional arrangements. First, the differences in priorities and cultures between the 
Bank o f England which emphaises more on the moral hazard problems,'-' and the FSA 
which concentrates more on the effects o f banking failures on third parties. Secondly, 
weak coordination amongst the Tripartite authorities rendered them unprepared for a 
covert support operation or facing systemic c r i s i s . ' " The standing committee on 
Financial Stability was perceived as "a sleepy backwater" in normal circumstances 
which needs to start f r o m scratch where financial trouble strikes.''^ In addition, the 
general corporate insolvency rules proved to be inadequate in the case o f the Northern 
Rock Bank and the temporary Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 was 
impermanent. 
A new Banking Bi l l was submitted to the U K parliament in October 2008 and 
was enacted in February 2009. It introduces key amendments. First, it amends the Bank 
of England Act by adding financial stability as one o f its objectives.'^'' It also introduces 
amendments to the Bank of England govemance including the reduction of the number of its 
board members from sixteen to nine.'"* In addition, the also confers on the Bank immunity 
f r o m liability in damages in the exercise o f its monetary role in improving the stability 
of the financial systems.'"^ Furthermore, it creates the Special Resolution Scheme for 
handling banks which have failed or facing imminent failure. The scheme covers 
stabilization procedures (transferring the troubled bank to a private purchaser or a 
bridge bank and placing the bank into public ownership) as wel l as new banking 
administration and insolvency procedures. The objectives o f these procedures are set out 
under Section 4 o f the Banking Act 2009 as the protection o f financial stability in the 
'-' Mervyn King, Govemor of the Bank of England, Turmoil in Financial Markets: What Can Central 
Banks Do?, paper submitted to the Treasury Committee on September 12, 2007, pp. 8. 
'^ ' Treasury Committee, Banking Reform. Ibid (n 119 ), paras. 25-27. 
'•' House of Commons, Treasury Committee Seventeenth Report of Session 2007-08, Banking Reform. 
HC 1008, (September 16, 2008), para. 268. 
"'Bank of England, Ibid (n 107), pp. 49-51. 
Banking Act 2009, Section 238. 
'-^  Ibid, Section 239. 
Ibid, Section 244. 
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U K particularly the continuity o f its banking system, the enhancement o f confidence in 
the stability o f the financial system, protection o f depositors and public funds and 
avoiding interference wi th private property rights. 
Most relevantly, the Act determines one o f the thorniest issues in a segregated 
financial supervisory authority, which is determining the institution responsible for 
deciding that a bank has failed or is facing imminent failure and the .selection o f suitable 
measures. The Banking Act assigns to the FSA the responsibility to "trigger" the 
decision after consultation with the Bank o f England and the Treasury, the Bank o f 
England is made responsible for its operation.'"^ 
The Banking Act does not seek to change the tripartite arrangement. It rather 
creates the Financial Stability Committee, a sub-committee o f the court of directors o f 
the Bank o f England, comprised o f the Governor, two Deputy Governors and four 
designated directors o f the Bank. Its functions include the provision o f 
recommendations to the court o f directors on the implementation of the financial 
stability strategy; advice the banks on individual institutions on issues relevant to the 
financial stability; and monitor how the Bank exercLses its monitoring role o f the inter-
bank payment systems.'' ' 
Therefore, the U K experience shows that there are important prudential aspects 
in the institutional structure and techniques o f the financial or banking supervisory 
authorities that should be addressed. The fo l lowing chapter wi l l examine the legal 
nature o f the BCBS. 
Banking Act 2009, Sections 7-9. 
Banking Act 2009, Section 238. 
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CHAPTER 7 
T H E L E G A L N A T U R E O F T H E B C B S STANDARDS 
7.0 Introduction 
The previous five Chapters covered the international standards on banldng 
supervision as set out by the BCBS either alone or in coordination wi th other 
international fora. This chapter seeks to analyse the legal nature o f the BCBS as soft 
international law (Section 1). It also draws prehminary conclusions on the significance 
o f the soft law as the best legal method for setting out international rules fo r baking 
supervision in terms o f implementation and compliance. The chapter afterwards 
examines the influence o f the BCBS standards even on non-member countries and the 
reasons behind it. 
7.1. What is soft international law? 
The researcher takes the view that the BCBS documents are characterised as soft 
law.' Soft law refers to documents, which do not legally bind countries and, therefore, 
are not directly enforced by judicial authorities and tribunals. They are described as .soft 
law as opposed to "hard law" or " f i rm law", such as treaty rules. Authors explain that 
states would init ial ly have no agreed legal rules to govern their relations, then agree on 
written formulae and eventually start to have expectafions towards each other built upon 
these formulae, and refer to them in further negotiations or settlements. Authors also 
explain that the direct effect o f soft law on relations o f states inter se is that it 
' There is a vast body of literature on sources of international law generally and soft law specifically, see 
particulariy: H. Baade, "The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises' in N. Horn 
(ed.), Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises. (1980), pp. 3-38; R.R. Baxter, 
'International Law in "Her Infinite Variety'". 1980 ICLQ. Vol. 29(4)(Oclober), pp. 549-566; C. Chinkin, 
"The Challenges of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law' 1989 ICLQ. Vol. 
38(4)(October), pp. 850-866; T. Gruchalla-Wesierski, 'A Framework for Understanding "Soft Law'" 
1984 Mcgill L J . Vol. 30. pp. 37-88; D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law. (2004), pp. 
18-65; Fricder Roessler, 'Law. De Facto Agreements and Declarations of Principle in International 
Economic Relations' 1978 G Y l L . V o l . 21, pp. 27-73; and L Seidl-Hohenveldern, "International Economic 
"Soft Law"", Recueil Pes Cours (Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of Iniemational Law) Vol. II. 
(Tome 163 de la collection), pp. 165-246. 
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legitimises conduct which abides by soft documents, making it very d i f f i cu l t for states 
that abstain or reject them to challenge such conduct." 
Soft law is not numerated as an authoritative source o f international law, 
unlike treaties and international customary law^ provided for , inter alia in Art ic le 38(1) 
o f the Statute o f the International Court o f Justice ("ICJ")." Some authors argue that 
there is no such distinction between hard and soft law.^ Indeed the existence o f vast 
volume o f documents, particularly in the f ield o f international economic law proves that 
Art icle 38(1) has failed to contain an exhaustive list of international law. 
In 1983, Sir Joseph Gold,^ then General Counsel o f the I M F , wrote an 
important Article in which he observed how the I M F resorted to soft law to assure 
compliance wi th exchange rate measures. His ideas were later on applied by Norton in 
C. Chinkin, Ibid (n 1), pp. 866. 
•' Supporters of the soft law as a .source of international law usually rely upon the Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits), ICJ 
Rep. 1986, pp. 14. The ICJ in this case deducted that there was an opinio juris (i.e. that a certain practice 
is believed to be obligatory by a rule of law) prohibiting the use of force directly from the attitudes of 
States concerning General Assembly resolutions which themselves are a traditional example of soft law. 
Opinio juris takes very long time to evolve, and it is doubtful in the ca.se of rapidly changing international 
banking standards that they can be of norm-creating character. 
^ Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ states the following: 
"The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations; 
(d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law". 
^ Prosper Weil took a critical view of the theory of 'relative normatively', which had evolved in 
international law in a much celebrated article published in 1983. He argued that it constituted a major 
deviation from the principles of international Law. 
Source: Prosper Weil, 'Towards Relative Normativiiy in International Law?" 1983 AJIL Vol. 77(3)(July), 
pp. 413^42. 
^ Joseph Gold, 'Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements" 1983 AJIL Vol. 
77(3)(July), pp. 443-489. 
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his 1995 important thesis on devising international banking standards, whereby he 
characterised the BCBS standards as international soft law.^ 
When the BCBS documents are examined in light o f the description o f soft 
law, it can be deducted that these documents are soft law. First, the BCBS was declared 
as a fo rum for the exchange o f opinion and has not been constituted as an international 
organisation entitled with a capacity to enter into international agreements.* Secondly, 
BCBS members made it clear that they had no intention to be bound by the decisions 
and none o f their representatives was empowered to do so. On the contrary, they 
retained discretionary powers to apply the documents and some times admitted that 
contravening enforceable laws might hamper the application o f the decisions. Thirdly, 
the language o f the BCBS documents reflects the weakness o f enforceability. Most o f 
the documents took the fo rm o f lengthy documents explaining supervisory concerns and 
ways to deal with them. Hortatory terms such as "desirable", "should", "can", "problems 
o f a material nature" and "may wish" have been used throughout the documents, and do 
not even contain "whereas" clauses.*^ The BCBS documents are also only been 
endorsed, not signed. 
7.3. The Influence of the BCBS Standards 
This thesis argues that soft law is the best f r o m o f international banking 
standard setting as a general rule. The author takes a critical view o f the leading articles 
published by the then General Counsel o f the BIS, Mar io Giovanol i , ' " who calls for 
international banking standards to be hardened into treaty fo rm. This w i l l be done by 
' Joseph J. Norton. Devising international Bank Supervisory Standards. (1995), pp. 241. 
* The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 5 regarding "'treaties constituting international 
organizations and treaties adopted within an international organization", states: 
"The present Convention applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an 
international organization and to any treaty adopted within an international organization without 
prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization.'" 
Peter C. Hayward, 'Prospects for International Co-operation by Bank Supervisors' 1990 The 
International Lawyer. Vol. 24(3)(Fall), pp. 787-788. 
"' Mario Giovanoli. 'A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: L.egal Aspects of International 
Financial Standard Setting" in Mario Giovanoli (ed.) International Monetary Law: Issue for the New 
Millennium. (2000). pp. 3-59; and "Reflections on International Financial Standards as '"Soft Law'"' in 
Joseph Norton and Mads Andenas (eds.). International Monetary and Financial Law upon Entering the 
New Millennium. (2002). pp. 71-98. 
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weighing the advantages o f treaties (formalism, precision, binding effect and 
sanctioning) and soft law in light o f the nature and characteristics o f international 
banking supervision. 
Treaties might be preferred due to their formalities particularly because they 
require the ratification o f the legislative body (according to the applicable constitutional 
l a w ) . " This arguably ensures the commitment o f the country comparable to non binding 
agreements. Treaties also reflect the seriousness o f the country towards its underlying 
commitments. '^ These factors are irrelevant to international standards on banking 
supervision due to the nature o f banking and banking supervision. 
Let us consider why progress has been achieved by the BCBS mainly in the 
f ie ld o f preventative banking supervision. This f i e ld is influenced by a major public 
policy interest o f maintaining the safety and soundness o f the banking system. It is hard 
to imagine that there could be differences amongst jurisdictions on this issue because o f 
the universal recognition o f the importance o f the safety o f banking as well as the lack 
of socio-politically sensitive issues. Therefore, it is easier to reach genuine consensus on 
banking supervisory standards without having to resort to concluding a treaty. States 
also do not need the assurance o f a treaty endorsed by the legislative body of 
counterparty states. 
One exception is related to the issue of safeguarding the banking system f r o m 
exposure to risks because o f serious financial crimes o f money laundering and the 
financing o f terrorism. These crimes transcend prudential requirements and enter into 
the realm o f national security, a highly significant political issue. This is why the 
recommendations not only o f BCBS but also o f the Financial Act ion Task Force 
( "FATF") were hardened into international agreements and binding U N Resolutions. 
Here, the researcher would like to depart view wi th the authors who set the F A T F 
recommendations experience as a model for BCBS standards.'^ 
'' Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law. (2005), pp. 91. 
"Jbid. pp. 98. 
K. Alexander. R. Dhumale and J. Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems: The International 
Regulation of Systemic Risk. (2006). pp. 151. 
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These features o f the BCBS standards on preventative supervision can be 
further clarif ied by drawing a comparison with protective banking supervision, where 
controversial issues arise strongly. States have variable views on how and to what 
extent they should bail out a troubled bank, because a substantial amount o f public 
money might be spent. This issue then becomes harder to reach an international 
consensus on. In fact there has never been an international treaty on deposit guarantees 
or insurance compared to the Deposit Guarantee Directive o f the EU. ' ' ' 
Similarly, there are strong policy issues, which influence the degree o f 
openness of a country to foreign banking. This is why states had to have an international 
treaty; namely, the General Agreement on Trade in Services ( "GATS") fo r this purpose. 
The BCBS standards do not provide that countries should allow foreign establishments, 
but recommend which supervisory requirements should be fol lowed to ensure a sound 
market entry. Likewise, the BCBS standards do not determine the range o f permissible 
activities for a foreign bank, but set out universal prudential rules to be applied should a 
certain activity be undertaken. 
Another related feature o f preventative banking supervision is its highly 
technical nature. They are f u l l o f practical details that need to be reviewed specifically 
and repeatedly. This is why its details are usually spelt out in secondary legislation and 
working manuals (wi th in the framework o f formulae laws). Secondary regulations often 
fa l l w i th in the original or delegated powers o f executives in supervisory authorities. In 
other words, they do not pass through legislative bodies. 
The second reason why states might opt for international treaties is the 
precision o f their wording and them being subject to specific rules o f interpretation 
under the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties.'^ The rather "loose" language o f 
soft law documents makes them open to various interpretations and hence there could 
be variable applications, each o f which is claiming conformity wi th soft law. The author 
European Parliament and Council Directive 94/19/EC of May 30, 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes. 
OJ. L 135, (31 May 1994), pp. 5-14. This directive is amended by the European Parliament and Council 
Directive 2005/1/EC of 9 March 2005 OJ. L 179, (24 March 2005), pp. 9-17. There is also a cun-ent 
proposal to amend the directive, see: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay, 
Council Document 3743/08, Ecofin 645, Brussels, (20 February 2009). ^ 
" Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posncr, Ibid ( n i l ) , pp. 95. 
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discussed this problem with the participants in a conference on soft law.'^ Her question 
was specifically whether there are rules in international law to guide the legal 
practitioner in the field of financial regulation on how to interpret a soft law document? 
They agreed that there were no such guidelines, despite the importance of the issue. The 
former Director of Banking Supervision Department ("BSD") at the CBJ, then Mr. 
Abdul Fattah, also confirmed to the researcher that there have been incidents where 
there were varying interpretations regarding the scope of the consolidated supervision 
between home and host supervisory authorities. This was one of the reasons behind the 
issuance of the fu-st BCBS' "Core Principles Methodology" which explained the 
following: 
"The Core Principles were designed to provide general guidance that could apply to various 
supervisory regimes, allowing some flexibility in the design and implementation of concrete 
measures. ]n so doing, the Basel Committee was also aware that national supervisory 
authorities might misinterpret the Core principles. In the same vein, the assessment of 
compliance with the Core Principles by numerous interested parties (e.g. the I M F , World Bank, 
regional development banks, consulting firms) is likely to result in varied interpretations and 
possibly inconsistent advice. Although the results of the assessments may not be made public, 
it is still important that assessments be conducted in a consistent manner from country to 
country." " 
The legalism of treaties, nevertheless, means that there is less flexibility in their 
interpretation, a quality that contradicts the nature of banking supervision in general. 
This is because banking supervisors would like to agree with precision on issues that 
affect banking competition specifically. Therefore, they have agreed on a certain 
minimum capital ratio. Supervisors yet deal with banks with variable traditions, 
different market structure and subject to very different legal infrastructures. For all these 
reasons, international standards should be flexibly worded and implemented. Flexibility 
has actually been a major contributory factor in the successful wide implementation of 
the BCBS standards. 
Even in the case of the most precise standard, the capital adequacy ratio, it is 
noticed that consensus was built upon a minimum ratio not a fixed one. Furthermore, 
S P T L International L a w Group and the British Institute of international and Comparative L a w , 
Sixth Conference on Theory and International Law. (March 25, 1996). 
" B C B S , Core Principles Methodology. (October. 1999), pp. 5, par. 23. 
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international standards on capital adequacy have been increasingly flexibly worded. 
Basel 11, most notably, provides banks and supervisors with a catalogue of options for 
capital adequacy measurement, while Basel I provided fixed buckets and ratios. 
Another striking example is the rule of home country control. This rule is one 
of the pillars of international banking standards, but can or should this rule be immune 
from change? The vast development in technology and the consequential growth of 
online banking is bringing a gradual end to geography. Putting this contentions point 
aside, the exact meaning of home country control has various degrees of understanding. 
This is because home country control is itself dependent on two factors: the degree of 
consensus on substantive rules, as well as the effectiveness of the host country' 
cooperation with the home country. The case is most evident in relation to developing 
countries ho.sting large international banks permitted by their home countries to apply 
the more advanced capital adequacy measures. If the host supervisory authority has not 
yet built up its institutional capacity to understand and monitor the capital adequacy of 
such a bank, how then can there be effective exchange of information between the two 
authorities? The home country should in this case become more proactive and intrusive 
in its exercise of its supervisory role to ensure the safety of the bank. Furthermore, 
supervisors might exercise their home and host supervisory role variably depending on 
their evaluation of their counterpart supervisory authority. A country with a reputation 
of corruption, nepotism or weak institutional capacity might be less trusted than the UK 
for example. This is an important practical issue which supervisors confide to 
themselves due to political sensitivities. 
The third reason why proponents of treaties prefer them is related to their 
binding nature. This should result into treaties being implemented and enforced before 
the judiciary. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties incorporates the related 
doctrine of paaa sunt servanda in Article 26, which provides that treaties in force are 
binding upon their parties, who should perform the treaties in good faith. Treaties might 
contain procedures for dispute settlement or enforcement which allow the invocation of 
state liability or reparation against a state in breach of underlying obligations. 
The most important defence against this argument is found in the wide 
implementation of the BCBS standards. Many of the BCBS rules transformed into 
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binding legislation in important financial centres.'* This includes the G-10 countries 
and the EU Member States. Furthermore, the BCBS standards have been accepted by a 
plethora of regional organisations and fora. Wide implementation by BCBS member and 
non-member states has taken place irrespective of the transitory role played by their 
regional organisations. By contrast, states' implementation of treaties might not lead to 
compliance in the sense of actual adherence to the obligations of the treaty.'^ One author 
provides this interesting following explanation:"" 
•'In fact states may sign commitments for a host of reasons of self-interest independent of any 
expectation of subsequent compliance. States may recognize that they are unable to comply, and 
commit with the hope that others will help them comply at home (as with many Eastern 
European governments in the area of the environment) or to strengthen a leader's political 
potential for implementing al home later, or to associate with the signing ceremony of a 
diplomatic conference". 
"If compliance is a matter of choice, then there is little difference between whether the obligation 
is nominally binding or nonbinding. The limiting factors associated with compliance are the 
political and technical factors associated with the decision to comply. In this chapter, I refer 
interchangeably to treaties, obligations, accords and international instruments. I presume that 
there is no significant variation in compliance depending upon the nature of the obligation. The 
question is under what conditions do states comply with international obligations of any sort". 
This point is further illustrated by examining the experience of the EU and the 
League of Arab States in this regard. The existence of nine common members between 
the EC and the BCBS, and the collaboration between them led to an in tandem growth 
of their legislation."' The EU, most significantly, transposed the BCBS non-binding 
For further details see. particularly: C . M . Chinkin , Ibid (n I ) , pp. 860-861. See also: A . D'Amato, 
"Manifest Intent and the Generation by Treaty of Customary Rules of International L a w ' 1970 A J I L . Vo l . 
64(5)(October). pp. 892-902. 
Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein. further argues that the distinction between soft and hard law is 
unnecessary since what matters is obtaining effectiveness. 
Source: Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, "'Hard'" L a w v "Soft" L a w : Unnecessary Dichotomy?' in J . 
Norton and M . Andenas (eds). International Monetary and Financial L a w upon Entering the New 
Millennium. (2002), pp. 363. 
Peter M . Haas. 'Why Comply, or Some Hypothesis in Search of an Analyst' in Edith Brown Weiss 
(ed.), International Compliance with Nonbinding Accords (1997), pp. 23. 
See for example: Nadia Al -Anani . The Future of the Harmonisation of Banking Supervisory Rules in 
the E C Law. Home Country Coniroi v Centralisation. (Research Paper No. 139/99. Loughborough 
University Banking Centre. 1999); Joseph Norton, 'The European Community Banking L a w Paradigm: A 
Paradox in Bank Regulation and Supervision - Reflections on the E C Second Banking Directive" in 
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standards into hard law directives. A non-comprehensive hst includes the First Banking 
Directive." which was adopted not long after the endorsement by the BCBS of the 
"Report to the Governors on the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments", which 
later became known as the "Concordat". The Consolidated Supervision Directive, 
1983"^ was first proposed by the Commission to respond to the BCBS decisions in this 
field. The Directive was adopted only one month after the issuance of the parallel, 
"Principles for the Supervision of Bank's Foreign Establishments", otherwise known as 
the 1983 Basle Accord, and was reinforced by the Second Banking Directive.'" 
Likewise, the Con.solidated Supervision Directive issued in 1992"^ was mainly inspired 
by the failure of the BCCI, while the BCBS responded by producing the parallel 
"Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Supervision of 
International Banking Groups and their Cross-Border Establishments". Another 
example is the Solvency Ratio Directive'^ which incorporated the Basel Capital Accord 
of 1988 into EU law in the following year. The EU more recently incorporated Basel 11 
into a directive issued in 2006."^ 
Joseph Norton. Chai-Jui Cheng and I. Fletcher (eds), Inlernalional Banking Regulation and Supervision: 
Change and Transformation in the I990.S-. pp. 49-80; and W. van Garven, 'The Second Banking Directive 
and the Case Law of the Court of Ju.stice", 1990 Y E L Vol . 10. pp. 57-70. 
First Council Directive 7 7 / 7 8 0 / E E C of 12 December 1977 on the co-ordination of laws , regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ 
L 332, (17 December 1977), 30. This Directive had been replaced by Directive 2000 /12 /EC, which 
subsequently was replaced by Directive 2 0 0 6 / 4 8 / E C (recast). 
Council Directive 8 3 / 3 5 0 / E E C of 13 June 1983 on the .supervision of credit institutions on consolidated 
basis. O J L 193, (18 July 1983). 18-20. This Directive had been replaced by Directive 9 2 / 3 0 / E C . which 
was replaced by Directive 2 0 0 0 / 1 2 / E C , replaced by directive 2006 /48 /EC (recast). 
Second Council Directive 8 9 / 6 4 6 / E E C of 15 December 1989 on the co-ordination of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
and amending Directive 7 7 / 7 8 0 / E E C . O J L 386, (30 December 1989), 1-13. This Directive had been 
replaced by Directive 2000 /12 /EC, which was subsequently replaced by directive 2006 /48 /EC (recast). 
Council Directive 9 2 / 3 0 / E E C of 6 April 1992 on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated 
basis. O J L 1 10, (28 April 1992), 52-58. This Directive had been replaced by Directive 2000 /12 /EC, 
which was replaced by directive 2006 /48 /EC (recast). 
Council Directive 8 9 / 6 4 7 / E E C of 18 December 1989 on a solvency ratio for credit institutions. OJ L 
386. (30 December 1989), 14-22. This Directive has had been replaced by Directive 2 0 0 0 / 1 2 / E C . which 
was subsequently replaced by 2 0 0 6 / 4 8 / E C (rcca.st). 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2 0 0 6 / 4 9 / E C of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of 
investment firms and credit institutions (recast). OJ L 177, (30 June 2006), 201-255. 
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The efforts of the League of Arab States, by contrast, have not resulted into the 
adoption of hard legislation equivalent to the EU directives. Whatever reasons are 
behind the absence of banking supervisory legislation at the level of the Arab League, it 
is interesting to see that alternate froa have emerged to cover this regional loophole. The 
Council of Central Bank Governors, meeting at the Arab Monetary Fund ("AMF") has 
issued guidelines calling basically for the adoption of banking supervisory measures 
modulated on the BCBS standards. The major impetus for creating this forum was to 
coordinate efforts with the BCBS. Similarly the Islamic Financial Services Board 
("IFSB") was created for the purpose o f amongst others, the coordination with the 
BCBS and other fora. The private sector, represented by the Union of Arab Banks, has 
also contributed in raising awareness of banks and even banking supervisory authorities 
on the possible impact of the BCBS standards on their activities. 
The above facts lead to an interesting conclusion that the attributed role of the 
EU directives in the wide implementation of the BCBS standards could be exaggerated. 
One leading author on this subject, Norton, has already made the following 
observation:"** 
••[Tjhc di.smissal ot" the Basle Committee as simply an informal group of bank supervisors is 
rather misleading. The Basle Committee represents the leading international bank supervisors 
in the world, each of whom has significant legal authority and discretion within its own 
national jurisdiction. And with respect to the E C itself, the E C , through the connecting factor 
of the contact group and overlapping membership between the Basle Conunittee and the E C , 
also clearly has significant legal potency in giving credence to the Basle principles". 
The main conclusion of this argument is not to undermine the significance of the 
EU. It is rather to illustrate that the BCBS standards have an intrinsic value that leads to 
the implementation of its standards despite the level of regional involvement in their 
drafting. 
The fourth rea.son why states might prefer treaties is the availability of 
sanctioning powers. The BCBS has no sanctioning powers, and has not resorted to 
alternative weaker methods of enforcement such as surveillance.^'^ The BCBS has 
Joseph J . Norton, Devising International Bank Supervisory Standards. (1995), pp. 258. 
For further details, see: Niels Blokker and Sam Muller, Towards More Effective Supervision by 
International Organizations: Some Concluding Observations. In Niels Blokker and Sam Muller (eds.), 
Towards More Effective Supervision bv International Organizations. (1994), pp. 275-311. 
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already decided that it would not undertake assessment of countries' compliance with 
the Core Principles due to lack of resources.^" It has rather encouraged individual 
supervisory authorities to make their own compHance assessments and the document 
"Conducting a Supervisory Self-Assessment - Practical Application" was issued in 
April 200\ for this purpose. The BCBS does not use "peer-pressure" measures, unlike 
FATF, which issues lists of countries that do not adhere to its Anti-Money-Laundering 
and Countering the Financing of Terrorism measures. Enforcement has however been 
encouraged via horizontal linkages with other international organisations; namely, the 
World Bank and the IMF. 
The role of the World Bank in strengthening the international financial 
architecture has risen from a series of financial crises. It should be understood within 
the context of its mandate as the international institution of global development and 
poverty reduction.^' The World Bank has utilised structural and investment lending as 
well as technical assistance loans to handle crises. During the Asian crises specifically, 
the World Bank concentrated its efforts on the affected countries' financial systems."''^  It 
has particularly focu.sed on problems related to corporate governance, insolvency and 
bank restructuring.''^ 
The involvement of the IMF in banking supervision finds its roots in the G-7 
Lyon Summit of 1996, which, in response to deep and frequent financial crises, stressed 
on the essential role played by prudential regulation in maintaining the stability of 
monetary and financial systems. In a letter addressed to the researcher in November 
1995, which discussed the role of the IMF in relation to banking supervision, the IMF 
stated the following: 
"The objective of the International Monetary Fund ( I M F ) is the promotion of international 
monetary cooperation which permits the expansion of international trade in a setting of stable 
and orderly exchange rate arrangements free from exchange restrictions. While international 
^' B C B S , Ibid (n 17), pp. 1, Executive Summary par. 2. 
" World Bank, International Financial Architecture: A n Update on the World Bank Group Activities, 
Information Note by Worid Bank Staff, April 27, 2001, page 1, par. 3. 
Andres Rigo, "Recent Financial Crises-Comments from International Development Banks' in I M F (ed). 
Current Developments in Monetary and Financial L a w Vo l . 1(1999), pp. 154-156. 
^•Ibid.. 150-154. 
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banks may play a key role in international trade and international capital flows, the supervision 
of such banks remain a responsibility of national supervisory authorities and is beyond the 
scope of the Fund. 
Plea.se note further that the I M F does not require countries to adopt particular policies or follow 
special economic programs. Rather, the institution works together with the countries to develop 
mutually agreed-upon economic programs that can be supported by I M F resources. This 
general principle applies in the area of supervision. The I M F does not demand the application 
of the Basle Committee guidelines. But in the discharge of its surveillance and other 
regulations that promote sound and safe banking practices, and these include, off course, those 
advocated by the Basle Committee".''' 
The roles of the IMF's are regular multilateral and bilateral surveillance,"'^ 
technical assistance and conditionality.^^ In multilateral surveillance, the IMF projects 
and analyses the international and regional economy where important banking 
developments are featured. More recently, the IMF has been working on the 
dissemination of international banking standards issued by the BCBS for the G-10 
countries to the international scene. The IMF has the advantage of universal 
membership and close knowledge and relations with governments. As to bilateral 
surveillance, its most important tool is the consultations undertaken under IMF Article 
of Agreement IV, whereby IMF staff visit member states once yearly at least. 
Traditionally consultations focused on macroeconomic considerations specifically, 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies but increasingly have been focusing on the 
surveillance of the banking system and infrastructure. Furthermore, the IMF, often in 
co-operation with the World Bank, provides "technical assistance" to diagnose and 
rectify banking problems. Finally, there is the conditionality, which refers to the 
economic policies that member states to the IMF intend to adopt in order to avail 
themselves of the IMF resources.^^ The IMF sees, within this context, a strong line 
between the soundness of the banking system in a country and macroeconomic 
This letter was sent by Pamela J . Bradley on behalf of Mr. Michael Camdessus, the then Managing 
Director of the I M F , on November 8, 1995. 
For a historical background on the I M F surveillance role, see: Wi l l iam Holder, 'Surveillance, Crisis , 
and Architecture' in I M F . Current Developments in Monetary and Financial L a w Vol . I , (1999), pp. 17-
29. 
Stanley Fischer, Banking Soundness and the Role of the Fund' in Charles Encx;h and John H. Green 
(eds ). Banking Soundness and Monetary Policy. (1997), pp. 22-34. 
" I M F , Glossary of Selected Financial Terms. 
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stabilisation programmes. Therefore, it puts strong emphasis on the situation of the 
banking system in macroeconomic conditionality. 
In addition to the above, the Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
("FSAP")^^ is an important collaborative effort between the IMF and the World Bank to 
strengthen the monitoring of financial systems in the context of the IMF's bilateral 
surveillance and the World Bank's financial sector development work. The FSAP was 
introduced in 1999; it aims to enhance the soundness of the financial systems in 
member states. Essential by-products of this programme are the "Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes" ("ROSCs"), whereby a modular assessment of 
countries' observance of international standards and codes is undertaken.'"^ FSAP is also 
the basis of the Financial System Stability Assessments ("FSSAs"), whereby the IMF 
addresses topics relevant to its surveillance, such as the resiliency of the financial 
system, which entails deeper coverage of financial sector topics. The results of the 
FSAP form the basis of priorities for technical assistance, as well as financial support 
provided by the IMF and the World Bank to member sates.'" 
What matters most is that the assessed .standards, in the context of the FSAP, 
include the BCBS Core Principles.^" Furthermore, the BCBS together with other 
international standard setting bodies, central banks and supervisor agencies, and other 
institutions, have cooperated with the IMF and World Bank in conducting the FSAP. To 
put it simply, compliance with the BCBS Core Principles can influence the ability of 
countries to avail themselves of financial assistance from the IMF and World Bank. 
Stanley Fischer, Ibid (n 36), pp. 30. 
''^  For further details, see: I M F and World Bank, Financial Sector Assessment Program ( F S A P ) . A 
Review: Lessons from the Pilot and Issues Going Forward, (November 27, 2000); and I M F , I M F Reviews 
Experience with the Financial Sector Assessment Programme ( F S A P ) and Reaches Conclusions on Issues 
Going Forward (PIN No 01/11 Febniary 5, 2001). 
I M F and World Bank, Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes ( R O S C s ) : A n Update. 
(March 30, 2000). 
•" I M F and the World Bank, Financial Sector Assessment Program ( F S A P ) : A Review: Lessons from the 
Pilot and Issues Going Forward. (November 27, 2000). para. 37. 
For a thorough explanation on this point, see: World Bank and I M F , Implementation of the Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Bunking Supervision. Experiences. Influences, and Perspectives. (September23, 
2002). 
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However, the assessment does not aim to be a simple "pass or fail"."^ The IMF and 
World Bank staff has prepared the "Structure and methodology for assessment reports 
prepared by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank"."" These explain that 
assessment will be on basis of each of the BCBS Core Principles. 
Results then will be set under one of the following criteria:"'' First "compliant", 
which indicates ful l observance or utmost immaterial shortcomings in relation to the 
"essential" criteria; secondly, "largely compliant", where minor shortcomings are 
noticed, which do not undermine the supervisory authority's ability to realise the 
objectives of the underlying core principle; thirdly "materially non-compliant", where 
the shortcomings cast doubts on the ability of the supervisory authority to achieve 
observance, but the deficiencies have been substantially rectified; fourthly, "non-
compliant", when no substantial progress toward observance has taken place; and 
finally, there is the self explanatory criteria of "not applicable". 
International law theorists have various explanations on why countries abide by 
international agreements."'' The researcher broadly agrees with international lawyers 
who employ the game theory in their efforts to explain why states comply with 
international agreements."^ By implementing this theory to international banking 
standards, we find out that states are faced with four strategic options. The first option is 
the "coincidence of interests". The second option is "coercion", whereby the stronger 
party threatens with retaliation such as closure of foreign banks or increasing applicable 
prudential measures. The third option is "cooperation" whereby states defect or refrain 
from undertaking retaliatory measures predicting that their counterparties would do the 
same. The final option before states is "co-ordination", whereby states prefer to concur 
on common rules and by doing so avoid retaliation and gain a good reputation of 
compliance. 
I M F and the World Bank. Ibid (n 41), Box 2: Comments from the F S A P Outreach Meeting in October 
2000. 
^ This is an annex to the B C B S , The Core Principles Methodology (Draft September 22"" 2005), 
(October, 2006), pp. 43-48. 
I M F and World Bank, Ibid (n 42). pp. 11. footnote: 15. 
Peter M . Haas. Ibid (n 20). pp. 2 M 8 
•" The researcher is heavily influenced by the thesis developed by Professors E . Posner and J . Goldsmith 
Ibid (n I I ) , particularly pp. 83-106. 
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In this era of globalisation and interdependence in the international financial 
market, states have a joint interest in the continuity of international banking institutions 
and markets while maintaining their safety and soundness. It is not enough for states to 
refrain from retaliatory actions such as closing a foreign bank. They have to agree on a 
set of rules to ensure that the foreign bank does not cause systemic risk or any other risk 
to its banking system. Countries need more than "cooperation". They have to resort to 
coordination by achieving agreement on common supervisory standards. 
The coincidence of interest and coercion does not alone explain why non-
BCBS member countries comply with international banking standards. Consider for 
example why some of the member countries of the League of Arab States choose to 
comply, while other countries do not, although non-complying countries might need 
loans or technical assistance more than complying ones. A key element, I think, is the 
political willingness of the country i.e. does the country would like to be viewed as a 
modern, open and advanced one. There could be various reasons behind this trend such 
as the acceptance of the international community and the attraction of foreign 
investment. Another key element is awareness of the importance of compliance with 
international standards not only for attaining supervisory goals, but also for the image-
building of the perspective country, as an open, modern and investment friendly, and 
financially .sound host country. 
The BCBS members have on their own part exerted efforts to ensure 
compliance with its standards by third countries. The duality approach in banking 
supervision partially aims at tailoring international banking supervisory standards 
suitable for varying banking systems across the globe. The issuance of the Core 
Principles constitutes an attempt to set out basic and relatively easy to apply 
international standards. 
In addition the BCBS exerted effort to raise awareness of the importance of 
international supervision standards. It has maintained a dialogue with supervisory 
authorities from non-member countries. The International Conferences of Banking 
Supervisors^^ organised by the BCBS have successfully attracted a large number of 
Some recent conference papers can be obtained on-line for the B I S web page. The eariier proceedings 
of the conferences are distributed and confided to Central Banks. A copy is also held with the Ba.sel 
Secretary. The Basel Reports on International Developments in Banking Supervision also contain 
summaries of the proceedings. 
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World supervisors.''^ The BCBS has maintained ties with regional supervisory groups 
and has often been represented by its Secretariat at their meetings. These groups cover 
many jurisdiction!;^" including Jordan, other Arab states which are members of the Arab 
Committee on Banking Supervision ("ACBS") and the Arab Monetary Fund ("AMF"). 
In addition, the BCBS and the BIS established the Financial Stability Institute ("FSI"), 
with the aim of assisting supervisory authorities in the enhancement and strengthening 
of their efforts. The main objectives of the FSI are the promoting sound supervisory 
standards and practices, providing supervisors with updated information related to the 
financial sector as well as training and sharing information amongst supervisors.^' The 
BCBS also participates in the training and technical assistance programme conducted by 
the FSI. Education and previous experience with international economic organisations 
also determine the degree of awareness a country has. Therefore, countries with longer 
experience of openness and interaction are more likely to adopt international standards. 
A final note should be made regarding countries with limited connectivity to 
the internatioiial banking markets or which simply host international banks but hardly 
export banking institutions and services. The.se countries need further incentives to 
comply with international .standards. This issue is of a particular relevance to offshore 
centres which find their interest in competing in laxity i.e. in attracting foreign banking 
though weak prudential requirements. Ambrosiano Bank, BCCl and Petra Bank 
International, which failures were discussed throughout the thesis, had connection with 
off-shore centres. As Jordan does not fall within the category of these countries, it 
would be beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss this point any further. 
The last conference, the 15"' International Conference of Banking Supervisors held in Brussels in 
September 2008, was attended by over 130 countries. 
Regional banking supervisory groups include the following; Association of Financial Supervisors of 
Pacific Countries; The Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas; The Banking Supervision 
Committee of the European System for Central Banks ( " E S C B " ) ; Caribbean Group of Banking 
Supervisors; Committee of Banking Supervisors of West and Central Africa; Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors; Executives' Meeting of East As ia and Pacific Central Banks Working Group on 
Banking Supervision; Group of French-Speaking Banking Supervisors; The Islamic Financial Services 
Board; Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors; Regional Group on Banking Supervision of 
Transcaucasia, Central A s i a and the Russian Federation; Southern African Development Community 
Subcommittee of Bank Supervisors; and South East As ia . New Zealand, Australia Forum of Banking 
Supervisors. 
For further details see B C B S , Report on International Developments in Banking Supervision. Report No. 
15, (September. 2006). pp. 27-72. 
" F S I . The Financial Stability Institute ( F S I ) . 
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Jordan provides an evident example of a country influenced by the BCBS 
standards characterised as international soft law. The following Part I I will examine the 
effect of the BCBS standards on Jordan. 
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PART I I 
JORDANIAN LAW 
C H A P T E R 8 
T H E E V O L U T I O N O F B A N K I N G S U P E R V I S O N L A W 
8.0. Introduction 
Part I of this thesis explained the BCBS standards on international banking 
supervision and concluded that they represent soft international law. Part II validates 
this conclusion by examining the strong impact the BCBS standards have had on 
banking supervision in Jordan, despite Jordan being a non-member country of the 
BCBS. This Chapter looks into the evolution of banking supervision in Jordan. It begins 
by examining the banking system from the early twentieth century to 1971 (Section 1). 
Then it explains the developments which occurred until 1989 (Section 2) and the 
financial crises which took place afterwards mainly as a result of the multi-tier financial 
system (Section 3). These sections show that the evolution of the financial system and 
the supervisory response in Jordan paralleled the economic development of the 
country.' The beginning of the 1990s witne.s.sed a progress towards openness and 
liberalisation. The economic system of Jordan is mostly free market oriented, and this 
was true particularly since the adoption of liberalisation policies in the 1990s. These 
trends lead towards an increasing interest in implementing international banking 
supervisory standards specially as of the Banking Law No. 37 for the year 2000 
("Banking Law 2000") (Section 4). 
The main resources for this section are: 
- C B J , The Financial Structure of Jordan. (October. 1989). 
- Marwan Hayek and Sami Zreikat. The Financial System in Jordan, Royal Scientific Society. 
Amman, (September, 1976). 
. (1989 ' J j V i o i j ^ ) ' ( ^ ^ j ' ^ ' L ? j - l i ^ 1 J 
' . ( 1996) 
. (1982) 'o^jVi ^ j W j j ^ j ' ^ " ^ L ? - ^ ' LP^ 
. ( 1994 ) 'u^jVi J> ^ t ^ ' J ^j^^ ^ j ^ ' jj^^ ' ^ u l i A j . 
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S.I.Early Stages-1971 
Jordan became part of the larger Ottoman Empire in 1516, where financial 
intermediary institutions did not exist due to Jordan's shallow economy at the time. The 
Jordanian banking system, including central banking, emerged only during the British 
mandate from 1920-1946. Transjordan (the name given by the British to the area east of 
the Jordan River) was made in 1920 part of the British League of Nations mandate of 
Palestine. Jordan was, consequently, linked to the Palestine Currency Board established 
by the UK government in 1926. Several foreign currencies were circulated as legal 
tender including the Egyptian pound" and lastly the Palestine pound in 1927."' Jordan 
became an independent state in 1946 under the Hashemite Prince Abdullah I . Jordan 
and the West Bank had been declared one in 1950 after the breakout of hostilities with 
Israel in 1948 until it was disengaged from legal and administrative ties in 1988." 
The Palestine pound continued to be the currency of Jordan until June 1950. 
The Jordan Currency Law No. (35) for year 1949 provided for the issuance of the first 
Jordanian currency, the JD, as well as the establishment of the Jordanian Currency 
Board ("JCB")."* The JCB was comprised of five members, three of whom were British 
including the Chairman^ and had its seat in London, although it had a Currency Officer 
in Amman. Its main functions were, first, the issuance and the redemption of the JD 
and, secondly, the investment of its assets in the gilt-edged securities in London.^ The 
JCB issued JDs in Jordan on payment of Sterling in advance in London against the 
surrender of JDs in Jordan at the rate of one Sterling pound for one JD. The JCB had to 
maintain reserves in Sterling amounting to 100 percent of issued currency.* This meant 
- Currency L a w (Item A ) , 1923. 
' Administration Council , Decision on Dealing in the Palestinian Currency, 13 October 1927. This 
Decision was confirmed by the L a w on the Replacement of the Egyptian and Ottoman Currencies with 
the Palestine Pound (Paragraph B ) for year 1927, which was later on replaced by the Palestinian Currency 
Law for year 1928. 
Prime Minister Disengagement Order No. ( I ) for year 1988. Adalah Publications. 
^ Jordan Currency Law No. (35) for year 1949, Section 6. 
.21 ^ ' I b i d ( l n ) ' ^ ^ ^ L J l ^ l . ^ 
' Ibid (n 5). Section 7. 
"* Ibid. Section 17. 
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that each time the JCB sought to expand its currency issue it had to immobilise an 
equivalent amount of Sterling. It also meant that the JCB could not provide commercial 
banks with rediscount facilities. In other words, the JCB did not mount to a monetary 
authority because it could not influence money or credit supply directly or indirectly.^ 
In addition, the JCB had no authority to control currency,'^ although a special Currency 
Control Depanment was established later on within the Ministry of Finance. Finally, the 
JCB did not assume any banking supervisory role. 
A report prepared by the staff of the World Bank in 1955 called for 
undertaking gradual steps towards the establishment of an independent monetary 
authority for Jordan that is also responsible for currency control.'' The report prompted 
the Jordanian Government to prepare the way for the establishment of Jordan's first 
monetary authority, the Central Bank of Jordan ("CBJ"). As a preparatory .step, the seat 
of the JCB was first moved to Amman in 1957 (although an Investment Committee 
continued to function in London until 1962).'' The number of Jordanian representatives 
was increased to four members including the Minister of Finance as the Chair, three 
representatives of the private sector compared to one British member representing the 
Bank of England.'^ 
A .set of laws were promulgated in 1959 for the purposes of establishing the 
CBJ and determining its functions. First, the Central Bank of Jordan Law No. (4) for 
year 1959 soon amended by Law No. (33) for year 1960. This Law provided for the 
establishment of the CBJ as a corporate body. Section 6 stated that the objectives of the 
CBJ were the "regulation of coins and banknote issue; maintaining reserves for the 
purposes of maintaining the price stability of the JD in Jordan and abroad; controlling 
credit for public interest and acting as a banker to the Government". It also stated that 
' The Worid Bank, The Economic Development of Jordan. Report of a Mission organized by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the Request of the Government of Jordan, 
1955, published in 1957, pp. 366. 
TTie first legislation on currency control was the Defence Regulation - Financial Affairs No. (2) for 
year 1944 issued pursuant to the Defense Law of Trans-Jordan for year 1935. 
'' The World Bank, Ibid (n 9), pp. 3 i -34. 
J C B . Report of the Jordan Currency Board for the Year Ended 31"' March. 1963. pp. 2. 
'••'22 ^ Ibid (n 1) ' . ^ ^ L J i 
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the CBJ would undertake four activities for the purpose o f achieving its objectives: "(a) 
Regulating the quality and quantity o f credit and interest rates to meet the needs o f 
trade, industry and agriculture; (b) Adopting suitable measures to deal wi th local, 
financial and economic problems; (c) Banking supervision; (d) Management o f 
Government reserves o f gold and foreign exchange". 
The simultaneous Banking Control Law No. (5) for year 1959 regulated certain 
aspects o f banking supervision without granting the CBJ operational independence in 
performing its tasks. The Law prohibited undertaking banking activities, being defined 
as receiving deposits, payment o f checks and extending advances to clients,'' ' without 
prior authorisation.'^ The Law also prohibited unauthorised persons f r o m employing the 
word 'bank' in their names and addresses unless the prior approval o f the Minister o f 
Finance is obtained.'^ The Law imposed limits on credit extension as well . '^ 
Furthermore, it provided that banks should have a minimum paid-up capital o f 
JD250.000 and JD500.0()0, for national and foreign banks respectively,'* as well as 
maintain reserves equivalent to their paid-up capital.' ' ' The Law also stated that banks 
should maintain certain liquid assets to be determined by the CBJ."" Furthermore, the 
Law provided that payment o f dividends was restricted until all capitali.sed expenditures 
would have been written off.'^' In addition, the Law provided for the duty o f banks to 
appoint independent external auditors with the approval o f the Minister o f Finance."" 
The latter was also authorised to order the auditing o f a bank's operations upon the 
request o f its creditors or depositors."^ The Law imposed on banks the duty to supply 
Banking Control L a w No. (5) for year 1959. Section 2. 
Ibid, Section 3(a). 
Ibid, Section 5(a). 
" Ibid, Section 6. 
Ibid, Section 4(a)(b). 
Ibid, Section 7. 
-"Ibid, Section 10(c). 
Ibid. Section 8. 
" I b i d . Section 16. 
Ibid, Section 12. 
9 9 9 
the CBJ and the Minister of Finance with copies o f their audited balance sheets and 
profit and loss statements within six months o f the financial year ended.""* Banks were 
also to supply the CBJ with monthly statements o f their assets and liabilities, as well as, 
a quarterly statement o f loans."^ 
The Law vested the Minister o f Finance with the authority to request 
information deemed necessary for authorisation"^ and issuing authorisation after 
consulting with the CBJ Board o f Directors,"^ provided that minimum capital 
requirements would be met."* The Minister o f Finance was authorised to revoke 
banking licences after consulting with the CBJ as well."^ In addition, the Law stated that 
in cases where the CBJ finds out that a bank's assets do not cover its liabilities, it should 
inform the Minister o f Finance.'"' The latter was authori.sed to decide, on basis o f a new 
auditing report, to appoint an expert to either assist the troubled bank or withdraw its 
licence.^' 
In 1964, the CBJ assumed its functions. Banking supervision was at the 
beginning assigned to a division within the Research and Statistics Department, which 
functions were to analyse banks' monthly returns for the purposes of evaluating their 
operations and financial positions.''" Implementation of the CBJ Law (1959) and the 
Banking Control Law, however, highlighted significant shortcomings and practical 
difficulties resulting f rom the CBJ's inadequate authorities. This lead to the 
promulgation o f a new set of laws.^"' 
Ibid, Section 9(a/2). 
" I b i d , Section 10(a). 
Ibid, Section 4(c). 
-''Ibid, Section 3(a). 
Ibid, Section 4(a). 
Ibid, Section 4(d). 
™Ibid, Section I I . 
Ibid. Section 14. 
« 8 '1965/1964 < ^ A ^ i J L ^ i J ^ i jy-i^ jij^^ >^^jVi ^ j S ^ i Ji:A\ 
" 1 1 . ^ Ibid (n 1 y^^j^^ 
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In 1966, a new CBJ Law was promulgated to strengthen in particular the 
monetary and economic role of the CBJ. Section 4 redefined the objectives of the CBJ 
as to "maintain monetary stability in the Kingdom and to ensure the convertibility o f the 
JD, and to promote the sustained economic growth in the Kingdom in accordance with 
the general economic policy o f the Government". The Law explained in more detail the 
functions of the CBJ, most relevantly, Section 4( f ) , which stated that one of the means 
by which the CBJ attained its objectives was "[sjupervising licensed banks with a view 
to ensuring sound and adequate banking services for the general public". 
The Law provided that the CBJ Board o f Directors should approve o f the 
licensing, merger and revocation o f licences of banks as well as the opening and closure 
of banks' branches.^"* I t also authorised the CBJ to request information from banks and 
specialised credit institutions as well as imposing pecuniary sanctions thereon.''^ 
Furthermore, the Law empowered the CBJ to impose on banks a compulsory reserve 
requirement not exceeding 25 percent o f their current and time liabilities.'"' In addition, 
the Law empowered the CBJ to impose ceilings on interest rates received and charged 
by banks as well as minimum and maximums limits on their commi.ssions." 
The simultaneous Banking Law No. (94) for year 1966, which replaced the 
Banking Control Law, completed the traasfer of banking supervisory authorities to the 
CBJ, though the Central Government retained a smaller role. The CBJ was designated 
with the authority to license banks'^^ and revoke their licences, although banks were 
permitted to appeal against the revocation decisions to the Council of Ministers.''^ Banks 
were not permitted to open new branches in Jordan, merge with other banks or 
introduce changes to their memoranda or articles o f association without the prior 
approval o f the CBJ, although the latter's decisions were appealable to the Council of 
^ Central Bank of Jordan Law No. (93) for year 1966, Section 12(g). 
" Ibid, Sections 45 and 46. 
Ibid, Section 42(a). 
" Ibid, Section 43. 
Banking L a w No. (94) for year 1966, Section,s 3 and 4. 
'"ibid. Sect ion? . 
224 
Minisiers."*" The Law stated clearly that banks' holdings o f foreign exchange had to be 
according to the limits and conditions specified by the CBJ as well."" Most importantly, 
the CBJ was empowered to inspect banks."^ In situations where the CBJ found that the 
interests o f a bank's customers or its financial safety were threatened, it had the 
authority to request banks to undertake corrective actions. I f the concerned bank failed 
to implement the CBJ's instructions, the latter was authorised to revoke the bank's 
licence.'*'' In cases o f liquidation, the CBJ was assigned the role of a bank's liquidator.'*'' 
The Banking Law for year 1966 also contained banking supervisory rules. 
Banks had to maintain a liquidity ratio ranging f r o m 25-35 percent o f deposits.''^ Banks 
were required to maintain 10 percent o f their annual net profits into a general reserve 
account as well.''^ Banks were also not allowed to extend credit to a customer that 
exceeded 25 percent o f their paid up capital and reserves without the prior approval o f 
the CBJ^^ and were generally restricted f r o m extending loans and advances secured by 
real estate exceeding 40 percent of the bank's deposits unless the CBJ agreed 
otherwise.'*^ In addition, foreign banks had to remit a minimum working capital o f JD 
250.000 and their assets in Jordan had to surmount their liabilities o f at least JD 
250.000."^ 
Year 1967 witnessed the break out of hostilities between Israel and Arab 
countries leading to the closure o f Jordanian banks in the West Bank. A State o f 
emergency was declared and the Emergency Regulation on Financial and Economic 
""ibid. Section 10. 
" I b i d , Section l ] (h ) . 
Ibid, Section 20(a). 
Ibid, Section 20(d) and (e). 
Ibid, Section 24(c). 
"'Ibid, Section 17(b). 
Ibid, Section 13. 
Ibid, Section 11(a). 
""^  Ibid, Section 11(g). 
Ibid, Section 5. 
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Affairs No. (2) for year 1967 was issued pursuant to Section 125 (2) o f the Jordanian 
Constitution (1952). The latter Regulation established the Economic Security Council 
("ESC"), which was comprised o f the Minister o f Finance as the Chairman and other 
four members o f the Government including the Governor o f the CBJ. The purposes o f 
the ESC were to maintain the economic and financial security o f the country as well as 
to handle any financial or economic difficulties that the effective legislation did not 
cover sufficiently or effectively. The Regulation stated clearly that the ESC decisions 
should be taken according to the public interest even i f they contravened effective 
legislation.^" The CBJ resorted to the ESC in 1967 to handle the situation o f closed 
banks in the West Bank,^' and continued to do so during the lifetime of the ESC which 
extended to Apr i l 1992." 
The CBJ launched its first banking rescue operation in 1967. The concerned 
bank was Intra Bank/ Jordan, who.se headquarters in Lebanon declined to pay its 
depositors as of October 1967.'''' The CBJ issued an emergency cease-and-desist order 
and appointed an administration committee to run Intra Bank and to collect its debts. 
Intra Bank was able to cover its losses and resume its operations in the following year. 
8.2. The Seventies and Eighties 
8.2.L The 1971 Generation of Laws 
The Banking Law No. (24) for year 1971 and amendments (hereafter "Banking 
Law (1971)")^'' together with the concurrent Central Bank o f Jordan Law No . (23) for 
The Higher C o u n of Justice decided clearly that the established trend of the Court is to approve of the 
right of the E S C to issue decisions not only where there was no effective law but also when the E S C 
deemed such laws inadequate including basic laws such as the Law of Commerce and the C i v i l Law. 
Source: Higher Court of Justice decision 202/1990 dated 31/1/1991, Adalah Publications. 
" .111-105 Ibid (n 1 ) . ^ J > J S ^ I 
52 
Council of Ministers, Decision on the Lift ing of the Emergency L a w s , and the Declaration on the 
Lifting of the Emergency Laws Official Gazette. No. 3818, 1.4.1992, pp. 624-5. 
" For further details, see: 1967 i ^ l k i <^ 31 ) \ - x p i J ^ U ^ l ^ U i i j J J i J i j^jji l iait 
The Banking Law (1971) was amended by Law No. (5) for year 1975, (which was later replaced by 
Law No. (11) for year 1992) and l ^ w No. (5) for year 1997, It was repealed by the Banking L a w No. (28) 
for year 2000. 
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year 1971 and amendments'"^ (hereafter "CBJ Law (1971)") re-established and 
strengthened the CBJ's legal authority as the banking supervisory authority. Despite 
that the BCBS was issuing its standards during this period, it did not influence 
Jordanian law then. 
8.2.1.1. The Central Bank of Jordan Law (1971) 
This Law authorised the CBJ to request banks to refrain f rom publishing their 
annual financial statements and not to distribute their profits without the prior consent 
o f the CBJ. '^ The CBJ Board o f Directors was also charged with the authority to 
approve the licensing and the revocation o f licences o f branches or representative 
offices o f foreign banks including those established in the free zones as well as to 
approve the licensing and the revocation o f the licences o f financial companies.'^ 
8.2.1.2. The Banking Law (1971) 
The Banking Law (1971) and subsequent CBJ regulations"^** issued pursuant 
thereto enhanced the supervisory powers o f the CBJ in relation to licensing and 
branching, requesting information, conducting inspection as well as coordination with 
banks' external auditors. It also provided for prudential requirements and few rules on 
internal controls and management. 
Concerning licensing, the Law prohibited the carrying out o f banking business 
except by a 'licensed bank'. ' ' The Law also prohibited using the name "Bank" and its 
synonyms other than by licensed banks.^" The Law, however, remained silent on the 
procedures and penalties to be applied in ca,ses where a non-licensed bank solicits 
deposits f r o m the public. 
The C B J Law (1971) was amended by L a w No. (4) for year 1975 (replaced by Law No. (10) for year 
1992); Law No. (19) for year 1979 (replaced by law No. (16) for year 1992); Law No. (21) for year 1989 
(replaced by L a w No. (14) for year 1991); and Law No. (37) for year 1989. 
' ' C B J L a w (1971), Section 44(c). 
Ibid, Section 12(g/2). 
The regulations of the C B J are entitled as instructions, memos, circulars or simply regulations. There 
arc no legal differences between them. The C B J also issued during the last few years 'Guidance Notes'. 
Banking L a w (1971), Section 3(a), 
^' Ibid. Section 8. 
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The Law confirmed that the CBJ is the authority designated with the duty to 
issue banking licences according to specified procedures.^' The Law set only two 
minimum requirements for authorisation: that the applicant bank was a public 
shareholding company (with the exception o f branches o f foreign banks); and own 
capital o f no less than the minimum specified by Law.^^ Meanwhile the CBJ enjoyed 
the discretion to request information it deemed necessary on the capital, expected 
earnings, management as well as the country's need for the applicant bank's services.^^ 
The CBJ had also the discretion to accept or refuse an application for licensing without 
providing for the aggrieved applicant's right o f appeal against the refusal decision. In 
addition, the prior approval o f the CBJ was a necessary requirement for merger and 
subscription of a licensed bank in another licensed bank." Jf a newly licensed bank 
failed to operate within one year o f notification o f the licensing thereof the CBJ should 
either withdraw its licence or extend its validity for only six further months, thereafter 
withdrawal would be imposed i f the applicant bank assumed its operations.^^ 
Furthermore, the CBJ was empowered to revoke a banking licence in the situations 
where a bank was declared bankrupt, liquidated, merged with another bank or upon a 
request o f the bank itself The CBJ was entitled to take the initiative to revoke the 
licence where the bank repeatedly breached the Banking Law to the detriment of its 
d e p o s i t o r s . A g a i n the Law did not set out revocation procedures or provide for the 
aggrieved right o f appeal against such decision. 
As to branching, the Law stated that a licensed bank may not open or transfer a 
branch inside Jordan without the prior approval o f the CBJ. Likewise, a prior approval 
was required for opening new branches abroad or reallocating a branch f r o m one 
Ibid, Section 4(a). 
*- Ibid, Section.s 3(c)(d) and 5. 
ibid. Section 4(c). 
'^Ibid , Section 10(b). 
^' Ibid, Section 4(d). 
Ibid. Section 24(a)(b)(c). 
" Ibid, Section 24(d). 
Ibid, Section 9(a). 
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country to another.^^ The Law, however, made no reference to the licensing of 
subsidiaries abroad. 
The Law provided for the CBJ to have the right to request information 
regularly from supervised banks and whenever the CBJ deemed this necessary.^° The 
Law particularly imposed on banks the duty to furnish the CBJ with their certified 
annual financial statements within three months period of the year ended.^' 
Furthermore, the Law provided for the CBJ authority to inspect banks and request 
information therefrom.^^ 
The Law also empowered the CBJ to sanction banks that violate the provisions 
thereof by issuing a warning; and reducing or suspending credit facilities extended to 
the concerned bank.^^ In cases o f repeated violation, the CBJ could afso prohibit the 
bank from undertaking certain operations or extending loans to its customers: appoint a 
controller to supervise the bank or even withdraw its licence. 
As to external auditors, the Law .stipulated that licensed banks should annually 
appoint a certified external auditor, provided that the auditor was not indebted to the 
bank, had no vested interest therein, and was not an agent, manager, official or 
employee thereof "^^  The Law also empowered the CBJ to appoint an external auditor for 
the licensed bank, should the latter fail to appoint one within three months. 
Furthermore, the auditor should supply the CBJ with copies o f audit reports as well as 
any further information requested by the CBJ.^^ 
'''' Ibid, Section 10(a). 
Ibid, Section 18. 
" Ibid, Section 15(b). 
Ibid, Section 20. 
" Ibid, Section 29(a)(b). 
" Ibid, Section 29(b). 
" Ibid, Section 21(a). 
Ibid. Section 21(b). 
" i b i d . Section 21(c). 
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The Banking Law (1971) and regulations i.ssued pursuant thereto determined 
certain prudential requirements o f banks as follows: 
Firstly, the Law stated that banks should maintain a menu o f liquid assets such 
as Jordanian currency and balances held with the CBJ.^ ** The Law also adhered itself to 
the stock approach by setting a minimum ratio o f 25 percent o f deposits without 
specify'ing a maximum l i m i t . T h e Law and the regulations issued pursuant thereto did 
not introduce maturity mismatching monitoring, which eventually become the 
international norm. 
Secondly, the initial Section 5(a) o f the Banking Law (1971) determined a 
bank's own capital to be 250.000 JDs only. In 1992, the Law was amended to confirm 
the increase o f minimum own capital o f banks to JD 5 million, as well as, entitle the 
CBJ to increase the own capital amount without having to resort to amending the 
Banking Law. Furthermore, the Law required that each bank .should transfer 10% o f 
its annual net profits accrued in Jordan to its .statutory reserves until its statutory 
reserves account become equivalent to the bank's working capital in Jordan.''" 
Thirdly, the Banking Law (1971) stated that the CBJ "shall determine the 
minimum capital/deposits ratio"^" Accordingly, the CBJ determined the ratio of capital 
83 
to deposits as 7.5%. The same Section also referred to less important ratios o f 
capital/credit and capital/assets. None o f these narrowly defined capital adequacy ratios, 
nevertheless, covered the risk-weighted methodology, which eventually have become an 
international norm in 1988. 
Fourthly, the Banking Law (1971) did not make a specific reference to loan 
classification and provisioning. The CBJ, according to its objective o f maintaining the 
safety and soundness o f the financial system, issued memos to regulate certain aspects 
™lbid . Section 17(a). 
™lb id . Section 17(b). 
''"jbid. Section 5(d) as amended by the L a w Amending Banking Law No. ( I I ) for year 1992, Section 5. 
Ibid, Section 13. 
" Ibid. Section 5(d). 
" C B J . Memo on Capital/Deposits Ratio No. (141/79) dated 14.7.1979. 
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of provisioning. The CBJ, nevertheless, did not introduce a comprehensive loan 
classification system. In addition, Jordan's accounting procedures allowed the delay o f 
provisioning for non-performing loan until a court decides on the disputed underlying 
loan. This often did not allow for timely provisioning.**" 
Fifthly, the Banking Law (1971) stated that a licensed bank may not extend 
facilities and guarantees to a single customer amounting to more than 25 percent o f its 
paid-up capital and statutory reserves. This provision was accordingly in line with the 
best international standards. 
Sixthly, Although the Banking Law (1971) did not employ the term 'connected 
lending' it provided that the written approval of the CBJ was a mandatory requirement 
for extending credit facilities o f more than 1000 JDs. to a member o f the bank's board o f 
directors or to any company which ten percent or more o f its equity capital is acquired 
by the board member. Banks were also required to obtain the coasent of the CBJ before 
extending a loan to one o f its employees i f such credit would exceed the employee's 
annual sa lary .Seventhly , the principle o f con.solidated supervision was not applied by 
the CBJ although it had been established as one of the pillars o f international 
supervisory standards. It is also noteworthy that neither the Banking Law (1971) Law 
nor the CBJ regulations provided for supervisory rules on monitoring country risk or 
foreign exchange risk. 
Finally, the Banking Law (1971) made .scattered references to the management 
o f banks. It stated that the CBJ, upon considering an application for a banking licence, 
may require information on management.*^ The Law also stated that any member o f a 
bank's board o f directors, management or staff would forfeit his position i f (i) he was 
convicted by court o f a financial crime, (ii) become unable to settle debts owned to the 
bank or (i i i) an attachment o f his indemnity was ordered by court in settlement o f his 
^ Eduard Maciejewski and Ahsan Mansur (eds), Jordan: Strategy for Adjustment and Growth. I M F . 
Occasional Paper No. (136), (1996), pp. 39. 
Banking Law (1971), Section 11 (a). 
*'*Ibid, Section 11(c). 
" Ibid Section 4(c). 
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88 debts."" In cases where a bank is put under liquidation or its licence was withdrawn, the 
manager o f such bank and members o f its board o f directors, were not allowed to work 
in another licensed bank unless the CBJ approved otherwise.*' The Law also .stated that 
banks' managers and officials were responsible for the implementation o f the Banking 
Law and other effective legislation as well as ensuring the reliability and accuracy o f 
information supplied to the C B J . ' ° The Law and the regulations issued pursuant thereto 
did not, however, provide for detailed "f i t and proper" criteria for banks' management. 
The Banking Law (1971) also contained no rules on how to properly set and 
administer internal controls within a banking institution. The CBJ inspectors, however, 
took note o f absent key internal controls. The CBJ, consequently issued regulations 
providing that banks' headquarters should establish internal control departments to 
closely monitor the operations o f their branches and adequately staff such department.*" 
The CBJ did not issue at the time a comprehensive regulation on internal controls. 
There was also no reference to the concept o f corporate governance neither in the Law 
nor regulations issued pursuant thereto. 
8.2.2 The Multi-Tier System 
The Banking Law 1971 and subsequent CBJ Regulations effectively lead to the 
creation o f what the researcher describes as a multi-tier supervisory system comprised 
o f the higher tier Commercial banks then investment banks, fol lowed by the lower tier 
comprised o f financial companies (including savings and loans companies). There was 
also a sizeable amount o f confusion in the Jordanian Law over the meaning o f the term 
licensed bank and hence over the distinction between banks and other financial 
companies. Furthermore, the scope of the CBJ authority did not cover specialised credit 
institutions, which created another tier in the supervisory scope between banks on one 
hand and those specialised credit institutions bearing similarities to banks. These points 
wi l l be explained thoroughly by looking first at the legal definition o f licensed banks 
Ibid, Section 25(a). 
Ibid. Section 25(b). 
* Ibid, Section 26. 
C B J . Memo on Internal Conirol.s No. (88/80) dated 21.6.1980 and C B J Circular on Internal Controls 
No. (7030/7424) dated 26.3.1988. 
232 
and financial companies, then examining various types o f banks and speciali.sed credit 
institutions. 
8.2.2.1. Definition of Licensed Banks and Financial Companies 
Section 2 o f the Banking Law (1971) utilised the term 'licensed bank' and 
defined it as 'any company licensed to carry on banking business in the Kingdom under 
the provisions o f this law' . The same Section defined 'banking business' as accepting 
deposits and the extension o f loans and other funds. The definition of financial 
companies was introduced into the Law in 1975: 
"Financial Company means any company established and registered to carry on as one of its 
objectives banking business or part of it, particularly the acceptance of funds on deposit or 
granting of loans and advances, but does not include the insurance companies.. 
The first CBJ regulations'''' allowed financial companies to undertake a wide 
range o f activities grouped under six headings: money market operations including 
deposit-taking, financial market operations, dealings in foreign exchange, finance and 
investment, extending credit facilities as well as 'other operations' such as mutual fund 
management. A major difference between a financial company and a bank was that the 
former could accept deposits provided that their term was no less than six months. 
Another difference between banks and financial companies was that financial 
companies were prohibited f rom providing overdraft facilities. CBJ Regulations also did 
not prohibit financial companies f r o m providing Islamic banking services and 
accordingly the CBJ licensed the Islamic Investment House. In addition, financial 
companies were subject to a less own capital requirement (JD4m. compared to JD5m. 
for banks). 
In 1982, the CBJ regulated a specific type o f financial companies, known as 
"savings and loans institutions". The rest o f financial companies became known by 
default as "financial intermediaries". The preamble to the latter Regulation'''' defined 
The Law Amending Banking Law No. (5) for year 1975, Section 2. 
''^  C B J . Regulation on the Licensing of Financial Intermediaries, issued pursuant to the C B J Board 
Decision No. (65) dated 18.5.1982. This Decision employed the term 'financial intermediary' instead of 
'financial company". 
C B J , Licensing Conditions and Permissible Activities of Savings and Loans Institutions issued 
pursuant to the C B J Board Decision No. (16) dated 20. 2. 1982, as amended by C B J Circular No. 
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savings and loans as "those financial companies, which are not permitted to accept 
deposits from the public but may receive funds earmarked for professional or 
contractual saving purposes such as real estate companies which undertake construction 
activities, mutual investment companies and co-operatives [emphasis added]". The same 
Regulation permitted savings and loans institutions to undertake specified activities 
including accepting only savings deposits not exceeding JD25,000; owning or selling 
real estate and bonds without undertaking the role o f an intermediary; extending credit 
to finance purchase and construction o f real estate; issuing banking guarantees provided 
that the aggregate value thereof does not exceed 200 percent o f the institution's declared 
capital; and the establishment o f real estate companies and land development. 
Meanwhile, savings and loans were subject to a less stringent own capital requirement 
o f only one million JDs. 
8.2.2.2. Types of Banks 
The Banking Law (1971) referred only to licensed banks without reference to a 
particular type o f banks. Successive Banking Laws, nevertheless, contributed to the 
segregation of the market through direct prohibition f rom providing certain activities or 
by imposing ceilings on banks' shareholdings in companies providing such activities. 
Section 11(d) of the Banking Law (1971) prohibited banks f rom engagement in 
wholesale or retail trade, whether on a commission basis or on their own account, unless 
for the purpose o f realizing debts due thereto. The Banking Law (1971) did not define 
the term 'trade'. It was understood, however, that banks should not undertake activities 
associated with trading risks which traditional banks did not customarily undertake such 
as the purchase and sale o f products.'^ Islamic banking activities were accordingly 
prohibited. Banks were also restricted f rom undertaking insurance activities being 
(7021/292) dated 31.12.1985 and C B J Circular No. (7021/9779) issued on 19.4.1988. The 1985 Circular 
employed the term 'savings and contractual lending institutions'. 
''^  One opinion was to define the term 'trade' according to the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the L a w 
of Commerce No. (12) for year 1966, which provide an inclusive list of activities deemed as a trade 
activities. TTiese Sections, nevertheless, only seek to distinguish trade activities, as opposed to civil 
activities, for certain legal purposes such as the application of insolvency procedures. This explanation is 
further cmphasi.sed by Section 6 (1/d) of the Law of Commerce, which cites banking itself as a trading 
activity. For further details on Section 6 of the Law of Commerce, see: 
tjyiili LiT^ K' ' ' j j i ^ i i j j . . - . jjUii.ic.J .(1990) l A j j U i l i J jUc^yi j^^ j ^ j U l i jjuiiiit 
.90-64 '(1993) 'SijUnH J j ^ ' -LS J M ' J ^ ' - J M ' J ^ V ' i ^ ^ j V ' lS J M ' 
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considered as a commercial activity for same reasons. Furthermore, Section 11(e) o f the 
same Law restricted banks' contribution, purchase o f shares or bonds o f any 
agricultural, industrial, commercial or any other enterprise to 75 percent o f each bank's 
working capital and reserves in Jordan. In addition, Section 11(g) prohibited banks ft^om 
extending loans and advances for the construction or purchase o f real estate wi th the 
exception of specialised banks. This in practice meant the exception o f the Housing 
Bank as well as the Arab Land Bank (also was known as the Egyptian Arab Land 
Bank). 
Market developments, subsequent CBJ regulation and other legislation have 
lead to the existence o f various types o f banks, namely, commercial banks, investment 
banks and Islamic banks. 
1. Commercial Banks 
As seen in the previous .section, the evolution o f the banking system in Jordan 
took place during the British Mandate era, and therefore it was influenced by the British 
banking system. Commercial banks, modelled after the British clearing banks, were the 
first type o f banks established in the country. In 1925, the Ottoman Bank (later on 
Grind lays Bank) had opened a branch in Amman. There had been no other forms o f 
financial intermediaries in the country other than the branches of Al-Masref Al-Zira'i, a 
small bank specialised in extending agricultural loans. The Arab Bank was the first 
national bank established in Jordan in 1948, followed by the Jordan National Bank 
established in 1956 then by the Bank o f Jordan and the Cairo Amman Bank, both 
established in 1960.'^ Further commercial banks were established in fol lowing years 
mounting to nine banks in 2001. 
Commercial banks were initially sufficient to meet the market needs o f a small 
economy. Their basic activities were to accept deposits, usually short and medium term 
deposits, and extend short and medium credit facilities. They particularly focused on 
providing import finance mainly via overdraft accounts, in addition to other facilities 
such as discount o f bills and documentary credits. Providing short and medium credit 
facilities was often justified on the grounds that banks' liabilities were short term as well 
as the absence o f a Lender o f Last Resort's facilities. In the po.st independence era 
' * C B J , Ibid (n l ) . pp. 10. 
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demand grew substantially fo r long-term credit for the growing productive sectors o f 
mining, agriculture, industry, construction and tourism as well as export credit.'^ 
Meanwhile, banking deposits increased in terms o f size and witnes,sed a structural 
change in favour o f time and savings deposits.'^* In the 1970s, commercial banks started 
to respond to market demand by increasing their finance for export credit, fo r example, 
but the need remained for long-term lending such as syndicated loans and underwriting 
corporate bonds as well as making secondary markets necessary for the exchange o f 
such instruments.'^'^ The governmental response for the market need for long lending 
was the establishment o f specialised credit institutions under acts o f parliament as well 
as the encouragement o f the establishment o f investment banks. 
100 2. Investment banks 
The Jordan Investment Bank was the first licensed investment bank in Jordan 
in 1978. There had been no CBJ Regulations on the licensing investment banks, but the 
license itself imposed more stringent restrictions on the bank's deposit taking and 
lending activities than those applicable to commercial banks . ' ° ' Investment banking was 
regulated for the first time under a CBJ Regulation issued in 1988,'"" which was 
substituted by another Regulation in 1991. '° ' ' The Regulations had two purposes: first, 
to stimulate the establishment o f banks modelled on the US investment bank that would 
extend long-term credit facilities for investors, particularly institutional investors as well 
as widen and deepen the capital market; secondly, to encourage the transformation o f 
C B J , Ibid (n l ) , (1989) ,pp . 11-12. 
103-102 '(1994) 
™ For a detailed examination of the experience of investment banks in Jordan, see: 
.(1984) ^ij-^ )^KJ '^ J '^"••'V' -^3 >'^«il ^ y=^\ 'Jj-ia- Jl>?• 
146 a - ' I b i d (1 n)' 
C B J , Regulation on the General Conditions for the Licensing of Investment Banks, issued pursuant to 
the C B J Board Decision No. (93) dated 12.10.1988. 
C B J , Circular on the General Conditions for the Licensing of Investment Banks No. (7020/14482) 
dated 16.7.1991 amended by the C B J , Circular No. (7020/10229) dated 19.5.1992. 
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financial companies, which were facing serious financial difficulties during the 1980s, 
into investment banking The latter Regulation, therefore, specifically authorised the 
CBJ to grant an investment banking license to a financial company restructured and 
transformed to an investment bank as well as to a company resuhing form the merger o f 
financial companies. In contrast wi th financial companies, investment banks were 
allowed an additional activity o f issuing chequebooks on current accounts and 
consequently, investment banks were allowed membership in the check clearinghouse. 
Most financial companies were eventually transformed into investment banks. 
Investment banks were put at a competitive disadvantage to commercial banks. 
The CBJ restricted investment banks f rom undertaking the lucrative business o f 
overdraft facilities and short-term finance.'"'' In addition, CBJ regulations clarified that 
investment banks were not allowed to undertake Islamic banking activities. It also 
forced investment banks to direct their finance to non-trade investments (tourism, 
agricultural, mining, industrial and housing sectors). Meanwhile, commercial banks 
were allowed to extend all types o f credit facilities to all sectors and were particularly 
allowed to manage syndicated loans, which was a traditional activity o f investment 
banks. Furthermore, commercial banks were only prohibited f rom the underwriting and 
management o f securities, which was not anyway a lucrative activity o f investment 
banks (due to various factors such as tax treatment, restrictions on interest rates and 
competition f rom other non-banking financial intermediaries). Consequently, 
investment banks made an estimated 90 percent o f their profits f rom commercial 
banking activities. In other words, investment banks were not performing their 
envisaged role. 
3. Isiamic Banks 
Conventional banks, as it has been discussed above, were not licensed to 
undertake Islamic banking activities under Section 11(d) o f the Banking Law (1971). 
Islamic banking therefore, could be provided only under special legislation. The first 
Islamic bank in the country, the Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment was, 
accordingly, established as a public shareholding company pursuant to the Jordan 
Ibid. Article Third (1). 
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Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment Law No. (13) for year 1978. This Law was 
replaced by the Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment Law No. (62) for year 
1985 (hereafter "Islamic Bank Law"). Section 6 stated that the main object of the bank 
was meeting the economic and social needs for banking and investment services on a 
non - usurious basis. Usury was strictly defined to cover two types of dealings related 
to debts and sales. Usury in sales "included the exchange of various currencies on 
forward basis", while the usury in debts covered "the receipt or payment of interest in 
the various types of lending and borrowing, including the payment of any fee by the 
borrower where no effort which results in a substantive benefit in accordance with 
accepted doctrinal opinion, is expended in consideration for such fees".'°^ Any internal 
regulations or instructions issued by the Bank in violation of its obligation to avoid 
usury in all activities would have no legal effect."^^ 
The Islamic Bank law stated that the Bank carried out three types of functions 
to attain its objects.'"^ First, undertaking non-usurious banking operations, which 
covered accepting deposits of various types as well as providing banking services such 
as payment and clearance of checks, opening letters of credit, issuing guarantees and 
transfer of funds. Other permissible services included management of property, acting 
as a trustee, undertaking consultancy services and providing feasibility studies. It was 
also allowed to extend fixed term loans as a mere service without charging interest 
either by instalment lending or discounting promissory notes, with over-draft facilities 
being excluded. The Bank was also prohibited ft^om borrowing foreign exchange, as this 
involved the payment of interest charges. It could, nevertheless, deal in foreign 
exchange either on spot basis or interest free mutual lending. Secondly, providing social 
services, mainly, Ghardh Hassan i.e. beneficial loans, for productive purposes. Thirdly, 
the Islamic Bank was allowed to provide non-usurious financing and investment 
activities to attain its objects. 
For deliiils on the early experience of the Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment, see; 
Ramadan Shallah, Jordan: 'The Experience of the Jordan Islamic Bank' in Rodney Wilson (ed.). Islamic 
Financial Markets. (1990), pp.100-128. 
Islamic Bank Law, Section 2. 
Ibid, Section 5. 
Ibid, Section 7. 
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The Islamic Bank Law defined the types of deposits the Bank was allowed to 
accept,'"^ as well as, certain modes of Islamic financing activities, namely, joint 
mudarabah, murabaha and musharakahV^ The Law also entitled the Bank to issue 
muqaradah bonds, an equivalent of interest bearing debenture bonds'" issued by 
companies. Furthermore, the Bank enjoyed the powers necessary for the attainment of 
its activities including the acquirement, sale, exploitation as well as lease of movable 
and immovable properties."^ Conventional banks were prohibited from undertaking 
these activities under Section 11 of the Banking Law (1971). 
There are two important notes that should be made on the Islamic Bank Law. 
First, it did not provide coverage for the establishment of new Islamic banks. In 1989, 
the CBJ had to resort to the ESC in order to authorise the National Islamic Bant''^ 
With the abolishment of the ESC in 1992, the CBJ lacked the authority to authorise 
further Islamic banking activities and institutions. Secondly, Section 15(b) explained 
that the Islamic Bank of Jordan was subject to the supervision of the CBJ. 
8.2.2.3. Specialised Credit Institutions 
Section 2 of the CBJ Law (1971) provides a simple definition of specialised 
credit institutions as being "any institution or body established in the Kingdom with the 
primary objective of extending credit for special purposes, and designated by the 
Council of Ministers as a specialised credit institution for the purposes of this law after 
the consultation with the Governor." These institutions are established under laws, 
which provide them with adequate protection by granting them the status of, or at least 
the benefits o f public institutions such as tax concessions and priority in the collection 
of debts. The main objective of specialised credit institutions is extending medium and 
long credit to certain developmental sectors. 
' Ibid, Sections 2, and 11-13. 
Section 2 of the Lslamic Bank Law provided definitions of the mentioned modes of financing 
"' Ibid, Section 14, 
E S C Decision No. 23/89 dated 22.11.1989, concerning the National Lslamic Bank. 
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The CBJ Law (1971) outlines the relationship between the CBJ and the 
specialised credit institution. It states that the CBJ acts as a banker to specialised credit 
institutions,"'' including accepting deposits, opening of accounts and collection of 
monetary claims."^ It also provides that the CBJ may discount or rediscount for, sell to, 
or buy from specialised credit institutions certain credit instruments,"^ as well as grant 
advances for them."^ The CBJ may request statistical information from credit 
institutions, and the latter shall comply with such requests in a timely fashion."^ 
Furthermore, the CBJ sets out interest and commissions rates for these institutions. " ' 
All specialised credit institutions were established under Law with the initiative 
of the Jordanian Government in order to provide medium and long-term credit facilities 
for various economic sectors, particularly agriculture, industry and housing, at 
preferential terms, for the purpose of promoting and developing these sectors .Three 
institutions were government-owned public institutions: the Agricultural Credit 
Corporation, the first one to be established in the country in 1959;'"' the Housing 
Corporation (1965)'"" (later replaced by the Housing and Urban Development 
Corporation in 1992);'"^ and the Municipal and Village Loan Fund (1966)'"" (replaced 
by the Cities and Villages Development Bank in 1979).'"^ The remaining institutions 
were jointly owned by the Government and the private sector. The latter category 
' " C B J Law (1971), Section 4(e). 
Ibid, Section 38. 
"*Ibid, Section 39. 
"•' Ibid, Section 40. 
CBJ L^w (1971), Section 45(a). 
"''ibid. Section 43. 
Agricultural Credit Corporation Law No. (28) for year 1959. 
'"" Hou.sing Corporation Law No. (47) for year 1965. 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation L.aw No. (28) for year 1992. 
Municipal and Village Loan Fund Law No. (41) for year 1966, 
Cities and Villages Development Bank Law No. (38) for year 1979. 
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covered the Industrial Development Bank (1965),'"^ the Housing Bank,'"^' as well as, 
the Jordan Cooperative Organisation (1968) which combined the Cooperative Bank.'"* 
Neither the CBJ Law (1971), nor the Banking Law (1971), provided for the 
supervisory role of the CBJ over specialised credit institutions, although it supervised 
the Housing Bank and to a lesser extent the Cooperative Bank. This is understandable as 
far as Governmental credit institutions are concerned because they rely on the funds and 
loans allocated by the Government as well as local and international organisations,'^'* 
and do not provide their services on a commercial basis. The remaining institutions, by 
contrast, solicited deposits from the public and acted more on a commercial basis. 
1. The Cooperative Bank 
The Cooperative Bank was established pursuant to the Cooperation Law No. 
(55) for year 1968 to be one of the departments of the Jordan Cooperative Organisation, 
a quasi governmental institution, which capital sources were from the Government, 
member societies and others. The main objective of this bank was to "undertake 
banking activities and extend credit facilities to cooperative societies"."'"' The bank's 
functions included the acceptance of deposits from .societids, cooperative societies' 
members and the whde public, npening burrent accounts, as well as, acting generally as 
a bank for cooperative societies.''" The Cooperation Law stated that the Cooperative 
Organisation should co-ordinate its credit policy with the CBJ as well as supply the CBJ 
with all information it requested.'''^ Furthermore, the CBJ was represented in a 
Industrial Development Bank Law No. (27) for year 1965. 
The Housing Bank was established by Housing Bank Law No. (41) for year 1973. 
'"^  The Organisation was first established pursuant to Section (6) of the Cooperation Law No. (55) for 
year 1968. 
For a broader di.scussion on the structure, activities of specialised credit institutions, see: 
(1992 lAoijjVl 5jc..Ull 
""Cooperation Law No. (20) for year 1971, Section 21. 
'•" Council of Ministers, Cooperative Bank Bylaw No. (5) for year 1971, Section 5. 
Ibid, (n 130). Section 23(a). 
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Consultative Committee, which met at least once quarterly to provide the Cooperative 
Bank's board of directors with its recommendations on the latter's credit policy.'" 
2. The Housing Bank 
The Jordanian Three Year Development Plan for 1973-1975'" '^' was first in 
promoting the establishment of a governmental or mixed Housing Bank to assist in 
avoiding a would be housing problem. The Housing Corporation, which had been 
established since 1965 was unable to fully meet the country's needs due to the 
legislative restrictions imposed on it as a public specialised credit institution. The 
Government, therefore, put forward the Housing Bank Law,'^^ which established the 
Housing Bank a hybrid institution between public specialised credit institutions to 
support the housing and construction sector in line with public needs and development 
plans, on one hand, and private banks on the other. '''^ 
The Housing Bank accordingly enjoyed advantageous treatment under its Law 
as opposed to private banks. Its sources of funds included compulsory deposits of 
various institutions, funds and housing corporations.'" The Government also 
guaranteed the Housing Bank's obligations towards third parties and provided it with an 
umbrella exemption from taxation.'"'*' In addition, the Bank enjoyed preferential rights 
in debt collection.''''^ 
Ibid, Section 24. 
'•^  National Planning Council, Three Year Development Plan 1973-1975. pp. 279-283. 
Housing Bank Law No. (41) for year 1973 replaced by the Housing Bank Law No. (4) for year 1974, 
("Housing Bank Law"). 
'•^ ^ For details on the development of the Housing Bank, see: 
•(1996') cui^yi ^ »:i :^ ^jxy^^iJU^ -
J U J ) ^ jS?l ^ :y^j»Jl ol-jl l u^lj iVl ^ j L - : " " ' L S JLLC ^ L ^ . 
'(1986) .^ii: jVi >=Lili ;i ^  6 ^ ^1 :^JSJ^\ J j i ( j_>^) A j j j x J l U i j U ^ I 
.89-63 cK> 
The Housing Bank L.aw, Section 14. 
Ibid. Sections 16. 17. and 65. 
Ibid, Sections 54-68. 
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The Housing Bank, nevertheless, had many characteristics of a private banking 
institution. The Law Explanation Bureau'"" in its decision No. (7/1976)''" resolved that 
the Housing Bank was a public shareholding company rather than a public institution. 
The Decision was based on various sections of the Housing Bank Law. Section 3 stated 
that the Housing Bank should be established as a public shareholding company, and 
Section 69 further stated that the Housing Bank should undertake its activities on a 
commercial basis. According to Section 8, half of the Housing Bank paid up capital was 
constituted of ordinary shares offered for public subscription under Section 11. Section 
47 also provided that profits were to be distributed according to the decisions issued by 
the General Assembly of Shareholders. Section 7, most importantly, provided that the 
Housing Bank undertook various activities including providing loans and advances for 
any period less than twenty years, discount of bills and bonds, attracting foreign 
investments for construction purposes, as well as, the acceptance of deposits. The 
Housing Bank, therefore, was authorised to accept deposits whether earmarked to 
housing/ constructing purposes or not. In addition. Section 7(e) provided broadly that 
the Housing Bank cartied out 'any banking activity closely related to achieving its 
objectives and any other activity authorised by the board of directors of the Central 
Bank of Jordan'. 
The Law Explanation Bureau examined in another decision'''" whether the 
Housing Bank was deemed 'a similar or competitive company to other commercial 
banks' for the purpose of determining the legality of cross-membership in the board of 
directors of the Housing Bank and another private bank, the Arab Jordan Investment 
Bank. The Law Explanation Bureau answered to the positive on basis of the similarities 
of the two banks' objectives stating that, 'the objectives of the Housing Bank are not 
limited only to supporting the Housing sector but extend to providing other banking 
services, whether related to the attainment of the housing related objective or not'. 
Furthermore, the practice of the Housing Bank, based on its law, proved the validity of 
The Law Explanation Bureau is established pursuant to Section 123 of the Jordanian Constitution 
(1952) and the Constitutional amendment of 1958 for the purpose of providing explanation on Jordanian 
Law upon the request of the Prime Minister. 
"" Law Explanation Bureau. Decision No. (7) for year 1976, Official Gazette No. (2650), 16.08.1976, pp. 
2049. 
Law Explanation Bureau Decision No. (7) for year 1978. Official Gazette. No. (2793), 1.7.1978, pp. 
1868. 
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the Law Explanation Bureau's decision. The Housing Bank Law allowed the Housing 
Bank to compete with ordinary banks. In fact it succeeded in adopting a vigour policy 
of soliciting deposits, including deposits from remote areas and small savers, through a 
wide net of branches, movable banks and promotional schemes such as offering prices 
on savings. The total deposits at the Housing Bank mounted to JD 987,9m. in 1997.'''^ 
The Housing Bank also undertook a wide range of activities upon the approval of the 
CBJ, including foreign exchange, mutual fund and margin trading. Furthermore, the 
Housing Bank extended increasingly what it termed 'developmental loans' and 'credit 
facilities', being facilities usually extended by commercial banks such as overdraft 
accounts, advances and discounted bills.''*'' In addition, the Housing Baitk distributed 
high profits which amounted to 13 percent in 1993 and 7 percent in 1994.'''^ 
3. The Industrial Development Bank 
Section 6 of the Industrial Development Bank Law stated that its principal 
objective was the promotion and funding of 'industrial projects', being defined as any 
industrial, mining, manufacturing, tourism and related services projects, as well as small 
scale industries and handicrafts. The Bank attained its objectives mainly by financing, 
and providing various types of technical assi.stance toward the establishment and 
upgrading of industrial projects with loans and other facilities such the issuance of 
guarantees and counter guarantees. It may also participate in the equity of such projects, 
as well as holding shareholdings therein. 
The Law Explanation Bureau considered in 1974'"^ whether the Industrial 
Development Bank was a company for the particular purpose of determining whether 
the Bank should be registered as a company according to the effective Law of 
Companies. The Law Explanation Bureau concluded that the Industrial Development 
Bank was a public institution established by law not merely a company established upon 
143 10 L>^ '(1997) > u j ^ l j ^ l j l j jjUji . J ^ y \ Ah 
""'(3)c -AuI QiA^yi An jvi ^ j i ^ i ^ j u ^ c ^ u i ^\:^ (1995) 
125-124 a -
Ibid, 58 
Law Explanation Bureau, Decision No. (4) for year 1974, Official Gazette. No. (2476), 1.3.1974, pp. 
252. 
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the request of a number of persons. Furthermore, the Law Explanation Bureau 
emphasised that Section (5) of the same Law, which subjected the Industrial 
Development Bank to the Law of Companies did not mean that the legislator considered 
it as a private bank. This decision was affirmed by following decisions.'''^ 
The Law Explanation Bureau failed to explain why the Industrial Development 
Bank was considered a public institution while the Housing Bank was considered a 
bank. A thorough review of the effective Industrial Development Bank Law shows 
similarities between this law and the Housing Bank Law. The Industrial Development 
Bank had characteristics of a public institution. It was incorporated by law with its main 
objective was the development of a public sector. It may delegate the Attorney General 
in judicial proceedings as well. Furthermore, the Industrial Development Bank enjoyed 
public sectors' advantages including governmental guarantee of external debts and tax 
exemptions.'"'* The Industrial Development Bank Law, even bestowed on the latter 
Bank many of the characteristics that the Law Explanation Bureau relied on to decide 
that the Housing Bank is a company rather than a public institution. First, it was subject 
to the Law of Companies as a general rule. Secondly, its paid up capital was JD6m., 
JD4.89m., the majority of which were preferential shares owned by the private sector, 
while the remaining shares were ordinary shares owned by the Government.'"^ 
Preferential shares were offered for the public as well.'^'^ Thirdly, the Industrial 
Development Bank Law, most importantly, provided that the latter Bank's activities 
include the acceptance of deposits (with the prior approval of the board of directors), the 
extension of loans of all terms to maturity, investment in industrial loans, providing 
technical assistance as well as providing a variety of other facilities such as 
guarantees.'^' 
Finally, there are two important elements, which were overlooked by the Law 
Explanation Bureau Decision while considering the legal status of the Housing Bank. 
"'^Ibid(n 141), pp.508. 
The Industrial Development Bank Law No. (5) for year 1972. Sections 9. 11(2), 14(j/4), 20(b)(d) and 
56. 
'•"Ibid, Section 17. 
'•'"Ibid, Section 19. 
Ibid, Sections 7, Hand 15. 
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First, the board of directors of the Industrial Development Bank appointed its general 
manager, which was similar to the practice of privately owned b a n k s . T h e general 
manager of the Housing Bank, on the other hand, was appointed by the Council of 
Ministers subject to Royal Assent.'^^ This was a significant difference, considering that 
the Housing Bank Law provided that the general manager was the head of the board of 
directors'^'* and that the board could delegate its authorities thereto.'^^ Secondly, a 
number of institutions were obliged to make compulsory deposits into the Housing 
Bank under Section 14 of its Law, while there was no equivalent requirement in the 
Industrial Development Bank Law. 
8.3. 1989-2000: Financial Crisis, Treatment, Restructuring and Reform 
8.3.1. Causes of the Crisis 
The Jordanian financial system went through a crisis pha.se towards the end of 
the 1980s, marked by the failure of the third largest bank in the country and the holder 
of more than 10 percent of the as.sets of the banking system, Petra Bank. Different types 
of banks, financial companies and even the Cooperative Bank also faced financial 
difficulties. The crisis is attributed to the multi-tier system, regulatory shortcomings 
which effects were exacerbated by the economic conditions in Jordan at the time. 
The Jordanian economy started to slowdown during the mid-eighties. Lower 
oil prices lead to a reduction of grants from oil exporting countries in the region, drop in 
export and decline of remittances fi-om Jordanians working in neighbouring countries. 
The Jordanian economy suffered from its worst recession in modem history during the 
period ft-om 1988-89. The general budget deficit (external grants excluded) surmounted 
20 percent of GDP. External and domestic debt rates escalated rapidly to reach 212 
Ibid, Section 36(d). 
The Housing Bank Law. Section 38(a). 
Ibid. Section 26(a). 
''"^  Ibid, Section 36. 
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percent of GDP. The inflation rate increased by 25 percent annually, while the JD 
exchange rate decreased sharply.'^^ 
The multi-tier system weakened competition between financial institutions. It also 
allowed less regulated institutions to escape supervision despite that they shared many 
commonalities with other institutions. This was particularly evident in the case of 
financial companies. The Jordan Securities Corporation,'^^ for example, faced financial 
difficulties as of 1983 as a result of excessive credit exposure to a single client which 
amounted to five times of the Company's own capital. In addition, the deal revealed 
weak internal controls as the general manager of the company signed the deal ultra vires 
and was not detected. These events lead to changes in the management of the company, 
restructuring of its capital after making provisions for its doubtful debts. The Company, 
however, never fully recovered because it could not restore customers' confidence. Its 
solvency and liquidity ratios had been increasingly diminishing until the company 
reached a critical financial situation during the financial crisis in 1989. Another example 
is REFCO, a financial company which was active in the real estate market.'^^ It 
sustained losses because of the real estate market slump down in the late 1980s, and its 
position further worsened further in 1990 due to consumers' withdrawal of deposits 
during the Gulf War. The CBJ eventually launched rescue plan to save the companies. 
As to regulatory shortcomings, the CBJ failed to implement two of the 
fundamental international supervisory standards, being consolidated supervision and on-
going coordination with cross border supervisory authorities. In addition, the CBJ failed 
to detect weak internal controls. These regulatory shortcomings were most evident in 
the cases of Petra Bank and Jordan and the Gulf Bank. Furthermore, a study conducted 
by a team from the IMF attributes the crisis to three major factors.'^^ First, the existence 
of deficiencies in the legal framework relating to provisioning identification. Secondly, 
a parallel market for foreign exchange emerged in 1987 causing many banks to be 
exposed to foreign obligations. Improvident speculations between the formal and 
'^ ^^ 6-4 below (n 191)'^^UJi ^ 
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Eduard Maciejewski and Ahsan Mansur (eds), Ibid (n 84). ), pp. 39 
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parallel markets lead to loosing substantial banking assets. Thirdly, banks and financial 
companies sustained excessive exposures to the real estate market. The early-mid 
eighties had witnessed a large inflow of capital leading to increase in demand and a 
consequent expansion in the construction business. This period was followed by a 
slump in the real estate market towards the end of the 1980s leading to similar decrease 
in the value of collateralised real estate loans and consequential losses to the financial 
sector. 
8.3.1.1. Petra Bank 
The main source of information on the circumstances leading to the failure of 
Petra Bank is the decision of the Jordanian National Security Court of 1992'^° (hereafter 
"Petra Bank case").'^' The National Security Court'^" is a specialised criminal panel 
and, consequently, was interested in the facts leading to the failure of Petra Bank only to 
the extent needed to verify accusations and determine penahies. The decision of the 
Court, however, provides the analyst with adequate and well-established facts to 
conclude that the reasons for the failure of Petra Bank were fraud committed by 
management, weak internal controls, violation of supervisory rules, as well as, the lack 
of consolidated supervision and on-going coordination with cross border supervisory 
authorities. 
The Petra Bank case focused on the family relationships, which connected 
Petra Bank to other cross-border financial companies.'^ "^ It found that at the centre of 
this relationship was the general manager of Petra Bank, who had planned since the 
establishment of Petra Bank a financial policy that would serve his interests and the 
interests of his family through a network of connected companies. Most importantly, the 
"* The National Security Court Decision No. 17/1992 dated 9/4/1992 concerning Petra Bank. 
1302J 1265 -1250 u - '(•989)'(10) '8 ' u i ^ V i ^ 
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The National Security Court is established pursuant to the National Security Law No. (17) for year 
1959. 
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general manager and his family owned shares in connected banks, mainly Mebco and 
Socofi. These banks shared common management and intertelated investments and 
faced simultaneous financial difficulties. They also facilitated for each other fraudulent 
transaction, for example, by opening fictitious accounts, issuing cross guarantees, 
tampering with bank accounts and destroying original documents and records. 
The Court further explained that it was possible for one man to cause the 
failure of Petra Bank because of the weak internal controls within Petra Bank and the 
influential character of Petra Bank's general manager. Petra Bank's board of directors 
did not exercise its legal role of monitoring the general manager. The top 
administration, which enjoyed high commissions, was totally loyal and obedient to the 
general manager. Very often, employees followed oral orders, which should have been 
approved by two signatories according to best banking practices. Another common 
practice of Petra Bank was described as "completing signatures," whereby a document 
would be signed by one employer in a certain department and, another cosmetic 
signature would be obtained within "one last minute notice"."''' 
8.3.L2. Jordan and the Gulf Bank 
Jordan and the Gulf Bank was established in Jordan in 1977. The CBJ explained 
broadly that investigations conducted by the CBJ revealed strong connections and 
common interests between the managers of Petra Bank and Jordan and the Gulf 
Bank.'^^ The CBJ particularly referred to the fact that the general manager of Jordan 
and the Gulf Bank, who was also the Head of its board of directors, had assumed before 
a managerial position at Petra Bank. While he was still at Petra Bank, he had been 
purchasing shares in Jordan and the Gulf Bank, which eventually allowed him to 
assume his managerial role in the late eighties. One author""^ explained that Petra bank 
funded the purchase of shares from Petra Bank's deposits. The bank was prone to failure 
in 1990 which prompted the intervention of the CBJ. 
Ibid, pp. 27. 
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8.3.2. The Restructuring of Financial Institutions 
The immediate response of the Jordanian Government was the initiation of a 
restructuring plan of banking and financial companies leading to their restructuring, 
merger, liquidation or, in the case of financial companies only, the transformation Irom 
a financial company to b a n k s . T h e plan was not confined to troubled institutions but 
covered inefficient institutions, which maintained high liquidity and made little 
investment, could not attract substantial deposits or their income was mainly gained 
from interest generated by re-depositing their customers' deposits in other banks. The 
consequences of the consolidation of the financial system led to the end of financial 
companies and jointly owned credit institutions and the adoption of the universal 
banking model which combined commercial and investment services. Some of these 
achievements were attained after a long time. 
8.3.2.1. Financial Companies 
The Government sought to encourage merger of companies as a solution as 
early as the mid-eighties. The Council of Ministers issued in 1986 an important 
decision, which set out the following merger policies for financial institutions 
generally:'^* 
"If two money changers or more merge and the net shareholders' equity rights thereof 
amount to JD4m., it can obtain an investment bank license two years as of the merger 
date, provided that its capital is no less than JD6m. 
If an investment bank merges with a bank or more and the net shareholders' equity 
rights thereof amount to JDlOm., it can obtain a commercial bank license two years as 
of the merger date provided that its capital is no less than JDIOm. 
If a commercial bank merges with an investment bank or more and the net shareholders' 
equity rights thereof amount to JDI5m., the resulting commercial bank may assume the 
activities of an investment bank via a wholly owned subsidiary which capital amounts 
to no less than JD6m. 
167 
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If a cominercial bank merges with a commercial bank or more and the net shareholders' 
equity rights thereof amount to JD 20m., the resulting commercial bank may assume the 
activities of an investment bank via a wholly owned subsidiary which capital amounts 
to no less than JD6m." 
Various financial companies were consequently merged and upgraded to the status 
of banks. One example is the merger of the Arab Finance Corporation (Jordan)'^ "^ and 
the National Development and Finance Company and their following transformation in 
1991 to become an investment bank, the Union Bank for Savings and Investment. 
Another example is the merger of the Finance and Credit Corporation'^" with a financial 
leasing company to create a new investment bank in 1989, Amman Bank for 
Investments. Furthermore, a rescue plan of the Jordan Securities Corporation'^' was 
launched by the ESC with the assistance of the Housing Bank and the Arab Banking 
Corporation/ (Bahrain). It was successfully restructured and transformed in 1990 into a 
new commercial bank, the Arab Banking Corporation/ (Jordan). The Jordan Finance 
House and DARCO were also merged to create the Philadelphia Investment Bank.'''' 
Other financial companies were transformed directly to banks including the 
National General Investment Company'^^ (renamed the National Financial Investment 
Company) which became the Business Bank and REFCO (renamed the Middle East 
Investment Bank).'^"* Another example is the Islamic Investment House,'^^ which was 
transferted to the National Islamic Bank, pursuant to a decision of the ESC. Finally, 
312-303 a - ' (1995) ' (4 )c 
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there was the Jordan Investment and Finance Corporation'^^ which was licensed as the 
Jordan Investment and Finance Bank in 1989. 
8.3.2.2. Banks 
The financial rescue operation covered six Jordanian and foreign banks. Three 
banks were liquidated due to their serious financial situation; namely, Petra Bank in 
1990, '^ ^ the Syrian Jordanian Bank,''* the National Islamic Bank.'^^ Meanwhile, the 
Jordan and the Gulf Bank was merged with Bank Al-Mashrek branches in Jordan. The 
Bank's headquarter in Lebanon was engaged in unsound banking operations which 
adversely affected the financial position of its branches.'**" The new bank was 
successfiilly reconstructed and sold to a group of investors in 1993. 
Another foreign bank covered by the rescue operation was the Bank of Credit 
and Finance International (BCCI). BCCI was a large international bank, which 
established its first branch in Jordan in 1974. As news spread in the market and the 
media that BCCI was going through financial difficulties, the CBJ took a precautionary 
measure by demanding BCCI Jordanian branches to repatriate funds denominated in 
foreign exchange held at correspondent banks abroad or at BCCI headquarters to be 
credited to the BCCI Jordanian branches' account held at the CBJ.'**" On July the 5"" 
1991, the banking supervisory authorities in Luxembourg decided that BCCI should 
seize payment. On the following day, the CBJ issued a decision to close temporarily 
BCCI branches in Jordan for three days and appointed a management committee. Later 
on, the Controller of Companies applied to the Amman Court of First Instance to put the 
179-175 c K " Ibid (n 157) >^^Ul 
E S C Decision No. 4/90 dated 15.7.1990 concerning the Liquidation of Petra Bank. 
™ E S C Decision No 4/91 dated 11.5.1991 concerning the Liquidation of the Syrian Jordanian Bank. 
"'^  E S C decision 2/91 dated 28.2.1991 concerning the National Islamic Bank. 
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BBCI Jordanian branches under liquidation. The Court approved of the application'^"* 
on basis of Section 23 (b) of the Banking Law (1971) 
In addition to the above, two investment banks were upgraded to commercial 
banks: the Jordan Investment and Finance Bank in 1993 and the Business Bank in 
1991. The latter bank was merged with the Jordan National Bank under the name 
'Jordan National Bank'. This was the first case of voluntary bank merger in Jordan. 
8.3.2.3. Specialised Credit Institutions 
The Cooperative Bank faced financial difficulties during the 1988-92 period, 
which eventually led the Council of Ministers to decide in May, 1993 that the latter 
bank shall cease immediately from both accepting deposits and extending credit 
facilities and be put under the management of the CBJ.'*" The committee, which was 
estabUshed accordingly, found that the Cooperative Bank had had a serious liquidity 
problem and that only one percent of its debts had been collected."*^ This effectively 
meant that the Cooperative Bank ceased to exist although it took until 1997 to legally 
confirm the status quo.'^^ 
The Housing Bank raised concerns related to the possibility of distortion of 
competition in the banking sector. In 1997 a new law was issued'*' to abolish previous 
Housing Bank Law and to subject the Housing Bank to the provisions of the effective 
Banking Law and the Law of Companies.'** 
Finally, the Industrial Development Bank continued to exist as a specialised 
credit institution until mid-2008. It was transformed to a public shareholding company 
'"The Court of First Instance, Decision on Application 344/91 dated 10.9.1991 (unpublished). 
""3410- Ib id (n 157)'^5^LJi,uiii^ 
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'** Cooperation Law No. (18) for year 1997, Section 21. 
'*' The Law on the Abolishment of the Housing Bank Law No, (16) for year 1997, Sections 2 and 3. 
"^ '^  For details on the transformation and its effects on the Housing Bank, please refer to: 
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189 provided that it applies for the CBJ for licensing. It was acquisitioned by an 
international Islamic bank and was licensed in January 2009 under the name Jordan 
Dubai Islamic Bank.''* 
8.4. The 1990s onwards 
8.4.1. General policies 
Jordan adopted in the early 1990s an adjustment programme aimed at the 
stabilisation of the economy to promote growth, restoration of the value of the JD and 
rebuilding the country's foreign reserves as well as improving the general budget and 
the balance of payment position. This entailed profound restructuring of the economy 
towards supporting export-led growth through the privatisations of public owned 
enterprises, trade liberalisation, deregulation of commodity prices as well as the 
improvement of business environment.'''*' 
A trend of liberalisation also gathered pace in the 1990s. In 1996, Jordan 
submitted to the WTO its Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime. After several rounds 
of questions from WTO Members on Jordan's foreign trade and economic policies had 
taken place, the WTO General Council approved Jordan's Protocol of Accession 
relatively speedily towards the end of 1999."" The Jordanian Parliament ratified the 
Law on Jordan's Accession to the WTO early in 2000'^^ and Jordan became officially 
Law Repealing the Law of the Industrial Development Bank No. (26) for year 2008, Section 5(a). 
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the 136 WTO Member in 2000.'^'' The negotiations period had a strong influence on 
Jordanian Law, as many laws and regulations were issued at the time to meet 
international requirements. 
Jordan concluded other important international agreements. In 2000, Jordan and 
the United States of America signed an agreement to establish a free trade area between 
the two countries,''^ which entered into force 2001 after completion of domestic legal 
procedures."^ Jordan also entered into an Association Agreement with the European 
Union"^ and a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Area states (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) which seeks to promote commercial and 
198 
economic cooperation. 
On the regional level, the Economic and Social Arabic Council of the League of 
Arab Siates''^ ^ issued a decision in February 1997 to establish the Great Arab Free Trade 
Area within ten years. The Agreement on the Protection and Promotion of Investment 
and Movement of Capital amongst Arab States for year 2000 seeks to promote 
economic cooperation and facilitating the movement of goods, services, capital and 
natural persons. Jordan also entered in the mid 1990s into peace and economic 
agreements with Israel"™ as well as economic co-operation with the Palestinian 
WTO. Protocol of Accession of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization. Done at Geneva on 17 December 1999: Notification of 
Acceptance. Entry into Force. Ref WU/100, 14 March, 2000. 
Agreement between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the 
Establishment of a Free Trade Area (2000). 
Ratification L^w of the Agreement between the United States of America and Jordan on the 
Establishment of a Free Trade Area No. (24) for year 2001. 
Ratification Law of the Euro-Med Agreement between Jordan and the European Union No. (31) for 
year 1999. 
Ratification Law of Jordan's Free Trade Agreement with E F T A No. (68) for year 2001. 
''^  The Pact of the League of Arab States was signed in Alexandria in 1945 and was reproduced In the 
Arab LawQuarteriv. Vol.7. Part (2), (1997). pp. 148-142. 
Ratification L i w of the Peace Treaty between Jordan and Lsrael No. (14) for year 1994. Funher 
agreements between the two parties followed including the Treaty on Commercial and Economic 
Cooperation between Jordan and Israel in 1995 and the Treaty on the Qualified Industrial Zones in year 
1997. 
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Authorities.^^' The result of these agreements was the reopening and the new 
establishment of a considerable number of Jordanian banks in the Self Ruled Territories 
as well as coordinating banking supervision efforts therewith. 
Also in 1995, Jordan assumed the obligations of Article V I I I of the IMF Articles 
of Agreement.•^"^ By doing so, Jordan undertook, amongst others, to refrain from 
imposing restrictions on "payments for current transactions" without the IMF approval. 
In 1997, the CBJ issued the Foreign Exchange Regulation No. 111/1997,^°^ which is a 
cornerstone in the liberalisation of foreign exchange in Jordan. This Regulation 
eliminates restrictions on current account transactions, both visible and invisible, as well 
as capital transactions. It does not require currency permits. 
8.4.2. Banking-Specific Developments 
The banking-specific reforms were comprised of the following two elements: 
First, policies on consolidating the financial .sector, promoting innovation and 
competition were adopted. The previous section explained how the Government and the 
CBJ lifted market distortions caused by the multi-tier system. By the end of 1995, the 
CBJ adopted the 'universal banking model',""'' whereby existing commercial and 
investment banks would be allowed to diversiiy in each others' activities if the applicant 
bank met a number of prudential requirements. The CBJ, however, had not issued a 
universal banking license before the Banking Law (2000). 
Further important measures were adopted by the CBJ. The CBJ moved from a 
system of direct credit control to more market based and indirect instruments of 
monetary c o n t r o l . I n 1993, the CBJ started to issue Certificates of Deposits, and 
The two sides concluded several agreements including the Cooperation Agreement on Commercial 
Affairs between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority in 1995 and Cooperation Agreement on Monetary 
and Banking Affairs between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority in 1995. 
IMF, Jordan Accepts Article Vl l l Obligations. Press Release No. 95/13, March 2, 1995. 
™ Council of Ministers, Foreign Exchange Bylaw for year 1997 i.ssucd pursuant to the Foreign Exchange 
Law No. (95) for year 1966; and the CBJ Regulation on Foreign Exchange No. (1 11/97) dated 30.6.1997. 
CBJ. Regulation on Universal Banking No. (330/95) dated 30.12.1995. 
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introduced the overnight discount window for deposits.'^ "^ Another important step was 
the liberalisation of interest rates, which started gradually as of 1988. In 1990, the CBJ 
issued its regulation No. 11/90,^°^ which liberalised all banking interest rates on both 
deposits and credit facilities. In 2000, commission rates were also fully lliberalised.^°^ 
Secondly, the CBJ adopted concurrent supervisory measures to strengthen the 
banking system. Most significantly, it adopted the below regulations which where 
obviously influenced by the international standards on banking supervision. An 
essential development in prudential supervision in Jordan took place in 1992^°^ when 
the CBJ modeled its capital adequacy requirements on the BCBS "International 
Convergence of Capital Measures and Capital Standards" of 1988 ("Accord"), by large. 
The set capital adequacy ratio was similarly 8 percent. Banks were commanded to 
supply the CBJ with detailed information on a regular basis. An essential shortcoming 
of the CBJ capital adequacy measurement was the lack of the calculation of capital 
adequacy on a consolidated basis. The CBJ employed the capital adequacy ratio as a 
means to strengthen and consolidate banks. It first raised the ratio from the BCBS 
standard of 8 percent of risk weighted asset to 10 percent in 1995""' then 12 percent in 
1997.-" 
Another important development was that the CBJ issued in 1990 a new 
regulation on banks' equity investments including the prevention of cross-ownership 
amongst banks.^'" The CBJ issued in 1993 a regulation on the licensing and the 
supervision of Jordanian banks establishing presence abroad."'^ It required the prior 
approval of the CBJ before a Jordanian Bank may establish a presence abroad. It also 
. ( 2 0 0 4 ) ' ( 2 0 0 3 - 1 9 8 9 ) Si-"^' < ^ u j i Q U I ^ ^ I ^ ^ d . i d j l ^ V i s j i i J - I ^ - ' J ' ^ ' > J I - ^ I 
™ CBJ, Regulation on Interest Rates No. ( 1 1 / 9 0 ) dated 16.1.1990. 
™ CBJ, Regulation on Commission Rates No. ( 2 8 / 2 0 0 0 ) dated 31 .1 .2000 . 
-"^  CBJ , Memo on Capital Adequacy No. ( 7 1 3 6 / 8 4 0 9 ) dated 26 .4 .1992 . 
CBJ. Circular on Capital Adequacy No. ( 7 1 3 6 / 2 9 2 9 2 ) dated 11.11.1995. 
-" CBJ , Circular on Capital Adequacy No. (10 /4 /7 /1610) dated 21 .1 .1997. 
- ' - C B J , Banks' Equity Investments Regulation No. ( 2 1 7 / 9 0 ) dated 31.10.1990amended by CBJ , Banks' 
Equity Investments Regulation No. ( 1 8 3 / 9 3 ) dated 8.8.1993. 
CBJ, Regulation on Branching Abroad No. ( 2 4 9 / 9 3 ) dated 9 .11 .1993 . 
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explained that the CBJ should issue its decision on basis of determined criteria 
including the comfort letters from the host countries as well as the supervisory systems 
therein. Banks' management should inform the CBJ with their losses, and supply it with 
the auditors' reports, its financial statements and the notes of the host supervisor. 
Furthermore, the CBJ emphasised on its right to undertake on-site supervision of 
foreign branches. Finally, the CBJ issued in 1995 its first comprehensive regulation on 
large exposures.^''' 
The Banking Law (2000) and the regulations issued pursuant thereto represent a 
significant step towards the transposition of the BCBS standards into Jordanian law. 
The following chapter will evaluate the compliance of Jordanian substantive banking 
supervisory legislation with mentioned standards. 
C B J . Regulation on Credit Exposures No. (103/95) dated I 1.4.1995. 
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CHAPTER 9 
JORDANIAN SUBSTANTIVE SUPERVISORY R U L E S 
9.0. Introduction 
This chapter evaluates Jordan's application of the BCBS substantive core principles. 
It shows the strong influence o f the BCBS standards on effective Jordanian banking 
supervisory legislation. First, it examines the legal powers of the CBJ related to licensing, 
branching, permissible activities, ownership and investments. While these issues were 
examined briefly under the Core Principles (2006), the implementation thereof involves 
many processes and procedures (Section 1). The chapter considers afterwards the 
application of the BCBS standards related to banks' risk management, as illustrated in the 
first section of chapter 4. It shows how the Jordanian legislation is progressing towards the 
application of the BCBS standards. Yet, it illustrates that the Jordanian law is less 
sophisticated than the former standards, mainly due to the differences between the 
Jordanian banking system and more advanced banking systems (Section 2). The following 
section looks into the growing importance of the pubUc/ private partnership in Jordanian 
law in light of the BCBS standards, which were examined in the second section of chapter 
4. It illustrates that the Jordanian banking legislation is largely influenced by international 
standards despite certain reservations. Many of the aspects of the public/ private partnership 
depend on infrastructure legislation i.e. they go beyond the BCBS jurisdiction. Therefore, 
specific references to Jordanian non-banking legislation, such as the Law of Companies, are 
made (Section 3). FinaUy, the chapter examines the influence of the BCBS capital 
adequacy standards, particularly Basel I I , on related Jordanian regulations. Since the CBJ 
regulations are well detailed and depend heavily on the Basel I I standards already examined 
in chapter 3, and in order to avoid excessive repetition of technical details, the chapter sets 
out comparative tables (Section 4). 
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9.1. Licensing, Branching, Permissible Activities, Ownership and 
Investments 
The Jordanian Law meets the BCBS requirements related to the requirements of 
licensing, branching, determining permissible activities, ownership and investments. The 
BCBS, and as illustrated in above Section 5.3.3.2 o f this thesis, provided general guidelines 
that require detailed legislation and processes to translate the guidelines into enforceable 
legislation. 
9.1.1. The General Prohibition on Using the Term Bank 
The Jordanian Law meets the requirement of Core Principle 2, which requires, inter 
alia, that a general prohibition on using the name bank be applied. Section 4(a) of the 
effective Banking Law (2000)' imposes a general prohibition on providing banking 
services without issuing first a final licence from the CBJ, and Section 4(b) confirms that 
"[n]o person that is not licensed to engage in banking activities shall accept deposits 
without a prior written approval of the Central Bank". 
Banking activities are defined as "[a]ccepting deposits from the public and using 
them in ful l or in part to grant credit, or for any other activities designated by the Central 
Bank as banking activities".^ Therefore, a person has to be involved in both taking deposits 
and the extension of credit and other services conjunctively in order to be considered a 
banking services provider. This understanding is reinforced by the following definition of 
deposits: 
"Funds turned over by any medium of payment by one person to another person who agrees to return 
said funds upon demand or in accordance with agreed-upon terms. The depositary thus acquires 
' The Banking Law (2000) was amended by the Law Amending Banking Law No. (38) for year 2004; Law 
Amending Banking Law No. (24) for year 2006; and Law Amending Banking Law No. (61) for year 2006 
(which replaced the Law Amending Banking Law No. (46) for year 2003). 
- Ibid. Section 2. 
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ownership of the funds and the right to dispose of them, with the obligation to return to the depcsitor 
the equivalent amount in the same currency as that of the deposit"."' 
According to this text, deposits earmarked for certain investments, such as deposits 
extended to brokers and other investors or under a life assurance contract have not been 
considered as deposits for the purposes of licensing a bank under Jordanian Law. There has 
never been a case filed against a broker or life assurance company for taking deposits 
neither under effective Banking Law nor previous equivalent texts. 
The Jordanian Law also prohibits the employment of the term bank and its 
equivalent in any language by a person other than a licensed bank or when one of three 
exceptions takes place: when the term is employed by an international agreement, where it 
is obvious from the context that the term is irrelevant to banking activities, and where the 
usage of the name is permitted by a Council of Ministers' resolution upon a 
recommendation o f the Governor, for example where a regional banking institution is 
allowed to establish a presence in Jordan."* Likewise, the Law prohibits releasing 
misleading or false information concerning the acceptance of deposits.^ 
Furthermore, the Law penalises any unlicensed person who uses the name "bank', 
provides banking services or issues misleading information in this regard by a fine o f 
JD500 to JD3000 per day as of the first day of violating the law. Should the violation 
persist, the CBJ is entitled to close the place o f business of the concerned person.^ 
9.1.2. Licensing of Banks 
9.1.2.1. General Licensing Requirements 
The Jordanian Law meets the licensing criteria required under the BCBS Core 
Principle 3. The Banking Law (2000) designates the CBJ as the sole authority responsible 
' Ibid, Section 2. 
Ibid, Section 4(d). 
Ibid, Section 4(e). 
'' Ibid. Section 5. 
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for bank licensing, and determines minimum requirements thereof. First, banks should take 
the form of public shareholding companies with the exception o f branches o f foreign banks, 
subsidiaries of banks and off-shore companies.^ The bank should also have a minimum 
start-up capital determined by the CBJ^ (currently JD 40m).^ Furthermore, the Banking 
Law (2000) requires the applicant to provide the CBJ with information on the incorporators 
as well as supply essential documents.'^ In addition, Section 25 provides that the bank's 
general manager and senior management should have experience in banking, be of good 
reputation and conduct, devote their time to the bank and shall not assume the position of a 
board member in any other bank (with the exception of subsidiary banks). As to the board 
of directors' members. Section 22 similarly requires the board member to be o f good 
conduct, and not assume a position in another bank, but does not require him to have a 
minimal level of education or expertise. In addition. The Banking Law (2000) permits the 
CBJ to license new Islamic banks for the first time, providing that the objects of the Islamic 
bank are providing banking and investment services on non-usurious basis, soliciting 
savings and promoting social solidarity. 
In 2006, the CBJ issued its Bank Licensing Guidelines, where it spells out for the 
first time its licensing criteria and determines that they are i.ssued "according to the 
international standards and best practices". The CBJ also explains that it reserves the right 
to accept or reject and application for licensing but on the basis of clear standards to 
"reduce the potential for political interference in the licensing process"." The guidelines 
refer to multiple criteria,'" one of which is of an economic nature, being the potential 
contribution to Jordan's economic development, such as providing banking services to 
under-banked remote areas and introducing novice financial services. 
' Ibid, Section 6. 
^ Ibid, Section 8. 
C B J , Regulation on Own Capital for Banks in Jordan No. (17/2003) dated 20.8.2003. 
Banking Law (2000), Section 7. 
" C B J , Bank Licensing Guidelines for year 2006, pp. 2. 
'- Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
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There five remaining criteria are o f prudential nature and cover the foUowing. First, 
The scrutiny of the financial standing and integrity of major shareholders i.e. ones holding 
at least 5 percent of the bank's equity, as well as, the ownership structure o f the bank's 
group or affiliate to ensure that they are transparent and do not obstruct effective 
supervision. Secondly, the assessment o f the applicant's operating and human resource 
plans, which cover the bank's planned strategy, organisation, internal control processes and 
procedures, corporate governance as well as managerial and other human resources 
development issues. Thirdly, the CBJ also assesses whether the proposed board of directors 
and senior managers meet individually and collectively a "fi t and proper" criterion, which 
encompasses a broader range of qualities beyond the provisions o f the Banking Law. It 
covers competence demonstrated by education, training and at least five years of 
experience as well as having knowledge of the industry including knowledge of 
international markets when relevant. It also covers the quality of "financial literacy", which 
refers to understanding of financial ratios and statements as well as the mere "commitment" 
to learn the business of the bank, fu l f i l ownership responsibilities and exert effort and time. 
Other qualities are the ability to provide independent and well informed judgements; 
probity and good reputation. Finally, they should have strategy and vision, leadership and 
knowledge of managerial best practices. Fourthly, the CBJ evaluates the financial 
projections and statements of the applicant bank including the adequacy of its capital and 
the legitimacy of its sources of capital. Finally, the CBJ assesses the effect of the bank on 
the safety and soundness o f the banking system. 
9.1.2.2. Licensing of Foreign Banks 
There are four possible forms that a foreign bank might establish a presence in 
Jordan. First, it might establish a subsidiary,'^ which enjoys a separate corporate identity 
and has to meet regulatory requirements such as capital adequacy on a solo basis. The 
subsidiary is considered a Jordanian company as Section 240(a) of the Law o f Companies 
Section 2 of the Banking Law (2000) defines a subsidiary as "[a] company in which one or more per.sons 
with a joint interest own at least 50 percent of its capital or hold an effective interest that allows said person or 
persons to control its management or general policies". 
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No. (22) for year 1997 (hereafter "Law o f Companies")'" determines that only a company 
that is registered and has its headquarters outside Jordan is considered a foreign company. 
A subsidiary o f a foreign bank is therefore subject to the same legal requirements of 
licensing and supervision unless the law indicates otherwise.'^ The second form is the off -
shore bank; i.e. a company registered in Jordan which carries out its operations abroad.'^ 
Although the Banking Law (2000) envisages the possibility o f establishing off-shore banks, 
and empowers the CBJ to license and regulate them,'^ the CBJ in practice has never 
authorised or issued a regulation to this end. The third type is the representative office o f a 
foreign bank which purpose is to protect the bank's interest e.g. by strengthening its 
relationship with local Jordanian banks and providing information and advice on the local 
market thereto."* According to the Licensing and Supervising the Activities o f the 
Representative Offices of Foreign Banks and Financial Companies Bylaw No. (11) for year 
1977 and amendments, representative offices should be authori.sed and supervised by the 
CBJ. There used to be few bank representative offices in Jordan, but there are currently 
none. 
The fourth and most significant form of foreign banking is the branch. The licensing 
of a foreign branch is subject to the same requirements of licensing a domestic bank with 
additional prudential requirements related to both the foreign bank and its Jordanian 
branch. The requirements related to the foreign bank are modelled on the BCBS standards 
as illustrated in the following Section 11(a) of the Banking Law (2000): 
"A foreign bank shall submit an application for licensing for one or more of its branches to operate in the 
Kingdom pursuant to the orders of the Central Bank and provided that the foreign bank meets the 
following conditions: 
The Law of Companies was amended by Law No. (4) for year 2002; Law No. (40) for year 2002; Law No. 
(74) for year 2002; Law No. (17) for year 2003; Law No (57) for year 2006; and Law No. (35) for year 2008. 
Banking Law (2000), Section 6(c). 
Law of Companies, Section 211(a). 
Banking Law (2000), Section 6(a)(d). 
Council of Mini.sters Bylaw on Licensing and Supervising the Activities of the Representative Offices of 
Foreign Banks and Financial Companies No. (11) for year 1977 and amendments No. (85) for year 1981 and 
No. (1 10) for year 2001, Section 12. 
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1. It mu.st be licensed to accept deposits in it home country. 
2. It must enjoy a good reputation and a strong financial position. 
3. It must have the approval of the competent authority in the country of its head office to operate in 
the Kingdom. 
4. Supervision by the competent authorities in its home country must be based on sound banking 
supervision, the minimum of which must he the application of internationally recognized hanking 
supervisory- standards. 
5. It mu.st pledge that the branch thereof licensed to operate in the Kingdom shall comply with all 
legislation in force [emphasis added]". 
Section 12 provides for two additional requirements o f the foreign branch. The first 
one is that it should transfer to Jordan in one lump sum the equivalent o f half o f the capital 
of Jordanian banks (currently JD20m). This is an important rule since branches do not have 
separate legal entities and therefore their deposits and assets are available to the creditors o f 
the foreign bank they belong to. The second one is that foreign banks should have their own 
regional managers; a requirement that should enhance the management of the foreign 
branch because it provides a clear line of responsibility for the bank and gives the CBJ a 
clear point of reference. 
9.1.2.3. Licensing Procedures 
The application procedure is divided into the two stages of preliminary and final 
approval. The incorporators first submit the documents that should illustrate that they meet 
the licensing criteria,'^ and the CBJ shall issue its decision o f either rejection or preliminary 
approval in three months and notifies the applicant thereof.^'' The CBJ should also 
determine in its preliminary approval the remaining requirements for authorisation such as 
the ful l payment of capital, which the applicant must satisfy within one year, otherwise the 
preliminary approval would be ipso facto cancelled.^' I f the requirements are otherwise met 
The documents required by the C B J are numerated by the C B J , Ibid (n 11), pp. 6-11. 
' Banking Law (2000), Section 9(a). 
Ibid. Section 9(b)(c). 
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and notified to the CBJ within one year, the CBJ shall issue its final decision to license the 
bank." 
9.1.2.4. Withdrawal of Licensing 
The Banking Law (2000) defines the situations where the CBJ may revoke the 
license o f a bank and provides that the CBJ shall notify the bank with its decision in seven 
days as well publish the decision in the Official Gazette and two daily newspapers.^"' 
Section 18 of the Banking Law (2000) states that the CBJ may revoke the final 
license of an existing bank under six circumstances: where the license is issued on the basis 
of false information supplied by the applicant; where the licensed bank fails to undertake its 
activities within one year o f issuing the license or refuses to take deposits; where the bank 
refuses to implement the penalties or the corrective measures provided for under the 
Banking Law;"" when a bank submits an application to revoke its license; where the licen.se 
of a bank which enjoys an effective interest is revoked; and where the bank is merged with 
or acquired by another corporate. 
Section 19 of the Banking Law (2000) deals specifically with the situations where 
the CBJ may revoke the license of a foreign bank. This includes the situations where the 
head office declines to accept deposits, the financial position of the foreign bank has 
become weak or where "any change has occurred that the Central Bank views as having a 
negative impact on the activities of the foreign bank branch in Jordan and its operational 
progress"."^ The latter text covers the situation where the bank's headquarter or an affiliate 
bank is facing inmiinent closure or is subject to investigation for massive fraud or financial 
crime. The license may also be revoked where "any changes has occurred in the nationality, 
ownership, memorandum of agreement and articles o f association of the foreign bank".'^ 
" Ibid, Section 10(a). 
Ibid, Section 20. 
Ibid, Section 88. 
Ibid, Section i9(d). 
Ibid, Section 19(b). 
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This broadly drafted text should be construed to mean any changes in the bank's ownership 
or founding documents that may have detrimental effects on the bank. It must be recaUed 
here that in the case of Jordanian banks, the CBJ's prior consent is required for the 
validation of the transfer of ten percent of its capitaP^ or introducing changes into its 
memorandum and articles o f association."* The CBJ by contrast may only request the 
foreign bank to supply it with information when such changes occur^^ then it can make its 
decisions concerning the local branches. It is less obvious why the change in the nationality 
as opposed to the locus o f the head office, which is essential for cross border international 
banking cooperation under the BCBS standards, is a ground for revocation. Finally, and 
most significantly. Section 19(e) states the following as one of the reasons for license 
revocation: 
"Where it has been established that the relevant authorities in the country of its head office have not 
applied sound standards of banking supervision". 
The latter section provides evidence that the Jordanian legislator considers the BCBS 
standards as a reference point for best supervisory standards and illustrates its willingness 
to incorporate them into binding laws. 
9.1.3. Branching 
Section 17(b) of the Banking Law states that banks may not open, close or transfer 
branches, whether inside or outside Jordan without the prior approval of the CBJ. The CBJ 
spells out the details of licensing branches in special regulations. 
9.1.3.1. Branching Inside Jordan 
The CBJ's regulation on branching inside Jordan"'^ allows the three forms of 
branches or offices (including money exchange offices), A T M s and locations for marketing 
banking services and products. Banks should apply for the CBJ in writing to open a branch 
Ibid, Section 34(a) read together with Section 2. 
Ibid, Section 16. 
Ibid, Section 12(c). 
•" C B J , Regulation on Licensed Banks" Branching Inside Jordan No. (36/2007) dated 30.9.2007. 
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or office on a determined date and in a specific geographical area supplemented with the 
approval of their board of directors, an economic feasibility study and any other 
information requested by the CBJ. The CBJ reserves to itself the right to approve or reject 
the application, but its decision is based on the criteria o f the fmancial, administrative and 
organisational soundness o f the bank as well as its compliance with banking legislation. I f 
the opening of the branch is approved, it should be opened within one year extendable to a 
maximum period o f two years. 
Banks by contrast do not have to apply to the CBJ to open the other forms of 
presence. In the case of banks seeking to establish ATMs, they should notify the CBJ of the 
proposed locations. They should also ensure the validity of A T M s and provide surveillance 
cameras. Likewise, banks should only notify the CBJ of proposed locations of marketing 
banking services and products and their launching dates. They should announce in a 
conspicuous place that the location is not a branch or office. 
9.1.3.2. Branching Outside Jordan 
The CBJ regulation on cross border establishments"^' allows Jordanian banks which 
have been providing banking services locally for at least five year to establish a presence 
abroad in the form of an ordinary or offshore branch, subsidiary, representative office or 
any other form approved by the CBJ. The bank must first submit an application supported 
with an economic feasibility study for the CBJ for approval. I t must have a written policy 
on coordinating the relationship between the head office and its establishments abroad, as 
well as, demonstrate that is it solvent, well managed and well rated bank.^^ The CBJ 
approval is based on the BCBS requirements as explained below:^^ 
"When reviewing the applications for cross-border establishment, the Central Bank of Jordan will 
take into consideration the following: 
'^ C B J , Instructions for Cross- Border Establishment by Jordanian Banks No. (18/2004) dated 24.6.2004, 
which replaced C B J , Regulation on Branching Abroad No. (249/93) dated 9.11.1993. 
The bank must meet the category of "Well Capitalized" as defined in the C B J , Framework for Corrective 
Actions Regulation No. (4/2004) dated 11.1.2004; be classified as 2 "Well Rated" and its management rating 
is 2 on basis of the C B J C A M E L system. 
" Ibid (n 31), Article 3. 
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a. The nature and level of supervision by regulatory authorities in the host country on cross-border 
establishments of the Jordanian bank. 
b. The nature of the conditions or pledges or comfort letters required by regulatory authorities in 
the host country either from the head office of the bank or the Central Bank of Jordan. 
c. The cooperation of the host country with respect to the exchange of regulatory information and, 
generally, its commitment to the Ba.sel Committee accords for the supervision on cross-border 
establishments. 
d. The signed agreements with the regulatory authority in the host country". 
The regulation also commits Jordanian banks to provide the CBJ with information 
and documents concerning their branches outside Jordan. First, the bank should inform the 
CBJ in advance of the date o f launching the operations of the branch supplemented with the 
name of the manager and ful l contact details. Likewise, it should inform the CBJ in 
advance of its decision to move or transfer one of its branches. The bank should also supply 
the CBJ with summaries of audit and inspection processes, the external auditor's report, 
directives issued by the host authority thereto, certified annual financial statements and the 
head office's assessment of the branch's risks and the adequacy of reserves and provisions 
set against them, as well as, any substantial losses or important events that may adversely 
affect it. It is noteworthy that the CBJ may impose on the branch a higher reserve ratio or 
assign a higher risk weight thereto. 
9.1.4. Permissible Activities 
The Banking Law (2000) and regulations issued pursuant thereto clearly defme 
activities permissible to banks as required under the BCBS Core Principle 2. It first of all 
carries forward the prohibition on banks to provide trading, industrial or any services other 
than financial ones."''' The Law allows Islamic banks to undertake their activities which 
involve exposure to trading risks,^^ but did not permit the combination o f Islamic and 
conventional banking within the same bank. In addition to accepting deposits. Islamic 
Banking Law (2000), Section 40(a/2). 
Ibid. Section 54. 
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banks are entitled to carry out the activities which were earlier only allowed to be supplied 
by the Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment under its specific law. These 
activities cover issuing Muquaradha bonds and other investment funds or portfolios, 
Mudharaba, Musharaka, and Murabah^^ and any other investments undertaken on a non-
usurious basis.^^ Furthermore, banks may not acquire real estate except in settlement o f 
debts and for a period that shall not exceed two years as of the acquisition date or for the 
purpose of conducting its own banking services therefrom,"'^ and should have to adhere to 
the related instructions o f the CBJ."'^ 
Section 37(a) of the Banking Law (2000) provides an inconclusive list of 
permissible financial activities and allows the combination of commercial and investment 
banking within the same bank. It states that banks, subject to their licenses, may undertake 
one of twelve activities including the acceptance of deposits, extension of credit including 
financing commercial transactions, provision of payment and collection services as well as 
the issuance and administration o f instruments of payment. The list covers providing 
financial agency services and banks are accordingly allowed to provide insurance agency 
services,"**^  as well as, insurance consultative services."*' Banks are also allowed for the first 
time to deal in money and capital markets either to its own account or for its customers' 
accounts; purchase and sale of debts; financial leasing; dealing in foreign exchange; foreign 
exchange management; underwriting, management and dealing in securities; investment 
trustee services; providing management and consultations on investment portfolios; 
advisory services, safekeeping, and managing of precious objects and securities. The list. 
Ibid, Sections 52. 
Ibid, Sections 51 and 53. 
Ibid, Section 48. 
'" 'CBJ, Regulation of the Acquisitions of Real Estates Circular No. (2/2000) dated 15.10.2000. 
""^  It is noteworthy that the Insurance Regulatory Law No. (33) for year 1999 as amended by Law No. (57) for 
year 2002, Section 2 defines the insurance agent as any per.son appointed and authorised by the insurance 
company to U^ansact insurance business on its behalf. 
'^ C B J , Circular on Insurance Consultation Services No. (10/2/1304) dated 5.2.2007. 
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however, does not cover the registration of securities, which is exclusively confined to the 
Securities Depository Centre ("SDC").^^ 
In addition, Section 37(a) states that banks may undertake any other banking related 
activities approved by the CBJ in orders issued specifically for this purpose. The CBJ, for 
example, allowed banks to provide private bonded services provided that the stored goods 
represent a guarantee f rom the beneficiary o f a credit guarantee extended by the same 
bank/^ Section 37(b) also allows a bank to have a subsidiary or more extending non-
banking services subject to the CBJ approval. The Arab Bank is for example allowed to 
provide Islamic banking services through its wholly owned subsidiary, the Arab Islamic 
Banking International. The CBJ also permits banks to provide insurance services through a 
wholly owned subsidiary.'*'* 
9.1.5. Transfer of Ownership and Review of Investments 
The Jordanian Law meets the requirements of Core Principles 4 and 5 on the 
transfer of significant of ownership and major acquisitions. 
9.1.5.1. Transfer of Significant Ownership 
Section 34(a) of the Banking Law (2000) requires the prior written approval of the 
CBJ to any transfer of a bank's shares which confers ownership of an effective interest 
(significant control in the BCBS terminology) of a person or increases the percentage o f 
such person's effective interest in the capital, being defined as controlling a minimum of 10 
percent of the capital of a legal entity.'*^ Otherwise, the underlying transfer contract 
becomes invalid. Section 34(b) states that the same rule applies to transferring shares to 
related parties being defined as follows:''^ 
Higher Court of Justice Ca.se No. (483/2005) dated 23.1.2006, Adalaii Publications. 
C B J , Bonded Services Regulation No. (7/2001) dated 16.4 2001, Article 1. 
C B J , Regulation of Banks' Acquisition of Insurance Companies No. (5/2000), dated 5.12.2000. 
Banking Law (2000), Section 2. 
Ibid. 
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"Two or more persons that constitute a single banking risk because one controls the other or owns at 
least 40 percent of the other person's capital, they have exchanged mutual guarantees, the settlement 
of their loans is from a single source, their loans are from the same project, or where other similar 
circumstances take place. For the purposes of this law, related parties shall be considered as a single 
person." 
Furthermore, Section 39 provides that a bank which acquires the lesser ratio o f 5 
percent in a bank or any other company must notify the CBJ within fifteen days. The 
researcher has raised the question of how does the CBJ ensure that banks performing the 
notification requirements during an awareness meeting conducted by Amman Stock 
Exchange ("ASE")^^ and was informed that there is an unpublished understanding between 
the CBJ and the SDC that the latter would inform the CBJ of bank's holdings exceeding the 
5 percent ceiling. 
9.1.5.2. Equity Investments 
Section 38 of the Banking Act (2000) as outlined in the Banks' Equity Investments 
Regulation''^ provide criteria for banks' individual and aggregate investments or 
acquisitions, whether owned directly or indirectly (such as a sub-subsidiary). Accordingly, 
a bank may not acquire a non-financial company.^"^ No bank, as well, shall have holdings in 
a company, which activities do not contain accepting deposits, exceeding 10 percent o f the 
subscribed capital of the targeted company. I f the bank's holding in the latter type of 
company exceeds 10 percent o f the bank's subscribed capital or 10 percent o f the 
subscribed capital of the bank or company in which the holding subsists, whichever is less, 
the prior approval of the CBJ shall be obtained. Furthermore, a bank may not exceed a 50 
percent limit of the acquiring bank's regulatory capital on its aggregate holdings of shares. 
C B J , Banks' Equity Investments Regulation No. (12/2002) dated 27.3.2002. This regulation repealed and 
replaced C B J , Banks' Equity Investments Regulation No. (217/ 90) dated 31.10.1999 and C B J , Banks' Equity 
Investments Regulation No. (183/93) dated 8.8.1993. 
""^  Section 38(a) of the Banking Law (2000) specifically prohibited banks from "[hjolding in a company 
whose objectives do not include acceptance of deposits, an ownership stake exceeding the ratio prescribed by 
the Central Bank". The blanket prohibition on ownership by banks in financial companies was pursuantly 
provided for in Article 1 of the C B J , Banks' Equity Investments Regulation, Ibid. 
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The mentioned limits do not include three types of equity: shares acquired by the bank as a 
debt settlement provided that the bank disposes thereof within two years as a general rule, 
shares registered in the name of the bank yet owned by its clients and holdings in 
subsidiary financial companies and banks. 
In addition, the CBJ regulates the banks' purchase of treasury stocks (i.e. shares o f 
their own stocks)^° with the prior approval of the CBJ. The regulation permits the purchase 
within the maximum percentage of five percent of the bank's paid up capital provided that 
certain precautionary requirements are met. The bank must apply to the CBJ illustrating its 
reasons for buying treasury stock and its projected effects on its financial position. I t should 
also demonstrate, amongst others, that it has earned net profits over the preceding two 
years, has a capital adequacy ratio one percent higher than the minimum regulatory ratio 
(i.e. 13 percent of risk weighted assets) and adhere to liquidity and the credit concentration 
ratios as well as enjoy a strong financial position. Furthermore, members of the bank's 
board of directors and their related and connected parties may not deal in the treasury 
stocks. In addition, the bank may not purchase treasury stocks within six months of 
increasing its capital as a general rule. Likewise, the bank may not increase its capital 
before it disposes completely of its treasury stocks, which can be done by distributing them 
to its partners or employees, or selling them to a strategic partner or the public. 
9.2. Risk Assessment and Management 
The term 'risk management' is not used by the Banking Law (2000), although 
Section 21 (c) states broadly that banks' boards of directors are responsible for setting out 
the objectives and policies o f the bank and monitoring their implementation. The CBJ 
regulations, however, focus on the management of credit and foreign exchange risks, being 
the most common types of risks Jordanian banks are exposed to. The first comprehensive 
approach to risk management, and which largely meets the requirements of the BCBS Core 
Principle (2006), is found in the CBJ Regulation on Internal Control Systems issued in 
2006. This regulation provides that the board of directors should review the risk exposure 
C B J , Treasury Stocks Regulation No. (28/2006) dated 23.4.2006. 
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of the bank and ensure that the bank has adequate procedures to assess, manage and control 
these risks.^' It also states that each bank should formulate a risk management system 
commensurate with its size and complexity. The system should cover the following five 
elements at least: the board of directors should approve and periodically review a risk 
policy which sets out measures and limits for each type of risk and ensures that the bank's 
employees are informed of it; banks should have specialist and independent employees 
responsible for risk analysis and developing risk management methods; banks should 
monitor the application of risk controls and the observance of risk limits; the bank's 
management should be informed o f any breach of risk controls and needed measures to 
rectify the situation; and the risk management policies, processes and procedures should be 
regularly reviewed. 
Each bank should also establish an independent risk management committee 
comprised of members of their boards of directors and top executives.''"' The committee is 
responsible for reviewing the risk management policy before its submission to the board of 
directors; the regular review of the risk management policy, procedures and processes; 
submitting reports to the board of directors on existing risks compared to the bank's risk 
policy; deliberating on risk management reports; checking the progress of database needed 
for risk analysis and finally the review of the business continuity plan. 
9.2.1. Credit Risk 
The Jordanian law provides adequately for credit risk management. It states that 
banks' boards of directors are responsible for adopting and monitoring the implementation 
of a credit risk policy spelling out its criteria and terms of credit extension and supply the 
CBJ with a copy thereof It also sets limits for large credit exposures or concentrations, 
connected lending and related lending. Banks do not need as a general rule to obtain the 
-' C B J , Regulation on Internal Control Systems No. (35/2007) dated 10.6.2007, Article Second(l). 
Ibid, Article Sixth. 
Ibid, Article Sixth(4). 
The Banking Law (2000), Section 21 (c). 
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approval of the CBJ before granting credit (with the exception of large exposures), but they 
should supply it with monthly returns on their credit exposures .They should also supply 
information on the credit ratings of their customers.'^ 
9.2.2.1. Credit limits 
The law states that banks are prohibited f rom "[gjranting credit to any person in 
excess of the limit set by the CBJ, or arranging financing for such person by a third party 
with the intent o f enabling him to discharge his obligations to an affiliate o f the bank.".^^ 
This is a broad definition which covers aU types of credit extension and beneficiaries, yet 
the Law emphasises the CBJ's authority to set exposure limits for loans granted to a 
borrower and his affiliates or related parties.^^ A related party was defined above, while an 
affiliate is defined in the Banking Law (2000) as a person who "controls or is controlled by 
another person, or each of two persons controlled by a third person".''^ The control element 
is broadly defined to cover the ability to influence the decisions or actions o f another 
person, e.g.^^ by controlling the board of directors. 
The Exposures Limits Regulation issued by the CBJ in 2001^' spells out regulatory 
details that shall be applied both in Jordan and by Jordanian banks' branches abroad without 
prejudice to the limits set by the host authority.^"^ An exposure is defined as "the total of 
direct and indirect credit facilities and bonds issued by a person and purchased by a 
C B J , Exposures Limits Regulation No. (9/2001) dated 1.8.2001, as amended by Circulars No. 
(10/2/3/3/16009) dated 6.10.2006; No. (10/2/3/3/14214) dated 5.10.2003; No. (10/2/3/3/11020) dated 
16.10.2005; and No. (10/2/3/3/11647) dated 27.11.2007, ("Exposures Limits Regulation"), Articles 
Fourteenth(3) and Fifteenth( 1). 
Ibid, Article Fifteenth(9). 
Banking Law (2000), Section 40(a)(4). 
Ibid, Section 41(b). 
Ibid, Section 2. 
Ibid. 
C B J , Ibid (n 55). 
Ibid. Article Fourteenth. 
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bank".^^ The exposure is limited to 10 percent or more of a bank's regulatory capital, while 
the aggregate exposure limit is 8 times its regulatory capital. The maximum limit of 
exposure to a person and its related parties in Jordan may not exceed 25 percent o f the 
bank's capital held in Jordan, while the limit for a loan extended abroad is charged against 
capital held by the bank in Jordan and its branches abroad.^'' Exposure limits also exclude 
credit extended to or guaranteed by the Jordanian Government, generally non-performing 
loans that meet provisioning requirement set out below, credit fiiUy covered by cash 
collateral, and loans ftjlly guaranteed by the Jordan Mortgage Refinancing Company. 
The law defines connected persons as affiliates, a bank administrator, his spouse or 
a relative of his up to the third-degree, or any person who has a personal interest 
therewith.^^ A relationship between a bank and a financial company is assumed to exist i f 
either the bank or the financial company enjoys a direct or indirect effective interest in the 
other.^^ The law authorises the CBJ to regulate exposures to connected parties, and 
accordingly, the CBJ imposes a 50 percent ceiling on loans to all connected parties apart 
from loans to board members at the bank and its subsidiaries, related parties thereto and 
housing loans to banks' employees .Banks may not extend a loan to a related party on 
more favourable terms to loans extended to others.^ "^ ^ Furthermore, the Law provides that i f 
one of the bank's directors, general manager or manager does not settle his debts to the 
bank shall forfeit his position.^' 
" Ibid, Article First. 
Ibid, Articles First and Third. 
Ibid, Article Twelfth. 
Banking Law (2000), Section 46(a). 
" Ibid, Section 45. 
''^  Ibid, Section 46(b). 
C B J , Ibid (n 55), Article Fifth. 
Ibid, Article Fifleenth(4). 
" Banking Law (2000), Section 30(b). 
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The CBJ also sets specific terms and limits on credit granted to an administrator 
being defined as a "member of the board of directors of a bank, whether serving on his own 
behalf or representing a legal entity, or the general manager of a bank or any other bank 
o f f i c e r " . L o a n s extended to board of directors' members should adhere to the limits set by 
the CBJ,^^ and on similar terms to loans extended to other bortowers. The board member 
should not be present when his board deliberates on his loan as well. In addition, the prior 
approval o f the CBJ must be attained.'" The CBJ imposes the following limits on exposure 
to an administrator where the denominator is the regulatory capital: 5 percent limit for 
credit extended to a board member of the bank or its subsidiary where the aggregate limit is 
25 percent; 10 percent for credit extended either to a board member in the bank and all of 
his related parties including loans guaranteed thereby or a board member in the bank's 
subsidiary and its related parties; and 50 percent aggregate limit to all credit given to the 
directors of the bank and its subsidiaries and parties related thereto. I t also imposes a fixed 
300,000 JDs limit on loans to managers and .senior executives and 100,000 JDs on loans to 
employees' funds.^'^ 
The CBJ is also empowered to impose limits to credit granted to any financial 
company that has a relationship with the bank.'^ The credit limit to exposure to subsidiaries 
is 20 percent of the latter's paid up c a p i t a l . I n case o f subsidiaries abroad, they shall apply 
the limits set by the host country i f higher than those set by the CBJ, otherwise, they must 
obtain the prior approval of the CBJ to apply the less stringent requirements of the host 
authority. 
" Ibid, Section 2. 
Ibid, ection 47. 
C B J , Ibid (n 55), Article Fifteen(3). 
Ibid, Articles Sixth and Eighth. 
The Banking Law (2000), Section 45. 
" C B J , Ibid (n 55), Article Seventh. 
Ibid, Article Eleventh. 
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A major source of credit risk in Jordan is excessive loans granted for real estate, 
and therefore it is limited to 20 percent of the total deposits of the bank in JD.^^ It covers 
credit extended for the purchase, construction, expansion or maintenance of immovable 
property, as well as, loans extended to investors in the real estate sector and housing 
associations.^'' Loans extended to finance the working capital of construction companies 
and credit to development construction such as schools and which term to maturity is seven 
years at maximum shall be excluded.^' 
Finally, banks are not allowed to extend credit to their attorneys or auditors;^^ 
finance the purchase of securities which the bank has undertaken to offer, cover or 
distribute;^^ or extend credit guaranteed by the borrower's shares in the bank.^" Jordanian 
and foreign banks also may not extend credit to their prime ten clients exceeding 35 and 70 
85 
percent of their direct credit facilities in Jordan, successively. 
9.2.2.2, Problem Assets, Provisions and Reserves 
The law emphasises on banks' compliance with the orders o f the CBJ concerning 
the classification and valuation of assets including the duration period for considering 
income from loans as unrealised and provisions held against non-performing l o a n s . T h e 
effective CBJ regulation on this regard, 'Instructions for Classification of Credit Facilities 
and Calculating Impairment Provisions and Reserve for General Banking Risks' was issued 
in 2006 "in light of changes in international guidelines", in a clear reference to the BCBS 
'''' Banking Law (2000), Section 40(a/9). 
C B J , Circular on Exposures Limits on Real Estate No. (10/2/3/3/11647) dated 27.11.2007, Article 1. 
Ibid, Article 2. 
The Banking Law (2000), Section 96(a). 
Ibid, Section 40(a/8). 
Ibid, Section 40(a/10). 
Ibid, Section 41(c) and C B J , Ibid (n 55), Anicle Fourth. 
Ibid, Sections 42(a/2,3) and 43. 
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standards.**^ The regulation covers the classification of loans, provisioning, rules of 
rescheduling debts and other terms. 
The instructions classify credit facilities into the following types: 
First, 'low risk credit facilities' category, which represent credit granted to or 
guaranteed by the Government of Jordan or a country hosting a branch of a Jordanian bank 
provided that the underlying credit is denominated in the host country's currency, as well 
as, credit fully coUateralised by cash margin or an 'eligible bank guarantee' i.e. one issued 
by a bank rated an investment grade by a recognised credit rating agency. 
Secondly, 'acceptable risk credit facilities' which refers to credit granted to an 
obligor with strong cash flows and financial position, available alternative cash resources, 
timely repayment of due principal amount and interest thereon, competent management and 
has his credit covered by eligible collateral. 
Thirdly, the category of 'watch-list credit facilities' which covers ten types of less 
worthy credits. It includes obligors with past due repayment of principal and/ or interest for 
a period ranging from 60 to 90 days; overdraft facilities exceeding their limit by ten percent 
for a period ranging from 60 to 90 days; performing credit facilities restructured f rom a 
previous non-performing category and in the case where there is no adequate financial 
analysis of the obligor. 
The last category is 'non-performing credit facilities' which covers overdue 
repayments, overdrafts which are dormant or exceed their limit with over ten percent, 
unrenewed mature credit facilities, current accounts that are overdrawn and claimed 
guarantees which value is unpaid or inadequately covered. These credit facilities are 
subdivided according to their duration into the three types of'substandard' (90 to 179 days), 
'doubtful' (180-359 days) and 'loss' (more than 359 days). Credit facilities extended to an 
B C B S , Sound Credit Risk Assessment and Valuation for Loans, Consultative Document (November, 
2005), which was amended by the final version: Sound Credit Risk A.s.sessmeni and Valuation for Loans 
(June, 2006). 
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obligor declared subsequently bankrupt is classified as 'loss', while those rescheduled twice 
within one year are classified as 'substandard'. 
The instructions also set out the following rules various rules on sound on 
provisioning. First, banks should set aside 'general banking risk reserves' f rom their profits 
and disclose them under the owner's equity section of their balance sheet. This provision 
should be no less than one percent of direct acceptable risk credit facilities and 0.5 percent 
of indirect credit facilities with the exception of low risk credit facilities. The part of credit 
facilities covered by a Government guarantee, acceptable bank guarantees, the Jordan Loan 
Guarantee Corporation, cash collateral, the Jordan Mortgage Refinancing Company, 
recognised export credit agencies, as well as auto loans covered by insurance companies 
and certain export promotion loans shall be excluded. Secondly, banks should maintain the 
equivalent of 3 percent of their total direct credit facilities as 'impairment loss provision' 
against watch-list credit. 
Thirdly, banks should also maintain an impairment loss provision for non-
performing facilities against principal outstanding amounts. Banks need to distinguish 
between credit facilities on basis of whether they are covered by eligible collateral or not. 
Eligible collateral is defined as cash margin; 75 percent of real estate value or the value of 
the mortgage deed whichever is less (common ownership excluded); 75 percent o f the 
listed financial securities evaluated according to market value; and 50 percent of the value 
of machineries and vehicles or the value o f the mortgage whichever is less. Real estate 
collateral should be appraised by an expert during the approval phase, when the credit is 
categorised as non-performing, when devaluation in real estate takes place and every four 
years at minimum. As to ftilly collateralised credit facilities, the provision should be 25 
percent of sub-standard credit, 50 percent o f doubtful credit and 100 percent of loss credit. 
The provision should be set aside during a five years period until it amounts to the 100 
percent coverage. As to partially colletralised credit, the provision held against each portion 
is calculated separately then summed up. The provision against the uncolleteralised portion 
is 20 percent of the amount of principal or 100 percent of the uncovered portion whichever 
is more. Certain credits are also excluded from this provision such as credit guaranteed by 
The Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation. 
280 
Fourthly, banks should create a f l i l l impairment loss of guarantees paid thereby on 
behalf of the client and have not been debited for more than 90 days. An impairment loss 
should also be created for overdrawn current accounts after 29 days starting f rom 3 percent 
and mounting to 100 percent after 90 days. Finally, in case of personal credit such as credit 
card withdrawals and auto loans, an impairment loss provision should be created according 
to the period o f delinquency ranging from 15 percent when the delinquency period is 60-89 
days and mounting to 100 percent when the period is more than 270 days. 
In addition to the above, the instructions set out rules on the rescheduhng of credit 
facilities to remove them from the non performing category. First, the obligor should make 
a cash down payment from his own resources that covers at least 10 percent of outstanding 
amount for the first reschedule, and may be doubled in the second reschedule. The other 
settlement instalments must be periodical and their maturity is a maximum of ten years as a 
general rule. The grace period should not exceed six months as weU. The credit facility can 
also be rescheduled for only three times provided that no more than two reschedules take 
place within twelve months. I f the obligor defaults, the credit facilities wi l l be reclassified 
according to their original category. Credit facilities can also be removed from the watch-
list to the acceptable risks category, if the obligor makes six monthly or three periodical 
repayments and meets other regulatory requirements. 
The CBJ instructions provide for further prudential rules to protect banks from 
credit risk. Most significantly, they provide that interest and commissions of non-
performing credit should be suspended. They also state that banks may not extend new 
credit facility to an obligor who has one of his debts classified as non-performing. 
Furthermore, they states that repayments of non-performing loans should not be taken from 
the proceeds o f new credit facilities extended to the obligor or a third degree relative of his, 
his related parties or affiliates. They also set out the general rule that an obligor who had 
one of his credit exposures written o f f may not benefit f rom further credit facilities, unless 
he makes fu l l repayment. Finally, i f one o f the credit facilities extended to a particular 
obligor is classified as non-performing, the same category will be assigned to any other 
facility extended to him as a general rule. 
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9.2.2. Market Risk 
The CBJ adopts a number of precautionary measures to minimise banks' exposure 
to market risk, which can result mainly in the case of Jordanian banks from adverse 
movements in securities and interest rates in the trading book and foreign exchange risk. As 
to securities. Section 38 o f the Banking Law (2000) and regulations issued pursuant to limit 
banks' holdings of shares and hence their exposure to market risk. The CBJ protects banks 
fi-om interest rates fluctuations in the Interbank market by applying a system of interest rate 
corridor to overnight deposits and repurchase agreements, whereby the upper and lower 
interest rates limits are indirectly c o n t r o l l e d . T h e r e has never been, however, any 
regulations which adopt the BCBS detailed rules of risk management to equity and interest 
rate risk prior to the Basel I I Regulation on Market Risk: the Standardised Approach 
released recently. By contrast, the CBJ adopts more extensive rules on the management of 
foreign exchange currency whether the bank is managing its own portfolio or dealing on 
behalf of its customers. 
As to foreign exchange, the CBJ sets out prudential rules on bank.s' management of 
their assets and liabilities in foreign exchange. Banks should have an investment policy 
approved and monitored by their boards of directors and supply the CBJ with a copy 
thereof The investment policy should cover the types of permitted investments, limits on 
foreign currencies' investments (currency, geographic distribution, economic sectors), 
concentration limits, daily and overnight positions, matching assets and liabilities in foreign 
currency, instruments susceptibility to interest rate risk as well as a "risk management 
policy related to investment, such as credit risk, market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, 
and legal risk".^^ 
C B J , Deposit Window Regulation No. (36/98) dated 28.2,1998; and C B J , Repurchase Agreements 
Regulation No. (136/98) dated 5.7.1998 and subsequent orders. 
C B J , Instructions for Managing Banks' Assets/Liabilities in Foreign Currencies, No. (32/2006) dated 
6.12.2006. Article Second. The Instructions replaced earlier Circular on the Management of A.S5;ets and 
Liabilities in Foreign Exchange No. (179/2000) dated 5.7.2000. 
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The CBJ allows the extension of direct credit facilities only to export economic 
entities^" and inserts limits on banks' open positions to major foreign currencies within a 
limit o f 5 percent o f their shareholders' equity per currency, while the total overnight 
position for all currencies is confined to 15 percent of shareholders' equity.^' Violations of 
these limits lead to the imposition of financial penalties.^^ Banks should have clear 
procedures, trained technicians as well as a back office to settle the transactions and a 
middle office to monitor client account that are independent f rom the treasury division and 
the trading room.^'^ Furthermore, the tasks of the middle office are listed in the instructions, 
which explain that this is done according to "international best practices". Finally, banks 
should supply the CBJ with monthly returns on their investments in foreign currency 
calculated on mark-to-market basis, and when not possible on mark-to-model basis.^'' The 
shortcoming in these instructions is that they apply only to banks in Jordan, which indicates 
that external branches of Jordanian banks wil l be subject only to the host country.^"^ 
The CBJ allows banks to manage client portfolios and investment funds in foreign 
currencies only as mediators and according to set prudential r u l e s . T h e board of directors 
should agree to a written policy on this regard that determines investment instruments, 
operational principles and controls and furnish the CBJ with a copy thereof Instruments 
may include derivatives provided that appropriate hedging takes place.'" Banks should 
separate client and proprietary accounts and are not aUowed to extend credit facilities to 
Ibid, Article Fourth ( I ) . 
" Ibid, Article Fourth (2/a). 
"^ C B J , Financial Penalties on the Breach of Credit Exposures in Foreign Exchange No. (23/2006) dated 
6.11.2005. 
'^ ^ Ibid, (n 89) Article Fifth. 
Ibid, Article Sixth (5). 
Ibid, Article Seventh. 
C B J , Instructions for Managing and Marketing Portfolios and Investment Funds in Foreign Currencies on 
behalf of Clients, No. (34/2007) dated 5.3.2007.^Article 13. 
Ibid, Articles 1 and 2. 
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fund investment portfolios, use their shares therein as collateral, or become counterparty in 
operations performed on behalf o f their customers.^** 
Banks may provide margin trading services in transferable foreign currencies and 
precious metals for their clients. These banks should adopt work policies and guidelines 
approved by their boards of directors.^^ They should also obtain from their customers a 
preliminary margin amounting at least to 15 percent of open positions' value. I f the margin 
decreases to below than 10 percent during trading, the customer should feed the account, 
and the position should be liquidated if the margin drops to below 5 percent. Banks 
under aU circumstances may not grant credit facilities to finance the m a r g i n . I n addition 
to the above, banks should supply the CBJ with daily foreign currency position statements. 
9.2.3. Liquidity Risk 
Section 36(b) of the Banking Law (2000) states that banks should maintain 
adequate liquidity to meet their business requirements, while Section 42(a/l) of the same 
law states that the CBJ is endowed with the authority to issue orders to set minimum limit 
for certain liquid assets to the total assets or .specific types of liabilities or assets. The CBJ 
approach has been to combine the traditional method of imposing regulatory requirements 
on liquidity ratio in addition of the method of constructing a maturity ladder. 
The CBJ instructs banks to maintain the liquid assets ratio o f 100 percent o f their 
total weighted liabilities calculated on a daily b a s i s . T h e assets are constituted of cash; 
net balances with the CBJ, local banks and other financial institutions; net balances with 
banks abroad; securities issued or guaranteed by the Jordanian Government; securities 
issued by the Jordanian Mortgage Refinancing Corporation; and triple A securities issued 
Ibid, Articles 3 and 14. 
C B J , Instructions for Margin Trading in Foreign Currencies and Major Precious Metals for the Benefit of 
their Clients, No. (31/2006) dated 18.10.2006, Arl\c\e 1. 
Ibid, Articles 2 and 4. 
Ibid, Articles 5. 
C B J , Liquidity Regulation No. (37/2007). dated 11.11.2007, Article Fir.st. 
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and guaranteed by foreign governments in their own local currencies which term to 
maturity is less than one year. The liabilities include, amongst others, 30% of total client 
deposits. It also covers 30 percent of Interbank deposits which term to maturity is more 
than one year. The weighted liability of Interbank deposits for less than one year are 
increased to 100 percent (as opposed to previous 50-75 percent ratio) in order to avoid 
liquidity risk emanating from banks' over reliance on short term funding from the Interbank 
market.'"^ 
The Instructions for Liquidity Based on the Maturity Ladder'"'' seeks to ensure that 
the inflows cover the outflows over particular time periods (1-7 days, eight days-one 
month, one month-three months, three months-six months, six months-one year and over 
one year). The net excess or deficit should be calculated for each specific period". The 
prudential returns should be submitted to the CBJ on a regular basis. 
9.2.4. Country Risk 
The CBJ has not adopted clear guidelines on country risk management with the 
exception of the Jordanian banks' branches in the Palestinian Territories, which are obliged 
to supply the CBJ with regular returns on their activities, sources of funds and exposures. 
There are further two occasional references to country risk in the CBJ regulations. First, the 
Exposures Limit Regulation states that Jordanian bank's cross border branches abroad 
"should take into consideration the risks of the country where it is established before 
extending credit and reflect that in its credit policy."'"^ Secondly, the CBJ requests f rom 
banks to supply investment policies on their management o f assets and liabilities on foreign 
"•^24 ' (2007) jVi ^ J i - ^ ' J j ^ j L ; ^ ^ j S ^ i 
C B J , Instructions for Liquidity Ba.sed on the Maturity Ladder No. (41/2008), dated 23.6.2008, which 
replaced earlier C B J , Circular No. (10/2/2/6641), dated 25.4.2000. 
C B J , Circular on Financial Statements in the Palestinian Territories, No. (7020/9760), dated 18.4,1995 and 
C B J , Circular on Financial Statements in the Palestinian Territories No. (10/7/7/9760). dated 22.4.1996. 
C B J , Ibid (n 55). Article Fourteenth(4). 
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exchange which includes "studies and proposals for developing the management of the 
bank's foreign currencies assets"."^^ 
9.2.5. Operational Risk 
The CBJ issued two regulations which cover operational risk. The first one is the 
Basel II: Operational Risk Regulation for year 2008 which quotes the definition of 
operational risk from the B C B S standards, as the risk resulting from failures in internal 
processes or external circumstances excluding strategic and reputational risks. Instead of 
regulating operational risk management, the latter CBJ regulation states that banks should 
adopt the B C B S 2003 document on 'Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision 
of Operational Risk' without providing any further rules or guidelines. This shortcoming in 
the C B J legislation is alarming. In 2003, six Jordanian banks were susceptible to substantial 
financial losses in what became known as the 'Facilities Case'. These banks extended credit 
to similar fraudsters who claimed they were fiinding projects for the benefit of the Jordan 
Intelligence Department. 
The other C B J regulation covers one particular type of operational risk; namely, the 
Business Continuity Plan Regulation'"^ which is influenced by international standards.'" 
This regulation obliges banks to adopt a business continuity plan defined as one "that 
ensures the resumption of the institution's operation, especially critical work, after a 
reasonable period of interruption of b u s i n e s s I t also contains principles that should be 
followed by banks. First, boards of directors and senior management must ensure that the 
business continuity plan is set up and properly implemented by the bank. They should also 
C B J , Ibid (n 89), Article(7) of the attachment. 
B C B S , Basel II , par. 644. 
National Security Court Decision on the Facilities Case for year 2003 as reproduced in Al Dust or. (July 11, 
2003), pp. 6-7. 
C B J , Business Continuity Plan Regulation No. (27/2006) dated 30.3.2006. 
''' The Joint Forum, High-level Principles for Business Continuity. (August, 2006). 
" - C B J , Ibid(n 110), Article 1(a). 
286 
allocate adequate resources and train personnel for this purpose. The second principle 
explains the four stages of the hfe cycle of the plan. The first stage is the business impact 
analysis which estimates potential losses emanating from expected and unexpected 
incidents. The second stage is risk assessment, which considers potential threats and their 
impact, prioritises actions to deal therewith, and provides gap analysis i.e. the comparison 
between the business objectives of the bank and the time required to resume its activities. 
The following stage is plan development, whereby banks distribute the plan internally and 
specify methods and procedures for quick recovery. The final stage is the development of 
the plan as well as the continuous testing, independent reviewing and updating thereof. 
Thirdly, the plan should contain principles on change control, training, data management, 
insurance poUcies and coordination with local authorities such as the police and civil 
defence. 
9.2,6. Compliance Risk 
The Banking Law (2000) states that boards of directors should adopt measures to 
ensure the compliance of their banks with any other legislation related to their activities."'' 
Banking supervisory instructions focused initially on compliance issues related to 
countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism."'' They were issued pursuant 
to Section 93(a) of the Banking Law (2000) which obliges banks to notify the CBJ if they 
suspect that certain transactions or payments are crime-related. In 2007, Jordan issued its 
first Anti-Money Laundering Law. It sets out the National Committee on Anti-Money 
Laundering under the chairmanship of the CBJ Governor, which main tasks are the 
formulation of general policies and monitoring their implementation."^ It also establishes 
an independent Anti-Money Laundering Unit within the C B J , which receives, analyses and 
processes reports on suspicious transactions."^ Furthermore, it imposes on Jordanian banks 
Banking Law (2000). Section 21(g). 
' C B J , Regulation on Anti-Money Laundering No. (10/2001) dated 5.8.2001 which was replaced by C B J , 
Regulations on Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing No. (29/2006) dated 28.5.2008. 
Anti-Money Laundering Law No. (46) for year 2007, Sections 5 and 6(a). 
'"^Ibid, Sections 7 and 8. 
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and their branches abroad the duty to exercise due diligence to identify their customers, 
avoid dealings with anonymous persons, and report suspicious transactions."^ The C B J 
iUustrates the duties of banks in its new regulation on money laundering issued in 2008,"^ 
according to which banks should adopt policies, processes and procedures on anti-money 
laundering and countering the finance of terrorism. It also establishes the role of the Money 
Laundering Reporting Officer, an upper management officer, whose main tasks are to 
receive information on suspicious transactions, report thereon, maintain their files and issue 
regular reports to the bank's board of directors."^ 
The first specialised Compliance Regulation for banks was issued in 2006,'"° and is 
heavily based on the B C B S standards. The regulation adopts a comprehensive definition of 
compliance risk, which encompasses "[rjisks of legal or regulatory sanctions, financial loss 
or loss to reputation a bank may suffer as result of failure to comply with laws, regulation, 
rules, codes of conduct, and sound banking practices applicable to its banking activities".'"' 
Like the B C B C standards, the CBJ regulation charges the board of directors with the duties 
of approving the compliance policy at the bank and evaluating its implementation.'"" The 
executive management sets out the compliance policy and communicates it throughout the 
bank, ensures that compliance measures are implemented as well as establishes a 
permanent compliance function independent from the internal audit procedures. It also 
draws a plan, on a yearly basis at least, whereby weaknesses in compliance and needed 
measures are identified.'"^ 
"^Ibid, Sections 13 and 14. 
C B J , Regulations on Anti-Money Laundering No. (42/2008) dated 3.7.2008. 
"'^  Ibid, Section 7. 
C B J , Compliance Regulation No. (33/2006) dated 26.12.2006. 
'-' Ibid, Article First (2). 
Ibid, Article Second (A). 
Ibid, Article Second (B/1-5). 
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The Compliance Regulation allows banks to establish a separate unit for 
compliance or, alternatively, allocate the compliance function to employees from various 
departments.'^^ Yet, it provides for adequate safeguards to ensure its independence. The 
compliance function should appear on the organisational structure of the bank and have its 
own work guidelines. There should be an adequate number of educated and trained 
employees in the compliance unit or function as well. The compliance staff should also be 
empowered to contact other employees, have access to documents, as well as, request 
assistance from the banks' specialists such as lawyers and external parties provided that 
confidentiality is maintained. In addition, the compliance head/ function should be able to 
report directly to the board of directors or to the compliance committee. Furthermore, 
compliance employees should not be assigned any tasks that may I conflict with their 
roles.'^^ In practice, Jordanian banks had to separate the compliance function from the 
wider risk function. Some Jordanian banks resorted to establishing a compliance unit 
compri.sed of a money laundering reporting officer who is specialised in suspicious 
financial transactions, as well as, the new compliance staff.'"^ Finally, banks should supply 
the CBJ with their compliance plan as well as details on compliance structure and staff. '"^  
9.3. The Public-Private Partnership 
9.3.1. Internal Controls 
The previous section illustrated how the Jordanian law provided for internal 
controls on risk management and the segregation of duties between front, middle and bank 
offices in investment activities; between customers and proprietary foreign exchange 
accounts as well as internal audit and compliance functions. The Banking Law (2000) and 
the CBJ Regulation on Internal Control Systems issued in 2006 covers the other aspects of 
internal controls in line with the B C B S 1998 document 'Framework for Internal Control 
Ibid, Article Fourth (4). 
Ibid, Article Second (B/6). 
The researcher is indebted to Mr. Jamal Mizher of the Compliance Unit at the Housing Bank for his useful 
remarks. 
Ibid (n 120), Article Fourth (1)(3). 
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Systems in Banking', which provide, amongst other, for rules on management oversight, 
internal audit function, and sound information systems and management. 
As to management oversight, the board of directors is charged with the 
responsibility of choosing competent management, assessing their performance and 
monitoring the effectiveness of their implementation of internal controls.'"^ It also approves 
of the budget, the bank's strategies and policies, the organisational structures and codes of 
conduct; determines the functions of units, delegates authorities; forms committees as weU 
as issues internal regulations to achieve financial and administrative control.'^^ 
Furthermore, the board reviews the reports of the supervisory authorities, external and 
internal auditors and internal committees and follows up the implementation of requested 
corrective measures.'^° FinaUy, it adopts measures to ensure that the CBJ is supplemented 
with accurate information.'^' 
The executive management is charged with the following responsibilities:'"" 
developing and reviewing strategies and policies; setting up work procedures that define, 
measure, and control risk; preparing financial statements and the budget and reporting to 
the board of directors on its implementation; proposing internal control policies to the 
board of directors and following up their implementation; and generally ensuring the 
effective implementation of the internal control system. The executive management should 
also ensure that the supervisors and auditors are supplied with needed information. The 
bank's annual report should contain a statement on internal controls as well. In addition, the 
executive management should enhance the integrity and professionalism of their employees 
as well as develop and distribute a code of conduct throughout the bank. Finally, they need 
to draw up a comprehensive organisational structure of the bank and detailed job 
descriptions. The organisational structure should ensure the dual supervision of all 
Banking Law (2000), Section 21(b) and C B J , Ibid (n 51), Article Second (4)(7). 
'"'^  Banking Law (2000), Section 21(h) and C B J Ibid (n 51), Article Second (2)(3). 
Ibid (n 51), Article Second (5). 
Banking Law (2000), Section 21(f). 
C B J , Ibid (n 51). Article Third. 
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activities, the segregation between conflicting responsibilities and conformity with the CBJ 
instructions.'"" 
The internal audit function should be assumed by the auditing committee and the 
internal audit unit. An auditing committee should be established in every bank by the board 
of directors and be comprised of a chairman and two non-executive board members.'^'' It 
assumes seven major responsibilities: it monitors the external audit operations and 
coordinates the relationship between any multiple external auditors; examines the 
observations of the CBJ and the external auditor and adopted measures in this regard; 
reviews the internal audit annual plan and the observations of the external auditor thereon 
as well as the measures adopted consequently by the bank; reviews the financial statements 
of the bank with particular focus the classification of debts and the adequacy of collateral; 
ensures the adequacy of accounting and risk control procedures; ascertains the bank's 
compliance with the law and the C B J instructions; and performs the tasks assigned thereto 
by the board of directors.' ^^  
The auditing committee submits regular reports to the board of directors and works 
under its supervision during its tenure.'"*^ ' It meets at least once quarterly and when the need 
arises, upon the request of its chairman or two of its members.'" The head of the internal 
audit department attends the meetings, and the committee may invite other persons to 
consult with them. The board of directors also determines the committee members' 
remuneration.'^^ 
Ibid, Article Fourth. 
'^ ^ Banking Law (2000), Section 32(a). 
Ibid, Section 32(a/l-7). 
Ibid, Section 32(b). 
Ibid, Section 33(a). 
Ibid, Section 33(c). 
'•^ ^ Ibid, Section 33(e). 
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Banks should establish well resourced internal audit unit/administration which 
covers the activities and operations of the bank.'''" It is responsible for setting out the 
Internal Audit Charter which spells out administrative powers, tasks and methodologies, as 
well as, the internal audit work procedures according to best international standards. It also 
prepares the annual audit plan which needs to cover the risk management unit and other 
major units of the bank and the annual report. In addition, it adopts procedures to follow up 
the observations in auditing and supervisory reports and customers complaints. 
Banks should have financial and accounting systems.'"" The systems should ensure 
the swift recording of financial transactions, organised book keeping, and necessary backup 
to ensure the continuity of operations. Banks should have procedures on the selection of 
financial and accounting systems and qualified personnel as well. Banks should also have 
regular auditing procedures and supervisory systems to ascertain that the transactions are 
duly executed and recorded. 
The C B J requires that banks' internal control systems ascertain the integrity of 
information management and the related technology infrastructure.'"" This includes the 
formulation of an information management strategy, processes and procedures. They 
should also establish an organisational structure including a Steering Committee 
responsible for the proper management of their information system and proper control of 
information technology-related risks. They should formulate as well a Code of Conduct of 
Information Security and Protection and spread awareness thereof amongst their 
employees. Furthermore, they should enhance their information and technology related 
systems in light of supervisory notes, and external and internal audit reports. Banks need to 
establish controls to ensure the effectiveness and competency of their information 
technology infrastructure and application programmes prior to their operation, when 
developments or alterations take place and on a regular basis. Controls should also provide 
" " C B J , Ibid (n 51), Article Fifth. 
Ibid, Article Eighth. 
Ibid, Article Ninth. 
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data protection, ensure the integrity of services provided to customers, as well as, 
continuously validate and backup information entered, extracted or treated electronically.'''^ 
9.3.2. External Auditors 
The Jordanian Law generally meets the requirements of the B C B S on the external 
auditor. The general assembly of the bank, like other listed companies,''''* elects the auditor 
and determines his/her remuneration or authorises the board of directors to undertake the 
latter task.'''^ Banks, however, should select the external auditor from a list of approved 
auditors provided annually by the CBJ.''*^ Should a bank faU to appoint an auditor for a 
period of four months as of the commencement of its fiscal year, the CBJ may appoint an 
auditor on the bank's expense.'''^ The C B J might also appoint an additional auditor on the 
expense of the bank if unsatisfied with the results of the bank's auditing.'''*' The bank's audit 
committee should approve of the external auditor before signing an agreement herewith.'''^ 
The bank should also sign an 'engagement letter' which states that the external auditor will 
provide the board of directors with reports illustrating observed weaknesses in internal 
controls or the accounting system; verify the information submitted thereto by the bank; 
and supply the CBJ with copies of all the reports submitted to the bank.'^ '^  
The Jordanian Law provides for a number of safeguards to ensure the integrity and 
professionalism of external auditors. Most significantly, auditors must be certified by the 
Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants, which can be obtained if the auditor 
obtains academic degrees and professional training.'^' Auditors are also under a duty of 
professional confidentiality'^" although they are exempt from this duty in their relationship 
with the CBJ.'^^ Furthermore, the auditor should not work as a trader, or become a partner 
or a shareholder in the company he audits. He also may not participate in the foundation 
committee of the company, become a member of its board of directors, be a partner with 
one of its board of directors or undertake a permanent or consultative work therein.'^ "* In 
addition, he is not allowed to take loans or guarantee loans extended by the bank or one of 
its subsidiaries,'^^ or speculate in the company's shares.'^^ In order to ensure the 
'"^  Further details are provided in the C B J , E-banking Practices Regulation No. (8/2001) dated 26.7.2001; 
C B J , Electronic Money Transfer Regulation No. (20/2004) dated 13.9.2004; and C B J , E-banking Risk 
Management Principles Circular No. (10/1/3344) dated 21.3.2005. 
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independence of the auditor, the law requires that banks may not change the external 
auditor during the financial year and should rotate the external auditor at least once every 
four years.'^^ Finally, the auditors' fees must be disclosed.'^'^ 
The external auditors must audit the annual and biannual financial statements of the 
bank'^ ^ according to best international standards. The external auditors'^'' should also 
supply the CBJ with a copy of the annual report and a certificate on their opinion 
specifically on doubtful debts and the adequacy of the bank's provisions as well as any 
information on the financial position of the bank. Another important obligation of the 
auditors is to inform the C B J immediately of any adverse developments in the financial 
position of the bank or any violations committed the directors or administrators of the bank 
Accountancy Profession Law No. (73) for year 2003, Section 30, Law of Companies Section 106. 
'•'•'^  Law of Companies, Sections 171 (a) and 192. 
""' Banking Law (2000), Section 61(a). 
Ibid, Section 61(b). 
Ibid, Section 61(c), 
Ibid (n 51), Article Seventh(2), 
Ibid (n 51), Article Seventh(l). 
Accountancy Profession Law No. (73) for year 2003, Section 21. 
Ibid, Section 27(b) and Law of Companies, Section 202. 
Banking Law (2000), Section 74(a). 
'^ ^ Council of Ministers, Practicing Professional Accountancy Bylaw No. (7) for year 2006, Article 4(b)(I)(J). 
Banking Law (2000), Section 96. 
Law of Companies, Section 203. 
'^ ^ Accountancy Profession Law No. (73) for year 2003, Sections 32 and 33. 
J S C , Instructions of Issuing Companies Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards for year 2004 
Article 4(16). 
'"^"^  Law of Companies, Sections 141 and 142. 
"''^  Banking Law (2000). Section 61(a). 
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or any of its subsidiaries. Finally, they should examine the internal auditing and internal 
controls of the bank in general and provide their recommendations accordingly. 
9.3.3. Accountancy 
The Banking Law (2000) requires banks to maintain records of their operations and 
organise their accounts according to "recognised accounting principles""'' being defined as 
these of the Board of International Accounting Standards.'^^ The C B J requests banks to 
supply various financial returns, most significantly, the bank should supply the C B J with its 
certified consolidated annual and semi annual financial statements supplied with the 
income statement, cash flow and clarifications.'^^ The statements should be signed by the 
chair of the board of directors or the regional manager in the case of foreign banks.'^ The 
financial statements should be prepared on a solo basis for the Jordanian branches and on a 
consolidated basis for the banks branches and subsidiaries inside and outside Jordan. 
Investments in companies which are not consolidated should be deducted from capital and 
be counted for when measuring capital against market risk.'^ "^ Finally, banks should publish 
their financial statements as well as disclose significant information that might influence 
the company's profits, .securities' prices or financial position.'^^ 
The CBJ instructs banks'^^ to set out written procedures that guarantee that records 
are maintained safely, confu-m the high quality of information presented to supervisors and 
provide rules on the selection of the suitable financial and accounting systems. The records 
should also be subject to regular auditing and be supervised internally to ascertain that the 
Ibid, Section 61 (a/2). 
JSC, Insu-uctions of Issuing Companies Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing for year 2004, Article 14. 
C B J , Circular on Financial Statements No. (10/1/11141) dated 12.11.2007, /Glides I , 2 and 3. 
Ibid, Article 4. 
Ibid, Article 9. 
'"' 'JSC, Ibid (n 162), Article 8. 
C B J , Ibid (n 51), Article Eighth. 
295 
bank's transactions are compliant with legislation and internal work guidelines, executed by 
authorised employees and well-documented. 
9.3.4. Corporate Governance 
Chapter 4 examined how corporate governance rules were initially set out by the 
O E C D then were adopted and reframed by the B C B S standards for banking supervisory 
purposes. This is understandable since corporate governance is mainly concerned with the 
availability of adequate infrastructure corporate law, which falls beyond the scope of the 
banking supervisory authority. Similarly, the C B J regulations focus on banking-specific 
issues related to banking as will be examined below. It is sufficient here to mention that the 
Law of Companies and the Jordan Securities Law No. (76) for year 2002 provide for 
substantial rules on the protection of shareholders' rights, the equitable treatment of 
shareholders, the protection of stakeholders' rights including creditors, di.sclosure and board 
responsibilities. This is not to negate that there are specific shortcomings,'^** most 
significantly, shareholders do not have the right on voting on the selling of substantia] 
assets unless it mounts to the selling of the whole company. The Law also does not provide 
for pre-emptive rights for shareholders in public shareholding companies. Furthermore, the 
law does not give minority shareholders withdrawal right i.e. the right of a shareholder to 
force his company to buy his/her shares when certain significant changes occur in the 
company. Finally, the law does not give stakeholders the right to participate in the general 
shareholders' meeting. 
The first attempt of the CBJ to promote a culture of sound corporate governance 
amongst bank took place 2000, when it circulated the B C B S document 'Enhancing 
Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations' issued earlier in 1999. The C B J issued in 
2004 the 'Bank Director's Handbook of Corporate Governance' which elaborated on the 
significance of corporate governance. It also provided guidance on directors' standards. 
See generally: I M F and World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes ( R O S O -
Corporate Governance Country Assessment: Jordan. (June, 2004). 
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management selection and oversight, planning and policy as well as internal audit and 
control.'^'^ 
In 2007, the C B J issued the 'Corporate Governance Code for Banks in Jordan'. The 
Code illustrates clearly that it "draws upon international best practice, in particular the 
O E C D Principles of Corporate Governance and the guidance issued by the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision".'^*^ It requires banks to have their own codes of 
conduct provided that they contain the minimum requirements provided therein,'^' and 
which are divided into the following pillars: 
The first pillar is commitment to corporate governance, which is achieved by 
compiling a code on corporate governance and publishing an updated version thereof in the 
Internet. Banks should also make public annual reports on their compliance with the Code. 
Furthermore, banks should establish a corporate governance committee comprised of the 
chairman of its board of directors and two non-executive directors. 
The second pillar is the functions of the board of directors, which has many aspects 
thereto. First, this pillar confirms the duties of the board of directors to monitor the 
financial soundness and operations of the bank and ensure that the interests of shareholders 
and stakeholders (including the CBJ) are maintained, while stressing that directors shall 
take into account the whole interest of the bank not that of a particular shareholder. 
Secondly, it stresses that the board of directors should be comprised of both executive and 
at least three non-executive members. It is noteworthy that the Law of Companies does not 
have an equivalent rule, but the Banking Law (2000) assumes that the board should have 
two non-executive members to serve in the audit committee.'^^ Thirdly, the pillar 
emphasises on the duty of the chairman to ascertain that corporate governance rules are 
followed. It calls for the segregation between the positions of the chairman and the general 
C B J , Bank Director's Handbook of Corporate Governance for year 2004, pp. 9 and footnote 1. 
'™ C B J , Corporate Governance Code for Banks in Jordan for year 2007, pp. 5. 
Ibid, pp. 5. 
Section 32(a). 
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manager, or at least, appointing a non-executive deputy chairman. The last requirement, 
however, contradicts the following Section 152(c) of the Law of Companies: 
"The chairman of the board of directors of a public shareholding company or any member 
thereof may be appointed as the company general manager or as his assistant or deputy by a 
decision issued by a two-thirds majority vote of the board members...". 
It follows that if a bank selects executives to the positions of the chairman and deputy 
chairman, the C B J should not impose sanctions on the bank. Therefore, the CBJ can only 
rely on its moral persuasion. 
The third pillar is that the Code should provide rules on the board of directors' 
conduct of activities. Most importantly, they should allow directors and their committees to 
have direct access to executive management as well as to external resources. It should also 
approve the appointment of senior executives especially the ones responsible for finance 
and internal auditing as well as set out senior executives' succession plans. In addition, it 
should conduct an annual self-as.sessment and evaluate the general manager. Finally, the 
bank should maintain the integrity of its operations and issues a code of conduct for this 
purpose that defines and controls insider dealing and conflict of interest. 
The fourth pillar relates to the board committees. The bank's code should provide 
for transparent rules on the nomination, objectives, functions and tenure of the bank's 
committees, which include the audit committee, the nomination and remuneration 
committee and the risk management committee. The fifth pillar covers the control 
environment. The handbook hereby stresses the importance of setting out and reviewing the 
bank's internal controls, internal audit, external audit, risk management and compliance 
functions. The fifth pillar covers the treatment of shareholders. Banks are called to 
encourage shareholders, including minority shareholders, to exercise their rights to 
participate in the meetings of the general assembly and vote on its decisions, including the 
election of the external auditor and the board of directors. It also calls the chairmen of 
board committees to attend general assemblies in addition to the external auditor. The 
proceeding of the general assemblies and related documents should also be made available 
to shareholders. The sixth pillar is transparency and disclosure, which covers the disclosure 
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of financial statements, providing shareholders with meaningful information on the 
activities of the bank, as well as, disclosing information to the market including 
'management discussion and analysis' reports on the current and future operations of the 
bank. 
9.4. Capital Adequacy 
Rules on own capital and capital adequacy have always been central to the CBJ's 
efforts to maintain the stability of the banking system. The current own capital requirement 
is 40m. JDs for Jordanian banks ad 20m. JDs. for branches of foreign banks. In addition, 
banks should deduct 10 percent of their net profits to the compulsory reserves account until 
it mounts to the subscribed capital.'^ "^ They also may not distribute profits before they cover 
their incorporation expenses and write off their losses.'^ "^ The CBJ also sets out rules on the 
capital adequacy of banks, it initially focused on the implementation of the leverage ratio 
(debt to equity) then started to apply the risk weighting of assets approach of the B C B S in 
the 1990s. The CBJ stiU applies the leverage ratio, currently set at 6 percent, in parallel 
with the B C B S standards.'" 
9.4.1. The Implementation of the Capital Accord 
The Banking Law (2000) obliges banks to comply with the regulatory capital 
requirements set out by the C B J to maintain their capital adequacy.''^ The law also 
provides that banks should comply with the limits set out by the C B J on "ratios applicable 
to its assets, risk weighted assets, components of capital, reserves and off-balance sheet 
accounts".'^^ It therefore confurns the status quo authority of the C B J to apply the B C B S 
Banking Law (2000), Section 62(a). 
Ibid, Section 62(b). 
C B J , Minimum Own Capital for Banks in Jordan No. (17/2003) dated 20.8.2003, Article First (a) and 
Second. 
Banking Law (2(X)0), Section 36(a) read together with the definition of regulatory capital in Section 2 of 
same law. 
Ibid, Section 41(a). 
299 
method of calculating capital adequacy without ruling out additional methods. The CBJ had 
already introduced major elements of the B C B S Capital Accord into domestic law as 
discussed in the previous chapter. It was later amended by virtue of the Capital Adequacy 
Circular of 1997'^ ^ and subsequent regulations,'^^ which applied the capital adequacy ratio 
of 12 percent of risk weighted assets against credit risk only. In 2002, the C B J incorporated 
market risk in its capital adequacy r a t i o i n line with the amendment of the Basel Capital 
Accord. These regulations were again combined and replaced by the Regulatory Capital 
and Capital Adequacy Regulation No. 16/2003 dated 9.6.2003. 
Under the latter regulation, the capital adequacy ratio continued to be set at 12 
percent of risk weighted assets (on and off-balance sheet) against both credit and market 
risks. The components of capital were divided into three categories according to the Capital 
Accord. First, the Core Capital (Tier 1) which was constituted of paid up capital and 
disclosed reserves including retained earnings and share premiums. Secondly, 
Supplementary Capital (Tier 2), which should not exceed the Core Capital, covered 
undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions/ general loan loss reserves, 
hybrid debt capital instruments, and subordinated debt instruments. It is worth noting that 
the Regulation did not provide rules on the eligibility of hybrid debt capital instruments, 
while it required that subordinated debt should have a minimum original fixed term to 
maturity of over five and not be guaranteed by the bank's assets. Finally, subordinated debt 
may not exceed 50 percent of the Core Capital, while general provisions were subject to the 
limit of 1.25% of risk weighted assets. Thirdly, banks were allowed to issue short-term 
subordinated debt to meet their capital adequacy requirements against market risk (Tier 3) 
within the same 250% limit of the Core Capital that was not required to support credit risk. 
Eligible short-term subordinated debt should have an original maturity of no less than two 
years, be unsecured and fully paid-up, and not repayable before maturity date except with 
™ C B J , Circular on Capital Adequacy No. (10/4/7/1610) dated 21.1.1997. 
'™ C B J , Regulatory Capital and Capital Adequacy Regulation No. (3/2000) dated 5.12.2000, and Capital 
Adequacy Regulation No. (11/2001) dated 11.12.2001. 
C B J , Capital Adequacy Ratio Incorporating Market Risk Circular No. (10/14642) dated 11.9.2002. 
B C B S , Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks. (January, 1996), par. 2, pp. 7. 
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the approval of the CBJ. The Regulation, however, did not meet the B C B S requirement that 
the debt should "be subject to a lock-in clause which stipulates that neither interest nor 
principal may be paid (even at maturity) if such payment means that the bank falls below or 
remains below its minimum capital requirement".'^' 
The regulation resembled the Capital Accord in its other aspects. First, it deducted 
goodwill and holdings in unconsolidated subsidiaries engaged in banking and financial 
activities from the capital. It also applied the same measurement method of the Capital 
Accord to credit risk as it allocated all claims to five risk categories. The major difference 
was that a higher 70 percent ratio was assigned to loans completely secured by residential 
mortgage (as opposed to the minimal 50 percent ratio under the Capital Accord). Likewise, 
the nominal principal amounts of off-balance-sheet items were multiplied by specified 
conversion factors ranging from 100 percent risk conversion factors for items serving as 
substitutes for loans to zero percent conversion factor to commitments which could be 
cancelled unconditionally. In addition, the calculation of market risk adopted the 
standardised method of the 1996 amendment to the Capital Accord. It was based on 
measuring the items of market risk separately then summing them. It also distinguished 
between risks resulting from movements in broad risk factors and specific risks associated 
with individual positions. Risk categories covered interest rate position risk for debt 
instruments, equity position risk for equity instrument and foreign exchange risk on the 
bank's level. Special rules on the treatment of derivatives including options were also set 
out. Unlike the Capital Accord, there were no special rules on the treatment for risks arising 
from commodities. Finally, a minimum of about 28'/2 of market risks needed to be 
supported by Tier 1 capital. 
9.4.2. The Implennentation of Basel II 
The CBJ exercised extensive effort for the preparation of the regulations needed for 
the transposition of Basel 11 into Jordan. The Basel II Task Force comprised of members 
from both the C B J and private banks was established for the purpose of setting out an 
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implementation road map. The CBJ issued in 2006 its proposed two-phases plan,'*" which 
stated that the beginning of 2008 was the starting date for the adoption o f the Standardised 
Approach for both credit risk and market risk, and the Main Indicator Approach for 
operational risk. The CBJ also imposed on banks to start an experimental implementation 
in 2007 as well as appoint an expert member o f staff to become its contact person with the 
CBJ. The second phase is planned to start in 2012, whereby banks should apply the 
foundation IRB approach to credit risk and the Standardised Approach to operational risk. 
The CBJ has adhered to its drawn plan and accordingly issued the following seven 
regulations in 2008 after prolonged consultations with banks. 
9.4.2.1. Basel I I : Scope of Application 
This document looks first into the institutional scope of Basel 11."^^ It states that it 
applies to all Jordanian banks on a consolidated basis. Banks are requested accordingly to 
prepare their capital adequacy statements on the whole group including any holding or 
subsidiary financial companies with the exception of insurance companies as well as on a 
sub-consolidated basis for branches in Jordan, branches in Jordan and abroad and 
subsidiary banks. Temporary holdings in financial companies (for trading purposes or as a 
repayment of debt) are not consolidated for capital adequacy purposes. Likewise, minority 
equity shares do not count unless the articles of association and the board of directors of 
such company both confirm that the minority shares are available for the bank or banking 
group.'*"* While Basel I I requires the deduction only o f significant investments in financial 
companies and banks, the Regulation deducts all investments in aU banks and investments 
exceeding 10 percent in non-deposit taking financial companies and provided that the 
eligible 10 percent have a 100 percent risk weighting. In addition, investments in non-
financial companies that exceed 10 percent of the subscribed capital of the acquiring bank 
for individual investments or 50 percent o f the acquiring bank in case of aggregate 
CBJ, The Central Bank of Jordan Plan for the Implementation o f Basel I I . Circular No. (10/2/3/3/12315) 
dated 27.12.2006. 
CBJ, Basel I I Regulation: Scope of Application for year 2008, Article First. 
Ibid, Annex on Bank/Company Board of Directors Approval. 
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investments shall all be deducted provided that consobdated holdings bear 100 percent risk 
weighting at least. 
The Regulation also retains most of the above-mentioned Regulatory Capital and 
Capital Adequacy Regulation No. (16/2003) on the components and limits of capital 
adequacy rules. The broad similarities are due to the fact that Basel I I itself carries 
forward the rules o f the Capital Accord on this regard. The major difference in the new 
Jordanian regulation is that it prescribes the elements of eligible hybrid capital instruments, 
which should be subordinated, unsecured and fuUy paid-up, and not redeemed at the 
initiative of the holder. The regulation, however, mistakenly added the lock in clause as a 
further requirement for hybrid instruments'^^ although it is a requirement for Tier 3 
instruments.'^^ The lock in clause was actually repeated again as an eligibibty requirement 
for Tier 3 instruments. 
9.4.2.2. Credit Risk 
1. Individual Claims 
The Basel I I : Credit Ri.sk-the Standardised Approach Regulation assigns risk 
weights to credit risk exposures in the banking book, determined according to the type of 
borrower. Below is a comparison between the CBJ regulation and Basel I I . 
Ibid. Article Second. 
Tiie text of the Regulation could be a mistranslation of the requirement that "although the capital 
instrument may carry an obligation to pay interest that cannot permanently be reduced or waived (unlike 
dividends on ordinary shareholders' equity), it should allow service obligations to be deferred (as with 
cumulative preference shares) where the profitabil i ty o f the bank would not support payment". Source: BCBS, 
Basel W, annex 1(a), para, d 
BCBS, Basel I I , main text par. 49(xiv). 
Table 3: Comparison between Credit Risk Weights in 
Basel I I and the C B J Regulations 
Borrower Risk Weight 
Claims on 
sovereigns 
- The CBJ applies the same credit ratings of Basel 11. 
- The risk weighting for exposures to the Jordanian Government and the CBJ 
denominated in the domestic currency is 0%. 
- Country risk scores might be identified by accredited export credit agencies which 
should correspond to the scores set out by Basel I I . 
- Claims on the BIS, the European Central Bank and the European Community, the 
International Monetary Fund and the Arab Monetary Fund receive a 0% credit risk 
weigh, which is permissible under Basel I I for the first four institutions. 
PSEs - The CBJ applies the proposed simplif ied standardised approach of Basel I I . 
Multi lateral 
development 
banks 
- The CBJ assigns a zero risk weighting to a list of multilateral development banks 
similar to the list provided by Basel I I and reserves the right to add further banks to 
the list. 
Claims on 
banks and 
securities 
f i rms 
- The difference is that the CBJ differentiates between short claims in foreign 
exchange and those in the Jordan Dinar; the latter type, by exception, is subject the 
min imum flat rate of 20% of risk weighted assets. 
Claims on 
corporates 
- The CBJ applies the same weights under Basel 11 for lending to corporates in 
general. 
- A n innovative sub-category for lending to SPEs is created under the standardised 
approach.. 
Retail 
portfol io 
- The CBJ requires that exposures meet the criteria of Basel I I and be subject to its 
maximum exposure l imi t o f 75 percent. 
Claims 
secured by 
property 
- Claims secured by commercial property are subject to 100 percent risk weight 
similarly to the ratio set by Basel I I . 
- A preferential treatment of 35 percent is granted for residential property according 
to Basel I I . The CBJ, however, imposes additional requirements for the concession, 
mainly, that the property is owned by individual(s) and that the loan does not 
exceed 80 percent of the estimated or purchase value of the property whichever is 
less. 
Past due loans - The CBJ applies identical risk weightings to the ones provided for under Basel I I . 
Higher-risk 
categories 
- The CBJ applies the 150% risk weighting for the four higher risk categories under 
Basel I I . 
- The CBJ adds credit extended to venture capital, subordinated debt and most 
overdrafts. 
Other assets - The CBJ assigns a zero risk weighting to ca.sh and gold bullion similar to the 
BCBS rules. It treats banks' deposits at foreign branches and compulsory reserves 
at the CBJ as cash. 
- Cash in collection and standards risk weights are treated similarly to Basel 11. 
- Loans refinanced by the Jordan Mortgage Refinancing Company are assigned 20 
percent risk weight. 
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As to off-balance sheet items, they are converted into credit exposures by 
multiplying them by credit conversion factors closely modeled on Basel I I as illustrated 
below: 
Table 4: Comparison between OfT-balance Sheet Conversion Factors 
in Basel II and the C B J Regulations 
Basel II C B J Regulations 
Commitments with a maximum original maturity of one year: (20%) Similar treatment 
Commitments with an original maturity exceeding one year: (50%) Similar treatment 
Commitments which are unconditionally cancellable by the bank 
without prior notification, or which effectively provide for automatic 
cancellation because the borrower's credit worthiness has deteriorated: 
(0%) 
Similar treatment 
Direct credit substitutes such as acceptances and general guarantees of 
indebtedness (including standby letters of credit which provide 
financial guarantees for securities and loans): (100%) 
Similar treatment 
Asset sales with recourse and sale and repurchase agreements, 
whereby the bank bears the credit risk: (100%). 
Similar treatment 
The lending of banks' securities or banks' posting of securities as 
collateral: (100%) 
Similar treatment 
Forward deposits, forward asset purchases, as well as, partly-paid 
shares and securities: (100%) 
Similar treatment 
Specific transaction-related contingent items (such as performance 
bonds, warranties and bid bonds: (50%) 
Similar treatment 
Revolving underwriting facilities and note issuance faciHties (50%) Not provided for. 
Self-liquidating short-term trade letters of credit arising from the 
movement of goods such documentary credits collateralised by the 
underlying shipment: (20%) 
Similar treatment. Short 
term letters of credits are 
ones less than 180 days. 
2. Specialised Lending 
Chapter 3 showed that Basel I I introduced a sub-category within corporate lending 
to cover the higher risks of lending to SPEs. Although Basel 11 created this category only 
for countries applying the IRB approach, the CBJ opted for applying the same rules under 
the standardised approach. The CBJ issued in 2008 its Basel I I : Specialised Lending 
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Regulation for this purpose. This regulation applies the same four categories and definitions 
for SPEs; namely, project finance, object finance, commodities fmance, income-producing 
real estate and high-volatility commercial real estate. It assigns a 100 percent risk weighting 
for all categories except for the last one as it is carries a 150 percent risk category. 
3. Credit Rating 
Sound credit rating is essential for the application of Basel I I . The CBJ, therefore, 
issued its Basel I I : External Credit Rating Assessment in 2008.'^^ This regulation states that 
banks should rely on ratings issued by credit rating agencies approved by the CBJ. This 
covers Standard and Poor's, Moody's, Fitch and any other agency approved by the CBJ 
according to set criteria.'*^ The criteria are also based on the Basel I I guidelines: the credit 
agency should meet the standards of objectivity, independence, disclosure, resources and 
c r e d i b i l i t y . I t is noteworthy that Jordan issued its first Law on the licensing and 
regulation o f credit information bureaus in 2003, yet there has been no company registered 
yet."^' 
4. Credit Risk Mitigation 
The Basel I I : Credit Risk Mitigations Regulation sets out comprehensive guidehnes 
on the treatment of C R M according to Basel I I . It states that i f a bank does not meet the 
requirements of eligibility, the CRM shall not be counted as a mitigant or the minimum 
capital adequacy requirement wi l l be otherwise increased.'"^^ 
CBJ, Basel I I : External Credit Rating Assessment for year 2008, Article First (3). 
'"'^  Ibid, Article Second (1)(2). 
' ' ' " Ib id . Annex I . 
' '" Credit Information Law No. (82) for year 2003. 
CBJ, Basel I I : Credit Risk Mitigation Regulation for year 2008, Art icle 1(6). 
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Table 5: Comparison between Risk Mitigation in CBJ Regulations and Basel II 
Item The Comparison 
1. Collateral 
Approaches The CBJ Regulation and Basel I I adopt similar approaches: banks may use 
either the simple or the comprehensive approach in the banking book, while 
the comprehensive approach is used in the trading book. Partial 
collateralisation is allowed, while maturity mismatch is permitted under the 
comprehensive approach only. 
Requirements of 
eligibility 
All collateral under the CBJ regulations must meet the minimum list of 
requirements under Basel I I . 
Instruments 
eligible as 
collateral 
The CBJ provides a list of instruments for recognition as collateral under the 
simple and comprehensive approaches similar to the ones provided under 
Basel I I . 
The simple 
approach 
The definition, minimum conditions and risk weights provided by the CBJ 
Regulation are modeled on Basel 11. 
The 
comprehensive 
approach 
The CBJ adopts the same definition of this approach as that of Basel I I . A 
major difference is that Basel 11 allows banks to either implement the haircuts 
set out under Basel II or apply their own estimates, while the CBJ regulation 
imposes the BCBS haircuts only. 
2. On-balance sheet netting 
General rule Banks under both the CBJ Regulation and Basel II may calculate capital 
requirements on the basis of net credit exposures according to similar 
conditions. 
3. Guarantees and Credit derivatives 
Method Basel I I allows the standardised approach and the internal rating based 
approach, while the CBJ Regulation covers the standardised approach only. 
Requirements Guarantees and credit derivatives under the CBJ Regulation must meet the 
requirements provided for under Basel 11. 
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9.4.2.3. Operational Risk 
The Basel I I : Operational Risk Regulation is a short regulation which adopts the 
same definition o f operational risk as that of Basel I I . It also applies the basic indicator 
approach for measuring operational risk whereby the income of a bank for the previous 
three years is multiplied by 15 percent. Banks may alternatively move to applying the more 
advanced standardised approach with the prior approval o f the CBJ. The regulation, 
however, does not provide any guidelines on the application of the latter standard. In 
addition, the regulation states that banks should adhere to the BCBS standards on 
Operational Risk o f 2003, without further illustration. 
9.4.2.4. Market Risk 
The Basel I I : Market Risk Regulation issued by the CBJ in 2008 introduces the 
Basel I I standards into Jordanian law. This regulation adopts the Basel I I definition of 
market risk as the risk of losses in positions arising from adverse movements in market 
prices and encompasses interest rate risk and equity position risk in the trading book as weU 
as foreign exchange risk and commodities risk throughout the bank. The definition of the 
trading book also covers instruments held for trading and hedging purposes. The Jordanian 
regulation similarly adopts the Basel I I definitions of instruments and positions but clarifies 
that short term positions are 90 days or less.'^ "* In addition, the regulation incorporates the 
prudent valuation guidelines of Basel 11.'^'' Finally, OTC derivatives and repo style 
instruments are charged against counterparty credit risk.'^^ 
As to the method of measuring market risk, the CBJ applies only the standardised 
approach of Basel I I . Accordingly, the CBJ regulation provides for separate capital charges 
against the following risks: 
CBJ, Basel I I : Market Risk Regulation for year 2008, Article 1(1)(4). 
Ibid, Articles 7 and 8. 
Ibid, Article 16. 
508 
1- Interest rate risk, whereby eligible instruments are identified according to Basel I I . 
Then the general risks are calculated according to the 'maturity method' (one of two 
methods recommended by the BCBS) then added to the specific interest rate risk. 
The capital charge is calculated according to Basel I I as weU.'^^ 
2- Banks should hold capital against general and specific equity position risk. The 
capital charge is 8 percent only as the CBJ does not provide for the 4 percent 
concession for liquid and weU-diversified portfolios.'^^ 
3- The CBJ applies the 'shorthand approach' (as opposed to the 'internal model 
approach') of Basel I I on all banks holding positions in foreign exchange and gold. 
The capital charge is the sum of net positions for foreign exchange (for single 
currencies and gross currencies) and the net position in gold multiplied by 8 
percent.'^^ 
4- The CBJ appUes the simplified approach to commodities which calculates net 
positions in aU commodities (except gold). Commodities are then multiplied by a 15 
percent capital charge, then summed and has its gross position subject to a further 3 
percent capital charge.'^^ 
5- Finally, the CBJ regulation covers options (although it refers to them broadly under 
the title 'measurement of derivatives' r i s k s ) . T h e regulation applies the simple 
approach of the Basel I I and the same risk measurement o f 16 percent divided 
equally between general and specific risks. 
""^  Ibid , Articles 9-10. 
Ibid , Art ic le 11. 
Ibid , Art icle 12. 
' " " I b i d , Art icle 13. 
Ib id , Art icle 14. 
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This chapter examined the influence of the BCBS substantive .standards, while the 
following chapter w i l l look into the BCBS standards on structural issues including the 
regulatory framework on international cooperation. 
CHAPTER 10 
T H E S T R U C T U R A L F R A M E W O R K OF BANKING 
SUPERVISION 
10.0. Introduction 
This is the third and last chapter of Part I I of the thesis on Jordanian law. 
Chapter 8 looked into the evolution of banking supervision, while chapter 9 examined 
the effective substantive banking supervision in light of the BCBS standards. They also 
showed that banking supervision has been undertaken by the Banking Supervision 
Department of the CBJ ("BSD") despite the dismantling of many of the regulatory 
distinctions between financial institutions. This chapter examines the safety and 
soundness of the structural framework of the Jordanian banking supervisory structure; it 
considers whether the structure meets the institutional requirements essential for 
effective banking supervision including those set out by the BCBS Core Principles. 
First, the CBJ should have a robust legal framework determining its objectives, 
responsibilities and powers including the enforceability of its legislation and decisions 
as well as the assurance of immunity from liability (Section 1). Secondly, the 
relation.ship of the CBJ with other related authorities should be well defined and 
coordinated. This covers the Companies General Controller/Minister of Trade and 
Industry, the Insurance Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, the Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and the Competition Directorate (Section 2). Thirdly, the 
supervisory authority should have the inter-related qualities of operational 
independence, transparency, sound governance, adequacy of resources, and 
accountability (Section 3). Finally, the law should support the cross-border exchange of 
supervisory information (Section 4). The Chapter shows how the Jordanian Law was 
influenced by the BCBS in terms of coordinating its cross-border supervisory efforts, 
but still has to develop its domestic coordination in line with the Core Principles. It also 
has to coordinate the relationship between the CBJ and other regulatory authorities. 
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10.1. The C B J Legal Framework 
As illustrated in Chapter 8, banking supervision has been undertaken by the 
CBJ since it assumed its functions in 1964 pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Central Bank 
of Jordan Law No. (4) for year 1959. The CBJ has a clear mandate for maintaining 
financial stability in Jordan including its functions acting as a banker to bankers, 
banking supervision and dealing with financial problems. Section 4(f) of the effective 
CBJ Law No. (23) for year 1971 ("CBJ Law 1971") states that the objectives of 
supervising banks are clearly stated as "to ensure the soundness of their financial 
positions and the protection of the rights of depositors and shareholders". The CBJ is 
not the only authority which influences banking supervision. Financial regulation in 
Jordan is designated to separate authorities whose responsibilities are divided along 
institutional lines. A review of the objectives and responsibilities of these authorities 
shows that there are gaps and overlapping that can adversely affect banking supervision. 
Some of the difficulties in determining issues of gaps and discrepancies could 
be resolved by the Law Explanation Bureau, a quasi judicial body established pursuant 
to Section 123 of the Jordanian Constitution (1952) and comprised of two judges from 
the Court of Cassation and a representative member from the authority seeking an 
opinion on the application of certain legislation. The Law Bureau considers matters 
referred by the Prime Minister's office provided that they are not referred to courts. This 
effectively means issuing a compulsory decision to a governmental body explaining 
how to construe the law for the purposes of conducting its fiinctions. The Jordanian 
Securities Commission ("JSC") and the CBJ, for example, sought an opinion on whether 
companies located in Jordan and providing financial intermediary services related to 
trading in securities and gold in foreign markets are subject to the supervision 
respectively.' The Law Bureau jurisdiction is nevertheless limited and retroactive. 
10.1.1. Powers and Enforceability 
The previous Chapter illustrated the wide supervisory powers enjoyed by the 
CBJ in licensing banks, approving mergers and withdrawal of licensing. It also looked 
into the wide range of prudential banking regulations issued by the CBJ and their 
Law Explanation Bureau. Decision No. (8) for year 2006. Official Gazette No. (4798). I7.I2.2{X)6, pp. 
4813. 
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application on consolidated basis, as well as, the CBJ's powers to approve of and/or 
appoint banks' external auditors and obtain information, certificates and statements 
therefrom. The CBJ may also request information, documents, conduct investigations 
and inspection of both Jordanian banks and branches of foreign banks in Jordan and 
their subsidiaries." The CBJ may appoint auditors to undertake its inspection 
responsibility but the CBJ does not outsource. 
The BSD accordingly undertakes extensive on-site and off-site inspection.^ On-
site inspection is conducted regularly by inspection teams each designated with the 
responsibility for certain banks. The back office team reviews prudential returns which 
are either regular returns such as financial statements, or ad hoc returns e.g. reports sent 
when a bank obtains shares exceeding 5 percent of the target company. There is also a 
high level of coordination between the on-site and off-site offices. The back-office 
receives inspectors' reports and follow up their implementation. It also reports to 
inspection teams on the results of its review of banks' returns. 
The CBJ applies rating systems to assess quantitative and qualitative 
components in the banks' financial conditions. The rating system applied to Jordanian 
banks is the CAMEL which covers Capital, Assets, Management, Earning and 
Liabilities. The rating system applied to foreign banks is the less comprehensive rating 
system of ROCA (Risk Management, Operational controls. Compliance, Asset quality) 
due to the fact that the home country is the major authority responsible for assessing the 
financial condition of the bank. I f the CBJ finds that a banking institution or its 
directors, managers or any bank officers are contravening the law or conducting 
unsound operations, it may impose on them any of the under sanctions and corrective 
measures: issue a written warning; instruct the violating bank to submit a satisfactory 
program of measures to abolish the violation; instruct the violating bank to refrain from 
undertaking certain activities; restrain the bank fi-om distributing dividend; impose a 
fine on the bank, the maximum amount of which is JD 100,000; instruct the Bank to 
suspend or dismiss an administrator, other than a member of its board of directors; 
remove the chairman of board the directors of the bank or any member of the board; 
dissolve the board of directors of the bank and assume the role of management for a 
The CBJ Law ( 1 9 7 1 ) . Section 45(a) and Ihe Baking Law ( 2 0 0 0 ) , Section 7 0 . 
' . 1 9 - 1 8 . L , ' ^ ' 2 0 0 7 ^ ^ F-Lkili J J^] j j j : > ^ J V I L S J S > J I -sliJi 
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maximum period of one year extendable for another year; revoke the licence of the 
bank;* and impose compulsory merger on a bank which "sustains financial problems 
substantially affecting its financial position" provided that the approval of the other 
bank is attained.^ 
The CBJ, consequently, enjoys what is termed under Jordanian public 
administrative law as "discretionary power" in the enforcement of sanctions or 
corrective measures in terms of timing and selecting which measure to apply. This 
power should be applied for the purpose of achieving the afore-said objectives of 
banking supervision, adhere to the doctrine of proportionality and avoid illegality ultra 
vires, abuse of authority or undue process.^ In 2004, the CBJ decided to limit its 
discretionary powers by issuing the Framework for Corrective Actions Regulation No. 
(4) for year 2004. This regulation, which was influenced by the US Law, defines four 
standard cases where the CBJ should respond with a certain prompt corrective action: 
the bank contravenes applicable laws; the bank undertakes unsound banking activities; 
the classification of the bank according to the CBJ ratings manual declines; the bank's 
solvency ratio falls below specified thresholds.^ The regulation then determines which 
of the sanctions provided for under the Banking Law (2000) applies in each situation, 
with financial fines being the primary measure.^  The CBJ issued other regulations 
applying the rule-based approach to specific violations related to the acquisition of 
.securities and shares in companies^ as well as concentration instructions on credit 
facilities denominated in foreign exchange.'° 
Finally, the Banking Law (2000) clearly states that the CBJ is the only authority 
^ Banking Law (2000), Section 88. 
Ibid, Section 80. 
See for example: Higher Court of Justice decision No. (409/2001) dated 13.06.2002. Adalah 
Publications. 
' CBJ. Framework for Corrective Actions Regulation No. (4/2004) dated 11.1.2004, Item First. 
Ibid, Third (1). 
" CBJ. Instructions of Money Penalties over the Banks' Investments in Securities No. (21/2005) dated 
7.8.2005. 
CBJ, Instructions of Money Penalties on the Violations of Credit Concentrations (Exposure Limits) and 
Credit Facilities in Foreign Currencies No. (23/2005) dated 6.11.2005. 
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in Jordan endowed with the responsibility of issuing a decision of liquidating. The CBJ 
may issue the decision in any of the four under situations: 
" 1 . Where the bank has committed a violation or more which may entail squandering of its assets 
or damage to its depositors' rights. 
2. Where the bank has biecome unable to meet the demand on its deposits or to f u l f i l l any of its 
obligations. 
3. Where the total losses of the bank has exceeded 75 percent of its subscribed capital. 
4. Where a decision is issued revoking its licence"." 
10.1.2. Immunity from Liability 
The successive CBJ Laws and Banking Laws have neither granted the CBJ nor 
its staff invnunity from tortious liability resulting from conducting any of their 
functions. The CBJ employees may however benefit of Section 263 of the Civil Code 
No. (43) for year 1976, which grants employees immunity from tort liability, first, if 
their actions were undertaken according to the instructions of their employers and, 
secondly, if the instruction are obligatory or the employee believes that they are 
obligatory. The Jordanian Court of Cassation has repeatedly decided that the onus of 
proof falls on the employee to prove that he has committed no negligence and, when 
applicable, that he has reasonable grounds to believe that the instructions he or she 
carried through were obligatory and legitimate.'^ Therefore, Section 263 provides a 
broad cover for employees in both the public and private sectors and does not meet the 
need of banking supervisors. 
The CBJ is a public institution and maybe liable in tort according to the 
provisions of the Higher Court of Justice Law No. 12 for year 1992. This Law was the 
first law in Jordan to allow the State to be liable under tort. It states that the Court has 
jurisdiction to review final decisions issued by a public authority in its administrative or 
quasi judicial capacities as well as compensate injured parties suffering damages 
' ' Banking Law (2000). Section 84(b). 
Court of Ca.ssation (Civil Capacity) decision No. (1464/1995) dated 11.10.1995 Adalah Publications; 
Court of Cassation (Civil Capacity) decision No. (72/1996) dated 12,6.1996. Adalah Publications; Court 
of Cassation (Civil Capacity) decision No. (1183/1997) daled 28.8.1997. Adalah Publications; and Court 
of Cassation (Civil Capacity) decision No. (1391/1997) dated 30.8.1997. Adalah Publications. 
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therefrom.'^ The claimant therefore has to establish that the CBJ has issued or refrained 
from issuing a public decision which renders it null on basis of one of four specific 
grounds: the abuse of authority, ultra vires, contravening the constitution or applicable 
legislation and lack of due process.''' The CBJ enjoys wide discretionary powers e.g. in 
licensing which means that establishing that the CBJ has issued a null decision becomes 
more difficult. In addition, the claimant has to prove that damage occurred and the 
causal link between the decision of the CBJ and the damages incurred.'"* 
In practice, there have been no precedents of cases brought before the Higher 
Court of Justice against the CBJ to claim damages. There has been however a number 
of cases on the nullification of decisions issued by the CBJ as an employer or in 
performing its functions as the regulatory authority of money exchangers and 
monitoring the movement of currency before the liberalisation of foreign exchange. The 
Court upheld for example decisions issued by the CBJ to withdraw the licence of a 
money exchanger on the ground that one of them exceeded its permissible activities by 
accepting deposi ts ,whi le the other failed to meet the requirement of minimum 
regulatory capital.'^ In another case the Court annulled a decision issued by the CBJ to 
confiscate foreign currency on the ground that the law did not authorise the CBJ to 
impose this particular sanction. 
To sum up, it is possible to hold the CBJ and its staff liable for damages in 
performing their banking supervisory function, but this is a remote possibility. 
Higher Court of Justice Law No. 12 for year 1992, Section 9, 
" C i v i l Code No. (43) for year 1976, Section 266. 
'^Higher Court of Justice decision No. (163/1986) dated I 1.4.1987, Adalah Publications. 
''' Higher Court of Justice decision No. (150/1987) dated 5.1 1.1987, Adalah Publications. 
"'Higher Court of Justice decision No. (13/1989) dated 18.7.1990. Adaiah Publications. 
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10.2. Coordination with Local Authorities 
10.2.1. The Controller of Companies and the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
There is an old legal tradition of regulating companies in Jordan under the 
successive Laws of Companies.'^ According to the effective Law of Companies No. 
(22) for year 1997 ("Law of Companies "), the Companies General Controller based at 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade registers all companies and maintains their records."° 
As far as public shareholding companies are concerned (which is the only form a 
Jordanian bank may take), the Controller examines the companies' accounts and 
records, attends their general shareholders' meetings as well as ensures that companies 
adhere to their objectives."' The Controller is accordingly authorised to examine 
companies' documents, books and register as well as obtain copies thereof"" 
The Law of Companies also confers on the Minister of Trade and Industry the 
more intrusive supervisory powers over public shareholding companies. First, according 
to Section 167 of the Law of Companies, the Minister may establish a committee to 
manage a company when its board of directors resigns or ceases to have a legal quorum, 
and the general assembly fails to elect an alternative board. In the case of banks, the 
same section makes it obligatory to consult with the CBJ before appointing the 
mentioned committee. Secondly, Section 191 of the Law of Companies states that the 
Minister issues forms needed for the preparation and presentation of financial 
statements and accounting policies in coordination with the CBJ. Thirdly, Section 275 
of the Law of Companies empowers the Minister to audit public shareholding 
companies, but banks and insurance companies are excluded. Fourthly, in cases where 
the company's auditor recommends the rejection of the financial statements, the 
Controller may appoint a committee to settle the dispute upon the recommendation of 
the general assembly. This section was amended in 2002 to require the prior 
. 10-7 . o - ' 1994 'Sa--Vi c^U^\ ^ CJH^jVl 
Law of Companies, Sections 5, 11 , 80 and 92. 
-' Ibid, Sections 273. 
" Ibid. Sections 283. 
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coordination with the CBJ.'^ Finally, Section 275 of the Law of Companies also entitles 
the Minister to assign delegates to audit a company upon the request of at least fourth of 
its board of directors or 15 recent of its shareholders. Should the audit reveal any 
violation, the Minister of Industry and Trade is empowered to establish an investigation 
committee. Unlike the other sections, the Law neither excludes banks nor requests the 
prior approval of the CBJ. 
10.2.2. The Securities Exchange Commission 
The first Jordanian capital market regulatory authority, the Amman Financial 
Market, was established in 1978."'' It combined the regulatory function and bourse 
activities"^ under one organisation. This situation was rectified under the provisions of 
the Securities Law No. (23) for year 1997 and the effective Securities Law No. (76) for 
year 2002 (hereafter the "Securities Law"), which have replaced the Amman Financial 
Market with three institutions: the JSC, an independent public authority"^ which aims at 
developing, protecting and regulating the capital market as well as protecting investors 
therein;"^ the Amman Stock Exchange ("ASE") where the trading activities take place; 
and the Securities Depository Centre ("SDC") which provides registration, safe keeping 
and transfer of ownership of security as well as clearance and settlement of securities. 
The SDC and the ASE are regulated by the JSC. 
The JSC is charged with the functions"^ of regulating the issuance and dealings 
in securities and ensuring accurate disclosure of information at issuance stage and on 
regular basis. It also undertakes the responsibility of registering and supervising 
"licensed persons""' being financial brokers, financial advisors, dealers, investment 
managers, investment trustees, underwriters, financial services companies or 
The Law Amending the Law of Companies No. (40) for year 2002, Section 76. 
-•' CBJ. The Financial Structure of Jordan. (1989), pp. 26. 
Amman Financial Market Law No (31) for year 1976, Articles 3 and 4. 
"* Securities Law, Section 7(a). 
Ibid, Section 8(a). 
" Ibid, Section 8(b). 
Ibid. Sections 15 and 47(a). 
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custodians,™ as well as "registered persons" i.e. natural persons working as directors, 
managers and employees involved in securities and who work for a licensed person.^' 
Furthermore, the JSC is responsible for the regulation of mutual funds and investment 
companies.^" Licensed persons therefore include banks undertaking investments in 
securities as well as inve.stment subsidiaries of banks. The JSC enjoys investigative 
powers under Law^^ and may cease or suspend the activities of the company, suspend 
public offerings of its securities, publicly censor violations, impose fines and revoke 
licences.'''* 
Consequently, the JSC might influence banking supervision for various reasons. 
First, Jordanian banks must take the form of public shareholding companies.'^ They 
must accordingly register with the JSC and have their shares listed^^ and traded in the 
ASE." Banks might also issue other types of securities such as bonds, or deal either 
directly or through their investment arms in the ASE. Under all circumstances, the CBJ 
is interested in the efficiency and transparency of the ASE, and consequently in the 
adequacy of their regulations and the effectiveness of the JSC supervision of the ASE. 
Disclosure requirements are particularly important, since the successful transposition of 
Basel II depends on market transparency.' 
There are no legal provisions to coordinate the relationship between the CBJ as a 
banking supervisory authority and the JSC. The two authorities have not also entered 
into a Memorandum of Understanding to coordinate their supervisory authorities in 
Section 2 of the Securities Law provides definition of licensed persons. 
-•" Ibid, Sections 2 and 47(b). 
~^ Section 2 of Ihe Securities Law defines the mutual fund for its purposes and exempts banks from its 
ambit. 
•"'' Securities Law, Section 15(b). 
Ibid, Sections 17-22. 
Law of Companies, Section 93(a). 
Securities Law, Section 5. 
Law of Companies. Section 98(c). 
ASC. Amman Stock Exchange Disclosure Directive for the year 2004, and JSC, Instructions for 
Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards of Issuing Companies for the year 2004. 
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regard to banks' investment services. This issue was highlighted in the Higher Court of 
Justice decision No. (483/2005). '^  This case concerned a Jordanian bank, then Export 
and Finance Bank, which was authorised by both the CBJ and the JSC to own, posses 
and undertake dealings in financial securities. The JSC conducted independent on-site 
inspection of the Bank's financial securities functions and found irregularities. It 
accordingly imposed sanctions on the bank. The claimant brought an argument before 
the Court that the JSC decision was taken before granting the bank adequate time to sort 
out the situation with its other regulator, the CBJ. The court upheld the JSC decision on 
the basis that it was the authority designated with the supervision of financial 
investment services. It gave no guidance or recommendations on how the regulatory 
authorities should have coordinated their efforts, whether banks are issuing or dealing in 
securities or fall under the supervision of the JSC as licensed persons. 
10.2.3. The Insurance Commission 
The main responsibilities of regulating insurance companies and services are 
designated to the Insurance Commission, an independent corporate body established in 
1999^ "^ by virtue of the Insurance Regulatory Act No. (33) for year 1999 and 
amendments."" The main functions of the Insurance Commission are protecting the 
rights of the insured and beneficiaries, supervising the solvency of insurance companies, 
enhancing the performance and efficiency of insurance companies, achieving positive 
competition, qualifying human resources to transact insurance business as well as 
improving public insurance awareness.^" The Insurance Commission licenses and 
regulates insurance companies, brokers, reinsurance brokers, insurance agents, actuaries 
and other insurance service providers divided into general insurance and life 
assurance."*^  The Insurance Commission also has access to authorised companies and 
'•^  Higher Court of Justice decision No. (483/2005) dated 23.1.2006. Adalch Publications. 
The Insurance Supervision Law No. (5) for year 1965, the first law regulating the activities of insurance 
companies, assigned the responsibility of regulating the insurance sector to the then Ministry of Economy 
which was renamed as the Minisu-y of Industry and Trade. 
'^ The Insurance Commission was first named the Insurance Regulatory Commission then its name was 
changed by the Law Amending the insurance Regulatory Act No. (67) for year 2002, Section 2. 
Insurance Regulatory Act No. (33) of 1999, Section 6. 
' ' Ibid. Sections 3, 4, 24, 25, 45. 54 and 55. 
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persons' information and documents'*'' as well as empowered to impose sanctions against 
ones contravening its instructions including the withdrawal of licences."^ 
Chapter 8 illustrated how banks in Jordan were not initially allowed to provide 
financial services or own insurance companies. It also explained that after the issuance 
of the Baking Law (2000) banks have been allowed to own insurance companies for the 
first time provided that they are wholly owned subsidiaries as well as provide insurance 
agency and consultation services. As banking and insurance institutions have become 
interrelated, their supervisors need to exchange information. Therefore, the CBJ issued 
in 2000 its Regulation of Banks' Acquisition of Insurance Companies which requests 
banks to submit thereto copies of the on-site inspection reports of the Insurance 
Commission as well as the reports of their external auditors.''^ 
The CBJ and the Insurance Commission took an important step by concluding 
their first Memorandum of Understanding in 2006.''^ The Memorandum is comprised of 
four major elements. First, it stresses on the timely exchange of information on draft 
and i.ssued decisions, instructions, regulations and law amendments, as well as, 
developments in licensing and supervisory requirements, licensing of jointly regulated 
institutions. It calls for conducting joint meetings to discuss mentioned developments if 
the need arise and organising joint training programmes. The second element is 
concerned with the inspection of banks' insurance subsidiaries by the CBJ as well as the 
inspection of banks providing insurance services by the Insurance Commission. The 
parties agree that they should send each other a prior notification of the inspection date, 
and that the respondent authority should supply the inspectors with information related 
to the purpose of the inspection. The insurance authority should also be allowed to send 
a representative to join the CBJ inspection team and vice versa. The third element 
concerns the consolidated supervision of the banking group which contains an insurance 
subsidiary. It states that the approval of the Insurance Commission of publishing the 
•"ibid, Sections 37 and 103. 
Ibid, Sections 47-51 and 87-95. 
CBJ, Regulation of Banks' Acquisition of Insurance Companies No. (5/2000) dated 5.12.2000, Article 
Second(5). 
•"^  CBJ, Memorandum of Understanding between the Central Bank of Jordan and the In.surance 
Commission dated 2.3.2006. 
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subsidiary's financial statement, then the approval of the CBJ should be attained before 
publication. Finally, the fourth element focuses on maintaining the confidentiality of 
exchanged information, which should not be disclosed to third parties except for 
supervisory purposes or with the prior approval of the authority which sent the 
information. 
One of the outcomes of the Memorandum of Understanding is the issuance of 
the Instructions of Licensing, Regulating and Supervising the Business of 
Bankassurance No. (1) for year 2008 by the Insurance Commission. Initially, all 
insurance agents were subject to the same regulations including banks.''^ The new 
regulation addresses the special need of bankassurances. It confirms that banks should 
obtain the prior approval of the CBJ before their authorisation by the Insurance 
Commission.'''^ It also states that banks must establish specialised insurance units and 
sets out the requirements that the management and personnel of the unit should meet, as 
well as, numerates their functions." '^* Mo.st importantly. Article 28 sets out the rules of 
conduct the bank has to follow in order to protect the rights of the consumer. It must be 
recalled here that consumer protection is an essential objective of insurance regulation 
as oppo.sed to banking regulation which is more concerned about financial stability. 
Indeed consumer protection is not one of the objectives of the CBJ. Therefore the 
regulation fills what would otherwise be a loophole in the regulatory structure. 
10.2.4. What Supervisory Role, if Any, for the DIG? 
The Deposit Insurance Corporation ("DIC") was established pursuant to the 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Law No. (33) for year 2000 ("DIC Law"). Jordan had 
never had a deposit insurance or deposit guarantee institution before. ^' The DIC is an 
independent corporate entity, which aims to "protect depositors with banks by insuring 
their deposits with the banks in accordance with the provisions of this law in order to 
Insurance Commission. Instructions of Licensing and Regulating the Business and Responsibilities of 
an Insurance Agent No. (1) for year 2005. 
Ibid, Article 7(b/4). 
Ibid, Articles 3-17. 
'^ Section 37(e) of the CBJ Law (I97I) states the following; "The Central Bank, in participation with the 
Licensed Banks and Specialized Credit In,stiiutions, may establish an institution for the insurance of 
deposits up to a maximum limit in accordance with special regulations to be enacted for this purpo.se". 
encourage savings and strengthen confidence in the Kingdom's banking system."^" The 
Die has strong ties with the CBJ. It was first situated in the premises of the CBJ and its 
founding staff were seconded from the CBJ or were former CBJ staff. It has had two 
Directors Generals both of whom were also ex senior CBJ executives. Furthermore, the 
Die board of directors is chaired by the CBJ Governor and that one of its members is 
one of the CBJ Deputy Governors, in addition to the Secretary General of the Ministry 
of Finance, Controller of Companies, the Director General and two experienced 
members appointed by the Council of Ministers who may not assume any executive role 
in a bank during their membership of the board and two years thereafter.^^ 
The Die assumes the two major roles of deposit insurance and bank liquidation. 
First, it insures deposits in member banks denominated in the JD with the exception of 
Interbank deposits. Government deposits and cash collaterals.The coverage is 100 
percent of the first JD 10,000 in each bank. The CBJ is empowered to increase the 
maximum protected cover and cover deposits denominated in currencies other that the 
JD.^^ Membership of banks in the DlC is mandatory for are all commercial Jordanian 
banks and branches of foreign banks operating inside Jordan, while Islamic banks are 
excluded by default unless they decide to become members,'^ ^ but none has opted for 
this choice."^ ^ Member banks contribute a flat rate of 2.5 per thousand of insured 
deposits. The CBJ continues to assume its role as a lender of last resort. In October 
2008, and in order to avoid the pseudo effect of the global credit crisis, the CBJ 
announced that it would guarantee all deposits denominated in the JD in Jordanian 
banks until 2009 ended.^ '^  
•'- D l C Law, Section 5. 
" Ibid, Section 6. 
Ibid, Section 12(b). 
" Ibid, Section 32. 
Ibid. Section 3. 
" Die, Annual Report 2007. pp. 15. 
•'^  DlC Law, Section 12(a). 
Editor. -Gov't to Guarantee Bank Deposits till 2009 End' The Jordan Times, (24.10.2008). 
Secondly, while the CBJ decides if and when a bank should be liquidated, the 
Die has become the sole liquidator of Jordanian banks both commercial and Islamic 
ones.^" Within this pretext, the DIC is endowed with certain banking supervisory 
powers under its law. Section 29 states that the DIC may check banks' financial 
statements available at the CBJ, and the Governor may pass on to DIC board any 
financial statements and information. In addition. Section 30 provides that the CBJ and 
the DIC may form joint inspection teams upon the request of the DIC and with the 
approval of the CBJ. The purpose of the inspection is to review the activities, operations 
and recommendations to be submitted to both institutions. Furthermore, Section 31 
states that the DIC must inform the CBJ of any illegal activities committed by insured 
banks or their executives, while Section 60 provides for its duty to send the CBJ 
monthly reports on the progress of banks under liquidation. 
The DIC and the CBJ signed a Memorandum of Understanding, which 
facilitates the cooperation between both institutions, prepares the DIC to perform its 
role as a liquidator as well as establishes a joint Standing Committee to oversee the 
implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding.^' In normal circumstances, the 
CBJ supplies the DIC with regular financial returns and decisions to authorise a new 
bank, while the DIC supplies the CBJ with its risk analysis of banks.^" A joint 
inspection may also be conducted according to the CBJ's inspection work procedures 
and under the leadership of the CBJ team.^-' The two institutions should also prepare a 
banks' watch list (i.e. banks that are susceptible to sharp decrease in solvency or 
liquidity), maintain regular contact on the development of the financial situation of such 
banks, as well as, set out a precautionary plan to deal with any probable financial 
turmoil.^" Should the CBJ decide to put a bank under its administration, it may appoint a 
representative from the DIC to the new administration.^^ Furthermore, if the CBJ 
^ Banking Law (2000). Sections 84 and 85 and DIC Law, Section 39(b). 
C B J , Memorandum of Understanding between the Central Bank of Jordan and Deposit Insurance 
Corporation dated 8.2.2005, Item 9. 
" Ibid, Item 2(b\l-4). 
" Ibid. Item 2(b\5). 
Ibid, Item 4. 
Ibid. Item 5(a) 
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decides to revoke the licence of a bank, it should inform the DIC of its decision ex 
ante!'^ i f the CBJ decides to liquidate a bank, it should involve the DIC in the 
preparatory work, and agree therewith on the liquidation process. 
10.2.5. The Competition Department 
The Competition Law No. (33) for year 2004 ("Competition Law"), which 
replaced the Competition Law No. (49) for year 2002 is the first law setting up a legal 
framework for regulating competition in all types of production, commerce and services 
in Jordan or that have effect in Jordan.^* Its aim is that the prices of both products and 
services are determined according to the principles of free competition and market 
r u l e s . I t establishes the Competition Directorate, an integral part of the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade as the official authority entrusted with implementing the 
Competition Law, including the investigation into violations of it.^° 
There are three major elements in the Competition Law. First, it prohibits 
practices and agreements restricting free competition between business entities. This 
includes cartels involved in price-fixing, limiting the supply or production of goods or 
services, market sharing, restricting market entry, eliminating an enterprise from the 
market and bid rigging.''' Secondly, the prohibition of abusive behaviour by a firm 
dominating a market including fixing prices and other trading conditions, tie in 
agreements, imposing exclusivity trading terms, agreements which restrict market entry 
or access to sources of supply, discrimination between customers in similar transactions 
and refusal to deal.^" Thirdly, and most relevantly, it regulates mergers and acquisitions 
by imposing limits on economic concentration.^' Section 9(b) prohibits the full or 
Ibid, Item 5(b) 
Ibid, Item 5(c) 
Competition Law, Section 3. 
Ibid, Section 4. 
™Ibid, Section 12(a) 
" Ibid, Section 5(a). 
Ibid, Section 6. 
7,1 Section 9(a) of the Competition Law defines economic concentration as "any activity resulting in the 
full or partial transfer of ownership of or interest in property or rights or shares or obligations of an 
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partial transfer of ownership, interest, rights or shares of one enterprise to another 
leading to a dominant position of 40 percent or more of the total market transactions, 
without the prior approval of the Minister of Industry and Trade. 
The authorities conferred by the Competition Law on the Competition 
Directorate and the Minister restrict the supervisory authorities of the CBJ in two 
situations. Section 9(c) makes it compulsory on licensing authorities, including the CBJ 
to consult with the Minister before authorising a traasfer of shares leading to economic 
concentration without providing for exceptions in emergency situations such as 
handhng a financial crisis situation. Meanwhile, there is no clear legal text stating that 
the Mini-ster shall not authorise economic concentration in the banking sector without 
the prior approval of the CBJ. 
10.3. Independence, Autonomy, Accountability, Governance, 
Transparency and Resources 
10.3.1. Main Safeguards of the Independence and Autonomy of the C B J 
The CBJ is an autonomous corporate body that performs its functions according 
to its law, and may conclude contracts, own property and bring legal action in its 
name.^ '* It may not be liquidated except by law as well.^^ It enjoys financial 
independence, as it has its own budget separate from the annual Public Budget Laws. 
Sections 7-9 of the CBJ Law (1971) determine the CBJ's capital and reserves and state 
that the net profits are paid to the Government after deducting expenses. The CBJ 
certifies a copy of its annual balance sheet and profit and loss statement by a certified 
external auditor and supplies the Ministry of Finance with a copy thereof It also has 
its own administration directly connected with the Prime Minister which means that it 
does not fall under the authority of the Ministry of Finance.Nowhere in the Jordanian 
enterpri.se to another, and which may enable an enterprise or a group of enterprises to control, directly or 
indirectly, another enterprise or group of enterprises is considered an economic concentration operation". 
" CBJ Law (1971), Section 3. 
" Ibid, Section 64. 
''^  Ibid, Section 61. 
" Council of Ministers, The Organisation of Ministries and Official Institutions and Departments Bylaw 
No. (16) for year 1988. 
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Law, that the Council of Ministers or the Minister of Finance are authorised to direct the 
CBJ on banking supervision. Furthermore, the Law spells out rules on the appointment, 
dismissal, remuneration and tenure of the board members including top executives in 
order to ensure the independence of the CBJ. The CBJ also issues its instructions to the 
Banking sector independently as well. Regulations on public procurement and the CBJ 
employees' regulations^^ are by contrast issued by the Council of Ministers with the 
Royal Ascent.^ ** 
Although the BSD is an integral part of the CBJ, the legislation provides it with 
a minimal degree of autonomy. The CBJ Internal Regulations, approved by the Board, 
outlines the BSD's mandate. The BSD also has its own Work Procedures and 
Guidelines, which inform staff of their functions, roles and responsibilities and lines of 
authorities. The BSD is also headed by an Executive Director who can only be 
dismissed by the CBJ Board of Directors.**^ The latter also reports directly to the Deputy 
Governor. However, there is not a particular Deputy Governor who is only in charge 
with banking supervision. 
10.3.2. Accountability 
The CBJ is accountable before the Parliament and the Governor appears on 
behalf of the CBJ in Parliamentary committees set up to examine its affairs.**' The CBJ 
is also subject to the review of the Audit Bureau, a public institution established 
pursuant to Section 119 of the Jordanian Constitution to monitor the expenditure, 
revenues and expenses of the State and submit reports thereon to the House of 
Representatives. " Initially, the position was not clear whether the term "State" covers 
central government budget only or both central and independent budgets. The 
Council of Ministers. Central Bank of Jordan Employees Bylaw No. (62) for year 2001 and Council of 
Ministers, Central Bank of Jordan Public Procurement Bylaw No. (19) for year 1999. 
''^  The Jordanian Constitution (1952). Section 120 and confirmed in the CBJ Law (1971). Section 65. 
Council of Ministers, Central Bank of Jordan Employees Bylaw No. (62) for year 2001, Section 9(b). 
CBJ Law (1971), Section 14(e). 
The Audit Bureau was established under the Audit Bureau l^w No. (28) for year 1952. 
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controversy was resolved by the decision of the High Tribunal^' that the CBJ is subject 
to the authority of the Audit Bureau. 
10.3.3. Sound Governance 
The management of the CBJ is assigned to a Board of Directors comprised of 
independent and ex officio members as a safeguard to ensure its independence and its 
sound governance. The CBJ Governor is the chief executive charged with the 
responsibilities of the implementation of the CBJ policies and the management of its 
affairs. He assumes all the authorities and functions of the CBJ (including banking 
supervision) with the exception of responsibilities reserved for the CBJ board, though 
he should also inform the board of the important decisions and measures he adopts.^^ 
The Governor is assisted with two Deputy Governors. Initially the Governor had one 
Deputy, but as of 1991, and in an attempt to enhance sound governance, the four-eyed 
principle has been adopted. 
The law determines rules and conditions for the board's appointment, dismissal, 
functions, tenure, responsibilities and restricted activities. It is comprised of eight 
members including the Governor (who is afso the Chairman, the two Deputy Governors 
(one of home should be nominated as the vice Chairman).*'' The Governor and Deputy 
Governors are appointed and reappointed by the Council of Minister and with Royal 
Ascent for five years, while other members are appointed by the Council of Ministers 
for three years .The other five members are selected from banks and specialised credit 
institutions on basis of their financial and economic experience.There can only be one 
High Tribunal decision on the Interpretation of the Constitution No. ( I ) for year 1995, Official Gazette. 
No. (4039), dated 2.5.1995. pp. 1147. 
"'' The High Tribunal is established by the Jordanian Constitution and is comprised of five members from 
the Court of Ca.ssations and four members of the House of Representatives including the Head of the 
House. See: the Jordanian Constitution for year (1952). Section 122. 
8S CBJ Law (1971), Section 13. 
Law Amending the CBJ Law No. (14) for year 1991 replaced by Law Amending the CBJ Law No. (16) 
for year 1992. Section 2. 
" CBJ Law (1971), Section 10(a). 
Ibid. Section 10(b)(c). 
Ibid. Section 10(d). 
representative from the banking sector, and should another serving board member 
become affiliated with a bank, either member shall forfeit his/ her position in the 
board.^ *^  This composition is therefore very different from the composition of the DIC 
board where members should not represent banks. The tenure of the CBJ board 
members is determined under law to ensure the board's independence from 
Governmental influence. The appointments are also published in the Official Gazette*' 
to ensure transparency. 
Section 11 of the CBJ Law (1971) sets out the procedural framework for the 
CBJ board. It provides that the board shall meet once monthly, when the need arises or 
if two board members request a meeting. The quorum of meetings is four members 
provided that one of them is the Governor or a Deputy Governor. Decisions are taken 
by absolute majority and the Chairman of the board has the casting vote in cases where 
a tie-vote is reached. Most importantly. Section 1 1 provides that the board member who 
has an interest in an agreement or transaction considered by the board, that member 
should withdraw from the meeting. This includes the member representing banks who 
should not attend the meetings that consider aspects of the bank he is affiliated with. 
Section 12 of the CBJ Law (1971) numerates the functions of the CBJ beginning 
with formulating the CBJ's general policy. Although Section 12 does not provide 
specifically for the board's role in monitoring the implementation of its policies, this can 
be inferred from the Law particularly Section 13(d) which states that the Governor is 
responsible before the board for the implementation of their decisions. Section 12 also 
authorises the board to formulate the regulations and internal bylaws needed for the 
administration of the CBJ as well as determine its organisational framework. Likewise, 
the board must approve contracts concluded with the CBJ advisors including their 
remuneration and the housing credit facilities extended by the CBJ to the Governor and 
his Deputies. Furthermore, the board approves the financial statements of the CBJ. In 
addition, the board determines the compensation paid to the Governor and his Deputies 
Law Explanation Bureau decision No. (24/1972), Official Gazelle, No. (2397) dated 31.12.1972, pp. 
2446. 
CBJ Law (1971), Section 10(e). 
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when their services terminates, their travelling and medical allowances, gratuities and 
leaves while the Council of Ministers determines their salaries.* "^ 
The CBJ board decides on critical banking supervisory decisions. The powers 
cover the approval of the licensing of Jordanian banks, their merger, the revocation of 
their licences, and the opening of their branches inside and outside Jordan and in the 
free zones. The board also approves the licensing and the revocation of licences of 
branches or representative offices of foreign banks in Jordan and in the free zones.''' 
The board penahses persons who take deposits without authorisation, or release 
misleading information in this r e g a r d . T h e Governor should also attain the prior 
approval of the board before penalising a licensed bank by dismissing a board member, 
dissolving the board, instructing the bank to suspend one of its administrators or 
imposing a financial fine.'"'' I f any member of a licensed bank's board of directors 
forfeits his position because he no longer meets the requirements of membership or 
because of a decision of the CBJ, he will not be able to assume a similar position in any 
other bank without the prior approval of the CBJ board.'"' Similarly, if a bank is 
liquidated or its licence is revoked, its manager and board members may not work in 
any other bank without the prior approval of the CBJ board. 
The Governor and his Deputies should devote their time to the management of the 
CBJ'^ and are not allowed to become members of Parliament, ministers, civil servants 
or members of other boards of directors as a general rule.' ' I f any of the Governor or his 
Deputies nominates himself for membership in the Parliament, holds any of the 
mentioned positions or if he is convicted of crime, his post at he CBJ is terminated. The 
Council of Ministers is also authorised to terminate these posts, i f any of their holders 
Ibid, Section 18. 
Ibid, Section 12(e) and Banking Law (2000), Section 88(c) read with Section 88(b/8). 
Banking Law (1971), Section 5. 
''^  Banking Law (2000), Section 88(c) read with Section 88(b/4,5,6 and 7). 
Ibid, Section 24 read with Section 23. 
Ibid, Section 27. 
' 'Ibid, Section 17. 
'''' CBJ Law (2000). Section 20(a)(b). 
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resigns, becomes unfit for medical reasons, is declared bankrupt, engages in business, 
accepts permanent paid employment, commits a legal violation causing the CBJ to 
sustain serious damage or he is absent from board meetings for two consecutive 
months. 
10.3.4. Transparency 
The CBJ published "values" contain the '[djissemination of information and 
knowledge, and the simplification of procedures and regulations in a comprehensible 
and professional manner".'°' The transparency of the CBJ as the banking supervisory 
authority covers in practice the under four elements. 
First, the supervisor should spread awareness amongst the pubhc on its 
objectives and mission. One of the issues of concern to the supervisors has been 
avoiding the moral hazard problem by announcing that no bank is too big to fail less 
banks and the public make imprudent decisions on where to deposit their money. The 
recent financial crisis, by contrast, was a reminder that the public also needs assurance 
that their Governments are ready to support the financial system to avoid a depositors' 
run on banks. Therefore, the general "mission statement" on the objectives in ordinary 
times is sufficient and this is the course followed by the CBJ. 
Secondly, information on the budget of the CBJ including expenses and 
remuneration paid. The law provides that The CBJ must publish its monthly statements 
in the Official Gazette and its annual general report in various types of m e d i a . T h e 
amount of funding allocated particularly to the BSD for the salaries, remuneration, 
training and outsourcing of banking staff is not however published. 
Thirdly, it is useful to publish information on the position of the financial system 
and regulatory arrangements to deal with any potential or existing financial risks. The 
CBJ provides general information in its annual reports, and in 2007 it published a 
Financial Stability Report which devotes a special section on supervisory measures and 
regulations. The latter report, however, does not contain details on regulatory plans. In 
'Banking Law (2000). Sections 20(c)(d) and 21. 
CBJ. About Central Bank of Jordan. 
The CBJ Law (1971). Sections 60 and 62(a). 
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addition, the CBJ publishes its regulations and annual reports on the Internet. Draft 
regulations are sometimes made available to the general public such as the draft of the 
regulation implementing Basel I I . Draft regulations are more often sent to banks for 
prior consultation as well. The CBJ by doing so benefits from the legal permission to 
publish non-confidential information it deems necessary for the public interest such as 
aggregate banking statistics. 
Fourthly, important decisions concerning banks: The revocation of a banking 
licence or liquidating a bank should be published in two domestic daily newspapers and 
the Official Gazette."*'* The Law of Companies makes it also obligatory to publish the 
registration of a public .shareholding company including banks, while the JSC 
regulations impose on banks many disclosure requirements whether as holders of 
securities or as registered companies. The CBJ is however not empowered to censure 
information on penalties imposed on banks, while the JSC is entitled to. 
10.3.5. Resources 
The previous subsection on transparency illustrated that there is no information 
available on the expenses of the CBJ on performing its banking supervisory function 
specifically. Therefore, this section considers, as far as possible, the adequacy of human 
resources. 
The CBJ may appoint by itself the employees it requires for the conduct of its 
affairs including the banking supervision staff.'"'' The appointment, remuneration and 
benefits are not subject to the Council of Ministers Public Servants Bylaw No. (30) for 
year 2007, which covers employees of ministries and other central government 
departments. The CBJ can therefore afford higher salaries and better benefits than the 
public sector in general. There is no publicly available information on the comparability 
of salaries and benefits paid by the CBJ, on one hand, and the private banking sector, on 
the other hand. Likewi.se, there is no information on the effect of the CBJ's salaries on 
retaining highly qualified staff. 
The Banking Law (2000), Section 60(b) and the CBJ Law (1971). Section 62(b). 
ibid, Sections 20 and 84(d). 
CBJ Law (1971), Section 23(a). 
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The CBJ also provides extensive training at the Jordanian Association of Banks 
as well as university scholarships both inside Jordan and abroad particularly to Canada, 
the UK and the USA. In addition, the CBJ often benefits ft^om the technical assistance 
programmes provided by international and regional organisations such as the IMF. 
The Central Bank of Jordan Employees Bylaw No. (62) for year 2001 and 
instructions issued pursuant thereto state that the CBJ employees are under the 
obligations to maintain the reputation and credibility of the CBJ; comply with the law; 
act diligently, conduct their work with probity and propriety; maintain confidentiality of 
information; and preserve the CBJ's interests and assets. They should also refrain from 
borrowing from banks unless within specific limits and with the prior approval of the 
CBJ. Employees must as well inform their superiors of any misconduct or negligence 
that they may become aware of, as well as, any financial trouble they may fall into.'^^ 
The Regulation also provides for sanctions imposed against employees contravening the 
Iaw.'°^ 
10.4. The Exchange of Information 
There has been a long tradition in Jordan of exchanging comfort letters with 
cross border supervisory authorities either when a foreign bank is seeking to establish a 
presence in Jordan or when a Jordanian bank seeks to establish a presence abroad. In the 
early 1990s, the CBJ sent inspection teams abroad with the cooperation of the host 
supervisory authorities.'"* The Banking Law (2000) turned this custom to binding legal 
texts. Section 11(a) clearly provides that foreign banks must apply for licensing by the 
CBJ and prove, amongst others the following: 
"4. Supervision by the competent authorities in its home country must be ba.sed on sound banking 
supervision, the minimum of which must be the application of internationally recognized 
banking supervisory standards". 
Council of Ministers, Ibid (n 80), Articles 15-18. 
Ibid, Articles 69-74. 
'™ Interview with HE Mr. Ahmad Abdul-Fattah, ihe former Dcpuiv Governor of the CBJ. February 22" 
1999. 
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As explained in Chapter 8, foreign banks are regulated, supervised and 
sanctioned similarly to Jordanian ones. Section 70(b) of the Banking Law (2000) also 
establishes the right of the home country supervisory authority to conduct on-site 
supervision on subsidiaries and branches established in Jordan, in addition to the CBJ 
inspection. The exchange of information has been facilitated by signing Memorandum 
of Understandings between the CBJ and each of the following banking supervisory 
authorities; the Central Bank of Lebanon, the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory 
Authority, the Central Bank of Cyprus, the National Bank of Romania, Dubai Financial 
Services Authority, the Central Bank of Egypt, the Central Bank of Syria, the Central 
Bank of Bahrain Monetary Agency, and the Palestinian Monetary Authority. I f the 
home country supervisor does not apply "sound standards of banking supervision", the 
banking Law provides that the CBJ may withdraw the bank's licence."^'' 
Information received by the CBJ, whether from banks directly, other supervisory 
authorities both domestic and foreign, is considered confidential and may only be 
disclosed for supervisory purposes or for certain specific exempt situations. The duty of 
confidentiality applies to both the CBJ and DIC's management and employees.'"' The 
CBJ may, however, publish aggregate statistical data.'" 
This Chapter concludes Part I I of the thesis which examines the inlluence of 
the BCBS standards on Jordanian Law by considering prudential in.stitutional standards 
as opposed to substantive standards which were overviewed in Chapters 7 and 8. This 
Part has also illustrated the important influence of the BCBS standards on the formation 
of the Jordanian law as of the 1990s. The following chapter will provide 
recommendations for the Jordanian banking supervisory law in light of the international 
standards and any relevant lessons learnt from the recent financial crisis. 
Banking Law (2000). Section 19(e). 
" " C B J Law (1971), Sections 19 and 23 and DIC Law, Section 38. 
"' Ibid. Sections 45(c). 
CHAPTER 11 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
11.1. Summary of the Thesis 
This thesis attempts to evaluate the impact of international standards of 
banking supervision aimed at the creation of a safe banking system on Jordanian 
legislation at two levels: to what extent international standards have influenced 
Jordanian law; and how international standards can direct new reforms. 
Chapter 1 sets out the theoretical basis for the thesis. It stems from the 
premises that banks should be supervised. The Chapter is centred on two basic points 
concerning the definition of banks as well as why and how banks are supervised. 
Chapter one concludes that banks are still special in relation to other financial 
institutions. Despite the continuous narrowing down of barriers between banks and 
other financial institutions banks are distinguished by their structure of assets and 
liabilities and maturity transformation problems which make them more prone to 
failure. The second conclusion is the vital importance of the soundness of the banking 
supervisory authority structure for the safety of the banking system. Another main 
conclusion drawn from Chapter 1 is that international standards for banking supervision 
should deal with the dilemmas and complexities of domestic banking supervision in 
numerous jurisdictions. In other words they should take into consideration the 
following: 
The existence of banks of variable degrees of sophistication across the globe. 
The segregation between the authority providing preventative supervision 
(usually the home country) and the authority that provides protective supervision 
(usually the host country). 
How to ensure the soundness of the banking supervisory authority's structure for 
the banking supervisory authority on a domestic level. 
And consequently, how to determine the optimal preventative international 
banking supervisory architecture that would represent the interests of all 
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jurisdictions, takes into consideration all the levels of complexities, changes and 
interactions of banking supervisory measures, while assuring states compliance 
with set standards. 
Part I of the thesis covers international standards throughout six chapters. It 
shows how the BCBS, being the major international banking standard setting forum, 
sets out standards that can be divided into three types: Allocation of banking 
supervisory responsibilities amongst cross-border authorities mainly based on the rule 
of home country control, and complementary rules on substantive standards such as 
capital adequacy and prudential issues related to the supervisory authority. 
Chapter 2 looks into the evolution of international banking supervision. 
Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate that as international banking has developed a phenomenon of 
large complex banking institutions, a dichotomy of banking supervisory standards 
emerges under what is known as Basel I I , as well as, a complementary trend in 
strengthening the rules of risk management, internal control, auditing and external 
auditing. Chapter 5 shows how the BCBS has equally exerted extensive efforts to 
strengthen cross-border and cross-functional cooperation. Chapter 6, by contrast, shows 
that the BCBS has failed to elaborate on some important aspects of the structure of 
banking supervisory authorities, mainly the situation where preventative and protective 
supervisory authorities are segregated. The latter issue is further elaborated on by 
looking into the recent UK experience. Finally, Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the 
impact of international standards set out by the BCBS on Jordan. It explains why the 
BCBS standards constitute soft law and why soft law, as opposed to treaties, is the best 
form to be adopted. 
Part 11 of the thesis considers the impact of the BCBS standards on Jordan in 
three chapters. Chapter 8 describes the evolution of banking supervision in Jordan in a 
chronological order. It shows that the development of Jordanian banking supervision 
was influenced initially by the local banking market structure. The 1990s represented an 
era of economic openness and a concurrent increase of interest in the adoption of the 
BCBS .standards which led, amongst other reasons, to the promulgation of a new 
Banking Law in 2000. 
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Chapter 9 focuses on the current Jordanian Banking Law (2000) and 
regulations issued pursuant thereto. It explains how they transposed international 
standards into Jordanian law to a large extent. Sections 11 and 19 of the Banking Law 
(2000) make explicit references to the application of such standards on foreign banks. 
The Chapter further examines current substantive banking supervision legislation on 
basis of the BCBS Core Principles and complementary documents. Compliance with the 
Core Principle on the structure of the banking supervisory authority is considered 
separately under following Chapter 10. This Chapter reveals many gaps in the 
supervisory structure some of which are not covered in any way by the BCBS standards. 
11.2. Recommendations 
The main conclusions drawn from this thesis are that soft law is the optimal 
form for setting international banking supervisory standards, and that Jordanian law is 
largely compliant with these standards. As illustrated in Chapter 7, there is no need to 
create an international agreement on preventive banking supervision. It follows also that 
there is no need to create an international organisation responsible for banking 
supervision. Yet there are various recommendations suggested to improve Jordanian 
Law, as well as, international standards on banking supervision particularly from the 
perspective of developing and small emerging economies. 
1L2.1. Recommendations on International Standards 
The Composition of the BCBS 
The influence of the BCBS is attributed to the significance of many of the 
jurisdictions represented in its membership combined with the willingness of many 
states lo comply with its standards. Therefore, the researcher finds herself in agreement 
with Davies and Green in that China and Australia should become members.' A 
representative from the IFSB is also recommended to become a member, to the mutual 
benefit of Islamic and traditional banks. The membership should allow the IFSB to 
consistently convey its supervisory concerns as well as interpret when and how the 
Davies, Howard and Green, David. Global Financial Regulation: the Essential Guide, (2(X)8), pp. 218. 
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BCBS .standards should apply to Islamic banking." In addition, there should be 
representatives from developing countries attending the meetings on a rotating basis. 
- Basel II 
Basel I I represents a milestone in the development of international solvency 
standards. It adopts a more risk-sensitive approach to measuring capital adequacy, 
allows banks to use their own risk based models (with the approval of their supervisors), 
incorporates capital adequacy rules against operational risk for the first time as well as 
emphasises the roles of market discipline and banking supervision. Basel I I , however, 
proved inadequate during the late financial crisis and accordingly there are calls for its 
amendments.^ In addition, the credit crunch crisis has raised questions about the 
adequacy and reliability of assessments undertaken by credit agencies in very 
sophisticated markets. This is a major issue since the proper application of Basel I I 
depends on external credit rating. This is a particular concern for the remaining 
economies whereby the availability credit ratings are not adequately available. 
The application of more advanced credit and operational risk management 
approaches is very expensive and almost certainly will be adopted only by large 
complex banking institutions. This will grant large banks a comparative advantage to 
medium and small-sized banks for two major reasons: Advanced approaches allow 
banks to reduce their minimum capital requirements and hence provide services at lower 
rate than other banks; IRB banks will avoid high risk transactions and concentrate on 
prime customers, leading high business risk to migrate to medium and small-sized 
banks. The fact that Arab banks, including Jordanian banks have opted for the 
standardised approach needs to be reconsidered on the long run. Molyneux and Iqbal 
send the below warning:" 
" The IFSB has already undenaken on its own initiative to interpret the BCBS standards to Lslamic banks 
on various issues including risk management. See for example: IFSB, Guiding Principles of Risk 
Management for Institutions (Other Than Insurance institutions) Offering Only Islamic Financial 
Services. (December, 2005). 
' FSF, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience. (7 
Apiil, 2008), pp. 12-15; and BCBS, Comprehensive Strategy to Address the Lessons of the Banking 
Crisis Announced by the Basel Committee. (20 November. 2008). 
' Banking and Financial Systems in the Arab World. (2005), pp. 273 
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"|0]ne must caution that banks in the Arab world are very much likely to rely on the 
standardized approach to capital calculations and this will place them at a competitive 
disadvantage to large Western banks. They are therefore unlikely to benefit from the IRB 
approach. 'ITiis could be an important policy issue if large international banks compete with 
domestic Arab banks for large corporate and other business, as the former will have a substantial 
financing advantage". 
Therefore, the current approach of the BCBS to allow jurisdictions to select 
amongst a wide set of approaches is recommended to subsist. 
Cross Border Information Sharing 
Information sharing between home and host supervisory authorities can be a 
difficult task for developing countries, and therefore, the home supervisory authority's 
role should be intensified. The researcher has written an article on this issue which 
concludes and recommends the following: 
"The Basel Committee exchange of information guidelines under Basel ii should be of particular 
relevance to developing and emerging economies attracting or attempting to attract large and 
sophisticated banking institutions, which apply the more advanced methods for calculating their 
risks and approved to do so by their home supervisory authorities. The former Capital Accord 
methodology will no longer be a valid choice for such banks. The local banks and their respective 
supervisory authorities might not be yet accustomed to the mind-numbing complexities of Basel 
II, or at least be familiar only with the less complex foundation methods of grading risks. In 
addition, the host market might not be developed enough to be used as an instrument to induce 
banks to maintain adequate capital: information might be disclosed but the investors are not able 
to read them well or impose a cost on negative information. This adds to the pressure on host 
authorities interested in the continued presence of foreign banking institutions without exposing 
their local markets to risks form undercapitalized foreign banks. 
An advice that could be extended to host authorities is to sign a detailed bilateral arrangement 
(MOU) with the home supervisory authority that emphasizes the duty of the home authority, and 
quite frankly shifts as many supervisory duties and responsibilities to the home authority. The 
host authority should request information before licensing, on an ongoing basis and when the 
need arises, h should explain why it needs the information to make sure that the host authority 
will supply the relevant information. It should panicularly request supervisory judgmental 
information (inspection reports and as.sessments), whenever this is possible under confidentiality 
laws. 
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Thi.s .simple precautionary advice, I believe, remains valid until the developing and emerging 
countries build adequate experli.se in handling the complexities of evaluating the integrity and 
accuracy of banks' internal credit rating systems."^ 
- The Structure of the Supervisory Authority and Supervisory Techniques 
Chapter 1 illustrates the paramount importance of the structure of the banking 
supervisory authority. It is the vehicle through which supervisory goals are delivered 
and supervisory policies and rules are enforced. Despite that, the BCBS provides for 
broad rules on the structure of the banking supervisory authority embodied mainly in 
Core Principle 1. This Principle should be expanded to cover at lea.st the following two 
issues: 
First, the credit crunch crisis which began in 2007 highlights the significance of 
the interaction between the banking and money markets. It particularly illustrates the 
important role of central banks' intervention to provide liquidity for the money market 
and ensure its liquidity, both on global and local levels. Doubts are therefore cast on the 
unification model of banking regulation, whereby the central bank's role to ensure 
financial stability is segregated from the banking supervisory function. The financial 
problems faced by the Northern Rock Bank in the UK, as the Bank of England is 
partially blamed for late intervention of the Bank of England and the weak coordination 
with the Treasury and the FSA. Had the Northern Rock situation occurred in a small 
developing country, it could have had more serious repercussions. 
Therefore, the BCBS should recommend against the segregation of the banking 
supervision function away from central banks, unless strict precautionary measures are 
first adopted. It is panicularly recommended to retain expert staff on banking 
supervision, establish cross-board membership between the original and the new 
supervisory authority, and gradualism in introducing changes. Furthermore, Core 
Principle I should embody the Financial Services Forum ("FSF") recommendation that 
coordination between the supervisory authority and the central bank should be 
^ Nadia Al-Anani, 'Information Sharing between Home and Host Supervisors under Basel I F , 2007 Arab 
Banking Review. {2"^ Quarter), pp. 127-128. 
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enhanced, particularly in relation to liquidity contingency plans.* In addition, the 
assessment reports prepared by the IMF and the World Bank or any self-assessment 
undertaken by banking supervisory authorities should be redrafted to prioritise the 
structure of the supervisory authority. 
Secondly, the relationship between the banking supervisory authority and the 
competition authority should be clarified under law or at least under a Memorandum of 
Understanding. It must elucidate that the banking supervisory authority is the ultimate 
authority responsible for the approval of licensing, merger and acquisition of banks, as 
well as emphasise on the exchange of information on this regard. 
As to the supervisory techniques, the BCBS should warn banking supervisory 
authorities, particularly ones from developing countries, of the dangers of transforming 
towards the risk based approach. Developing countries tend to have less complex and 
less competitive markets. Therefore, reliance on the rule based approach, as well as on 
site and off-site supervision is more likely to reasonable and acceptable whether the 
supervisory authority or the banking sector will ultimately incur the cost of supervision. 
11.2.2. Recommendations on Jordanian Law 
Prudential Requirements 
The evaluation of Jordanian Law shows that it is largely compliant with 
international standards on banking supervision. Below is a list of recommendations on 
improving compliance therewith or to support certain CBJ methods. 
- Licensing: The CBJ guidelines on licensing should clarify Section 19 of the 
Banking Law (2000) on the revocation of licensing. It should explain that the 
CBJ may revoke the banking licence where material changes in the founding 
documents of the head bank that can adversely affect the bank, including 
changing the locus of the head bank, take place. 
^ FSF, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience, (7 
April, 2008), pp. 42. Available online: http://www.fsforum.ore/publications/r_0804.pdt". Accessed on 
25.1.2009. 
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Capital Adequacy: The gradual implementation of Basel I I by the CBJ should 
be commended. By doing so, Jordanian banks can gradually strengthen their risk 
management capabilities and expertise to become more competitive. The CBJ 
should monitor the implementation of Basel I I very carefully considering the 
challenges that face banks because of the lack of local credit rating agencies and 
the unavailability of historical data on many customers. The CBJ should also 
enhance its capacity before moving towards stage 2 where banks will be allowed 
to apply more advanced methods to the measurement of their risks. The CBJ 
employees already benefit from training programmes provided in Jordan and 
abroad including the Financial Stability Institute based at the BIS. The CBJ 
should also consider outsourcing from leading auditing firms. 
The CBJ added prudential requirements to ensure the safety of banks. First, the 
Basel I I : Scope of Application Regulation deducts all investments in banks from 
the capital base not only significant one. Secondly, the Basel I I : Credit Risk- the 
Standardised Approach Regulation combines rules on specialised lending to 
SPVs equivalent to the specialised lending rules under the more advanced 
Foundation Internal Rating methodology under Basel I I . The regulation adds 
eligibility requirements for benefiting from the concessionary treatment for 
loans for residential property. 
Chapter 9 highlights the weaknesses in the drafting of the Basel I I regulations. It 
is recommended that the CBJ attains the approval of its Legal Consultations 
Office or an expert external lawyer before issuing a regulation, even if it very 
technical and unlikely to expose the CBJ to legal risk. 
The CBJ combination of the leverage ratio and the Basel I I risk-weighted 
method also commended for increasing the safety of banks.^  
Market risk: The CBJ Regulation on Managing Bank's Assets / Liabilities in 
Foreign Currencies applies does not apply to branches outside Jordan. The 
regulation should cover banks inside Jordan and abroad. 
^ Philipp M. Hildcbrand, Is Basel 11 Enough? The Benefits of a Leverage Ratio. Financial Markets Group 
Lecture. L S E . (15 December. 2008), pp.10. 
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Liquidity Risk: The 2007 amendment of liquidity regulation should also be 
praised for increasing the risk weighting for short term Interbank loans. This 
should protect banks from over reliance on Interbank loans, which represent 
fluctuating short term sources of income. 
Operational Risk: There are no detailed guidelines on operational risk. The 
CBJ Basel 11: Operational Risk Regulation state broadly that banks should 
adhere to the BCBS standards on operational risk management. This is less than 
adequate. International banking supervision standards have to find their way into 
local legislation through scrupulously drafted regulations and manuals, which 
should be detailed and comprehendible to both supervisors and banks. One 
exception is the Business Continuity Plan Regulation which provides details on 
one specific aspect of operational risk. 
Country Risk: There are no specific rules on country risk. The CBJ must be 
satisfied that banks have a comprehensive risk management process to identify, 
measure, monitor, and control country risk, as well as board and senior 
management oversight. 
Corporate Governance: The Corporate Governance Code for Banks on Jordan 
contains a minimal list of principles. An analysis of these principles shows that 
they are divided into three types: (1) Principles that confirm the general rules set 
out in enforced legislation such as the formation of an audit committee. (2) 
Principles that are not provided for under law but falls within the CBJ's broad 
supervisory powers, such as the requirement of implementing a code of 
corporate governance and the set up of an "appointment and remuneration 
committee." (3) The principle on the segregation between the chairman of the 
board and the general manager post which contravenes Section 152(c) of the 
Law of Companies. The moral authority of the CBJ, however, might lead banks' 
to comply with the third set of principles. It is, however, preferable to amend the 
Law of Companies or the Banking Law (2000) to assure enforcement. It is 
noteworthy that there is a proposal for amending the Law of Companies and that 
the SEC is working on a universal code of corporate governance for all listed 
companies. Therefore, it is recommended that the CBJ, the SEC and the 
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Controllers of Companies should coordinate their efforts to universally amend 
the law and avoid inconsistencies. 
- External and internal auditors: The CBJ regulations should provide for 
conducting joint meetings between the CBJ, external auditors and internal 
auditors. They should also empower the chairman of the internal audit 
committee or the head of the audit unit to have direct access to the CBJ. 
Cross Border Information Sharing 
The Banking Law (2000) and the CBJ regulation on external branching as well 
as the Memoranda of Understanding signed with foreign banking supervisory authorities 
provide adequate coverage for the exchange of information and coordination concerning 
banking activities. There is however no coordination between the CBJ and other 
financial supervisory authorities. This is perhaps due to the restrictions impo.sed on 
investments in .securities and foreign exchange and the relatively limited presence of 
Jordanian banks abroad. I f this is the case, then the CBJ should at least explain in its 
following financial stability report why it has not entered into coordination arrangements 
with supervisory authorities in which jurisdictions Jordanian banks have established 
subsidiaries or branches. 
- Structure of the Jordanian Supervisory Authority 
It is recommended that the CBJ continues to assume its role as the authority 
responsible for the supervision of the banking sector for two major reasons: First, the 
CBJ is an independent, well-funded and highly regarded institution. This status is 
attributed to the CBJ role as the country's monetary authority responsible for maintaining 
the value and convertibility of the local currency as well as ensuring financial stability. 
A new banking or financial supervisory authority without any monetary role might not 
be as well funded, independent and autonomous. Secondly, weak coordination between 
these two authorities, if separated, can lead to serious consequences on handling 
financial crises. Thirdly, supervising non-banking institutions involves issues that fall 
outside the customary sphere of the CBJ jurisdiction, and Central banks in general, as it 
covers issues of cu.stomer protection^ and competition regulation. Fourthly, banks are the 
" C. Goodhart, The Organisational Structure of Banking Supervision. FSl. Occasional Paper No. (1), 
(November. 2000), pp. 10-11. 
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key financial institutions in Jordan and, despite the recent increase in deregulation and 
innovation in the Jordanian banking sector, the local financial market is still largely 
divided on an institutional basis. Therefore, the major benefits attributed to a single 
supervisory authority; mainly, attaining economies of scope and scale, as well as, 
avoiding duplication, gaps and contradiction in supervision are less relevant to Jordan. In 
short, maintaining financial stability, which interrelates to monetary stability, outweighs 
the benefits of a single supervisory authority. 
The CBJ has clear responsibilities and objectives towards banking supervision 
which were further enhanced by the gradual abolishment of the multi-tier system. The 
banking supervisory structure in Jordan should be improved by following the under 
recommendations which are influenced by the UK Banking Act 1987. 
- The administrative structure of the BSD should be upgraded to a semi-
independent status. This can be done by conferring a high position on the 
Director of the BSD and giving him or her direct access to the CBJ Board of 
Directors as well as a direct and regular reporting line to the Parliament.'^  
Another measure is the imposition of a "Chinese Wall" between the BSD and 
the rest of the CBJ.'^ There should be a Deputy Governor for monetary 
functions, and another for banking supervisory functions. This structure ensures 
co-ordination between supervisory and monetary policies, as well as, a 
reasonably high degree of transparency and accountability. 
The CBJ board of directors combines ex officio members including one 
representative from banks. By contrast. Section 6(e) of the DIC Law provides 
that board members should not be executives of any bank. It is recommended to 
follow the example of the DIC to ensure maximum independence. It is 
recommended in the same time that the CBJ establishes a supervisory board of 
senior CBJ members and prominent banking officials so that it would benefit 
from their expertise while safeguarding its independence. 
J. Tuya and L. Zamalloa, Issues on Placing Banking Supervision in the Central Bank. In Balino & 
Cottarelli (eds), Frameworks for Monetary Stability; Policv Issues and Country Experiences. IMF, 
(1994), pp. 683. 
Tuya and L . Zamalloa, loc.cit. 
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The CBJ has become a more transparent institution. The issuance of the new 
CBJ Financial Stability Report and the increase in consultations with banks on 
draft regulations are welcome developments. The CBJ can still improve its 
transparency by issuing a separate budget and plan for the supervisory function 
on its own, similarly to the practice of the FSA." The scope of consultation on 
draft regulations should also be expanded to benefit from the experience of the 
wider public including practitioners in non-banking institutions, consumers and 
most importantly academic researchers. Banking regulation is a neglected 
subject in law and finance departments at Jordanian academic institutions. 
Increasing research and debate on controversial banking supervisory issues is to 
their mutual benefit. 
Coordination between the CBJ and other local supervisory institutions or 
institutions with tasks related to banking supervision is needed. Below is a 
review of the relationship of the CBJ with each institution. 
- There is a degree of overlap between the role of the CBJ and the JSC, but 
there is no formal coordination between the two authorities. It is therefore 
recommended that the CBJ and the SDC conclude a memorandum of 
understanding to determine the extent and regularity of exchange of 
information between them in common and crisis situations, set out rules 
for joint inspection teams as well as mutual consultation on draft 
legislation. This will reduce compliance costs on the industry as well as 
ensure more effective regulation. The CBJ should also require banks' 
investment subsidiaries to submit copies of the on-site inspection reports 
and the external auditor's reports. 
- The Memorandum of Understanding between the CBJ and the DIC 
indicates a leading role for the CBJ though it does not refer lo the CBJ 
explicitly as such. Most notably, the CBJ is entitled to revoke the licence 
of a bank without informing the DIC. This is understandable for the time 
being. In practice, the DIC is still a new institution and it is beyond its 
financial capacity to bail out a major bank. In the longer run, the 
1 1 FSA. Business Plan 2009/10. 2009. 
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Memorandum should be reviewed to enhance the supervisory role of the 
DIC in coordination with the CBJ. 
The CBJ needs to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Competition Department. This Memorandum should clarify that the CBJ is the 
final authority responsible for the licensing, merger and acquisition of banks. 
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ANNEX 
C O R E PRINCIPLES FOR E F F E C T I V E BANKING 
SUPERVISION, 2006 
Principle 1 - Objectives, independence, powers, transparency and cooperation: An 
effective system of banking supervision w i l l have clear responsibilities and objectives for 
each authority involved in the supervision o f banks. Each such authority should possess 
operational independence, transparent processes, sound governance and adequate resources, 
and be accountable for the discharge o f its duties. A suitable legal framework for banking 
supervision is also necessary, including provisions relating to authorisation o f banking 
establishments and their ongoing supervision; powers to address compliance with laws as 
well as .safety and soundness concerns; and legal protection for supervisors. Arrangements 
for sharing information between supervisors and protecting the confidentiality of such 
information should be in place. 
Principle 2 - Permissible activities: The permissible activities of institutions that are 
licensed and subject to supervision as banks must be clearly defined and the use of the word 
"bank" in names should be controlled as far as possible. 
Principle 3 - Licensing criteria: The licensing authority must have the power to set 
criteria and reject applications for establishments that do not meet the standards set. The 
licensing process, at a minimum, should consist of an assessment of the ownership structure 
and governance o f the bank and its wider group, including the fitness and propriety o f 
Board members and senior management, its strategic and operating plan, internal controls 
and risk management, and its projected financial condition, including its capital base. 
Where the proposed owner or parent organisation is a foreign bank, the prior consent o f its 
home country supervisor should be obtained. 
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Principle 4 - Transfer of significant ownership: The supervisor has the power to review 
and reject any proposals to transfer significant ownership or controlling interests held 
directly or indirectly in existing banks to other parties. 
Principle 5 - Major acquisitions: The supervisor has the power to review major 
acquisitions or investments by a bank, against prescribed criteria, including the 
estabhshment of cross-border operations, and confirming that corporate affiliations or 
structures do not expose the bank to undue risks or hinder effective supervision. 
Principle 6 - Capital adequacy: Supervisors must set prudent and appropriate minimum 
capital adequacy requirements for banks that reflect the risks that the bank undertakes, and 
must define the components of capital, bearing in mind its ability to absorb losses. At least 
for internationally active banks, these requirements must not be less than those established 
in the applicable Basel requirement. 
Principle 7 - Risk management process: Supervisors must be .satisfied that banks and 
banking groups have in place a comprehensive risk management process (including Board 
and senior management oversight) to identify, evaluate, monitor and control or mitigate all 
material risks and to assess their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile. 
These processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity o f the institution. 
Principle 8 - Credit risk: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a credit risk 
management process that takes into account the risk profile of the institution, with prudent 
policies and processes to identify, measure, monitor and control credit risk (including 
counterparty risk). This would include the granting of loans and making of investments, the 
evaluation o f the quality o f such loans and investments, and the ongoing management of 
the loan and investment portfolios. 
Principle 9 - Problem assets, provisions and reserves: Supervisors must be satisfied that 
banks establish and adhere to adequate policies and processes for managing problem assets 
and evaluating the adequacy o f provisions and reserves. 
Principle 10 - Large exposure limits: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have 
policies and processes that enable management to identify and manage concentrations 
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within the portfolio, and supervisors must set prudential limits to restrict bank exposures to 
single counterparties or groups of connected counterparties. 
Principle 11 - Exposures to related parties: In order to prevent abuses arising f rom 
exposures (both on balance sheet and o f f balance sheet) to related parties and to address 
conflict o f interest, supervisors must have in place requirements that banks extend 
exposures to related companies and individuals on an arm's length basis; these exposures 
are effectively monitored; appropriate steps are taken to control or mitigate the risks; and 
write-offs o f such exposures are made according to standard policies and processes. 
Principle 12 - Country and transfer risks: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have 
adequate policies and processes for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling 
country risk and transfer risk in their international lending and investment activities, and for 
maintaining adequate provisions and reserves against such risks. 
Principle 13 - Market risks: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place 
policies and processes that accurately identify, measure, monitor and control market risks; 
supervisors should have powers to impose specific limits and/or a specific capital charge on 
market risk exposures, i f warranted. 
Principle 14 - Liquidity risk: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a liquidity 
management strategy that takes into account the risk profile of the institution, with prudent 
policies and processes to identify, measure, monitor and control liquidity risk, and to 
manage liquidity on a day-to-day basis. Supervisors require banks to have contingency 
plans for handling liquidity problems. 
Principle 15 - Operational risk: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place 
risk management policies and processes to identify, assess, monitor and control/mitigate 
operational risk. These policies and processes should be commensurate with the size and 
complexity o f the bank. 
Principle 16 - Interest rate risk in the banking book: Supervisors must be satisfied that 
banks have effective systems in place to identify, measure, monitor and control interest rate 
risk in the banking book, including a well defined strategy that has been approved by the 
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Board and implemented by senior management; these should be appropriate to the size and 
complexity o f such risk. 
Principle 17 - Internal control and audit: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have 
in place internal controls that are adequate for the size and complexity of their business. 
These should include clear arrangements for delegating authority and responsibility; 
separation of the functions that involve committing the bank, paying away its funds, and 
accounting for its assets and liabilities; reconciliation of these processes; safeguarding the 
bank's assets; and appropriate independent internal audit and compliance functions to test 
adherence to these controls as well as applicable laws and regulations. 
Principle 18 - Abuse of financial services: Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have 
adequate policies and processes in place, including strict "know-your-customer" rules, that 
promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the bank 
from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities. 
Principle 19 - Supervisory approach: An effective banking supervisory system requires 
that supervisors develop and maintain a thorough understanding of the operations o f 
individual banks and banking groups, and also of the banking system as a whole, focusing 
on safety and soundness, and the stability o f the banking system. 
Principle 20 - Supervisory techniques: An effective banking supervisory system should 
consist of on-site and off-site supervision and regular contacts with bank management. 
Principle 21 - Supervisory reporting: Supervisors must have a means o f collecting, 
reviewing and analysing prudential reports and statistical returns f rom banks on both a solo 
and a consolidated basis, and a means o f independent verification o f these reports, through 
either on-site examinations or use of external experts. 
Principle 22 - Accounting and disclosure: Supervisors must be satisfied that each bank 
maintains adequate records drawn up in accordance with accounting policies and practices 
that are widely accepted internationally, and publishes, on a regular basis, information that 
fairly reflects its financial condition and profitability. 
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Principle 23 - Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors: Supervisors must have at 
their disposal an adequate range of supervisory tools to bring about timely corrective 
actions. This includes the ability, where appropriate, to revoke the banking licence or to 
recommend its revocation. 
Principle 24 - Consolidated supervision: An essential element of banking supervision is 
that supervisors supervise the banking group on a consohdated basis, adequately 
monitoring and, as appropriate, applying prudential norms to all aspects o f the business 
conducted by the group worldwide. 
Principle 25 - Home-host relationships: Cross-border consolidated supervision requires 
cooperation and information exchange between home supervisors and the various other 
supervisors involved, primarily host banking supervisors. Banking supervisors must require 
the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same standards as those 
required of domestic institutions. 
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